Since 1989, the situation of Romani minorities has increasingly been debated in the context of the changing social, economic, cultural, and political landscapes in Europe. The fall of communism, the enlargement of the European Union, the neo-liberal restructuring of states, economies, and civil societies, and the resurgence of nationalism and extremism throughout Europe have resulted in a highly ambivalent situation. On the one hand, Romani minorities are faced with massive unemployment, discrimination, extreme poverty, and violence. On the other hand, we have seen the emergence of a heterogeneous Romani civil and social movement, as well as the development of large-scale, Europe-wide programs that aim at the Roma’s empowerment and the improvement of their situation. How are we to assess these diverse developments in regards to the way in which the Roma have increasingly been represented as a European minority?

In *The European Roma*, Huub van Baar combines insights from political and social sciences with those from philosophy and cultural and postcolonial studies to shed new light on the relationship between the representational histories of Europe and its Romani minorities. This book offers the first critical investigation of how the Europeanization of the representation of the Roma interacts with new practices of governance in Europe. Van Baar mobilizes a Foucauldian analytics of governmentality to examine shifting forms of Romani minority representation and self-representation. By so doing, he offers new perspectives on the formation of minority policy and politics, transnational activist and advocacy networks, and Romani memorial practices in Europe.

Huib van Baar is a researcher at the Amsterdam School for Cultural Analysis (ASCA), Faculty of Humanities at the University of Amsterdam.

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**THE EUROPEAN ROMA**

Minority Representation, Memory and the Limits of Transnational Governmentality

Huib van Baar

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Cover image by Damian Le Bas

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Minority Representation, Memory and the Limits of Transnational Governmentality

Huib van Baar

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Hierbij nodig ik u uit voor de openbare verdediging van mijn proefschrift op woensdag 23 november om 13:00 uur in de Aula van de Universiteit van Amsterdam, Oude Lutherse Kerk, Singel 411 (hoek Spu) te Amsterdam

Receptie na afloop van de promotie

Paranimfen
Anikó Imre
(imre@usc.edu)
Arthur Bakker
(A.Bakker4@uu.nl)
The European Roma

Minority Representation, Memory, and the Limits of Transnational Governmentality

Huub van Baar
van Baar, Huub, 1970-
The European Roma: minority representation, memory, and the limits of transnational governmentality / Huub van Baar
p. cm.
Including bibliographical references and index

ISBN 978949109821 5

The European Roma

Minority Representation, Memory, and the Limits of Transnational Governmentality

ACADEMISCH PROEFSCHRIFT

TER VERKRIJGING VAN DE GRAAD VAN DOCTOR
AAN DE UNIVERSITEIT VAN AMSTERDAM
OP GEZAG VAN DE RECTOR MAGNIFICUS
PROF. DR. D.C. VAN DEN BOOM
TEN OVERSTAAN VAN EEN DOOR HET COLLEGE VOOR PROMOTIES
INGESTELDE COMMISSIE,
IN HET OPENBAAR TE VERDEDIGEN IN DE AULA DER UNIVERSITEIT
OP
WOENSDAG 23 NOVEMBER 2011,
TE 13:00 UUR

DOOR

HUBERTUS JOHANNES MARTINUS VAN BAAR

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Faculteit der Geesteswetenschappen
To the three I lost in 2010
To the two who came into my life in 2006
To the one who was always there for me while this book was written:

To
Bart, Hiske, Allan
Johanna, Benjamin
& Yolande
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Acknowledgments

Many relatives, friends, colleagues, organizations, and institutions have been unstinting in their help during the years it has taken to write this book. First and foremost, this book is the product of the labor, insights, and critical inputs of many Roma and networks of Romani activists, journalists, scholars, and organizations throughout Europe. I want to thank them for their hospitality and generosity, for sharing with me their ideas, experiences, and expertise, and for giving me food for thought to develop and write this book.

This research project would not have been possible without the support, advice, critical comments, and encouragement of Ginette Verstraete, John Neubauer, and Anikó Imre. I am grateful to my supervisors Ginette and John. Thank you very much for the trust you have put in me, for the flexibility to let me develop my plans and ideas, for commenting on my work so carefully, for collaborating in such a friendly and inspiring way, and for your professional and personal support during the process of devising and writing this book. Anikó, since our first meeting at Budapest’s Batthyány tér, you have been a great prop and stay to me. I want to thank you a lot for the many online and offline exchanges we have had throughout the years, for the time we spent together with or without our kids and partners in Amsterdam and elsewhere, and for your trust and friendship. Ginette, John, and Anikó, thank you for the wonderful collaboration and for organizing the different workshops and the Summer University at the Central European University together with you. That all was exciting teamwork!

I am also grateful to those who have made the public defense of my dissertation possible. Next to the members of my research team, I first of all would like to thank John Clarke, Sudeep Dasgupta, Marieke de Goede, Leo Lucassen, Mireille Rosello, and Peter Vermeersch for agreeing to be on my dissertation defense committee and for being the first critical readers of my work. I also want to thank Anikó Imre and Arthur Bakker for assisting me as my ‘paranymphs’ during the defense.

The Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) has provided financial support for the research and writing of this project. I want to thank NWO and the organizers of the “Transformations in Art and Culture” program for their support. In particular, I want to thank Elske Gerritsen, José van Dijck, Rob Zwijnenberg, and the colleagues of the partner projects with whom I have worked together during several NWO TKC workshops and conferences.
This project took me to various places across Central and Eastern Europe. Numerous people and organizations have helped me to undertake my research. First of all, I would like to thank several museums and their staff in the region. I thank Krystyna Oleksy, Teresa Świbocka, and Teresa Zbrzeska of the Polish State Museum Auschwitz-Birkenau in Oświęcim for their help and our discussions during my research in the museum in 2003 and 2004. I also thank Piotr Setkiewicz, head of the museum’s archives, for his kind assistance. I am very grateful to Jana Horvathová, Ilona Lažničková, Petr Lhotka, and Michal Schuster of the Museum of Romani Culture in Brno for their willingness to discuss different kinds of issues with me during my visits in 2003 and 2008. I also owe special thanks to Adam Bartosz of the Regional Museum in Tarnów in Poland, to Dezider Tóth of the Museum of Slovak National Uprising in Banská Bystrica, and to Tamás Kovács of the Holocaust Documentation and Memorial Center in Budapest.

I could not have done much of my research without the extremely valuable support of many Romani press agencies. First and foremost, I want to thank the Roma Press Agency (RPA) in Košice in Slovakia. Kristína Magdolenová, Ivan Hriczko, Maria Horňáková, Maria Hušová, Tomáš Repčiak, Gregor, and the others at RPA have helped me to getting access to various kinds of sources of information in Slovakia. They have made me familiar with the complex daily practices of networking and news production. I owe special thanks to Jarmila Balážová and Zdeněk Ryšavý of the Romani press agency and civic association Romea in Prague. Romea helped me not only during some of my visits to the Czech Republic, but also, via delivering outstanding news items on Europe’s Roma at its website, throughout the entire period of my research. Last but not least, I would like to thank Ivan Veselý of Association Dženo in Prague, Miklósi Gábor and Esther Holbrook of the Roma Press Center in Budapest, Petar Nikolić of TV Novi Sad in Serbia, and Orhan Galjuš, Beki Galjuš, Tjaja Miranda, and Loek Koster at Radio Patrin and Nevipe in Amsterdam.

Various other Romani organizations and networks have contributed to this study. First of all, I want to thank Spolu International Foundation and the European Roma Grassroots Organizations Network ERGO for numerous exchanges and discussions, as well as for enabling my visits to some of their partners and projects in Central and Eastern Europe. I am particularly grateful to the productive exchanges I have had throughout the years with most of Spolu’s and ERGO’s current and former members: Zduženje Spolu in Slovenia; Khetane Zajedno in Serbia; Association Integro in Bulgaria; Tarna Rom in Moldova; Fundatia Avundipe, Bairska Svetлина, and Roma Progress in Macedonia; Agentia Împreună in Romania, and Roma Active Albania and Amaro Drom in Albania. I want to thank the local partners in Zvolenská Slatina, Detva, Chmínianské Jakubovany, and Žehra in Slovakia, as well as those in Bački Monoštor and Sivac in Serbia. For visits to some of ERGO’s projects, I owe particular thanks to Darina Tókoliiová, Anton Bodak, Véra Page, Maria Olahová, Radmila Zecirotić, Maria Mladenov, Tamara Savić, and Stevan Nikolić. Particularly through Spolu and ERGO, I have become much more familiar with the complex dynamics of everyday exchanges in the Romani social and civil movement. Most of all, I am indebted to Ruus Dijkstra, Valeriu Niculae, Lilia Makaveeva, Bisser Svetlinov, Marcel Dediu, Adriatik Hasantari, Froukjen Ymtema, and Spolu’s former director Jef Helmer. Ruus, thanks very much for the millions of exchanges and discussions throughout the years. To be continued!
On a cloudy November day in 2003, I met Čeněk Růžička for the first time, chair of the Committee for the Compensation of the Romani Holocaust in the Czech Republic. First, we had coffee in the morning; then, we had lunch in the afternoon, and, finally, we had dinner in the evening. Čeněk, I want to thank you very much for the time you took to meet me and Vítek Švejdar in 2003, to tell us about what happened in Lety, under communism, and during the difficult, still ongoing struggle to get the genocide of the Roma and Sinti recognized in the Czech Republic. I also want to thank Markus Pape for his generosity to discuss ‘Lety’ and for inviting me to the annual commemorations in Lety and Mirovice and to the exhibition on Lety at the European Parliament in 2005.

I would like to thank Romani Rose and Uwe Wenzel of the Central Council of German Sinti and Roma for discussing several kinds of issues during a number of meetings and commemorations and, most of all, for receiving me at the Documentation and Cultural Center of German Sinti and Roma in Heidelberg in 2006. I am grateful for the help offered by the Romani minority self-governments in the Hungarian towns of Jászberény, Jászladány, and Nagykanizsa. I particularly want to thank Istvánne Váradi, Ferenc Kardos, Levente Molnár, and Tamás Rácz. I owe special thanks to Lalla Weiss, chair of the then Dutch National Sinti and Roma Organization in Best, for discussing her organization’s work and its contribution to the permanent exhibition on the genocide of Sinti and Roma in the Auschwitz Museum. In Slovakia, I thank Klára Orgovanová in Bratislava; Petr Pollák in Levoča; the late Josef Mižigár from Žehra; Ives Ogou in Somotor; Tibor Kessel, Dagmar Horváthová, and the others I met in 2005 in Sčovce; Roman Eštōčák in Vranov nad Topľou, representatives of the Romani community centers in Bardejov, Malá Domaša, Žehra, and Letanovce, and Ondrej Sokolovič of office of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in Košice. I owe special thanks to Zuzana Kumanová of the NGO In Minorita and to Orhan Galjuš of Partners for Democratic Change in Bratislava. I also want to thank the Czech representatives of Partners for Democratic Change for helping me out during my visits to Chomotov, Kadaň-Prunéřov, and Most. Furthermore, I want to thank Gabriela Hrabaňová of the NGO Athinganoi in Prague; Gwendolyn Albert of the League of Human Rights in the Czech Republic, and the Romani community center in Matiční ulice in Ústí nad Labem. I thank the Roma from Serbia and Kosovo who, in 2005, were living under Belgrade’s E70 Gazela bridge, and who were so kind to discuss their experiences with me, Maria Mladenov, and Zhivka Valiavicharska. Last but not least, I want to thank Adam Andrasz of the Romani Cultural Center in Tarnów, Poland, for his hospitality.

At the Contact Point for Roma and Sinti Issues of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), I particularly want to thank Andrzej Mirga. In Brussels, I want to thank the European Roma Information Office (ERIO), and above all its former executive director Valeriu Nicolae. I owe special thanks to Deborah Harding of the Open Society Institute in New York. In Budapest, I thank Claude Cahn, Jean Garland, and Tara Bedard of the European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC). In Prague, I thank Petr Višek of Socioklub and Hana Želenková of the Czech Minority of Labor and Social Affairs. In Bratislava, I thank Viliam Figusch of the Information Office of the Council of Europe. I am also grateful to Zuzana Bošelová and Martin Fotta of the Milan Šimečka Foundation in Bratislava for inviting me to give the third lecture in the series on the Roma Holocaust in Europe and for discussing some MSF projects with me. I thank Steef van den Berg at
the Dutch embassy in Bratislava and Peter van der Bloemen at the Dutch embassy in Budapest, as well as Péter Kraszév at the Cultural Institute of the Republic of Hungary in Bratislava and Nena Skopljanac of Medienhilfe in Zürich. I thank the filmmakers Katrin Seybold, the late Melanie Spitta, Mira Erdevički, Angela Melitopoulos, and Ursula Biemann for discussions about their work. In Amsterdam, I would like to thank Eric Kluitenberg at De Balie for collaboratively organizing the workshop “Old Curtains, New Screens: Media, Minorities, and Politics in Post-Communist Europe” in 2006.

I owe special thanks to the ASCA academic community and other (former) colleagues at the University of Amsterdam. I want to thank ASCA’s current and former academic directors, as well as ASCA’s managing director Eloe Kingma, for providing such an inspiring interdisciplinary and international scholarly environment. I want to thank Jannah Loontjens, Noa Roei, Carolyn Birdsall, Joy Smith, Ihab Saloul, Joost de Bloois, Murat Aydemir, Esther Peeren, Anette Hoffmann, Stephan Besser, Senta Siewert, Michael Katzberg, Marleen Rensen, Guido Snel, Emmanuelle Radar, Margaret Tali, Jules Sturm, Adam Chambers, Jantine van Gogh, Ania Dalecki, Margreet Vermeulen, Marten Hidma, Gea Lindeboom, and everybody whom I have forgotten to mention, for the scholarly, personal, administrative, serious, and funny exchanges I have had with them throughout the years. I want to dedicate special thanks to a few people at the department of philosophy: Pieter Pekelharing, Maarten Coolen, Ruth Sonderegger, Karen Vintges, Veit Bader, Michiel Leezenberg, Mariwan Kanie, Bert van der Schoot, Edwin Vink, and Bastiaan Hoorneman. I also want to thank René Gabriëls at Maastricht University, Thijl Sunier at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, and the students who participated in the tutorial I gave on Foucault’s work on archaeology, genealogy, and governmentality.

The workshop “Transnational Governmentality in South East Europe,” held in May 2007 in Rabac, Croatia, meant a welcome and supportive turning point for me. I want to thank Paul Stubbs in Zagreb and Despina Syrri in Thessaloniki for inviting me, and Oliver Kramsch, Wendy Larner, John Clarke, and Janine Wedel for the productive talks we had. John, thank you too for connecting me with your colleagues in Milton Keynes! I owe much to the intellectual, critical, and friendly exchanges with members of the academic community at the Open University in Milton Keynes in the UK, and at its Centre for Citizenship, Identities, and Governance in particular. For their encouragements, remarks on my work, and hospitality, I want to thank Vicki Squire, Claudia Aradau, Paola Gioia Macioti, Jef Huysmans, John Clarke, Engin Isin, Janet Newman, and Clive Barnett. I also want to thank William Walters at Carleton University in Ottawa; Tania Murray Li at the University of Toronto; Lisa Parks at the University of California, Santa Barbara, and Anna Maria Orla-Bukowska and Marek Kucia at the Jagiellonian University in Cracow.

Throughout the years, I have benefited a lot from the insights, support, and comments of and discussions with colleagues who are also involved in scholarship on Roma-related issues. I particularly want to thank Leo Lucassen, Wim Willems, the late Michael Zimmermann, Sławomir Kapralski, Michael Stewart, Victor Friedman, Paloma Gay y Blasco, Dina Iordanova, Nicolae Gheorghe, Andrzej Mirga, Peter Vermeersch, Will Guy, Susan Tebbutt, Eva Rosenhaft, Alaina Lemon, Yaron Matras, Martin Kovats, Věra Sokolova, Nidhi Trehan, Angela Kóczé, Nando Sigona, Judith Őkely, Johannes Ries, Fabian Jacobs, Marek Jakoubek, Lenka Budilová, Tommaso Vitale, and Julia Szalai.
In many different ways, the Central European University in Budapest was the central meeting point for diverse scholarly exchanges during the years in which I conducted my research. I want to thank Eva Gedeon and Kornelia Vargha for their outstanding organizational work regarding the CEU SUN summer schools. My research team much enjoyed the collaboration with you when we co-organized the 2007 Summer University on Media Globalization and the Transformation of Post-Communist European Identities. Next to that, I particularly want to thank Michael Stewart for organizing the Summer University courses in Romani Studies and for his ongoing contribution to promoting scholarship on and by the Roma. Michael, thank you for inviting me as a student and as an instructor to some of the courses. Through these courses, I have also become familiar with the inspiring work of scholars and activists of my own generation: I want to thank Annabel Tremlett, Alina Silian, Magda Lesińska, Valeriu Nicolae, Zsuzsa Vidra, Nicole Pallai, Teodora Krumova, Deyan Kolev, Jilia Hasdeu, Svetlina Denova, Márton Rövid, Jan Grill, Giovanni Picker, Hana Synkova, Nadine Blumer, Tereza Dvořáková, and Klára Vomastková for the exchanges we had in the context of the summer courses at CEU.

For personal communication and public debates about the situation of Sinti and Roma in the Netherlands, I would like to thank Michelle Mila van Burik, Orhan Galjuš, Beki Galjuš, Felicita Vos, Zoni Weisz, Lalla Weiss, Tjaja Miranda, Loek Koster, and Amet Jasir. I also want to thank Gerbrig Klos at Amnestiy International, Ruus Dijksterhuis of ERGO, Peter Rodrigues at the University Leiden, and Marija Davidović of the Anne Frank Foundation for the pleasant way in which we have collaborated on topics that were not directly related to my research, but crucial to activate the public debate domestically.

I would like to thank Bronwyn Birdsall and Anikó Imre for proofreading the chapters of this book and Orhan Galjuš for translating its summary into Romanes. Orhan, thank you very much for doing me this favor! I owe special thanks to Damian Le Bas for allowing me to include his artwork ‘Roma Europe’ at the cover of this book. I want to thank you and Delaine Le Bas for helping me out. I also thank Slawomir Kapralski and Marek Jakoubek for translating some of my articles into Polish and Czech.

I am grateful to my friends who, through the way in which they have unconditionally supported me throughout the years, have learned me a lot about the most important values in life. First of all, I would like to thank my Czech friends Vítěk and Hana Švejdarová, Jan and Martina Čechtický, and David Lobpreis for their friendship and hospitality during a number of research trips. Vítěk, I particularly would like to thank you for accompanying me on several trips and translating for me at places as diverse as Praha, Mirovice, and Nymburk. Hana and Vítěk, thanks for being there and sharing with me many of my finest hours in and beyond Prague. In Poland, I thank Paweł Leszkowicz and Tomek Kitlinski; in Romania, Valeriu Nicolae and Marcel Dediu. I owe special thanks to Maria Schuller-Horráková and Johannes Schuller in Budapest. Maria, thank you for your invaluable help during my research in Slovakia and for becoming such a beloved friend over the years. I thank Zhivka Valiavicharska for our conversations and ‘governmentality’ talk, and for eating fish and raspberries during our wonderful time together in Belgrade. I thank Nicolas Beger in Brussels. I am grateful for the support I have got from Irena Rosenthal, Marc de Wilde, Sarah Malko, Klaské de Jong, Yvo van Basten-Batenburg, Iris Hettelungh, Louise Rijnierse, Rosalie Iemhoff, Dieuwertje Daams,
Hilla Dayan, Peter-Wim Zuidhof, Jung Hwa Smit, and Mellie Muller. I want to thank Henk and Margot van Dalen. Since April 2011, Henk is no longer with us. He was a great friend to me and sent me all the articles on our favourite novelists and on the Roma that he could find in Dutch newspapers and magazines. Most of all, I want to thank Arthur Bakker, Jantien Smit, and Dirk-Jan Luiting for their enduring, unreserved support.

Unluckily, there are more people who I need to thank posthumously. I am grateful to my parents in law, Bart and Hiske Jansen, who died so suddenly in April and June 2010. I also want to thank Ank Kuin-Levin and Allan Levin for their trust and generosity. Allan died in August 2010 and, throughout my life, has been one of my intellectual inspirations. I want to thank Paul and Yvonne van Baar, and Petra Jansen and Matéo Mol for their support and the pleasant relaxation from time to time.

I want to thank my parents, Tiny and Clemens van Baar, for their love and respect, for the many incredibly nice gestures, and, most of all, for their unconditional support.

Finally, I want to thank Yolande, Johanna, and Benjamin. When I finished this book, you, Johanna and Benjamin, started to learn writing letters and juggle with them. For a long time, you did not know better than ‘Daddy is writing a book.’ Now that the book is done, I hope to join your learning processes and your lives much more than during the past year. Thank you for your patience and, most of all, for the endless energy you gave me to move on! Yolande, in the years in which you first finished your own dissertation, after that had our twins, and then lost your parents, you have nevertheless always been there for me—an almost superhuman quality. I want to thank you for traveling together to imaginary worlds and through Europe, for reading and commenting on my work, for our discussions on life, politics, and literature, for sharing the things we like to do, and for your trust, support, and love.

HUUB VAN BAAR
Amsterdam, October 2011
Introduction

On several research trips to Central and Eastern Europe carried out to give this study its present shape, I met Roma and discussed their situation. Usually, I met them or their advocates in local Romani community or cultural centers, at NGO offices, in Romani neighborhoods, or in governmental offices where some of them were working to advise their government. On several of these occasions, I saw signs with the symbols of development agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), European countries, and international governing organizations (IGOs). At the window of the Gypsy Shop Romen in the old center of Prague, for instance, I noticed the well-known blue label with the circle of twelve yellow stars, under which was written “Financed by the European Union’s PHARE program.” At the wall of a school built for Slovak Roma in the middle of an entirely segregated community, I also saw the same symbol of the European Union, accompanied by the text Európsky sociálny fond (European Social Fund). On the doors of Roma-related NGOs in various countries, I saw the emblems of the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and the World Health Organization (WHO). Next to the entrances of Romani community, cultural, and press centers in Czech, Hungarian, Polish, Serbian, and Slovak towns, I noticed the acronyms of their local, national, and international donors. From time to time, I even saw impressive billboards that listed many agencies involved in a specific project. In the case of the “Return to Roma Mahala” project in Kosovo, for instance, a huge billboard was put down in front of newly built houses meant for Roma who fled and were chased away during the war in 1999 (figure 0.1). The board included numerous signs: flags of different European countries, the Romani flag, and the emblems of several NGOs, IGOs, and development agencies.

The plenitude of organizations, institutions, and agencies involved in current Roma-related projects all over Europe express the will to turn the tide for the Roma in Europe. This study examines how we are to assess this will by analyzing the current and past situation of the Romani minorities in Europe. The European Roma represent a case in point, for no other population group in Europe has recently become the focus of so many different inclusion, empowerment, and development programs than the Romani. They have become the target group of, for instance, social inclusion programs developed by
the EU, Decade Action Plans initiated by the Open Society Institute and the World Bank, 
community policing projects of the OSCE, community empowerment initiatives of 
NGOs, and national action plans devised by governments in and beyond Central and 
Eastern Europe.\(^1\) As the huge variety of these programs indicates, the will to turn the tide 
is about the will to empower and create opportunities for political, socio-economic, and 
cultural self-articulation and participation, as much as it is about the will to improve and 
include marginalized, displaced, or endangered populations in culture and society in or-
der to enhance well-being, community cohesion, security, standards of living, and justice 
(Cruikshank 1999; Li 2007b). On the billboard in Kosovo, the blue and green flag with the 
red wheel, which is the flag of the Romani nation, is also present.\(^2\) This insertion and the 
explicit call of IGOs and NGOs to include Romani actors in the attempt to empower 
Romani minorities, develop their communities, and improve their living conditions 
point to the fact that the entire enterprise has to be a common European effort in which 
the Roma are co-authors of the new European narratives of inclusion, integration, and 
community cohesion.

\[\text{FIGURE 0.1} \text{ The “Return to Roma Mahala” project in Mitrovica, Kosovo, 2007.} \]
\[\text{Photo: Tara Bedard, European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC 2007d).}\]

\(^1\) See, for instance, various EU’s social inclusion programs for the Roma (EC 2004b; 2004a; 2008c; 2010b), the 
Decade of Roma Inclusion 2005-15 program launched by OSI and the World Bank in 2003, several World 
Bank reports (2005b; 2005a; 2008), various initiatives carried out by UN agencies (UNDP 2002; 2003; 2005; 
2006; UNICEF 2007), a number of OSCE projects (2003; 2006b; 2007b; 2007a; 2008; 2010), and empowerment 
initiatives undertaken by NGOs (ERRC 2004d; ERGO 2009; 2010).

\(^2\) Since the 1970s, the International Romani Union (IRU) has developed various symbols to represent the 
Romani nation, such as an own flag and anthem. In 2001, the IRU officially declared the Romani nation. For 
the text of the declaration and other information on the IRU, see Acton and Klimová (2001). The IRU has no 
clear status among the Roma (Klimová-Alexander 2005; Nirenberg 2009).
The latter element—the active inclusion of the Roma themselves in the programs devised for them—is a novelty in Europe. Yet, programs meant for their ‘improvement’ are not. To a large extent, earlier programs meant to improve them, in interrelations with other socio-economic and political processes, have ambiguously laid the foundations for several of the problems the contemporary programs intend to solve. At least since the seventeenth century, programs dealing with Romani or Gypsy groups collectively have become a part of the European scenery. In seventeenth and eighteenth-century Spain and in the eighteenth-century Habsburg Empire, the Gypsies—or Gitanos and Zigeuner as they were called in these parts of Europe—became the target of assimilation programs. They aimed at turning supposedly wild, lawless, and uncivilized pagans into the desired good, productive, obedient, and civilized Christians. They had to give up ‘their’ culture, tradition, habits, and language and conform to the customs and rules of Europe’s majorities. Yet, despite aspirations to entirely incorporate the Roma and their cultures into majoritarian societies, they and their cultures did not disappear.

More than 170 years after the Habsburgs launched their assimilation programs, in the 1930s and 1940s, Romani groups in Nazi dominated Europe would become the target of a kind of inverted improvement project. In the name of programs that had to allow others to improve their alleged racial purity, the supposed racially impure, anti-social, and work-shy Romani populations in Europe had to disappear from the face of the earth. The local articulations of national-socialist and fascist forms of racism led to the mass murder of the European Roma, in which, alongside the Nazis, collaborative forces in countries such as Austria, Croatia, Hungary, and Romania played a crucial role. Yet, as the singers of the Czech Romani band Gypsy.cz rap, “they’ve been trying to kill us, but we are still alive” (from the song Amerca, Gypsy.cz 2008).

The installation of various kinds of communist regimes in postwar Central and Eastern Europe inaugurated yet other programs to deal with the Roma (Guy 2001a; Barány 2002). During a new wave of attempts at assimilating them, Romani populations became the target of ‘resettlement’ and ‘anti-nomadism’ programs in Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Poland, and Romania, of educational programs throughout the region, and of specific ‘health care’ policies in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Romania. In spite of the fact that many of these programs were officially introduced to improve the Roma’s socioeconomic participation, in practice many of them impacted grimly and dramatically on their situation. Romani children were segregated in several of the region’s educational systems and, consequently, turned out to be low skilled. Roma were frequently treated in separated parts of hospitals. Romani families continued or started to live in segregated urban or rural areas. Their fellow citizens often saw the Roma as second-class citizens. Largely as a consequence of the Roma’s ambiguous treatment during communism, their situation rapidly worsened after 1989. Many of them became unemployed, unable to compete on

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3 In practice these communist ‘resettlement’ and ‘anti-nomadism’ measures implied both forced and encouraged migration or settlement (chapter 6, Guy 2001b; Sokolova 2008; van Baar 2011b).
4 The most notorious of these programs were the Czechoslovakian sterilization policies (chapter 6, Sokolova 2008). Much less known and researched, however, are the effects of the Romanian pro-natalist policies and their later abolition (Kligman 1998) on Romania’s Roma and the consequences of the forced bathing of many of Hungary’s Roma (chapter 6, Bernáth 2002).
the conditions set by the newly emerging market economies, and involved in vicious circles of poverty, segregation, and discrimination.

Last but not least, during the postwar decades Western European governments also developed educational, employment, health care, and other programs for their Gypsy and Traveler minorities. Often, these policies focused on the issue of mobility and contradictorily aimed at the simultaneous improvement, diminishing, and controlling of site provision. Western Europe, where the forerunners of the EU were established, also became the site where the first Europe-wide programs for Gypsies, nomads, caravan dwellers, and Travelers—as they were usually called in the European policy documents of the 1970s and 1980s—would be introduced (Danbakli 2001; Simhandl 2007). Yet, these programs remained limited in scope and were primarily developed on paper, rather than implemented on the ground.

This short historical overview of various interventions in Romani lives throughout Europe raises several questions regarding the current attempts to turn the tide. Apart from the obviously bad intentions of some historically earlier improvement schemes, it seems that even those that looked not very bad on paper turned out to have several ambiguous or simply bad implications. Is it possible to avoid such effects and do the contemporary programs take these effects, which are maybe even not side effects, into account? Apparently, we deal with different, heterogeneous Romani groups and diverse circumstances across Europe. Is it possible and desirable, as the current programs seem to do, to bring these diversities into alignment with each other? What does the multi-vocality of the involved actors, institutions, and organizations imply for the results they tend to achieve? Could these efforts result in some kind of Tower of Babel effect? Do the current programs reflect on what apparently went wrong in the past? Do the present-day programs aimed at ‘re-membering’ the Roma and guaranteeing European citizenship for them actually remember what happened in the past and what was ostensibly more the rule than the exception? Last but not least, what is novel in the current approaches that would guarantee that the mistakes of the past would not be repeated? Is it the common European effort? Is it the desired or materialized inclusion of the Roma themselves in the development of these new, ambitious programs? What does this participatory move imply and what does it look like in practice? The earlier expressions of the will to improve show that there has always been a gap between what was designed, devised, or intended and what was implemented or realized on the ground. This gap unavoidably seems to be part of the game. The failure to achieve what is planned does not necessarily mean that the results have always been dubious and unproductive. Undoubtedly, we can find

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5 For an overview of postwar policies in Western Europe, see, for instance, Liégeois (1987; 1994), Fraser (1995), and Zimmermann (2007d). For France, see Peschanski (2007), for Germany, see Margalit (2002), for Italy, see Plasere (1991), for the Netherlands, see Willems and Lucassen (1990), for Spain, see Bernecker (2007), for Switzerland, see Meier (2007), and for the UK, see Acton (1997), Bancroft (2005), and Clark and Greenfields (2006).

6 Unlike Romani populations in Central and Eastern Europe, a part of the Western European Roma and Travelers live in trailer camps. Yet, in spite of the public opinion in many European countries, most of them have national citizenship and do no longer travel. For the historical background of the profound differences between Western and Eastern European Roma, and how these differences emerged in modern European history, see, for instance, Mirga and Gheorghe (1997), Lucassen et al (1998a), and Guy (2001c).
examples of programs that have led to relatively good outcomes, even though they were not scheduled.

Despite all these questions and remarks, the current empowerment, development, and inclusion programs clearly illustrate that the will to change the Roma’s situation has not disappeared. In contrast, novel forms, practices, and centers of expertise have been developed. Diverse kinds of experts, including Romani, have devised new programs that clearly and justifiably want to break with the unsuccessful attempts and the ambiguous or obviously bad intentions of some of their forerunners. The current programs also strongly suggest that, due to well-meant intentions and the inclusion of the Roma in the devising, developing, and implementing of these programs, they will make a difference. The slogan of the different actors involved in Europe’s current Romani programs seems to be: “From now on, everything will be different.” And: “We will do it better and decisively break with the past and, in any case, with the authoritarian pasts of Nazism and communism.” I am not skeptical about these attempts. For sure, we cannot easily and uncritically compare former communist Roma approaches with current European ones, let alone suggest that there are straightforward continuities between the Nazi past and the present-day circumstances of Romani minorities in Europe. If we try to avoid being skeptical and suspecting conspiracies behind what is said, written, and done how, then, are we to assess the conditions under which the will to turn the tide is manifesting itself vis-à-vis the European Roma?

TOWARD AN ANALYTICS OF EUROPEAN GOVERNMENT

In this study, I will analyze the conditions under which the new attempts at improving the situation of the Roma in Europe have been developed, legitimized, and articulated. I am not in the first place interested in the gap between programs and their implementation. Rather, one of my central aims is to investigate the complex mixture of the will to turn the tide, its unforeseen effects, and its frequent failures to realize what was attempted. Inspired by Michel Foucault’s (1995) analysis of the relationship between the development of the modern apparatus of incarceration, its ‘failure’ to reduce crime, and its simultaneous, largely unforeseen capacity to regulate and differentiate the kinds of illegalities it partly created itself, James Ferguson remarks:

If unintended effects of a [development] project end up having political uses, even seeming to be ‘instruments’ of some larger political deployment, this is not any kind of conspiracy; it really does just happen to be the way things work out. But because things do work out this way, and because ‘failed’ development projects can so successfully help to accomplish important strategic tasks behind the backs of the most sincere participants, it does become less mysterious why ‘failed’ development projects should end up being replicated again and again. It is perhaps reasonable to suggest that it may even be because development projects turn out to have such uses, even if they are in some sense unforeseen, that they continue to attract so much interest and support. (Ferguson 1994: 256)
Following Ferguson’s reflection, in this study I analyze Roma-related programs beyond well-established binaries of devised plan vs. implementation, intention vs. achievement, politics vs. instruments, and success vs. failure. I examine how such programs have been made possible at all, how they have turned out to have particular, often unforeseen uses on the ground, and how they relate to new, post-1989 European conditions. The most important among these conditions are, I explain in the course of this study, the fall of communism, the emergence of new forms of European governance, the neo-liberal restructuring of states, economies, and civil societies, and the resurgence and reshaping of forms of nationalism and Romaphobia.

My central methodological approach is to understand knowledge, expertise, and tools of development, improvement, and empowerment as specific dimensions of intersecting and overlapping forms of government. I conceive government in the general meaning given to it in Foucault’s late work on governmentality and bio-power (2007b; 2008a). According to Foucault’s understanding, government does not refer to the limited meaning of our daily use of the notion in terms of political government and institutions of rule. Rather, government relates to the fields of possibilities and power relations instigated by the multiple intersections of self-government, the government of others, and the government of the body politic. From this viewpoint, notions such as the subject, the family, the community, and the state are understood as the effects, rather than the unproblematic starting points, of specific regimes of government. Here, government is in the first place understood as the ‘conduct of conduct,’ a philosophical expression in which Foucault combines two meanings of the French conduire: “To ‘conduct’ is at the same time to ‘lead’ others ... and a way of behaving within a more or less open field of possibilities. The exercise of power is a ‘conduct of conducts’ and a management of possibilities” (2000e: 341).

The Foucauldian extension of the meaning of government can be regarded as an integral part of a contestation of and reflection on our prevailing notion of political government and of the recently emerged term governance. In Foucault’s genealogy of the state and the modern state project, he shows that, in various early modern European discourses, the notion of government did not in the first place refer to the governing and managing of a state:

[R]ather, it designated the way in which the conduct of individuals or of groups might be directed—the government of children, of souls, of communities, of families, of the sick. It covered not only the legitimately constituted forms of political of economic subjection but also modes of action, more or less considered and calculated, that were destined to act upon the possibilities of action of other people. To govern, in this sense, is to structure the possible field of action of others. The relationship proper to power would therefore be sought not on the side of violence or of struggle, nor on that of voluntary contracts ... but, rather, in the area of that singular mode of action, neither warlike nor juridical, which is government. (Foucault 2000e: 341)

Foucault explains that the early modern notion of government encompasses “men in their relationships, bonds, and complex involvements with things like wealth, resources, means of subsistence, ... the territory with its borders, qualities, climate, dryness,
fertility, [and] ... things like accidents, misfortunes, famine, epidemics, and death” (2007b: 96). In order to contribute to the well-being of a population, government is conceived as the endeavor to shape, regulate, and direct human conduct by “more or less considered and calculated modes of action” (Foucault 2000e: 341). In the course of modern European history, Foucault argues, government has particularly been articulated as the government of populations, aimed at improving their well-being, that is, their welfare, health, fertility, wealth, productivity, security, longevity, happiness, and the like.

Foucault’s tracing of the early modern European meanings of government is not meant to develop a new, better, or more comprehensive definition of government. Rather, this endeavor is part of writing the history of the present by way of a genealogical inquiry into some of the founding concepts of modern political thinking, such as the state, the subject, the family, the nation, culture, liberalism, citizenship, race, and, by extension, the category of ‘Europeanness’ itself (Stoler 1995). By means of a genealogical investigation of the notion of government, Foucault shows that we cannot limit our understanding of government to the prevailing notions of political government and institutions of rule. The state is not a kind of universal or autonomous source of power, but a product of intersecting and overlapping practices of government—a conception that complicates narratives that read power primarily along the lines of state sovereignty and its disciplining practices. As I will explain in this study, on the basis of a Foucauldian analytics of government we are able to understand institutions, such as the state and the EU, as the historically specific, contestable outcomes of various practices of governing or, as Foucault named it, as the “mobile effect of a regime of multiple governmentalities” (2008a: 77).

The neologism ‘governmentality’ literally links the act of governing with specific modes of thought—mentalities—to express that the empirical, technical activity of governing is always intrinsically related to certain rationalities. Governmentality as a philosophical term, thus, points to the inherent relationship between, on the one hand, particular tools, instruments, and forms of expertise implied in governing and, on the other, the specific way in which we think about this governing activity. In Foucault’s work, governmentality refers both to this intrinsic relation between what can be called the technical and rational dimensions of government, and to the specific form this relationship has assumed at a particular moment in history (Dean 1999). This twofold meaning and its extension to the sphere of Europe makes it possible, I will illustrate, to analyze Europe in terms of its governmentalization, that is, of constituting Europe itself as a site of various intersecting and overlapping governmentalities. The will to improve the condition of European populations has become a crucial element of historically diverse European arts of government and is key to both the idea of Europe and contemporary modes of European minority governance (chapters 1 and 2).

However, in order to develop programs and policies aimed at improving the conditions of populations, phenomena need to be ‘problematized’ as improvable at all. The interrogation of the history of regimes of governmentality and the truth claims they make, is “a matter of analyzing, not behaviors, or ideas, nor societies and their ‘ideologies,’ but the problematizations through which being offers itself to be, necessarily, thought—and the practices on the basis of which these problematizations are formed”
(Foucault 1990b: 11, his italics). Problematizations do not primarily focus on solutions and answers to specified problems, but rather on why and how things, such as behavior, accessibility, or social processes are becoming a problem to be solved or managed in specific ways. Analyzing practices of problematization means interrogating “why a problem and why such a kind of problem, why a certain way of problematizing appears at a given point in time” (Foucault 2007a: 141). Looking at the current situation in Europe, we can, for example, problematize the way in which the EU is constructed as an ‘area of freedom, security, and justice’ (Walters 2002). Accordingly, we can concentrate on how such a problematization relates to, for instance, considering Europe as a site where the human security of some needs to be improved (Glasius and Kaldor 2005), where the war on terror is being articulated (de Goede 2008), and where migration and related phenomena are to be managed (Huysmans 2006; Verstraete 2010). Similarly, we can ask how contemporary formations of Europe as a site where minorities such as the Romani are (to be) guaranteed full European membership relate to the ways in which the conditions of minorities are problematized as improvable. To explain how I understand practices of minority problematization, I will compare the currently most dominant approach to minorities—that of European governance studies—to my governmentality approach. This will shed light on the meaning of the practice of problematization and on the way in which a governmentality approach enables the interrogation of the phenomenon of minority formation itself.

EUROPEAN MINORITY GOVERNANCE WITHIN THE PROBLEMATICS OF GOVERNMENTALITY

Since the mid 1990s, European studies have increasingly been dominated by what has been called ‘the governance turn’ (Kohler-Koch and Rittberger 2006). This turn has also strongly affected research and policy formation on minorities in Europe. We have been able to notice a trend to pay specific attention to the situation of minorities in Europe, to ethnic conflicts and their prevention and resolution in Central and Eastern Europe in particular. Minority governance is usually understood as a set of tools and methods—or the overarching analysis thereof—to enhance all forms of minority participation in society at large, to prevent, solve, or reduce conflicts between minorities and majorities, and to institutionalize minority protection in such a way that minorities themselves are becoming the vital agents and representatives in various decision-making processes that deal with minority affairs. Minority governance is considered as a way to protect minorities, their rights, cultures, languages, and the like, to manage latent or manifest tensions with other social groups, and to improve their participation by means of their empowerment. Minority governance is not necessarily external; it can also involve internal governance or minority self-governance. Minority governance may range from accommodating human or minority rights and establishing minority media to realizing diverse modes of autonomy. It may involve various agents from local to regional and European agencies and organizations. Europe is involved to the extent that European institutions and organizations as well as several NGOs may help facilitate the improvement of the position of minorities vis-à-vis majorities and their institutions, as well as the integration of minorities in mainstream European societies.
This conceptualization of minority governance primarily starts from two general observations or assumptions, one descriptive and the other prescriptive. First of all, this approach follows a broad tendency to understand governance in the context of a recent shift from political, state-dominated government to governance (Rosenau and Czempiel 1992; Rhodes 1996). In this concept of governance the traditional nation state and its apparatuses are no longer seen as the primary or only authorities in the government of social relationships and structures. Instead, other agents at various levels are increasingly involved in the steering of social processes (Kooiman 1993; Kohler-Koch and Eising 1999). Advocates of governance studies have frequently argued that:

[ Governing within states is more and more] conducted by public/private partnerships and by formal and informal networks involving state and non-state agencies, while, in the international sphere, states and other actors are regulated by an expanding web of conventions, treaties, and international agencies, all of which operate without the backing of an overarching Hobbesian power. (Hindess 2005: 405-06)

In this line of reasoning, governance is primarily conceptualized as both a newly emerging structure or pattern of governing and as an ongoing process of steering and coordination, mainly through self-organizing networks and partnerships at, but increasingly also beyond and ‘below’ the state level. Following this understanding of governance, studies thereof try to describe and analyze the steering and coordination patterns, processes, and structures that have emerged in the transformation from government to governance. Translated to the context of Europe, European governance is often perceived as a form of multi-level governance, where agents ranging from EU institutions, the OSCE, and the Council of Europe (CoE) to national governments, municipalities, enterprises, NGOs, and activist or advocacy networks have operated and developed political and policy networks on and through numerous planes, such as local, community, urban, regional, national, and European levels (Marks et al 1996; Hooghe and Marks 2001; Bache and Flinders 2004). Seen from the perspective of multi-level governance, minority governance in Europe deals predominantly with the question of how and at which level the most adequate tools and instruments need to be to situated and developed to enhance the participation, self-articulation, and self-determination of minorities and to prevent or reduce minority-majority conflicts. This conception of governance follows another trend in governance studies to intimately link governance with a normative framework in which we can distinguish between ‘bad’ and ‘good’ modes of governance.

The emergence of the notion of ‘good governance’—introduced by the World Bank (1997b) in the 1990s—illustrates the prescriptive character that has been attached to a number of prevailing conceptualizations of governance. ‘Good governance’ would encourage practices that contribute to the shift from government to governance and that enhance the dispersion or ‘horizontalization’ of power relations amongst various agents and agencies in favor of cultural and social diversity and of democratic, open, and sustainable forms of decision-making. The notion of good governance has also affected the politics of integration in the EU and has been implemented in many EU policy strategies and networks, including those that focus directly or indirectly on minority
groups. In its white paper on European governance, for instance, the EU relates good governance to practices that actively increase openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness, and coherence. These five so-called key principles are considered as vitally important “for establishing more democratic governance” (EC 2001: 10). In the examples of the World Bank and the EU, ‘governance’ has been turned into a benchmark or normative principle, on the basis of which we can principally evaluate and even quantify the performance of a variety of agencies and organizations. In the case of minority governance in Europe, the use of benchmarking as an evaluation tool has become a widespread practice. Minority governance is qualified as ‘good’ when particular rules and tools have been implemented correctly and effectively, that is, in favor of the participation and self-determination of minorities and in favor also of the diminishing of (potential) conflicts between groups.

The prevailing approach of governance studies to European minorities poses a number of problems. Firstly, the suggestion that we have recently dealt with a significant transformation from government to governance does not recognize that governance is “as old as government” (Pierre and Peters 2000: 18). Indeed, governing and steering without the direct involvement of the state and on the basis of intensive collaborations with non-state agents are no new phenomena in Europe. Postwar Western European welfare states, for instance, were already largely based on self-regulatory principles of capital and stock markets. It could even be argued that, since the rise of classical liberalism in the late eighteenth century, a critique of too much governmental involvement in societal affairs has become a central characteristic of modern European societies. Indeed, from the French Physiocratic critique of raison d’état to Adam Smith’s theory of a self-regulating market and Adam Ferguson’s notion of an autonomous civil society, liberalism has been conceived as a way to limit, rather than extend, the governmental influence of the state (chapters 1, 2, and 4).

In other words, if there is anything unique or new about recent developments in Europe (and beyond), it is related less to a shift from government to governance than to the innovation or renewal of particular modes and tools of governing. Some advocates of governance studies (Pierre and Peters 2000; Zielonka 2007) have tried to challenge the critique of the supposed newness of the governance perspective. They have framed the recent shift as one from vertical types of governance to largely horizontal ones, but without suggesting that hierarchical forms of governance—of which the traditional nation state was the classical expression—are disappearing or profoundly weakening. The propagators of this view question the suggestion that the state has really been “hollowed out” (Rhodes 1994). They have put forward that the state is still a dominant, if not the most dominant, agent in processes of governing, steering, and coordinating. Therefore, they argue that horizontal and vertical as well as external and internal modes of governance usually coexist.7

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7 The position of so-called ‘meta-governance’ (Jessop 2002) is different for its propagators argue that the state not only remains a central organizing force in governance relations, processes, and patterns, but also that it keeps the position of a legitimizing agency “through which most governmental strategies have to pass to become authorized” (Clarke 2004: 115).
However, even such advanced conceptualizations of governance confront us with a number of problems, of which some become more visible when we return to the case of Romani minority governance. Before 1989, the Roma were neither approached in terms of the autonym ‘Roma’ nor part of an extensive, broadly institutionalized European attention to minority issues. Though several small-scale European programs dealing with ‘Gypsies’ or ‘nomads’ existed already prior to the fall of the Berlin wall, these minorities were rarely an explicit focal point of Europe-wide policies, even less of what is now viewed as a politics of European integration and social inclusion. European approaches and policies toward the Roma have only gradually and recently developed toward a minority status and a concern with issues such as human and minority rights, active citizenship, and human development (chapters 5, 6, and 7, Guglielmo and Waters 2005). In post-war Europe and until the early 1990s, Romani groups were predominantly problematized in terms of assimilation, nomadism, or migration, rather than in those of European minority integration. In other words, not only has the European focus on the Roma significantly changed, Romani groups in Europe have also been identified and ‘minoritized’ differently than in the past.

But there is more at stake. When European institutions started to deal much more explicitly with the situation of minorities in EU candidate members in Central and Eastern Europe, the EU had not yet developed, for instance, many binding legal and extra-legal tools to encourage these candidate member states to develop and improve their minority policies. Only in the second half of the 1990s did EU institutions start to develop minority-related tools, such as the EU race equality directive (EC 2000b). Without going into detail here, we can provisionally state that Europe and its institutions, as well as Romani minorities and how they are perceived (also by themselves) have significantly changed in the course of the last two decades, at least in comparison to the Cold War times. ‘Europe’ and ‘the Roma’ have interacted to a great extent and new forms of their mutual perception and conception have been initiated. How does this observation relate to the governance debate?

When seen through the lens of governance studies, minority governance primarily tends to focus on the tools to enhance minority representation and self-determination, on how these techniques have been, could, or need to be renewed to achieve the desired results, and on the patterns and processes of governance in which these tools are embedded and could make a difference. Yet, governance studies do not so much try to unravel the conditions of possibility for these techniques and how they actually change the objects and subjects, as well as their reciprocal relations in the fields in which they operate. Moreover, governance studies, in particular when they focus on the discursive character of governance, do not pay much attention to the crucial role that governance tools and technologies play in the emergence and demarcation of new governable objects, subjects, scales, and spaces. Thus, the perspective of minority governance tells us little about the reasons for the emergence of the representation of the Roma as a European minority and for the development of European Roma-related policies. Likewise, the reasons behind the advent of a European politics of minority integration remain unclear. A governance approach does not tell us much about, for instance, the change of the problematization of the Roma in terms of assimilation and nomadism into their more recent problematization in terms of human and minority rights, human security and
development, and minority integration. A governance approach also does not clarify how identity constructions of Europe and Romani groups have simultaneously and reciprocally changed. More generally, governance studies often consider the problems of (minority) governance as external to the governance discourse. However, the emergence of discourses and studies of governance needs not be perceived as a result, but, rather, as a symptom of changing governmental patterns and processes. What kinds of practices, knowledge, and expertise, for instance, enable us to constitute and perceive Romani minority governance differently than before the end of the Cold War? How could the existence of Romani groups in various countries in Europe actually develop into a question and transform into a specific European ‘problem’ or set of ‘problems’ to which various programs, interventions, practices, and processes attempt to give an answer? In what ways do governmental techniques and rationales themselves contribute to new forms of Roma problematization? How do these transformations relate to new ways of thinking Europe and defining it as open, democratic, multiform, and aware of its past?

To shed light on these issues, I look at minority governance in Europe through the lens of governmentality. This alternative focus helps to ask how Romani minorities have recently been introduced as problems of, for instance, European integration, social inclusion, human development, community building, and minority empowerment. How and why has such a transformation actually taken place? Seen through the lens of governmentality, questions of how we could successfully incorporate Romani minorities in European societies and improve minority policies turn into the problematization of specific contemporary governmental practices, techniques, and rationales in Europe. Such a perspective allows for analyzing, for instance, the relationship between the politics of European Romani minority integration and the Europeanization of Roma minority representation. Partly, the difference between the notions of ‘problem’ and ‘problematization’ covers the difference between the conceptual lenses of governance and governmentality. Problematization can be described, more explicitly, as the set of discursive and non-discursive tools and practices through which something has been shaped in a thinkable and pliable form and actively constituted as an object of expertise or knowledge. A governmentality approach sheds light on this process. A problem, on the other hand, tends to reduce the problematic character of things, practices, and phenomena to something that has a clear solution. The difference between the two methodological approaches is, of course, not absolute but helps to reveal two crucially interconnected dimensions of practices of problematization: de-politicization and re-politicization.8 Let me explain these two dimensions and link them to the issue of minority formation.

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8 The boundaries between governance and governmentality studies can be and have been blurred by scholarly interventions. I want to stress that critical variants of governance studies can also shed light on some of the mentioned issues. Yet, the lens of governance studies is often trained on an analysis of problems, rather than of problematizations. The minority governance approach prevails particularly in scholarly fields, such as diversity management and post-conflict and reconciliation studies, and at new centers of expertise, such as the European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI). A good example is a book series jointly published by OSI and ECMI on ethnopoltics and minority issues (see Gál 2002).
Problematizations and how they constitute something as an object of knowledge are rendering the improvable subject or object technical. This is related to a process of de-politicization: it tends to transform difficult, complex, and political-economic problems into non-political, natural, and neutral issues. Primarily political problems tend to be removed from the domain of political discourse and reformulated in the ‘objective’ and ‘neutral’ language of expertise, policy-making, and science. Through such de-politicizing dynamics governmentalities, understood as specific forms of power based on regulating populations, achieve their relative stability. Some scholars suggest that these dynamics lead to a situation of closure in which failure to achieve the planned and desired goals of governmental programs first and foremost leads to the consolidation of expert regimes and to the legitimization of cycles of reform (eg, Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983). This mechanism is also the ‘anti-political’ dynamic that Ferguson describes when he points to the unintended effects of governmental projects and how they relate to the ambiguous replication of such programs (see above). Closure is indeed an important characteristic of expert discourses: “Such discourses are devoid of reference to questions they cannot address, or that might cast doubt upon the completeness of their diagnoses or the feasibility of their solutions” (Li 2007b: 11). Closure, I will argue, has also been a dominant and persistent feature of past and contemporary expertise discourses on Romani minorities. An analysis of the involved practices of problematization, seen as a process of de-politicization, sheds light on the ways in which political issues tend to be removed from the political domain and public debate, and how they are turned into quantifiable problems to be solved by policy-makers and other kinds of experts. The analysis that I undertake in this study interrogates these practices of problematization and how they try to stabilize governmental forms of power. My analysis aims at making the problems of minority governance and minority policy discourses unfamiliar again by revealing the way in which they are connected to processes of rendering technical, natural, or private.

Yet, the Roma’s problematization as a European minority has gone together not only with new ways to regulate different kinds of Romani minority populations in Europe and, thus, with de-politicization. Practices of problematization, I will argue, always also go together with those of re-politicization and, in the case of the Roma, with questioning how they have become the targets of novel and reshaped forms of population regulation. I contest the views of scholars who suggest that these processes of re-politicization represent practices of resistance that are largely external to how de-politicizing expertise discourses tend to advance to closure. Indeed, “enclosures are only provisional, and the claims of any particular expertise are always subject to contestation” (Miller and Rose 2008: 69). Practices of re-politicization can take place at various sites, ranging from the offices of international organizations or NGOs to those of social or ‘frontline’ workers, and from the places where specific projects are ‘carried out’ to political protest actions against socio-economic reform or exclusionary practices. Thus, re-politicization also, or maybe even particularly, occurs at moments when governmental programs are articu-

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9 Another strategy of de-politicization that I will discuss in this study is that of rendering issues primarily a ‘private’ matter and re-moving them from the public domain (chapters 6, 7).
lated on the ground, for instance, at “moments when the targets of expert schemes reveal, in word and deed, their own critical analysis of the problems that confront them” (Li 2007b: 11). At such moments of articulation, I will clarify, it becomes clear that the Roma minority problematization as ‘European’ has not simply been set, but has become part of various kinds of disputes that are ultimately about the contestability of the notions of ‘Europeanness’ and European and national citizenship. The narrative of the Roma as a European minority suggests that they are part of Europe and can be co-authors of the heterogeneous discourses of European integration and identity. Through mobilizing both their Europeanization and the idea of Europe as a democratic space, Romani actors and their advocates are claiming the right to participate in Europe. In this way, by being critical about the ways in which expert narratives tend to exclude delicate political-economic issues, Romani actors contest existing narratives of Europe and produce new ones. I will return to these issues below. Let me first explain the theoretical impact of how de-politicization and re-politicization are connected.

In this study, I will explain that processes of re-politicization, considered as acts of resistance and expressions of forms of agency, are not external to how power operates. I oppose readings of governmentality that regard it as the inauguration of forms of power that are successfully establishing modes of population control (eg, Duffield 2007; Hynek 2010). I will clarify that issues of re-politicization and contestation are not going to play a role only after specific forms of population regulation are established. During processes of governmentalization and at the moments when governmental programs are articulated, contestation already becomes manifest: “relations of contest or struggle … are constitutive of government, rather than simply a source of programmatic failure and (later) redesign” (O’Malley et al 1997: 505). Contrary to what some critics have suggested, a parallel investigation of de-politicization and re-politicization, structure and agency, rule and contestation, and programmatic design and messy enactment is integral part of an analytics of governmentality. Various scholars, who employ a Foucauldian ‘framework’ of governmentality to bring to light forms of population regulation, mobilize it to analyze the specific forms of power to which it has given rise. Yet, once they discuss how these forms of power have been challenged or contested, they often resort to notions of politics that have been developed by other thinkers or in other theoretical contexts. Of course, this is a legitimate move. The world and the academy have moved on since Foucault wrote on governmentality. Both new, valuable critiques of his work and novel conceptual and empirical ways to analyze practices of contestation have been developed. However, I do not support the implicit or explicit suggestion that a Foucauldian analytics of governmentality does not or cannot address the theoretical question of politics and contestation. I will show that these questions are at the heart of Foucault’s work and key to how he analyzes relations between governmentality and agency or between power and resistance. A governmentality approach is always about the “rational forms, technical procedures, instrumentations through which to operate” and, at the same time,

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10 I will distinguish the strict and limited ways in which some have discussed governmentality in the context of relatively reified forms of power from a more general analytics of arts of government that is attentive to the co-constitution of governmentality and forms of counter-conduct (chapter 1).
about the processes and strategies “that subject the power relations they are supposed to guarantee to instability and reversal” (Foucault 1997c: 203).

Foucault calls the processes that contribute to strategic reversibility and forms of contestation ‘counter-conducts’ (2007b). Counter-conducts also point to the limits of governmentality, understood as a specific, relatively stable form of power. Forms of counter-conducts enable the strategic reversibility of the power relations inaugurated by particular forms of population regulation. Though particular governmentalities and counter-conducts can be analytically distinguished, in practice they appear in conjunction with each other. One of the consequences of the parallel emergence of particular governmentalities and counter-conducts is that we need to investigate the effects of their simultaneous occurrence. Foucault clearly makes this point, when he states that “the history of the governmental ratio, and the history of the counter-conducts opposed to it, are inseparable from each other” (ibid 357, my emphasis). In this study, I will show how the inseparability of these two histories impacts on the way in which we are to understand Romani minority formation in modern European history.

I will show, firstly, how this inseparability impacts on the way in which we read the position and construction of Romani minorities in modern European history (part two). If we combine the perspectives of governmentality and counter-conduct, and how they relate to parallel processes of de-politicization and re-politicization, we can shed new light on how, in the eighteenth century, Romani or Gypsy groups were, for the first time in European history, explicitly problematized in minority terms and as a people with its own, supposedly non-European culture, origin, and language. Scholarship on the Roma has hitherto primarily produced two largely opposed historiographies on how we should read this Roma problematization. On the one hand, some scholars read this Romani ethnic minority representation along the lines of the politics of historicism: since the eighteenth century, ‘the Gypsies’ have time and again been seen as those who do not (yet) belong to Europe (Willems 1997; Lucassen et al 1998a). The suggestion that they are non-Europeans and are ‘lagging behind’ with regard to the ‘civilized,’ modern peoples of Europe has made it possible to simultaneously subject them to governmental programs of improvement and relegate them to “an imaginary waiting room of history” (Chakrabarty 2000: 8). These scholars consider the Roma minority representation in terms of ethnicity and diaspora as largely responsible for historically recurring forms of their marginalization and, therefore, tend to reject it. On the other hand, the linguist Yaron Matras (1999) calls for a more positive reading of the legacy of the eighteenth century and suggests that the then emerged Roma representation has indirectly enabled forms of Romani agency and self-articulation.

However, mobilizing a governmentality approach, I will argue that none of these two positions can be maintained autonomously. Rather, these views need to be brought into dialogue again to shed light on their crucial interdependence and to articulate a more heterogeneous and ambivalent reading of modern European history. Combining insights from postcolonial and governmentality studies, I call for a careful re-narrating of the histories of Europe and its minorities, the Romani in particular (chapters 3, 4). Such a rereading of Europe’s history illuminates the way in which the Roma’s minority problematization has gone together not only with influential forms of their population regulation, but also with novel forms of their minority self-articulation.
The other way in which I will mobilize the inseparability of governmentality and counter-conducts to discuss the Roma relates to how, since the fall of communism, they have increasingly been problematized as a *European* minority (part three). I have already put forward that a governmentality approach is attentive to the de-politicizing and re-politicizing dimensions of contemporary European Romani minority governance. Now, I want to explicitly connect these two dimensions to the promise of participation and to the will to turning the tide for Europe’s Roma expressed in the numerous governmental programs mentioned at the beginning of this introduction.

**THE POLITICS OF CITIZENSHIP AS PARTICIPATION: TRAVELING ACTIVISM AND MEMORY**

I have clarified that the title of this book, *The European Roma*, is not meant to describe a neutral, objective condition or status. Rather, it needs to be read in relation to the notion of historically changing and changeable Roma problematizations, including processes of Roma minoritization themselves. The question “who are the Gypsies?” has historically been asked several times, and—as David Mayall (2004) has eloquently illustrated—the answers have differed from time to time. This study will not answer this question, but, following Mayall’s call, turn this search for the Roma’s origins itself into a core problem of scholarship on Romani minorities. The post-1989 Europeanization of Roma minority representation marks a new phase in Europe’s history as well as in that of the question of who the Roma would be. Shortly after the collapse of communism, the Council of Europe stated: “Living scattered all over Europe, not having a country to call their own, [the Gypsies] are a true European minority” (CoE 1993: §2). Since the early 1990s, it has increasingly become common use in policy documents, human rights reports, political speeches, transnational activism, media coverage, scholarly studies, and the like to refer to the European minority status of the Roma, and, consequently, to *Europeanize* their representation. The World Bank answers the question “who are the Roma?” as follows: “they are Europe’s largest and most vulnerable minority” (2005b: 3). This and similar kinds of answers to questions who the Roma would be have become common in politically correct language in Europe. Heterogeneous and geographically dispersed Romani, Gypsy, and Traveler groups in Europe are increasingly considered in terms of their European belonging and minority identity. Problematizing Romani minority identities as ‘European’ has become a catalyzing tool to empower the Roma, to facilitate their inclusion, to guarantee their access to justice and public services, to challenge nationalism and Romaphobia, and to renounce the authoritarian Roma approaches of former communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe.

Undeniably, one of the most remarkable post-1989 developments is the way in which the Roma themselves have increasingly become important actors and participants in the political debate about their representation, their situation in Europe, and the ways in which their situation should be improved. Romani activists, by developing their own social and civil movements, have increasingly entered the post-1989 political scene as active agents, rather than passive ‘victims’ of how others continue to represent them (Vermeersch 2006). Increasingly, thus, they are not merely the objects or subjects of discourses and programs of improvement and participation. Rather, they themselves have
become critical participants and players in both the political debates about their European minority status and the policy fabric that has been built around it. The political momentum of ‘1989’ and the dynamic interactions between, most notably, Romani activism, advocacy networks, NGOs, and some IGOs have substantially strengthened, widened, and diversified the Romani movement that has been developed in Europe since the 1960s (chapters 5, 7, 8).11

The reinforcement of the movement has taken place at the same time as the influential restructurings of states, societies, and markets during what is often referred to as Central and Eastern Europe’s ‘democratic transition’ from planned to market economies. These changes, which have often been particularly attributed to neo-liberalism, have also had a considerable impact on the situation of the region’s Romani minorities. According to some scholars, for instance, the introduction of neo-liberal regimes and welfare reforms to East Central European states, such as Slovakia and Hungary, has gone together with turning the poorest among the Roma into an underclass. This development would have drawn them in a ‘culture of poverty,’ in which poverty tends to be reproduced along the lines of an ethnicized Romani culture (Ladányi 2001; Ladányi and Szélényi 2006). Others have particularly focused on the impact of neo-liberalism on civil society and on some of the key actors and parameters of the Romani social and civil movement (Sigona and Trehan 2009c). Some of these scholars have discussed the appearance of ‘NGOization’ at the center of the Romani movement. This phenomenon relates to how particularly pro-Roma advocacy NGOs, gradually departing from a movement agenda of solidarity and participatory democracy, have become a kind of service deliverers that would contribute to, rather than challenge, the success of the new, neo-liberal orthodoxies of state and supra-state actors.12 NGOization results, it is argued, in a divide within the movement, according to which some bureaucratic, professionalized NGOs run the show and limit “the dynamics and flexibility of civil society” (Rostas 2009: 170). NGOization would have radically displaced so-called ‘Romani grassroots communities’ and subaltern voices.

In this study, I do not deny that the developments, which these scholars attribute to neo-liberalism, have taken place (chapter 6). However, I challenge the view that neo-liberalism, as one of the latest ‘grand narratives’ of de-politicization, is the big, rampant, and in many ways destructive force behind all these developments (chapter 5). Undeniably, neo-liberal governmental technologies of participation tend to depart from issues of redistribution, democratic participation, and collective social responsibility and, instead, focus on market inclusion, consumerism, and individual or community responsibility. In this de-politicizing move, a participatory democratic agenda tends to be reduced to a ‘social inclusion’ one, which one-sidedly focuses on the integration of ‘problem groups,’ such as Romani. As a result, there is also a serious risk that complex issues and histories of Roma marginalization are reduced to problems of morality, decency, and responsibility, which primarily need to be solved by the marginalized Roma themselves (chapters 6, 7).

12 See, most notably, Nirenberg (2009), Rostas (2009), Sigona and Trehan (2009a; 2009b), and Trehan (2009a; 2009b).
However, I do not underscore that phenomena such as NGOization are solely related to processes of de-politicization and cooptation, thereby seriously undermining Romani agency. I challenge the associated view that neo-liberalism is a kind of hegemonic, ideological policy framework, which is largely imposed on Central and Eastern Europe, and on the Roma and their NGOs in particular, from outside. Alternatively, I will show that neo-liberalism, understood as a form of governmentality, sheds light on how it has also gone together with important and viable processes of re-politicization and with the production of new forms and sites of Romani agency. These processes articulate what I call a politics of citizenship as participation. When development programs, improvement schemes, and empowerment projects are articulated, the involved Roma, as well as their formal and informal activist and advocacy networks, are also becoming manifest in the political arena. In various manners, they re-politicize the ways in which the Roma are frequently treated as people who, despite the narrative of their Europeanness, still need to put in additional efforts to be regarded as equal and full citizens of the states where they live and the ‘Europe’ to which they belong. One of the crucial questions to be addressed becomes:

How do we think the political at [the] moments when ... the subaltern emerges in the ... sphere of politics, in his or her own right, as a ... full-fledged member of the body politic, without having had to do any ‘preparatory’ work in order to qualify as ... ‘citizen’? (Chakrabarty 2000: 10-11)

In this study, I will show that the notion of politics implied in re-politicization processes in which Romani agents, among others, are involved is not only about calls for being included and integrated. This notion refers also, and more fundamentally, to a politics of citizenship in which the Roma claim the right to participate and question the ways in which newly emerged discourses of inclusion tend to approach them as subjects who still need to do ‘preparatory work’ to be qualified as citizen. This politics challenges both the population regulative mechanisms themselves and the ambiguous narratives of European belonging that have come with them. In The Politics of the Governed, the anthropologist Partha Chatterjee puts forward:

Unlike the concept of citizen, which carries the ethical connotation of participation in the sovereignty of the state, the concept of population makes available to government functionaries a set of rationally manipulable instruments for reaching large sections of the inhabitants of a country as the target of their ‘policies’—economic policy, administrative policy, law, and even political mobilization. (Chatterjee 2004: 34)

It is exactly the ethical connotation of participation—not only in the state but also in Europe more generally—that plays a prominent role in the re-politicizing acts typical of the current Romani politics of citizenship. The notion ‘citizenship as participation’ that I use refers to citizenship struggles for the deepening of democracy and for challenging old and new practices and mechanisms that reproduce inequality and exclusion or tend to do so.
I understand these political struggles and the politics of citizenship of participation beyond the ‘global hegemonic neoliberal power’ versus ‘local grassroots community resistance’ binary. Going beyond this artificial opposition, which tends to essentialize resistance as residing in discrete localized places or actors, will shed light on how neoliberal power is constituted, but also contested through diverse social relations and everyday practices. Neo-liberalism has influentially gone together with the blurring of the boundaries between states, markets, and civil societies, and, I argue, also with the emergence of new participatory spaces and forms of activism and contestation. Though these spaces and activities are characterized by their own ambiguities, they embody sites where and strategies through which the meaning of participation is negotiated and contested in everyday life struggles. The politics of citizenship, however, is not based on a reified approach to ‘the local’ or those who are often uncritically called ‘Romani grassroots communities.’ I will show how the unremitting traffic in mimicry beyond the simple replication of what governmental programs tend to prescribe contests territorialized notions of Romani culture or ethnicity. This traffic facilitates what I call traveling activism. With this notion, I draw attention to the significance of how various discourses, strategies, and techniques of activism are translated across space and difference (chapter 7). My examination of traveling activism will clarify how activist expertise travels through disjunctive circuits and how the diverse forms of coalition building that arise from these activities can serve as a productive source for claiming the right to participate as equal and full citizens.\footnote{Wendy Larner and Nina Laurie (2010) speak of ‘traveling technocrats’ to show how discursive, political, institutional, and geographical boundary-crossings contribute to articulate neo-liberal technologies of government unevenly. Similarly, yet in order to indicate a kind of opposite movement, I use the concept ‘traveling activism’ to illuminate how comparable forms of boundary-crossings articulate a politics of citizenship as participation beyond its limited neo-liberal meaning of activation or cooptation.} Traveling activism also shows how Romani activists and their advocates have incorporated and mobilized neo-liberal elements in the Romani movement for different than neo-liberal ends.

Ultimately, the politics of citizenship as participation and the various strategies of traveling activism address the issue of the political community and the question of European belonging. The scope of this politics of citizenship has not remained limited to challenging, for instance, issues of inequality, discrimination, and poverty, but has explicitly been extended to issues of culture and memory. Particularly since 1989, we have seen the emergence of Romani memorial practices that challenge the politics of historicism, and the exclusion of Romani histories and memories from national and European ones more generally. In this way, the Roma are writing their own histories, inscribing their diverse memories in Europe’s ‘memoryscapes,’ and contributing to the production of new narratives about Europe. In particular with regard to the memory of the genocide of the Roma during the Second World War, we can observe the emergence of a variety of new Romani memorial and cultural practices throughout Europe, and Central and Eastern Europe in particular. I argue that these practices have emerged at the same time as a globalization of Holocaust discourses (Huyssen 2000) and, in the context of the EU, a governmentalization of Holocaust remembrance. I will analyze how these various phenomena of remembering relate to the post-1989 European narrative of re-membering and integrating Romani minorities in Europe (chapter 8).
Theoretically, this interdisciplinary study can be situated at the intersection of various literatures, most notably those of governmentality studies, development studies, European studies, postcolonial studies, and Romani studies. At the intersection of these literatures, I analyze how new or renewed forms of European governmentality have been developed, deployed, and contested to regulate Romani minority populations in Europe. This book brings insights from disciplines, such as philosophy, anthropology, history, sociology, geography, and political and cultural studies together to investigate different dimensions of Romani minority formation and transformation, Romani minority governance, and newly emergent transnational Roma advocacy and Romani activist networks.

Methodologically, this book is based on theoretical analyses of historical sources and contributions to the literatures mentioned, on the study of policy documents and reports of IGOs, NGOs, and national or local governments, on examinations of formal and informal Romani political, cultural, activist, and lobby networks at local, national, and European levels, and on interviews and discussions with policy makers, various Romani activists, and Romani inhabitants in the countries where I conducted fieldwork. Between 2002 and 2009, I undertook several research fieldtrips to Central and Eastern Europe to bring the programmatic and pragmatic dimensions of policy making ethnographically together with empirical analyses of its multifold and messy articulations on the ground.

The chapters of this study are grouped into three parts. Part one introduces the theoretical framework of governmentality and how we can extend it to an analysis of transnational, European forms of population regulation. Chapter 1 introduces the methodological and conceptual parameters of this study. I critically build on Foucault’s work and post-structuralist analyses of his intellectual legacy to explain how a governmentality approach helps to overcome some of the drawbacks of a governance approach. I discuss the concept of governmentality in the context of Foucault’s work and how it relates to contemporary debates about the state, bio-power, and agency. Building on a so-called ‘topological’ reading of power (Collier 2009), I illuminate how an analytics of governmentality helps to analyze issues of power, agency, and resistance beyond functionalism and historical periodization. I explain how such an analytics involves an examination of the dynamic interplay between governmentalities understood as relatively stable forms of power, on the one hand, and practices of counter-conduct that tend to destabilize the former, on the other.

Chapter 2 extends the analysis of governmentality explicitly to Europe and discusses how intra-state and inter-state forms of governmentality have appeared in conjunction with each other in Europe’s history. I discuss Foucault’s reading of two distinct forms of governmentality—so-called ‘police’ and liberalism—to discuss transnational forms of population regulation and processes of minority formation in Europe. I explain how the emergence of liberal forms of governmentality has inherently gone together with processes of minority formation. I will move beyond Foucault’s Eurocentric analysis of inter-state governmentalities to propose how we could examine contemporary transnational population regulation in Europe. I discuss postcolonial critiques of development regimes to call for analyzing transnational population regulation, such as those regarding Romani minorities, beyond tradition vs. modernity, global hegemonic power vs. local
grassroots resistance binaries. In a transit to part two, I propose to re-narrate European modernity to the extent that it can help to shed new light on how Romani groups have been minoritized in modern European history.

Part two discusses how the development of liberal governmentality has historically gone hand in hand with the emergence of ‘Gypsy studies’ and Romani minority formation. I investigate this nexus of emerging liberalism, Romani minoritization, and ‘Gypsy studies’ in eighteenth-century Habsburg rule, and analyze two currently prevailing scholarly readings of its legacy. Chapter 3 engages in a debate about how the Gypsy problematization during the Habsburg regime has been read in scholarship on the Roma. I discuss the position of the historians Leo Lucassen and Wim Willems and that of the linguist Yaron Matras and call for bringing the two largely opposite historiographies that their works represent in dialogue again. I combine philosophical and postcolonial critiques of homogeneous, uniform narratives of the Enlightenment, and modernity more generally, to question the way in which these historiographies have hitherto been read in relative isolation. None of these two historiographic ‘paradigms,’ I argue, can be maintained separately and only their combination sheds new light on the ambivalence of Romani minority formation in European history.

Chapter 4 advances and deepens the debate on Romani minority formation in European history. I interrogate eighteenth-century modes of governmentality by means of a close reading of both Habsburg assimilationist Gypsy policies and scholarship on the ‘Gypsies’ in the Prussian academy. I discuss the ambivalent impact of the scientific and administrative tradition of so-called ‘Cameralism’ (Kameralistik) and ‘police sciences’ (Polizeiwissenschaften) on practices of population regulation in the Habsburg Empire. I show how we can understand shifting Habsburg Gypsy policies and emergent Romano-related knowledge formation in light of the forms of governmentality related to these scientific and administrative practices. I explain how the development of comparative forms of science—linguistics, biology, economics, nationalism—has gone together not only with new forms of Roma population regulation, but also with opportunities of Romani minority self-articulation.

Part three mobilizes the threefold nexus between problematization, government, and knowledge formation that I theoretically explain in part one and historically articulate in part two to move on to the present-day situation of Romani minorities in Europe. In part three, I examine the nexus between the Roma problematization as a European minority, neo-liberal forms of governmentality, and heterogeneous, hybrid knowledge formation at the transnational European level. Chapter 5 discusses the current Europeanization of the Romani identity and minority status alongside the emergence of neo-liberal forms of governmentality. I explain how we can consider neo-liberalism as a specific form of governmentality and how this reading differs from more conventional readings of neo-liberalism along the lines of policy or ideology. I combine my reading of neo-liberalism as governmentality with an analysis of shifting security, development, and human rights agendas in Europe to explain how we are to assess the problematization of the Roma as a European minority beyond fixed institutional boundaries. I clarify how we can regard the emergence of new centers of Roma-related expertise at the level of IGOs and NGOs in light of how neo-liberal governmental technologies are articulated with the policy, political, and administrative cultures of these actors. Whereas chapter 5 introduces neo-
liberalism primarily at a theoretical level, chapters 6, 7, and 8 explore several case studies of how neo-liberalism, the Roma’s Europeanization, the collapse of communism, and the resurgence of nationalism have influenced the situation of Romani minorities on the ground.

Chapter 6 is dedicated to how neo-liberal technologies have recently been articulated in East Central Europe with various different political and socioeconomic cultures and institutional settings. I clarify that it is the way in which these technologies have been assembled with these cultures and settings, rather than a kind of neo-liberalism imposed on the region from outside, which has ambiguously impacted on the Roma’s situation. I examine how EU and World Bank supported neo-liberal activation programs have been introduced to East Central European welfare regimes to improve the Roma’s employment chances. I demonstrate how the assemblage of these programs with ‘local’ cultures and politics has impacted on the Roma’s situation, leading to their eviction, exploitation, and dehumanization. I explore three crucial legacies of communism to put these grim effects in the perspective of the region’s transformations. I undertake an inquiry into communist reform politics, past alternative socio-cultural and economic networks, and communist practices of racism against the Roma to show how the legacies of these practices are currently playing tricks on them.

Chapter 6 needs to be read next to chapters 7 and 8, for these three chapters deal with developments that are simultaneously occurring. While chapter 6 underlines the impact of processes of de-politicization, chapters 7 and 8 show that these processes are actually taking place alongside attempts to politicize development and empowerment programs meant for the Roma and alongside endeavors to challenge issues of poverty and inequality that affect their current situation.

Chapter 7 discusses the Romani social and civil movement and how, since the fall of communism, transnational Romani activist and pro-Roma advocacy networks have increasingly entered the scene. I explain that the post-1989 Romani movement can be characterized by a ‘perverse confluence’ (Dagnino 2008) of participatory democratic and neo-liberal projects, in which notions such as citizenship, participation, and civil society play a key, yet often opposite role. I introduce the notions of traveling activism and the politics of citizenship as participation to highlight the ways in which issues of participation, inequality, and poverty are explicitly politicized in the current Romani movement. I analyze how Romani activist networks have strategically mobilized neo-liberal tools and activist knowledge and expertise to reinforce these processes of politicization.

Chapter 8 examines the significance of various Romani memorial practices that have been increasingly developed in post-1989 Europe. The chapter starts from an analysis of what Katie Trumpener (1992) once called ‘the European memory problem’. With this problem she pointed to how, throughout European history, dominant cultural and intellectual movements have displaced Romani memory and represented the Roma as ‘a people without history.’ I examine how we are to assess the current boost of particularly Holocaust-related Romani memorial cultures in Europe vis-à-vis Trumpener’s thesis. I argue that the European memory problem that she discussed does no longer exist, but that we are presently facing the appearance of another kind of European memory problem. Romani cultural and memorial practices contest the politics of historicism that tended to relegate ‘the Roma’ to the domain of pre-modern, ‘history-less’ cultures. These
practices challenge the exclusion of Romani histories and memories from national and European ones and contribute to new, diverse images and stories about Europe. I explain that these practices are taking place in the context of a trend to governmentalize Holocaust remembrance in the EU, which enables the inclusion of Romani minorities in European memorial cultures. At the same time, though, this governmentalization tends to turn Holocaust remembrance into a pedagogy that does not sufficiently reflect on how current forms of European governmentality ambivalently go together with exclusionary practices. Finally, I argue that current Romani memorial practices invite us to rethink the structures of temporality and the politics of historicism integral to both past and contemporary forms of European governmentality.

This study ends with an afterthought, in which I reflect on the links between neoliberal forms of governmentality, governing at a time of financial and political crisis, and the current reemergence of institutional and citizen violence against Romani minorities and migrants throughout Europe. Building on the findings of this study, I develop two future research agendas. The first combines insights of governmentality studies with those of critical security studies to analyze processes in which the Roma are framed in terms of security. The second agenda builds on what I call a politics of citizenship as participation to widen and deepen ethnographic analyses of practices of politicization related to the heterogeneous Romani movement in Europe.
Part I

Governmentalizing Europe
Chapter 1
Theorizing Governmentality

INTRODUCTION

This chapter develops the main theoretical, conceptual, and methodological background of this study. I explain the concept of governmentality and how the introduction of this neologism by the French philosopher Michel Foucault in the late 1970s has contributed to contemporary debates about the nature, scope, and impact of modern power relations. I show how his concept could be understood as an analytical framework to contest state, sub-state, or supra-state institutions and organizations as transparent, a-historical, and unproblematic political formations, and to rethink the relations between power, knowledge, and object and subject formation more generally.

Since the early 1990s, and since the publication of some seminal studies on Foucault’s work on governmentality in particular,¹ we have been able to notice a rapid, almost exponential increase of the number of publications that have taken governmentality as their central methodological starting point. This recent boom, however, has not necessarily contributed to an increase of clear articulations of the concept and its analytical scope and methodological ambitions. Undoubtedly, some of the more persistent present-day mystifications and obscurities regarding ‘governmentality’ date back to Foucault’s own work. Indeed, as his work could generally be characterized by permanent shifts of focus and attention, his views on governmentality, though part of his late work, had also been subjected to change. In particular, when the central focus of his work changed for the very last time in the early 1980s and when he started to elaborate on technologies of the self and practices of freedom, he developed a further explanation of the conceptual scope of governmentality that many contemporary ‘governmentality studies’ have hitherto left untouched (Foucault 1997d; 1997b; 2005a; 2010). Even more explicitly than in the ‘governmentality lectures’ that he gave between 1977 and 1979 at the Collège de France in Paris (Foucault 2007b; 2008a), in the late discussion on this new notion he stressed that governmental techniques and strategies can be mobilized to maintain as well as contest dominant power relations, and to govern both selves and others at different governmental scales. As I argue in this chapter and beyond, the attitude in much of the

literature to neglect particularly this variant of the concept has led to an ambivalent, yet persistent tendency in some inquiries into governmentality to conceive Foucault’s neologism as an all-encompassing form of power that controls activities, spaces, persons, and populations without offering an adequate view of how these control or security mechanisms could be contested. I argue that such a one-sided view can and should be challenged. In order to do so, it helps to differentiate between at least three distinct understandings of the concept of governmentality: governmentality as an analytics, as a process, and as a form of power.

In this chapter, I shed light on how governmentality could help to situate political institutions—for example the state, but also international governing organizations (IGOs) such as the European Union (EU) and the World Bank—within a more general philosophy of contemporary power relations. I show how governmentality as an analytics of government supports a theory of networked and dispersed power in which political organizations are considered as the effects of power relations, rather than as the secure centers from where power is delegated and distributed to nearby or remote sites elsewhere. Secondly, I explain how governmentality as a process has contributed to the gradual codification and consolidation of specific, yet contestable political institutions. An analysis of such processes of governmentalization elucidates how various arts of government have historically been developed and, in the course of modern European history, led to more or less stable and durable, yet contestable power relations. I show how a critical history of such processes of governmentalization—or what could also be considered as a genealogy of problematizations of government—contributes to distinguishing and mapping out different intersecting and overlapping modalities of governmentality. This leads me, finally, to illuminate how we can understand governmentalities as forms of power on the one hand, and power relations as the interplay between various contestable modalities of governmentality, on the other.

INTERROGATING POWER TOPOLOGICALLY: BEYOND PERIODIZATION AND FUNCTIONALISM

The introduction of the neologism governmentality in the late 1970s has contributed to at least three important discussions in late-twentieth and early-twenty-first-century poststructuralist social and political thought. Firstly, discussing power in terms of governmentality has contributed to an ongoing debate about how we need to perceive the state, state-related practices, and the state’s sovereignty in an age in which forces commonly attributed to various processes of globalization have increasingly contested the state or at least resituated it in new networks of multiple governing agencies (Appadurai 1996; Ong 2006; Sharma and Gupta 2006). Secondly, by the emphasis on how, since the late eighteenth century, governmental power has increasingly been exercised at the intersection of individual bodies of persons and the collective body of a population, the analytical framework of governmentality contributes to an understanding of what it means that basic features of the human species have become the object of political interventions and strategies (Rabinow and Rose 2006; Lemke 2007; Rose 2007; Dillon 2010). Last but not least, a governmentality perspective engages in debates about the relations between structure and agency and those between power and resistance, and offers a view of
power that goes beyond these binary oppositions. Without attempting to strictly separate these three debates, I will elaborate on them to situate the notion of governmentality in its own history of emergence, development, and still ongoing re-articulation.

Already in his earlier works, Foucault wanted to de-center the state as the central power-arranging institution in modern European societies. Accordingly, he displaced state theory as the prevailing conceptual framework for analyzing power and considered its emergence as a symptom and stage of historically diverse reflections on forms and practices of government, rather than as a kind of neutral tool to analyze the state, its alleged sovereignty, and its exercise of power. According to Foucault, state theory conventionally focuses on sovereign power and how it juridico-politically and institutionally consolidates specific state-subject relationships, most of all those of domination or even repression, within a state’s territory (1990a: 92-101; 2004: 1-41). The introduction of the notion of governmentality has contributed to a reconsideration of concepts of sovereign power, and to a refinement and redirection of Foucault’s own theory of power, an understanding of the state, its history, and its apparatuses in particular. The almost parallel introduction of the concept of bio-power has played an important role in this development. In the works written after Discipline and Punish (1975), Foucault emphasized the importance of bio-power in regulating modern societies at the level of populations, rather than exclusively at the one of nationalized territories. Bio-power is conceived as a form of power that intensively regulates life and its mechanisms, and that governs and manipulates bodies, whether on an individual or a collective scale. According to Foucault (1990a: part 5), bio-power emerged as a relatively new and distinct form of power in the course of the eighteenth century, when the category of human nature ambivalently entered into the field of governmental technologies. Bio-power could be seen as a largely limitless set of mechanisms through which the basic biological features of human beings, now considered as a species, have become the explicit object of political strategies and interventions (Foucault 2007b: 1, 74-75). Bio-power involves an intimate relating and mutual strengthening of its two main dimensions, namely a so-called anatomo-political, disciplinary element that works at the level of individualized bodies, and a so-called bio-political, regulatory element that primarily operates at the level of the collectivized body of a population. Anatomo-politics is predominantly related to technologies that seek to optimize the productive capacities of the human body, to maximize its forces, and to integrate it into systems of efficient and economic controls, for instance through proper training in the army, at school, or at workplaces. Bio-politics, on the other hand, is first of all related to the regulation of the population as a whole or of a specific part thereof. Bio-political regulation includes the management of processes of collective life through governing the health, happiness, wealth, security, longevity, productive capacity, or the reproduction of populations. Sexuality, probably Foucault’s best-known example, could be considered as historically constituted at the juncture of the individual body and the collective body of a population and as one of the crucial targets of modern forms of power organized around the management of life. At the anatomo-political, bodily level, bio-power has been involved with the various ways in

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which sexuality relates to, for instance, behavior, dreams, happiness, gender, illness, childhood, emerging maturity, and notions of subjectivity. At the bio-political, collective level, bio-power has become manifest in sexuality’s direct and indirect connections with, for instance, issues of fertility, reproduction, longevity, sex education, environmental problems, economic prosperity, and health care and its accessibility. As the example of sexuality—or, to be more precise, of the dispositif of sexuality (Foucault 1980; Deleuze 1992)—explains, these two dimensions of bio-power constantly intersect. Certain forms of sexual behavior and self-perception, for instance, are supposed to contribute to a population’s health where other forms are not. Vice versa, sex education supposedly helps to develop, demarcate, and normalize certain forms of sexual behavior and self-perception (Foucault 1990a: 145-59; 2004: 251-52).

At least retrospectively, we could say that the parallel development of the conceptual frameworks of governmentality and bio-power in Foucault’s work has disproved the core arguments of its critiques. Critics of his work on power have suggested that it tends to understate the role of sovereign forms of power, to periodize different forms of power or society too easily in favor of distinguishing epistemologically incompatible epochs, and to offer limited room for agency, resistance, and freedom. These critiques have their origin in Foucault’s own work, which has confusingly introduced as well as permanently shifted its central parameters. Initially, for instance, Foucault juxtaposed disciplinary and sovereign power and suggested that the former had historically replaced the latter, thereby claiming an epochal shift in terms of the dominant type of power. In one of his 1973 lectures, for instance, he suggests that “one type of power, that of sovereignty, is replaced by what could be called disciplinary power” (2008b: 22). However, both in the lectures of the mid 1970s (2003; 2004) and in Discipline and Punish he clarifies that we need to see the appearance of discipline in terms of a far-reaching intermingling of both modalities of power, in which juridico-political instruments increasingly function as normalizing techniques. Thus, Foucault suggests that sovereign power and politico-juridical instruments do not disappear, but, rather, that they have profoundly been rearticulated in their connection with disciplinary power. Foucault comes back to this theme in the first volume of The History of Sexuality, where he conceptualizes discipline as one of the two dimensions of bio-power. He states that he does not mean to say “that the law fades into the background or that the institutions of justice tend to disappear, but rather that the law operates more and more as a norm, and that the juridical institution is increasingly incorporated into a continuum of apparatuses (medical, administrative, and so on) whose functions are for the most part regulatory” (1990a: 144).

Nonetheless, even this reformulation of the relationships between sovereign, disciplinary (or anatomo-political), and regulatory (or bio-political) forms of power cannot entirely take away the critique of the periodization of history and of the correlated distinction of epochs in which different kinds of power dominate. This problem has much to do with a kind of functionalism that is still largely inherent to the notions of power that Foucault developed until the late 1970s. Suggesting a radical shift from a ‘legal’ to a ‘disciplinary’ age in the eighteenth century, as Foucault still did in his 1973-74 lectures on psychiatric power, would imply an underestimation of the role of sovereignty in modern societies. But even the suggestion that, since the seventeenth and eighteenth century, discipline and forms of population regulation are complementary com-
ponents of an all-encompassing newly emerged normalizing logic of power that has radically resituated sovereign power implies that these two components—the former at the level of the individual and the latter at the one of collectives—determine a shift from a ‘classical age’ of sovereignty to a ‘modern age’ of normalization (Collier 2009: 82-87). At least until his lectures of early 1976, Foucault clearly supported the idea of such a shift:

The normalizing society is a society in which the norm of discipline and the norm of regulation intersect along an orthogonal articulation. To say that power took possession of life in the nineteenth century, or to say that power at least takes life under its care in the nineteenth century, is to say that it has, thanks to the play of technologies of discipline on the one hand and technologies of regulation on the other, succeeded in covering the whole surface that lies between the organic and the biological, between body and population. (Foucault 2004: 253)

This shift implies, as Stephen Collier has eloquently analyzed, that “the two poles of disciplinary and regulatory power operate according to different logics, but that they are fundamentally isomorphic and functionally complementary” (2009: 85). In spite of Foucault’s explicit and frequent rejection of functionalism, structuralism, and correlated forms of periodization in his works from History of Madness (1961) through Discipline and Punish (1975), the conceptual frames of these works did not entirely succeed in avoiding forms of functionalism and periodization.

However, from the lecture series on governmentality and bio-politics onward, Foucault’s work further complicates the relation between sovereignty, disciplinary, and regulatory forms of power and starts to integrate them within his analysis of a problematics of government (2007b; 2008a). For the first time, his work suggests that there is no necessary link between the two central components of bio-power and that the three discussed forms of power are not necessarily part of the same inner, normalizing logic. Instead, his work unravels how “each deals differently with what we [prevailingly] call normalization” (Foucault 2007b: 56) and develops new concepts to articulate this analytical decomposition (norm, normation, normalization, and, more generally, security mechanisms). From now on, Foucault proposes neither a shift from sovereignty to discipline, nor one from a sovereign to a normalizing society, in which disciplinary and

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3 I do not entirely agree with Collier’s observation (2009) that this shift in Foucault’s work was a clear and unambiguous one. Indeed, the discussion of the emergence of the reality of population in terms of blockages and processes of unblocking and release—most notably in the seminal governmentality lecture of 1 February 1978 (2007b: 87-110)—ambivalently suggests the beginning of a new age. Yet, I agree with Collier’s basic observation that, from here on, Foucault departs from his earlier emphasis on congruencies between different technologies of power. This is also expressed by Foucault’s use of the concept of ‘assemblage’ (2007b: 312). Various authors have emphasized that the notions of governmentality and assemblage could be productively combined to articulate an analytics of government (Ong and Collier 2005b; Li 2007a; Collier 2009; Fergson 2009). In chapter 5, I will stress the importance of understanding neo-liberal forms of governmentality in terms of assemblages for a discussion of newly emerged forms of Romani minority governance in Europe.

4 I will discuss Foucault’s concept of security in chapter 2.
regulatory power work out complementarily. Rather, he proposes that the series of sovereignty-discipline-security supports neither epochal nor functionalist claims:

There is not a series of successive elements, the appearance of the new causing the earlier ones to disappear. There is not the legal age, the disciplinary age, and then the age of security. Mechanisms of security do not replace disciplinary mechanisms, which would have replaced juridico-legal mechanisms. In reality you have a series of complex edifices in which, of course, the techniques themselves change and are perfected, or anyway become more complicated, but in which what above all changes is the dominant characteristic, or more exactly, the system of correlation between juridico-legal mechanisms, disciplinary mechanisms, and mechanisms of security. (Foucault 2007b: 8, my emphasis)

The shift from an analysis of correlated and isomorphic power mechanisms that support one and the same normalizing society to examining a heterogeneous set of different elements and the way in which they are and need to be assembled to govern things, activities, spaces, persons, and populations as adequately as possible involves a crucial shift of focus. This methodological change goes together with an increased emphasis on “technologies of power” (Foucault 2007b: 8). Following Collier’s suggestion, we could call this shift one toward a focus on a topology of power, in which “one technology of power may provide guiding norms and an orienting telos,” but “does not saturate all power relations.” Interrogating power topologically implies an analysis of “a configurational principle that determines how heterogeneous elements—techniques, institutional arrangements, material forms, and other technologies of power—are taken up and recombined” (Collier 2009: 89). At the center of such a topological analysis of power is not a history of techniques—e.g. the disciplinary technique of putting someone in a cell or the security technique of crime statistics—but a history of technologies of power that focuses on the reactivation, transformation, and reconfiguration of various sovereign, disciplinary, and security techniques in certain spaces and at certain moments.5 This is what Foucault means when he calls for interrogating “systems of correlation” (2007b: 8). Departing from the focus on congruencies within power-knowledge nexuses that determined much of his earlier works, this analysis implies a “fuzzy history of the correlations and systems ... for things do not necessarily develop in step in different sectors, at a given moment, in a given society, in a given country” (Foucault 2007b: 8, my italics). Writing the fuzzy history of technologies of power involves the articulation of a “strategic logic,” rather than a dialectic one that “puts to work contradictory terms within the homogeneous”:

A logic of strategy does not stress contradictory terms within a homogeneity that promises their resolution in a unity. The function of a strategic logic is to establish the

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5 The focus on histories of technologies of power, which increasingly dominates Foucault’s work after Discipline and Punish and the first volume of The History of the Sexuality, seriously complicates those interpretations of his work that consider it as an expression of a ‘modernization paradigm’ or of a shift toward a ‘disciplinary society’ (Lucassen 2008; Wakefield 2009).
possible connections between disparate terms which remain disparate. The logic of strategy is the logic of connections between the heterogeneous and not the logic of the homogenization of the contradictory. (Foucault 2008a: 42)  

The focus on non-totalizing forms of assembling heterogeneous and disparate elements that characterizes the shift toward governmentality has also consequences for theorizing agency, freedom, and resistance. The critique of the limited role that these issues would play in Foucault’s work (eg, Fraser 1989; McCarthy 1991; McNay 1992; Taylor 1986; Said 2002) could also be related to his writings prior to the publication of his trilogy on the history of sexuality and to his work on governmentality. His initial understanding of sovereign and disciplinary techniques of power could not avoid the ‘repression trap’ and the closely related focus on power as mainly domination on the one hand, and resistance as primarily reaction to the dominant power relations and their normalizing effects, on the other. Foucault had criticized state theory for focusing primarily on how sovereign power creates subjects and on how this process would mainly lead to forms of subjection and repression. He had introduced discipline as a way to alter the understanding of power and to create room for how power is always productive as well. However, as a number of critics of Foucault’s earlier works have put forward, both the omnipresence of a normalizing, disciplinary power and its uncompromising ability to produce ‘docile bodies’ (Foucault 1995: 135-69) do not sufficiently shed light on how processes of subjection actually intersect with productive ones of subject and identity formation. The problem with how he has rendered power and resistance in his work until the mid 1970s is that the latter becomes merely conceptualized as reactive or a reacting-to-power, rather than as a positive action on its own terms (Hartmann 2003).

However, with the shift toward an analytics of government, Foucault’s work departs from analyzing “shifts in power relations in terms of vaguely defined and anonymous functional imperatives ... or in terms of broad shifts in discursivities” (Collier 2009: 90). From here on, an important new—or better, rearticulated—element of his work contributes to another perspective regarding issues of agency, resistance, and freedom. His post-1976 work “places particular emphasis on the work of actors—thinkers—who constitute existing ways of thinking and acting as problems, and seek to reform and remediate them” (ibid). Undoubtedly, Foucault’s work has always been committed to the analyses of individual thinkers—we only need to recall his discussion of Samuel Tuke and Philippe Pinel in his work on madness (2006), or of Jeremy Bentham in his work on the prison (Foucault 1995). Yet, we can trace an important rearticulation after 1976, when his work analyzes these individual thinkers less along the lines of their agreement with functional imperatives and dominant discourses—thereby still claiming the epochal and functionalist shifts of which these thinkers are mainly the representatives—than in terms of how these thinkers innovatively rearticulate and recombine heterogeneous existing elements to modify actions by acting on the acts and actions of

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6 Nevertheless, it would be somewhat misleading to characterize the discussed shift in Foucault’s late work as primarily a shift toward analyzing strategies (eg, Gordon 1980: 250-55). Indeed, the articulation of a strategic logic of power relationships has already been presented as a central feature of analysis in Discipline and Punish (Foucault 1995: 277, 285-92).
others. In this sense, the activity of governing is “to structure the possible fields of action of others” (Foucault 2000e: 341). Considering the exercise of power as such a mode of action upon the actions of others includes the element of freedom: “power is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are ‘free.’” This means that “individual or collective subjects … are faced with a field of possibilities in which several kinds of conduct, several ways of reacting and modes of behavior are available” (ibid 341-42). In other words, power relations are much more diverse and essentially conditioned by the element of freedom, rather than merely representations of states of domination or repression. Such a state of domination represents only the far end of a much more heterogeneous and longer spectrum of power relations. In cases of domination or repression, power relations are immobilized and prevented from “any reversibility of movement by economic, political, or military means” (Foucault 1997b: 283). Studies of governmentality that have based their conception of governmentality primarily on Foucault’s lectures of 1977-78 and 1978-79 and, thus, on how they predominantly discuss this term in relationship to state practices and their continuous rearticulation, have often overlooked the implicit, yet crucial link with a dimension of governmentality that Foucault has explained more overtly in his post-1979 work. There, he links technologies of power that have been mobilized to achieve the extremity of domination to what he calls technologies of the self that contribute to transforming selves in situations of relative freedom.\footnote{I will discuss the way in which we need to perceive freedom in this context in chapter 2, where I will discuss liberal forms of governmentality more generally.} He suggests considering governmentality as the encounter between technologies of power and those of the self, thereby explicitly extending the scope of the governmentality concept:

If we understand by governmentality a strategic field of power relations in their mobility, transformability, and reversibility, then I do not think that reflections on this notion of governmentality can avoid passing through, theoretically and practically, the element of a subject defined by the relationship of self to self. Although the theory of political power as an institution usually refers to a juridical conception of the subject of right, it seems to me that the analysis of governmentality—that is to say, of power as a set of reversible relationships—must refer to an ethics of the subject defined by the relationship of self to self. Quite simply, this means that in the type of analysis I have been trying to advance for some time you can see that power relations, governmentality, the government of the self and of others, and the relationship of self to self constitute a chain, a thread … (Foucault 2005a: 252)

To summarize, the focus on both changing systems of correlation and a repertoire of governmental technologies that stretches from the micro to the macro scale allow for a new perspective on power relations. Looking at them through the lens of an analytics of government avoids reactive concepts of resistance and, more in general, discusses power beyond power-resistance and structure-agency binaries. The analytical framework of governmentality rearticulates and differentiates the understanding of power relations in
such a way that it avoids the ‘repression trap.’ But what, then, do we exactly need to understand by this analytics of government?

**RATIONALITIES, TECHNOLOGIES, AND STRATEGIES OF GOVERNMENT**

In one of his lectures, Foucault brings up the question: “Why should one want to study this insubstantial and vague domain covered by a notion as problematic and artificial as that of ‘governmentality?’” His first, provisional answer is: “to tackle the problem of the state and population” (2007b: 116). The framework of governmentality looks for ways to simultaneously deconstruct the state and analyze it as a historically specific formation of one set of institutions among others that codifies and annexes locally devised mechanisms of power to regulate a state’s population. Thus, the state and its institutions are not a priori given institutions that mobilize or disseminate particular power technologies. Rather, these institutions need to be understood as materialized intersections of various technologies, strategies, and tactics of power that only bring these institutions and their subjects as well as the legitimization of power and the normalization of specific discourses into existence. These institutions, therefore, are not the originators or seats of power, but, rather, the effects of a variety of dispersed power technologies that have crystallized in more or less coherent, yet contestable institutionalized forms in the course of time. The state, thus, has neither a core nor a substance, but relates to heterogeneous practices or styles of articulating the activity of governing:

> We cannot speak of the state-thing as if it was a being developing on the basis of itself and imposing itself on individuals as if by a spontaneous, automatic mechanism. The state is a practice. The state is inseparable from the set of practices by which the state actually became a way of governing, a way of doing things, and a way too of relating to government ... The state is therefore a schema of intelligibility for a whole set of already established institutions, a whole set of given realities ... [The state emerges as] nothing more than a way of governing ... [or] a type of governmentality. (Foucault 2007b: 276-77, 286, 248)

Governmentality is to the state—or, more generally, to any institutionalized form of political government—what techniques of segregation are to psychiatry, what disciplinary mechanism are to the prison system, or what bio-politics are to medical institutions (see Foucault 2007b: 120).  

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8 In a similar vein, Foucault relates the modern notion of the autonomous subject to that of a much wider set of practices of what the ancient Greeks called ‘the care of the self.’ What Foucault conceives as ‘technologies of the self’ are various techniques that have historically been developed to articulate the care of the self differently. These technologies include practices such as mnemonics, confession, meditation, praying, asceticism, notebooks, diaries, writing in general, diets, and Cartesian doubt (Foucault 1988; 1990b; 1997d; 2005a). According to Foucault, genealogical analyses of such technologies need to clarify that, for instance, the kinds of knowledge of the self that are implied in the notion of the autonomous subject are not universal, and that self-knowledge in general does “not have the same form or function within [the] history of the care of the self” (2005a: 462).
Foucault (1994a; 1995; 2006) had tried to show that institutions, such as the clinic, the prison, the asylum, and the hospital, are no pre-given institutional settings in which power is applied to achieve clearly formulated goals. Moreover, the ‘microphysics of power’—the study of these power mechanisms from below rather than from above—was invented to show that such materialized forms of power have been practiced ‘diagrammatically,’ that is, dispersed throughout society.\textsuperscript{9} Foucault tried to show how, for instance, Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon functioned as a spatial diagram of visibility and intelligibility on which many societal relations had been modeled in the nineteenth century (Foucault 1995: 195-228; 2008b: 73-79).\textsuperscript{10}

In a similar vein, the study of governmentality approaches the ‘problematics of government’ that is related to the state’s emergence and its gradual consolidation and institutionalization. By the end of the 1970s, Foucault realized that, though he had criticized the political-juridical notion of power and the related prioritization of sovereign power in state theory, to some extent he had still considered the state as a conceptual ceiling of some of his earlier analyses. Then, he would need not only a microphysics of power, but also a macrophysics thereof, not to simply complement the microphysical approach, but to seriously complicate it. As I have already suggested above, this complication affects his conceptualization of disciplinary power as a flexible set of technologies to produce obedient and useful subjects, as it involves his notions of resistance and subject formation as immanent to such disciplinary power. Most of all, however, it affects any taken-for-granted dealing with the institution of the state and, more generally, with any governmentalized institution that has appeared in modern history, including supra-national institutions such as the EU. As we shall see below, a study of governmentality, and the idea of government as strategic codification and consolidation of power relations in particular, enables the required link of a microphysics with a macrophysics of power without reproducing some of the main drawbacks of his earlier works. The shift is not simply one from a microphysics to a macrophysics of power—as if we only deal with a shift in object—but implies an increased focus on how technologies of power are involved in processes of redeployment and reconfiguration and, consequently, on how they differently assemble governmental tools and rationales (Collier

\textsuperscript{9} I will come back to the notion of diagram below.
\textsuperscript{10} Bentham invented the panopticon at the beginning of the nineteenth century as an architectural model to shape industry houses, workhouses, orphanages, mental hospitals, prisons, and the like in such way that they could effectively contribute to the management and improvement of the entire population. In this respect, the panopticon “is a form for a series of institutions” and needs to be understood as “a schema which gives strength to any institution, a sort of mechanism by which the power which functions, or which should function in an institution will be able to gain maximum force” (Foucault 2008b: 74). Foucault describes the design as follows: “at the periphery, an annular building; at the centre, a tower; this tower is pierced with wide windows that open onto the inner side of the ring; the peripheric building is divided into cells, each of which extends the whole width of the building; they have two windows, one on the inside, corresponding to the windows of the tower; the other, on the outside, allows the light to cross the cell from one end to the other. All that is needed, then, is to place a supervisor in a central tower and to shut up in each cell a madman, a patient, a condemned man, a worker, or a schoolboy” (1995: 200). Foucault argues that the design of the panopticon constitutes its inmates as objects of knowledge, rather than as subjects of communication, and, thus, that the panopticon could be generally described as “the formal schema for the constitution of an individualizing power and for knowledge about individuals” (2008b: 79; see also Dean 1991: 180-87).
Foucault’s delineation of the concept of government starts from questioning the prevailing identification of government with political government and the focus on practices of state-related institutions and apparatuses. A history of the concept of government shows that, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, it had a much broader meaning, ranging from the government of the self, one’s own passions, soul, children, a family, or the right disposition of things to that of a ship, a market, a town, or a specific part of a population (Foucault 2007b: 92-107, 120-29; 2008a: 1-4). Until well into the eighteenth century, government and its problematics were discussed not only in politics, but also, and even more extensively, in philosophical, medical, religious, ethical, and pedagogic contexts. According to Foucault, only relatively late in history, namely in the course of the seventeenth century, did government start to be identified with and more exclusively related to the government of a state. To perceive of the state as something that has no essential necessity or functionality, but, rather, as a historically specific way in which the problem of governing has discursively and spatially been articulated, requires, therefore, a more general and wider demarcation of the concept of government. If we want to cover what is typical of the mentioned notions of government, Foucault suggests to understand the activity of governing as the ‘conduct of conduct’: leading, directing, or guiding the conduct of oneself, something, or others in a particular way and on the basis of a more or less well-articulated and specific form of rationality (Foucault 2000e: 341). Such a rationality or mentality of government means:

a way or system of thinking about the nature of the practice of government (who can govern; what governing is; what or who is governed), capable of making some form of that activity thinkable and practicable both to its practitioners and to those upon whom it was practiced. (Gordon 1991: 3)

A governmental rationality refers to an ‘underlying’ yet materialized form of thought that articulates in a specific way how governing is perceived of, who or what is exactly considered the object of the governing activity, and what kinds of objectives are related to certain practices of government. A rationality of government refers neither to a uni-

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11 As Mitchell Dean puts forward, in the expression ‘the conduct of conduct,’ the term ‘conduct’ has a clear meaning only in the first term of the phrase. In the former use ‘to conduct’ means to direct or lead. The latter sense of the term ‘conduct’ is more difficult to delineate. In the literature on (Foucauldian) government, the latter term has usually been used to describe every kind of human conduct, where conduct is used as a synonym for all human action and behavior. Foucault describes (the second use of) conduct “as a way of behaving within a more or less open field of possibilities” (2000e: 341). Dean emphasizes that the second use of conduct “does not necessarily presuppose a ‘free subject’ if by that is meant a self-determining being that exists as an autonomous center of consciousness, will and action” (1995: 562). Dean wants to clarify that Foucault’s notion of conduct neither starts from a trans-historical notion of subjectivity, nor necessarily presupposes a concept of the modern, allegedly autonomous and freely acting subject. Dean, therefore, proposes to take conduct “as a broad term encompassing all types of action and comportment, and styles and patterns of quotidian existence, involving some form of deliberation. It might be located as a region of action lying between the ‘ideal types’ of affective and habitual responses and rational action that does not exclude the possibility of an admixture of habit, emotion and calculation” (ibid 561-62).
versal, trans-historical form of thought, nor to a mode of rationality that precedes forms and practices of action. These rationalities of government need to be seen as ‘superficial,’ rather than ‘deep’ forms of thought; they are not situated ‘below’ its practices and technical devices as a kind of mental forms that have first been developed and, only thereafter, applied to or translated into specific circumstances. Rather, rationalities of government are interwoven with its practices and the discursive fields in which the specific problems of government are materially articulated. The intimate relation between rationalities and practices of government also means that rationalities do not exclusively refer to knowledge or thought in the sense of ideas. Rather, they include everything that could be considered as the know-how that enables the performance of government, comprising theories from dietetics to economics, techniques from iris scans to truth and reconciliation commissions, schemes from zoning plans to electoral thresholds, and expertise from risk management to community work. Thus, following this more general notion of government, its performance always relates to how specific techniques and the interventions of experts materialize government, express certain rationalities, and demarcate something as a particular problem-space that needs to be addressed in terms of different kinds of governmental interventions.

To make government practicable at all, the domain to be governed needs to be demarcated spatially, visualized technically, and conceptualized as an intelligible field. Governmental rationalities, technologies, and expertise come together in Foucault’s concept of the diagram. What he considered as the diagrammatic could be seen as a way to “think with hands and eyes” (Latour 1986), that is to make government intelligible and express its visual and material dimensions. In its most general form, Foucault’s diagram could be conceived of as a non-transcendental, historically variable, and geographically specific version of Kant’s schema—that is the way in which reason necessarily needs to adjust to the phenomena to imagine worldly relationships (Foucault 2008b: 75; Gordon 1980; Deleuze 1999). Foucault’s best-known example of a diagram is Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon, his meticulous design of a mechanism that dissociates the seeing/being seen dyad (see note 10). Even though prisons, but also other social institutions, were built according to Bentham’s sterile architectural principles, Foucault stresses that these institutions never really functioned according to the ‘original’ ideals and intentions. Yet, rather than considering the panopticon as a kind of utopian dream building, or as a failed design of how social institutions could or should be improved or even optimized, Foucault suggests that we need to understand it as a diagram:

[I]t is the diagram of a mechanism of power reduced to its ideal form; its functioning, abstracted from any obstacle, resistance or friction, must be represented as a pure architectural and optical system: it is in fact a figure of political technology that may and must be detached from any specific use ... The panoptic mechanism is not simply a hinge, a point of exchange between a mechanism of power and a function; it is a way of a making power relations function in a function, and of making a function function through these power relations. (Foucault 1995: 205, 206-07, my emphasis)

A diagram could be considered as a figure that problematizes government in a certain way and—even if it is not really institutionalized—it nevertheless “articulates or pre-
supposes a knowledge of the field of reality upon which it is to intervene and/or which it is calculated to bring into being” (Gordon 1980: 248). A diagram shows how a field of visibility is intrinsically related to its mapping or drawing. How something is visualized by means of charts, maps, sketches, drawings, tables, numbers, and the like illustrates rudimentarily what or who is to be governed within what kind of governable space and within what kinds of power relations (Sarasin 2009). The enclosure of such a field of visibility is intimately linked to expertise and the practice of rendering technical, that is making something “amenable to a technique” (N Rose 1999b: 79). Rendering technical, to put it differently, is the process that makes it possible at all to represent a certain domain as an intelligible field with certain limits and characteristics and as a sphere that needs to be governed, managed, and developed in particular ways.

Linking governmental rationalities with governmental technologies implies the acknowledgment of “the material conditions which enable thought to work upon an object” (Rose and Miller 1992: 185). This understanding of technology means that we cannot separate the realms of the technical and the governmental, but that they are mutually dependent upon one another. A technology of government opens up new objects and spaces of government. Governmental technologies and the practice of rendering technical, thus, do not refer to a contingent or intrusive intervention in the governing activity, but to the necessarily material dimension of government. The relationship between technology and expertise also plays an important role in how particular issues and themes could be kept outside the realm of political contestation. Experts often frame their professional activities and technological interventions as a set of ‘positive’ and ‘neutral’ tools needed to solve the problems that they have specified. The translation of political questions into technical terms itself, however, needs to be considered as an intervention that shapes and limits governmental spaces, subjects, and practices. The process of rendering technical could remove delicate issues from the disputed domain of politics to relocate them onto the allegedly neutral terrains of management, medicine, accounting, monitoring, therapy, developmental aid, human development, activation

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12 In the literature on governmentality, the diagrammatic dimension of government is often conceptualized in terms of programs of government (Rose and Miller 1992; N Rose 1999b; Dean 1995; 1999). Though Foucault sometimes used his notions of diagram and program interchangeably (1994b; 1994c), the use of the latter term could easily be misunderstood. Partly because of its computer metaphor, the notion of program could wrongly suggest that we deal with clearly delineated ‘inputs’ and ‘outputs’ as well as with an unproblematic relation between the intentions and achieved results of programs. However, Foucault conceptualized programs and diagrams differently. They crystallize in institutions and direct individual and collective forms of perception and reception. In the same way, we need to understand Bentham’s panopticon not as a ‘reality,’ but as a scheme that has guided, shaped, and modified practices of government. That the social reality never really became panoptic does therefore not imply that panopticism was merely utopian. If, for instance, the penal system failed as a way to deal with crime because it only produced delinquency, if these delinquents were seen as fundamentally incorrigible, and if the public opinion and the judiciary warned for the emergence of an entire class of ‘criminals,’ then, Foucault suggests, this had everything to do with the fact that the schematic planning of a panoptic society did not remain utopian (Foucault 1994c; 1991b; Lemke 1997). Colin Gordon suggests that what Foucault illustrates here “is a curious anti-functionality of the norm: the failure of prisons to fulfill their planned function as reformatories, far from precipitating their breakdown acts instead as the impulse for a perpetual effort to reform the prison which continually reinvokes the model of its original, aborted program” (1980: 250; see also Foucault 1995: 264-78; 2009).
policies, community building, minority empowerment, and the like.\textsuperscript{13} Hence, the tactics of government and the intervention of expertise make possible the continual definition and redefinition of what is, for instance, within the competence of (e.g. national or European) politics and what is not, and what is considered as part of the public domain and what is rendered merely private.

We have seen that Foucault’s conceptualization of government implies a broad understanding of it. Mitchell Dean has concisely reformulated this concept of government as:

Any more or less calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a multiplicity of authorities and agencies, employing a variety of techniques and forms of knowledge, that seeks to shape conduct by working through our desires, aspirations, interests and beliefs, for definite but shifting ends and with a diverse set of relatively unpredictable consequences, effects and outcomes. (Dean 1999: 11)

Foucault’s definition of government has several advantages (Merlingen 2007). First, this notion enables us to distinguish a plurality or a network of dispersed governing agents and agencies, ranging from an individual to transnational activists movements, from NGOs to municipalities, from political governments to IGOs, and from enterprises to churches and religious foundations more generally. Conceptualized along the lines of governmental rationalities and technologies, government inherently embodies networked relations of power. Thus, it is a theory of power that does not conceptualize it as a unified and centralized substance or property that can be possessed by a particular person, group or institution (be it a monarch, a class, a political government, the IMF, or the EU) and, thereafter, distributed or transferred from such a supposed center of power to remote peripheries to be exercised over subjects to oppress, direct, encourage, or discipline them. Such a concept of power implicitly suggests that power relations could be examined independently from other social, discursive, and technical formations or at least by means of an analysis of the functions and dysfunctions of centralized political authorities and institutions. Instead, the notion of power that is implied by the concept of government enables us, for instance, to understand political authorities and institutions that are usually associated with the state apparatus—schools, prisons, asylum centers, the army, hospitals or museums—not so much as the natural centers of power, but, rather, as the effects of a manifold of dispersed, heterogeneous, unstable, and contestable relations of power.

A second strength of the concept of government is the emphasis that it lays on the importance of the simultaneous analysis of micro- and macro-physical elements and phenomena. Government conceptually links both levels of analysis or, perhaps it is better said, clarifies that these levels or scales themselves are the outcomes of various governmental processes. A macro-agent or a global one is not necessarily different in kind from a micro-agent or a local one, but is, rather, one who has temporarily established a longer and more constant ‘chain of command’:

\textsuperscript{13} James Ferguson (1994) has called the underlying mechanism of this relocating of political questions an ‘anti-politics machine’ to emphasize how experts often actively contribute to the de-politicization of delicate issues.
The degree of connectedness of more or less ‘effective’ networks implies that the government of complex processes or large spaces does not differ from that of smaller ones in terms of ontology, but, rather, in those of technology. ‘Techniques,’ then, not only refers to large governmental infrastructures, such as those of markets and bureaucracies, but also to small devices and inscription techniques that are an important and necessary make-up for the well-functioning and durability of these larger, more unstable and heterogeneous structures. In this respect, maps, charts, benchmarks, diagrams, numbers, indices, or tables are not the dull and ready-made instruments at the expert’s desktop, but viable inscription tools that influentially act upon the reality to make a variety of things from devices and agencies to entire populations comparable, calculable, gradable, and, thus, governable in a more or less durable and stable sense. In the context of Europe, we could perceive, for instance, the ‘scoreboard for Europe’—which ‘measures’ the performances of national governments in the EU in specific fields of policy—and the ‘Eurobarometer’—which polls the popularity of the EU among different national publics—as such tools (Reif and Inglehart 1991; EC 2000d). They are governmental and bio-political technologies that have helped make the performance of national governments, territorialized populations, public opinions, and civil societal agencies into more durable and comparable entities (Walters 2002; Merlingen 2003).

This aspect touches upon a third advantage of the government concept: the way in which it connects discursivity and materiality. An inherently technical understanding of government adds an important aspect to those discourse and frame analytical theories that do not sufficiently take the material dimension of discourse into account.14 We could also say that governmentality theory blurs the boundaries between the discursive and the technical by stressing that inscription or translation processes are always materially embedded in the performance of government and, thus, making the activity of governing possible at all.

This aspect can be linked to a fourth strong point of the government concept. The examination of governmental rationalities and technologies emphasizes the historical changeability and situational contingency of specific forms of government or governance. In the end, the effect of a study of governmentality is “to strip political rule of its self-evident, normal or natural character, which is essential for its operation” (Merlingen 2007: 188). Thus, governmentality theory as an analysis of the problematics of government aims at making the familiar unfamiliar again and de-reifying various institutional and political formations that we take for granted when we consider them as the starting points of our political analyses, rather than as their provisional and contestable endpoints. Discussing how a governmentality approach contributes to the de-familiarization of political rule, though, is closely related to analyzing government genealogically.

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14 Yet, critical forms of discourse theory that take the materiality of discourse into account have been cross-fertilized with analyses of European governance (Howarth 2005).
To understand how governmental rationalities and technologies have been developed in historically specific ways, we still need to take an important theoretical step. This step involves the historicization of government or, rather, a genealogical interrogation of government. Genealogy, a term that Foucault (1998) derived from Friedrich Nietzsche’s philosophy of knowledge and morality, is a critical, de-constructivist form of writing history that does not opt for an alternative or better way to represent history. Genealogy undoes history of its naturalness and finalities, firstly, by deconstructing historical knowledge as a possible foundation for claiming universal or transcendental truths and, secondly, by challenging attempts to utilize historical knowledge for the discovery of the alleged roots of individual or collective identities. Genealogy reverses or, better still, shuffles the prevailing relationships between historical causes and effects. It maps out how what we often consider as original and authentic has actually to be understood as an effect of how knowledge or expertise is mobilized to unify and homogenize multiplicities. Genealogical analyses do not “bring a whole group of derived phenomena back to a cause” and, consequently, are “opposed to a genesis oriented towards the unity of some principal cause burdened with multiple descendants.” Rather, genealogical examinations involve attempts “to restore the conditions for the appearance of a singularity born out of multiple determining elements of which it is not the product, but rather the effect” (Foucault 2002: 202-03). Genealogies try to make a singularity intelligible precisely by showing what turns it into something singular, homogeneous, or authentic.

A genealogical articulation of government connects two important aspects of governmentality theory, namely how government becomes the conceptual key to the writing of a history of power technologies, on the one hand (see above), and how governmentality functions as a process, on the other. The latter aspect could be called ‘governmentalization’ and clarifies how historically specific and situated technologies, strategies, and tactics of power have gradually become codified in the form of the institutions that we often take for granted in our inquiries: the state, the EU, UN agencies, the World Bank, an NGO, and the like. The analysis of traversing trajectories of governmentalization sheds light on how, through processes of reflection, codification, and consolidation, a particular institution or organization has gradually acquired the ‘right’ and authority to speak in the name of a larger group of individuals or even entire national or transnational populations and, thus, to govern in their name. A genealogy of government shows, for instance, how the state has been gradually governmentalized in the course of modern European history. The governmentalization of the state shows that it is, in actual fact, “the mobile effect of a regime of multiple governmentalities” (Foucault 2008a: 77) at the intersections of which the state is constantly being codified and re-codified. As I have discussed above, this focus on the state’s governmentalization implies that we do not start off with an examination of “the nature, structure, and functions of the state in and for itself” (Foucault 2008a: 77). Rather, such an analysis begins with unraveling the problem of bringing something under the control of the state and with the problem of what Foucault calls ‘statification’:
The state is not a universal nor in itself an autonomous source of power. The state is nothing else but the effect, the profile, the mobile shape of a perpetual statification (étatisation) or statifications, in the sense of incessant transactions which modify, or move, or drastically change, or insidiously shift sources of finance, modes of investment, decision-making centers, forms and types of control, relationships between local powers, the central authority, and so on. (Foucault 2008a: 77)

Thus, in the case of the state, the analysis of its governmentalization reveals that it is neither a master category of political organization nor something that has been solidified some time in the early modernity and that, since then, has been reformed time and again while maintaining some essential features.

What does it actually mean that a governmentalized institutional formation, such as the state or the EU, could be considered as a mobile effect of “a regime of multiple governmentalities”? (Foucault 2008a: 77) To adequately answer this question, we need to deal with a third and last crucial element of Foucault’s analytics of governmentality, namely the ways in which governmentality functions as a specific form of power. Many studies that have employed or referred to governmentality ‘theory’ have neglected to differentiate between the three interconnected dimensions that I consider this theory’s central components:

Firstly, governmentality as an analytics or conceptual analysis of diverse, historically specific arts of government and their effects. This perspective on government includes the study of technologies of power as the analysis of how different governmental tools and rationales have historically been redeployed, reconfigured, and transformed at a given moment and place.15

Secondly, governmentality as a process: governmentalization as a gradual, historically specific, non-linear codification of certain rationalities, technologies, and strategies of government.

Thirdly, governmentality as a historically specific and situated form of power in which government is consolidated and retained in more or less stable and durable, yet contestable ways.

Studies that neglect this differentiation prevailingly focus on governmentality as a form of power, and on liberal or neo-liberal modes of governmentality in particular. By so doing, they run the danger of simplifying the empirical and theoretical implications of a governmentality approach and, consequently, of reducing its potential to critically assess processes of governmentalization, to distinguish different modalities of power, to chal-

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15 The conceptual framework of governmentality itself cannot be understood as a kind of trans-historical and universal theory, but needs to be considered in relation to the two other dimensions. However, the fact that studies of governmentality themselves need to be seen as a product of liberalism (chapter 2) does not preclude that these studies could, at the same time, develop as a critical analytical framework for studying various forms of governmentality and their impact (see also Stenson 1998, who has formulated a comparable point of view).
lenge existing governmental forms of power, and to indicate trajectories toward other, newly emerging forms of governmentality.

Foucault distinguishes various stages of the governmentalization of the state, or, better, various trajectories of governmentalization that have allowed the state to survive as one of the most dominant agencies of government (2007b: 109). Each of these stages corresponds roughly to a dominant modality of governmentality. Firstly, Foucault distinguishes what he calls pastoral forms of governmentality, which have been developed for the first time in the Middle Ages and from which modern, liberal governmentalities as well as practices of the state have simultaneously and gradually emanated. In contrast to prevailing notions and theories of secularization, Foucault suggests that the early modern period does not start with the reduction or even disappearance of the social and political power of the Church, but, rather, with the dissemination of the Church’s pastoral functions outside of its main institutions over state related practices. Thus, even though other forms of governmentality have started to dominate since the sixteenth century, pastoral power still plays an important role in contemporary societies.16

Secondly, Foucault distinguishes a ‘proto-liberal’ form of governmentality central to the doctrines and practices of raison d’état (reason of state) and police (police). Today, we associate reason of state largely with the arbitrary or even violent exercise of power, and police with that specific state institution that is mainly concerned with security issues. Foucault shows that these doctrines had another connotation in the period between, roughly, the middle of the sixteenth and the end of the eighteenth century. As I will discuss in chapters 2 and 4, the doctrines and practices of ‘reason of state’ and the correlated ‘police sciences’ represent a “‘dispositional’ and ‘householding’ conception of government” (Dean 1999: 6) that is primarily related to the enactment of mercantile and so-called cameralistic forms of administering persons and things.

The most substantial part of Foucault’s genealogy of governmentality is related to the understanding of the gradual emergence and transformation of a third modality of governmentality, which he considers as primarily liberal. As I will discuss in the context of changing forms of European governance in chapter 2 and in the context of eighteenth-century East Central European practices of government in chapter 4, liberal forms of government are primarily “concerned with the government through certain processes—whether economic, psychological, biological, demographic or social” (Dean 1999: 6). The emergence of liberal technologies of power implies a shift of the dominant form of government “from a government of inhabitants, ‘things,’ and households [characteristic of reason-of-state practices] to a government through tendencies, laws, necessities, and processes” (ibid 111). Liberal governmentality emerged for the first time in the eigh-

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16 Foucault conceptualizes pastoral governmentality as forms of spiritual government of souls oriented to their salvation in another world. He distinguishes political modes of pastoral governmentality that are related to Egyptian, Assyrian, Babylonian, Mesopotamian, Hebrew, and Christian cultures and societies. Central to all these modalities are governmental rationalities and technologies that are related to the complex triangle of a high authority (a deity), its representative on earth (a ‘shepherd’ or ‘pastor’), and a spiritual or religious community (a pastorate or ‘flock’). Foucault has extensively discussed Christian forms of pastoral power and the ways in which they transformed into the state pastorate (Foucault 2007b: 123-236). I will not discuss pastoral power in this study, but focus on (the emergence of) liberal modes of governmentality.
teenth century—along with bio-political forms of population regulation—and includes forms of government whose basic forms “we can still recognize in its contemporary modifications” (Foucault 2007b: 354). As I will discuss at length in the third part of this study, one of its dominant contemporary modifications is related to neo-liberalism or neo-liberal technologies of power, such as modes of government through community (N Rose 2000) and the governance of activation (van Berkel and Borghi 2008a; Newman and Tonkens 2011).

Earlier in this chapter, I pointed to the importance of understanding these different modalities of governmentality not as the inauguration of ever-new logics and regimes of power that have decisively replaced earlier ones. This understanding of power relations has important implications for how we analyze dominant and newly emerging trajectories of governmentalization. Often, the contemporary condition in Europe or the world has been described as the ‘age of globalization’ or as ‘the neo-liberal order.’ These representations, though justifiable to some extent, tend to suggest radical shifts and rather homogeneous, all-embracing transformations. Articulating power topologically, however, makes it possible to analyze current ‘states of affairs’ as ambiguous and heterogeneous at the same time. Understanding ‘globalization,’ ‘Europeanization,’ or ‘neo-liberalism’ as strategies to govern heterogeneous things, persons, populations, spaces, or processes—and thus as forms of governmentality, rather than as dominant ideologies—makes it possible to undo these terms from totalizing or homogenizing claims (chapter 5, Larner and Walters 2004; Walters and Haahr 2005; Ong 2006). A topological approach to power relations articulates how different modalities of governmentality and diverse technologies of power overlap, intersect, or even contradict. Though one modality of governmentality may be the most dominant at a certain place and time, this form does not inevitably saturate and dominate all relationships of power.

BEYOND GOVERNMENTALITY? CONTESTATION AS A LIMIT CONCEPT

If a topological approach to power relations articulates how different modalities of governmentality overlap, intersect, or even contradict, we also need to ask how dominant governmentality can be subjected to change. Let me take the example of neo-liberalism again. If we conceive it as a set of technologies of power, rather than as an omnipresent and omnipotent ideology, we also need to question whether the actual articulation and enactment of these technologies automatically leads to something that we again need to describe as neo-liberal (chapters 6, 7, Clarke 2008; Ferguson 2009). Put differently, is neo-liberalism really “everywhere” (Peck and Tickell 2002), or could we also trace trajectories toward its contestation? In this section, I discuss, more generally, the ways in which modes of governmentality could be challenged.

A consideration of the possibility of the contestation of a particular governmentality, understood as a form of power, needs to start from acknowledging that we cannot simply juxtapose forms of resistance to mentalities of rule. Within the governmentality literature, it has sometimes been suggested that the continuous revision and reshaping of rule is a consequence of resistance to rule (Hunt and Wickman 1994; Miller and Rose 2008). However, such an approach implicitly considers resistance as something exterior
to rule, rather than as primarily constitutive thereof. An understanding of resistance as something that is integral to the shaping of power relations allows a conception of politics as “relations of contest or struggle which are constitutive of government, rather than simply a source of programmatic failure and (later) redesign” (O’Malley et al. 1997: 505). As I have explained above, governmental mentalities cannot simply be seen as the answers of rulers or policy-makers to questions they ask themselves in order to deal with the conduct of the objects or subjects they want to govern. This has much to do with the impossibility to consider rationalities, technologies, expertise, and practices of government as autonomous, separate, or even successive moments of governmental actions, rather than as always inextricably interwoven elements of a specific art of government. If we would consider them as separate or successive moments of government, this would imply that resistance is a kind of external blockage that hinders unproblematic and successful implementation in the ultimate phases of a linearly represented governmental process. Seen from this perspective, a governmental project or program could fail only due to obstacles that are put on the highway of an otherwise well-oiled and ongoing governmental machine. Or, following yet another but related interpretation of how rule is supposed to work, resistance is taken into account by the ‘rulers,’ but it is always seriously weakened or even neutralized by their attempts to bring it into alignment with their rationalities and technologies of government. This interpretation assumes, firstly, that rulers are well able to identify what they need and do not need to rule successfully, and, secondly, that, after the identification of these abject elements, they can get—easily or not—rid of them during implementation processes (O’Malley 1996: 323). Both views of the role of resistance presuppose that governmental projects and techniques can be coherent, uniform, univocal, systematic, and, finally, also successful—if only we remove the resistant elements or align them effectively during the process of implementation.  

However, the crucial matter is that we cannot separate out rationalities and technologies of government from the processes of their messy translation. Neither can we conflate governmental strategies and outcomes, nor isolate power relations from the resistant elements that constantly saturate them. We need to acknowledge the constitutive role of resistances, contestations, and antagonisms in how rule operates and in how governmental rationalities and technologies, as well as their spatial configurations, are shaped and reshaped. The acknowledgment of such a relation between rule and contestation implies more than the recognition of a kind of permanent interaction between them. It is the explicit aim of this study to analyze the extent to which this mutual relation between rule and contestation corrodes the stability of rationalities of govern-

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17 James Scott’s (1985; 1990; 1998) seminal studies on high modernism, state domination, and everyday forms of resistance still seem to start from a similar view of resistance. Scott acknowledges that there are “no pristine sites outside of power” and devotes much space to “the messy encounters between tangled and ineffectual state plans, on the one hand, and local forms of resistance and accommodation, on the other hand” (2005: 400). Yet, he does not really take into account the constitutive role that resistance plays in how rule operates (see below). Therefore, his concept of resistance considerably differs from the one implied by Foucault’s work on governmentality (Ferguson 2005b; Li 2005).

18 Increasingly more authors who have discussed a governmentality approach, have also acknowledged this issue (O’Malley 1996; O’Malley et al. 1997; Stenson 1998; 2008; Barnett 1999; Li 1999; 2007a; Ong 2006; Ong and Collier 2005a; Lemke 2000; 2007; Allen 2003; Clarke 2004; McKee 2009).
ment and contributes to a form of ambivalence that is not accidental, but, rather, central to forms of governmentality. This issue points to the importance of the strategic mobility, transformability, and reversibility that characterizes forms of governmentality:

[a governmentality approach involves the examination of] the complex and multiple practices of a governmentality that presupposes, on the one hand, rational forms, technical procedures, instrumentations through which to operate, and, on the other, strategic games that subject the power relations they are supposed to guarantee to instability and reversal. (Foucault 1997c: 203, my emphasis, see also 2005a: 252; 2008a: 320)

Strategic games, thus, refer to the principal contestability of power relations. A game represents a set of rules by which a non-essential ‘truth’ and a relative degree of certainty and stability is produced. A game “is a set of procedures that lead to a certain result, which, on the basis of its principles and rules of procedures, may be considered valid or invalid, winning or losing” (Foucault 1997b: 297). Such a set of procedures is not something fixed for “it is always possible to discover something different and to more or less modify this or that rule, and sometimes even the entire game” (ibid). Strategic games need to be seen in the context of the ways in which power relations are conditioned by the element of freedom. As I have discussed earlier in this chapter, states of domination in which ‘free play’ has almost been made impossible represent only one far end of a much more heterogeneous and longer spectrum of power relations. The strategic aspect of games, therefore, could basically be related to “any form of activity ... in which the coordination of action is potentially open to dispute” (Tully 1999: 168). Within these manifold games, such strategies of struggle are related to “any form of reciprocal interplay, or ‘incitation and struggle,’ disputation takes, from sedimanted games of domination where free play is reduced to a minimum at one end, through all forms of negotiation and provisional agreements and disagreements, up to direct confrontations that break up game at the other end” (ibid). James Tully has concisely reformulated how Foucault’s notion of strategic games contributes to a view of contestation that leads beyond power-resistance binaries:

[Foucault] sees the modification of the rules of any game as itself an agonic game of freedom: precisely the freedom of speaking and acting differently. He asks us to regard human activities as games with rules and techniques of governance to be sure, and these are often agonic games, but also, and more importantly, to look on the ways the players modify the rules by what they say and do as they carry on, and, in so doing, modify their identities as players: that is, the games of freedom within and against the rules of the games of governance. (Tully 1999: 168; cf Foucault 1997b: 291-93)

Consequently, to deal with the relationship between rule and resistance, an analysis of specific modes of governmentality needs to be linked with an examination of parallel types of contestation—or of what Foucault has now and then called ‘counter-conducts.’ He clearly makes this point at the end of his lectures on security, territory, and population, where he states that “the history of the governmental ratio, and the history of the
counter-conducts opposed to it, are *inseparable from each other*” (Foucault 2007b: 357, my emphasis).

Foucault himself has only summarily dealt with such counter-conducts (2004: 66-79; 2007b: 197-216, 355-57). His related remarks are sometimes vague and cryptic. In the first volume of *The History of Sexuality*, for example, he writes: “it is not that life has been totally integrated into techniques that govern and administer it; it constantly escapes them” (1990a: 143). Foucault suggests that, as soon as life in the form of population regulation has entered into modern history as a bio-political object, individuals or collectives have also started to consider the basic needs and requirements of that same life as the sources for counter-conducts.¹⁹ What could that mean? In his lecture series on governmentality, Foucault delineates three ways in which counter-conducts have simultaneously developed with modern forms of governmentality. In these cases, he discusses forms of counter-conduct that were developed at the time of the shift of the dominant type of power from *raison d’état* to liberal governmentalities. Firstly, he suggests that the indefinite governmentality of the state was partly halted by the simultaneous emergence of the reality of society (or civil society) itself.²⁰ Secondly, he brings up the ways in which various forms of revolt and rebellion functioned as counter-conducts. Foucault relates them to oppositions to the state in which a population tried to break the bonds of obedience that were a result of its bio-political regulation. Thirdly, he puts forward that the state as the possessor of ‘truth’ was also opposed by the idea of a nation (Foucault 2007b: 355-57).

At first glance, these examples of counter-conduct may seem somewhat odd. Indeed, ‘society,’ ‘population,’ and ‘nation’ are quite heavy terms, which seem to suggest big, collective movements, rather than micro-political and strategic ways to rearticulate and challenge modern governmentalities. Moreover, we are usually inclined to identify civil societal movements, popular or mass revolts, and anti-state forms of nationalism with the oppressed, marginalized, and minoritized. What Foucault seems to clarify here, however, is that the popping up of the pairs of state-society, state-population, and state-nation as schematizations typical of modern, liberal rationalities and technologies of government—rather than as politically universal entities—has resulted in attempts to intervene in society and the ‘nation’ through the bio-political regulation of population as well as in parallel efforts to challenge the corresponding governmentalities. Thus, these challenges are not conducted outside existing power relations and dynamics, but rather by

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¹⁹ Jacques Rancière suggests that Foucault was “never interested” (2010: 93) in the theoretical question of politics, but primarily in questions of power and bio-politics. Yet, if we take seriously the ways in which I have analyzed the relationships between governmentality, biopower, and contestation in this chapter, as well as Foucault’s own claim that the main goal of his work has not been to analyze the phenomena of power but to discuss how humans are made, and turn themselves into, subjects (Foucault 2000e: 326; 2010: 41-42), Rancière’s statement becomes unsettled again. If, as Rancière puts forward, the “question of politics begins when the status of the subject able and ready to concern itself with the community becomes an issue” (ibid 93), this question is also central to Foucault’s notion of acting on the acts and actions of others (see above). If it is true that Rancière’s concept of politics has more in common with that of Foucault than the former suggests, this congruence would also have consequences for the way in which Rancière (1999; 2010) distinguishes his use of the police concept from that of Foucault. My chapter 4 can be read as an implicit critique of how Rancière distinguishes his police concept from the Foucauldian one.

²⁰ In chapter 2, I will discuss the state-society relation in the context of liberal governmentality.
means of a perpetual use of tactical elements that are pertinent in these struggles, insofar as they fall within the general horizon of particular, dominant forms of governmentality. This points to the crucial importance of processes of discursive and strategic re-articulation. As discourses and practices of binary distributions between state and society, state and population, and state and nation, counter-conducts could mobilize new agents. Consequently, it would be erroneous to suggest that the discourses and practices of civil society, for instance, belong exclusively to the underprivileged and disadvantaged. These discourses have a capacity to circulate and an ability to transform and even metamorphize to serve dissimilar political programs and projects (I will return to this theme in the third part of this study). This ability is what could be understood as the strategic polyvalence or reversibility of forms of governmentality.

This discussion leads me to propose conceptualizing contestation as a limit concept. Since counter-conducts always appear within the horizon of parallel forms of governmentality, we can productively consider those resistances that are embodied by counter-conducts as challenges that emerge at the limit of corresponding governmentalities. Such forms of contestation could be understood as “border-elements … which have been continually re-utilized, re-implanted, and taken up again in one or another direction” (Foucault 2007b: 215). As I have clarified, it would be a mistake to identify such an understanding of the border, the limit, or the margin too easily with those who are or have historically been marginalized or disadvantaged. Strategies for change and challenge can be developed within various contexts and articulated wherever governmental practices are seriously destabilized.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I have explored the main methodological and conceptual parameters of the analytical framework that I will mobilize in this study to discuss several trajectories toward Europe’s governmentalization and to interrogate past and current forms of European Romani minority governance and self-governance in particular. I have examined how an approach to power relations along the lines of an analytics of government avoids considering state, sub-state, or supra-state institutions as natural, pre-existing political formations. Understood from the angle of governmentality, such formations are seen as the temporal, unstable, and contestable effects of various technologies of power and their dissemination through the social body, rather than as the unproblematic starting points of socio-political analysis. I have explained how a governmentality approach contributes to discussing sovereign, disciplinary, and regulatory forms of power beyond epochal or functionalist claims as well as to conceiving contemporary power relations beyond structure-agency and power-resistance binaries. I have shown how an understanding of government beyond political government or governance has several advantages. Such a

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21 Foucault has tried to show how, for instance, the discourse of races started as a form of counter-conduct or counter-history and how this discourse gradually, in the course of modern European history, was recodified as a dominant and dangerous form of state racism. Foucault considers the repeated re-articulation of the discourse of races as an example of a discourse’s ability to circulate and transform and serve even contradictory political aims (Stoler 1995: 70-73; Foucault 2004: 76, 208).
conception not only identifies heterogeneous agents and agencies involved in the performance of government at a variety of levels, it also considers the objects, subjects, spaces, and scales of governance themselves as situated, historically specific outcomes of governmental rationalities and strategies. Moreover, an analytics of government understands the maintenance, circulation, and transformation of power relations beyond intentional or discursive framings. I have paid particular attention to the crucial role that practices of rendering technical—making something amenable to a technique—play in assembling disparate and heterogeneous elements in order to make something governable at all. I have related the analytics of government to the relevance of understanding governmentality both as a process and as a form of power. Examining processes of governmentalization makes it not only possible to de-familiarize our common understanding of government and its scope, but also sheds light on how specific arts of government have historically undergone important changes and crystallized in different, yet contestable forms of power. Examining how my threefold theory of governmentality contributes to a better understanding of transformations of European (minority) governance is the central aim of the next chapter.
Chapter 2
Toward the Governmentalization of Europe

INTRODUCTION

This chapter contributes to current debates about how we could extend analyses of governmentality beyond the state and productively apply them to supranational and inter-state forms of governance in Europe, to modes of transnational minority governance in particular. Whereas, in part three, I will discuss current modalities of transnational, European governmentality, this chapter sheds light on their first appearance in early modern Europe and, therefore, provides a background for understanding the nature and scope of Europe’s governmentalization. This chapter traces the trajectory from early modern to current forms of inter-state governmentality in Europe. My main aim in this chapter is to suggest how we could mobilize Foucault’s own pioneering, yet fragmentary reflections on Europe to discuss contemporary forms of European Romani minority governance. For that reason, this chapter maps out the agenda for what I am going to analyze in the second and third part of this study.

This chapter’s first part articulates what I call the early modern governmentalization of Europe. I show how, since the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, forms of inter-state governmentality have been simultaneously and co-constitutively developed with intra-state forms of governmentality. A hitherto neglected part of Foucault’s work considers the parallel emergence of state and inter-state forms of governmentality in Europe at the end of the sixteenth century and discusses their transformations in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (but see Leira 2009; McMillan 2010). I pay particular attention to how notions of governmental balance, stability, and police were simultaneously developed in the context of state and inter-state practices of governing. I explain how these practices led to a new and self-reflexive perception of Europe in which its internal stability and balance had to be based on a non-unity, rather than a unity, of all its states. In the third section of this chapter, in which I focus on the emergence of liberalism at the end of the eighteenth century, I show how the problematization of European government in terms of balance and police gradually changed. It was displaced by an art of government according to which Europe is perceived as an economic unity and as an economic subject, which now needs ‘the world’ as its limitless market. The representation of Europe as a region of unlimited expansion and the globalization of the European market, I argue, have not only had crucial consequences for modern forms of
population regulation outside Europe—in colonized parts of the world—but also for those inside Europe.

Though Foucault did pioneering, original work to understand the state/inter-state relationships and their transformations in early modern European contexts, his work does not tell us much about how we need to understand post-eighteenth-century forms of European governmentality. Further, his genealogy of inter-state governmentality remained Eurocentric in tone. In the last part of this chapter, I will discuss a few bodies of literature that can productively be mobilized to discuss transnational population regulation of minoritized groups, such as the Romani, beyond the limits of Foucault’s work. I will explain how particularly postcolonial critiques of development regimes help to shed light on how we could approach present-day forms of transnational population regulation in Europe.

STATE AND INTER-STATE GOVERNMENTALITY IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE

In Foucault’s genealogy of governmentalities, the changes in how government was problematized in the seventeenth and eighteenth century are crucially important. Increasingly, government became codified as political government and associated with the emergence of state institutions as well as with their authorization to ‘speak in the name’ of increasingly territorialized and nationalized populations. This does not mean that the state and their apparatuses only emerged in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and as a consequence of the shift from what Foucault called the pastoral government of souls to the political government of men. The crucial issue is that state government gradually began to enter into a reflected practice in these centuries. At this moment, a proto-liberal form of governmentality is born, namely the one that is usually connected with the emergence of doctrines and practices of raison d’état (reason of state) and police (police). This emergence had everything to do with the sort of reflective practice that was related to these governmental rationalities and technologies. What started to be developed from the end of the sixteenth century onward was a specific kind of critique of political reason. The crucial point here is the shift from the governing activity as something that is more or less natural and unproblematic to the explicit problematization of the government of the state.

The governmentality that characterizes reason of state largely breaks with the medieval Christian tradition in which human, natural, or divine laws are the central principles of the government of a state. Seventeenth and eighteenth-century theorists of ‘the reason of state’ put forward that a governable state needs no external principles or laws. The state, like nature, has its own rationality. Akin to the way in which the first ‘heretic’ natural scientists considered the principiae naturae to be found in nature itself, rather than in deity, these theorists of the state looked for the conditions of possibility for the government of a state in, rather than outside of, the state. The perception of this rationality as something immanent to the state has important implications for the alleged finality of the state. The aims of the state can no longer be searched for outside of it. Happiness, salvation, and welfare need to be identified as the state’s own finalities. However, if the
The state’s welfare does not rest on an external source—such as principles of nature or human or divine knowledge—it relies on the state’s internal forces:

The real problem of this new governmental rationality [of raison d’état] is not ... just the preservation of the state within a general order so much as the preservation of a relation of forces; it is the preservation, maintenance, or development of a dynamic of forces. (Foucault 2007b: 296)

To maintain and improve the state’s strength and stability presupposes a specific form of knowledge and expertise. The government of the state and the development of its dynamic of forces are possible if and only if the state’s strengths are also known. The necessity of this type of knowledge and expertise gave rise to ‘the science of the state’ or statistics, which was originally understood as the state’s knowledge of the state (Hacking 1990). At the same time, the focus on both the ‘physics’ of the state and the ‘calculation’ of its strength was intimately related to the development of a governmental technology that could potentially contribute to the augmentation of the strengths of the state and, hence, to improving its effective performance.

Here, theories and practices of police come into play. In seventeenth and eighteenth-century European scientific traditions, police does not exclusively refer to our contemporary state-related institution for ensuring public security and safety, but to a much wider range of practices. Police encompassed regulations with respect to categories as diverse as religion, morals, health, supplies, roads, highways, town buildings, public safety, the arts, the sciences, trade, factories, factory workers, menservants, and the poor. The primary task of police was seeing “to everything regulating society” and “to everything pertaining to men’s happiness” (de Lamare 1705 cited Foucault 2000c: 413). Pasquale Pasquino has eloquently formulated how the theorists of police considered its role in governing their contemporary states:

One can picture the field of intervention of police regulations as the vacant lots of a city, the formless provinces of a vast kingdom, a sort of no man’s land comprising all those areas where the feudal world’s traditional customs, established jurisdictions and clear relations of authority, subordination, protection and alliance cease to rule ... This no man’s land is beginning to be perceived as an open space traversed by men [sic] and things. Squares, markets, roads, bridges, rivers: these are the critical points in the territory which police will mark out and control. The prescriptions or regulations of police are instruments of this work of formation, but at the same time they are also products of a sort of spontaneous creation of law, or rather of a demand for order which outreaches law and encroaches on domains never previously occupied, where hitherto neither power, order nor authority had thought to hold sway. (Pasquino 1991: 111)

Thus, police basically involved all kinds of regulations with regard to humans and things. These police interventions had as their main aim enhancing the state’s strength. In this conception the happiness of the state’s individual subjects is both equated with and subordinated to the strength of the state. At the same time, one of the most impor-
tant features of police is the crucial reversal of the relation between individual welfare and a ‘good government’ or what was also called ‘good police’: the happiness of an individual is no longer the result of good government, but the necessary component for the survival and welfare of the state. Our contemporary notion of a ‘police state’ refers to the way in which police was always obsessed with its governing too little and, consequently, with an unlimited and totalizing attempt to govern all and each—ommenes et singulatim—in favor of the state’s welfare.¹

With the emergence of police as a new governmental technology that aims at the total regulation and, in fact, at the radical disciplining of all and each at the same time, a profoundly new epistemological and governmental object appears: population. This new object of government appears in the interplay between the governmental rationality of reason of state, governmental technologies of police, and the expertise of the early modern statisticians. At the same time, the investigations of the state’s forces started to encompass much more than only statistics. The necessity to gain knowledge of the population and its subgroups involved inquiries into fields such as the medical sciences, epidemics, demography, economy, idleness, crime, vagrancy, and ‘customs and habits.’ In other words, the development of new governmental rationalities and technologies occurred parallel with that of new scientific and scholarly traditions as well as with that of new forms of administrative and institutional practices.

The linkage of these new domains to the investigation of populations and their internal mechanisms is also related to the government of minorities in Europe. In the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, minorities, seen as parts of territorialized populations, started to become an explicit focal point of governmental, bio-political practices and, as such, to being framed and identified differently than before. As I will argue in chapters 3 and 4, a study of the eighteenth century is crucial for a better understanding of both the construction of ‘the Roma’ or ‘Gypsies’ as specific, supposedly non-European minorities in Europe and of how these constructions were related to new ways to frame Europe, and forms of European inter-state governmentality in particular. An investigation of the Roma’s situation in the eighteenth century shows how the emerging, early modern governmentalization of Europe and the explicit problematization of the Roma as a minority group are intimately related.

To interrogate the nexus between the governmentalization of the state and of interstate relations in early modern Europe, I briefly engage with Foucault’s discussion of Europe in the context of raison d’état and police. In a neglected part of his lectures on governmentality, Foucault relates this new governmental rationality and technology of raison d’état and police to the emergence of reflections on forms of inter-state governing in Europe. The government of a state and the knowledge, development, and maintenance of its forces did not take place in a vacuum, but “in both a European and global space of competition between states” (Foucault 2007b: 365). Moreover, political events, such as those related to the treaties of Westphalia (1648) and Utrecht (1713), were an integral part of debates about how a balance or equilibrium between states had to be achieved, maintained, and developed within Europe. The kind of state that emerged in the context of

¹ In chapter 4, I will discuss the specific ways in which governmental technologies were articulated and transformed in the eighteenth-century Habsburg Empire.
these ‘European’ treaties is situated within what Foucault calls an “absolutely new idea of Europe” (ibid 297). This idea can best be expressed by a strategic striving for these states’ individual peace, which will no longer be based on a unity of all of these states, but on a non-unity maintained as plurality. In this Europe, “the objective will now be to ensure the security in which each state can effectively increase its own forces without bringing about the ruin of other states or of itself” (ibid 300). Therefore, we need to understand raison d’état within a larger framework, which “is diplomatic and so essentially defined by the constitution of a Europe, of a European balance” (ibid 300, my italics). 2 According to the state-of-reason governmentalities, the objective has become “to increase the state’s forces within an external equilibrium in the European space, and an internal equilibrium in the form of order” (ibid 348). Thus, the internal state order that has to be guaranteed and improved by governmental technologies of police is inextricably interwoven with an external European order that has to be safeguarded by a technological assemblage of armies and diplomats.

We could say that the problematization of the state’s government also led to the problematization of the balance of Europe and, thus, to problematizing inter-state governance. Thus, we can consider this problematization as an early modern form of Europe’s governmentalization. Though we cannot speak of a concrete European form of institutionalization, the government of Europe as a system of states starts to be explicitly discussed and codified in philosophical, juridical, and political texts and contexts. 3 Other developments supported this early governmentalization. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, for instance, for the first time the term Europe was used self-descriptively. This usage emerged largely in tandem with the consideration of Europe as something that had a history and with the implicit suggestion that “all [world] history was the history of Europe” (Pocock 2002: 62). Most notably in The Order of Things, but also elsewhere, Foucault extensively discusses the parallel governmental and epistemological changes central to the emergence of the social and human sciences at the end of the eighteenth century. Seen from the perspective of the huge efforts to illuminate these co-emergences, it is remarkable that his work does not pay more attention to the interrelationships between the emergence of inter-state governmentality in Europe, on the one hand, and the parallel articulation of a European, allegedly progressive and universal history,

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2 Foucault does not want to suggest that this balance was achieved, nor that it was a balance for which all states in Europe strove. At the same time, he states that, though war was not something that disappeared from the European space at all, from now on, it was waged on the basis of other principles. War was legitimized on the basis of the striving for such a European equilibrium (in this context, Foucault also uses an inverted version of Clausewitz’s famous statement: “politics is the continuation of war by other means” rather than Clausewitz’s “war is the continuation of politics by other means.” See Foucault 2004: 15). In addition, diplomacy and a military apparatus were now constituted and developed more permanently and professionally (Foucault 2007b: 300-05).

3 Foucault gives the example of the ‘grand design’ (magnifique dessein) of the French king Henri IV. His design “consisted in constituting a Europe, a plural Europe therefore, as a limited geographical division, without universality and without a culminating unity ... , in which fifteen states would be stronger than the others and take decisions for them” (Foucault 2007b: 298). This design is further explained as follows: “Rendering all the fifteen major powers of Christian Europe roughly equal in strength, realm, wealth, extent, and domination and giving them well-adjusted and moderated bounds and limits so that those whose desires and greed would be the biggest and most ambitious do not think of expanding, and the others are not offending, jealous, and fearful of being oppressed” (Donnadieu 1900: 45; cited Foucault 2007b: 308n18).
on the other (most notably in French and German Enlightenment philosophy). An inquiry into these interrelationships, I will explain below, clarifies that newly emerging representations of Europe and its history or, still better, histories were going together with forms of inter-state governmentality that started to majorize some and minoritize other populations within the contested borders of Europe. Indeed, in seventeenth and eighteenth-century articulations of European universalism, imperialism, and orientalism (Said 1978), the writing of the history of Europe did by no means imply a coherent, ‘balanced,’ and uniform representation:

The historical concept of ‘Europe’ has migrated, to the point where everything we mean when we say ‘the history of Europe’ refers to the history of the political and religious culture ... that arose in the far-western Latin-speaking provinces of the former Roman empire ... The lands to which the term Europa was originally applied—Thrace, Macedonia, Illyria, the more modern Bulgaria, Albania, Serbia—those which the Byzantine emperors considered their European ‘themes’ or provinces—are in our minds only marginally European, inhabited by uncouth warring tribes whose history is not ours and whose problems are none of our business. (Pocock 2002: 60)

The split between Western and Eastern Europe to which John Pocock points can be considered as a way in which a specific form of orientalist discourse affected Europe internally. As Pocock and others have put forward (Wolff 1994; Delanty 1995; Todorova 1997), the prevailing North-South divide in the representation of Europe started to change in the eighteenth century into a primarily East-West divide. In the narratives of Enlightenment thinkers such as the French philosophes Voltaire and Rousseau, for instance, the eastern parts of Europe, including Russia, are represented as the backward and despotic counter-parts of a universal, Western Europe that are preoccupied with problems that are far from ‘enlightened.’ In the eighteenth century, Europe started to get ‘internal’ Eastern frontiers in a somewhat similar way as it had already acquired several colonial frontiers ‘outside’ Europe. The new idea of Europe to which Foucault refers started to function as a universal and regulative idea in the Kantian sense, to which the not-yet-modern and not-yet-enlightened parts of the world, including Eastern Europe, had to be subjected as well (Kant 1983; Hindess 2002; Tully 2002). However, to address these intra-European divides and how they were related to population regulation within and at Europe’s own territorial, representational, and bio-political borders, we need to analyze the further development of inter-state forms of governmentality since the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Foucault continues the debate about inter-state governance in Europe when he discusses the emergence of liberal governmentality in the eighteenth century. Modern, liberal forms of population regulation, he argues, have significantly been affected by the development of what he considers as mechanisms of security. Securing a ‘liberal Europe,’ as I will show in the next section, will inevitably endanger the freedom of minoritized parts of its population.

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4 Pocock (2002: 66-67) suggests that, to some extent, the discourse of orientalism could be originated in Europe’s encounter on its open eastern frontier as much as in its encounter on the former European colonial frontiers.
Foucault characterizes the various modalities of modern governmentality that have been developed from the eighteenth century up to now as primarily liberal, be they liberal in the classical nineteenth-century sense, social democratic, neo-liberal, or even—up to a point—authoritarian and illiberal (chapter 1, Hindess 1993; Valverde 1996; Dean 2002). This wide and at first glance rather odd delineation of liberalism has much to do with how his interpretation of liberal thought and its traditions significantly differs from the usual approaches in political theory. Liberalism is prevalingly understood as an ideology or a normative doctrine “that treats the maintenance of individual liberty as an end in itself and therefore views liberty as setting limits of principle both to the legitimate objectives of [political] government and to the manner in which those objectives may be pursued” (Hindess 2001: 93). Following his articulation of governmentality, Foucault treats liberalism rather as a specific rationality of government that mobilizes particular, ‘liberal’ technologies of government and inaugurates new fields of expertise. This account of liberalism also accords central place to the freedom of individuals, but, as I will explain below, this liberty not only limits the legitimate use of political government and the means to achieve its objectives, but also restricts the effectiveness of government and establishes new, indirect forms of intervention that could be characterized as ways to act remotely and govern at a distance (Foucault 2007b: 20, 71-72). Whereas the main feature of modern, liberal governmentality is the freedom of the individual, this freedom is not so much the foundation of this governmentality as the principle of a form of conduct that aims to produce this freedom as an effect of how government is exercised. This implies that the liberal style of government considers the individuals and their freedom as objects of government, and at the same time treats them as the necessary and voluntary partner in the exercise of government (Lemke 1997: 172-73). This means that freedom is not so much the basis on which liberal government is enforced and exercised as that this liberal form of conduct tries to organize and facilitate as effectively as possible the conditions under which individuals could act and interact ‘freely’:

Freedom becomes a governmental creation linked to specific processes that ensure the ‘ordered’ functioning of the state and its population and also contains the criteria for its own control. The constitution of the subject as self-regulating has become an explicit political stake. (Aradau 2008: 175-76).

As I will show below, liberal governmentality implies that we do not simply deal with a sovereign that guarantees freedom for its subjects in terms and by means of laws and political, civil, social, or human rights, nor exclusively with a form of discipline that tries to regulate everything at the cost of the individual’s expression of freedom. With the emergence of modern, liberal governmentality, sovereign and disciplinary forms of power are displaced, but, simultaneously, reassembled with liberal technologies of government that could be understood as “mechanisms of security” (Foucault 2007b: 1-86). To get a better sense of this security-freedom nexus and the complex triangle of sovereignty, discipline, and governmentality, I will successively pay attention to the key roles played by the concepts and ‘realities’ of population and (civil) society, the emergence of
the social and human sciences and of new forms of expertise in the eighteenth century, and the problematic relation between freedom and security in the exercise of liberal modes of governmentality, most notably with regard to minoritized population groups.

One of the central features of liberal governmentality is reflection on the limits of government and making them explicit. Whereas the governmentality typical of reason of state and police sciences emerged with the explicit problematization of the government of the state, liberal governmentalities are born with the explicit problematization of the limits of the government of the state. A crucial point for understanding the transformation from state-of-reason to liberal government is how proto-liberal and classic liberal thinkers, such as the French Physiocrates, Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Adam Ferguson, David Hume, and started to question the totalizing way in which the sciences and practices of police aimed at governing each and every detail of social and economic life. These thinkers criticized the possibility of an immediate, pragmatic, and immanent relation between government and knowledge in police thinking. Police science—as the theory and practice of collecting and accumulating knowledge of the state’s strengths—presupposed that a territorialized (state) population, its forms of association, its means of subsistence, and its patterns of activity could be entirely mapped, and that knowledge thereof directly contributed to the realization, maintenance, and strengthening of the desired, ‘healthy’ balance of the state.

What the mentioned critics of reason-of-state governmentality have in common is their farewell to the idea of the transparent intelligibility and direct accessibility of the dynamics of population. Population, in the liberal critique of state reason and police sciences, is rather understood as encompassing a variety of self-regulating domains, ranging from the private or domestic sphere of the family and spheres of economic activity in which subjects of interest constantly interact to the workings of civil society and processes of population change that are subjected to their own ‘Malthusian’ developmental logics and conjunctures.\(^5\) Fundamental to this understanding of population is not only that these different spheres are perceived of as following their own internal and autonomous rules that make these domains largely inaccessible for political government. At the same time, and because of the supposed self-regulation and relative autonomy of these domains, governmental interference with them is considered as perilous, for it could substantially reduce its effectiveness. This is also why liberal governmentality can be understood as a non-transcendental form of critique of political reason in the Kantian sense: rather than suggesting that we always deal with too little government—as is the case in police government—liberalism is obsessed with a fear that there will always be governed too much and that this will have counterproductive effects (Foucault 2007b: 10-13, 17). Based on the categorical limitations of human reason, Kant declared that human beings could not know the cosmos, God, and the soul. Foucault

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\(^5\) As Mitchell Dean (1991) argues, it was Thomas Malthus who, at the turn of the eighteenth century, introduced the notion of a fundamental disequilibrium and an unalterable tendency toward overpopulation at the heart of the natural order of a population. Malthus’ work greatly contributed to the transformation of the British poor relief system and the reform as well as, finally, the abolition of the notorious Poor Laws. More in general, his works as well as those of Darwin and Wallace have importantly contributed to the centrality of the notions of population and milieu in a number of scientific disciplines (N Rose 1999b: 115; Foucault 2007b: 20-23).
emphasizes how liberal governmentality could be typified by a similar approach, now with respect to political reason: the limitation of the state’s power to act is a direct effect of the limitation of its power to know (Gordon 1991).  

Liberal forms of governmentality emerge “with the recognition of the heterogeneity and incompatibility of the principles regulating the non-totalizing multiplicity of economic subjects of interest and those operating in the totalizing unity of legal-political sovereignty” (Burchell 1991: 137). In other words, liberalism begins, firstly, with the rejection of the idea of a totally administrable society and that of a fully and directly governable population, and, secondly, with the confrontation of government with society as the very broadly defined domain that functions independently from the state. Society, however, is not the counterpart of the state, but needs to be understood as a kind of interface between the rationalities and practices of liberal government on the one hand, and the objects and subjects that are constructed by them, on the other. State and society are not political universalia, but schematizations typical of liberal rationalities and technologies of government (Burchell 1991: 141; Foucault 1997a: 75).

As a result of the emergence of this new ‘reality’ of society, liberal forms of conduct imply a new relation between knowledge, expertise, and government. Under liberal conditions, political government is confronted with individuals protected with several rights that must not be disqualified by liberal forms of government. On the other hand, liberal government is confronted with a number of relatively autonomous and self-regulating processes that it simply cannot govern by the exercise of sovereign power, because it is short of the needed knowledge and capacities (Rose and Miller 1992: 179-80). Consequently, liberal government is permanently challenged to invent new technologies of government and install new forms of expertise to administer the domains that are located outside the realm of ‘politics’—but without undermining their supposed autonomy and self-regulation. What is needed, therefore, is knowledge of the diverse processes and dynamics of the population and its two main correlates, economy and society:

[W]e have a scientific knowledge indispensable to government, but it is very important to note that this is not a knowledge of government itself ... You have a science which is ... external to the art of government and that one may perfectly well found, establish, develop, and prove throughout, even though one is not governing or taking part in this art of government. But government cannot do without the consequences, the results, of this science ... [A]n art of government that would be both knowledge and power, science and decision, begins to be clarified and separated out, and anyway two poles appear of a scientificity that, on the one hand, increasingly appeals to its theoretical purity and becomes economics [and other social sciences, HvB], and, on the other, at the same time claims the right to be taken into consideration by a government that must model its decision on it. (Foucault 2007b: 351, my italics)

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6 As Nikolas Rose (1993; 1996b) emphasizes, this central feature of liberal governmentality also implies that the ‘reflexivity’ that some contemporary social scientists (Beck et al. 1997) consider as characteristic of our postmodern age is not distinctive to late modernity, but to liberal thought much more generally.
Barry Hindess puts the point succinctly when he puts forward that Foucault deals with a fundamental shift in the representation of society: it is no longer understood on the basis of an immanent knowledge of the population of a state, but, rather, on the abstract and scientific knowledge of social processes presented by the positive sciences, such as economics, sociology, statistics, medicine, psychology, ethnology, and biology (Hindess 2001; Helliwell and Hindess 1999). Consequently, liberal government—though critical of its inclination to govern too much—does not amount to a quantitative limitation of governing. The interventions of liberal governmentality will have to be restricted, but these restraints do not imply a negative boundary. An entire domain of fundamentally other, indirect kinds of interventions appears within which it will be “necessary to arouse, to facilitate, and to laissez faire, in other words, to manage and no longer to control through rules” (Foucault 2007b: 353, my emphasis). The central aim of liberal modalities of governmentality is not so much to prevent things—as in the case of sovereign interventions by means of laws and rights—as to ensure that the necessary and natural regulations [of population, economy, and society] work, or even to create regulations that enable natural regulations to work” (ibid). It is the role of the social and positive sciences, by developing knowledge about these ‘natural’ and ‘autonomous’ regulations, to ensure and guarantee a population’s welfare and development in the widest possible sense.

This role of the social sciences is closely related to the emergence of modern, independent fields of expertise and its various assembled technologies as a potential solution to the problem of the impossibility of direct regulation with which liberal governmentalities are constantly confronted. Expertise could be seen as a form of authority that emerges as a correlate of political authority and that arises out of a claim to neutral, efficient, and effective knowledge. Expertise emerges out of a desire to make various qualities—health, security, welfare, development, European integration, NGO performance, etc.—quantifiable and, thus, calculable and manageable. The field of expertise mediates between the necessity to maintain a certain degree of moral and public order on the one hand, and the need to restrict government in support of the free organization and interaction of individuals, on the other. Consequently, experts enter into a kind of double alliance:

On the one hand, they ... ally themselves with political authorities, focusing upon their problems and problematizing new issues, translating political concerns about economic productivity, innovation, industrial unrest, social stability, law and order, normality and pathology and so forth into the vocabulary of management, accounting, medicine, social science and psychology. On the other hand, they ... seek to form alliances with individuals themselves, translating their daily worries and decisions over investment, child rearing, factory organization or diet into a language claiming the power of truth, and offering to teach them the techniques by which they might manage better, earn more, bring up healthier or happier children and much more besides. (Rose and Miller 1992: 188)

This double role of expertise in liberal governmentality also touches upon the rather problematic relation between freedom and security in liberalism. Since liberalism represents the regulation and organization of the conditions under which individuals could be
free, it is also involved in a problematic, continuously changing relation between the indirect production of freedom and the attempts to produce these conditions directly. Indeed, the organization of these freedom-securing conditions could also limit and even threaten the proposed guarantee of freedom, at least for some parts of the population. Freedom and what Foucault calls mechanisms of security are thus inherently related (Foucault 2007b: 1-86; 2008a: 63-68). Liberal forms of governmentality are basically related to the permanent proliferation of security mechanisms:

[The central objectives of security mechanisms are] allowing circulations to take place, of controlling them, sifting the good and the bad, ensuring that things are always in movement, constantly moving around, continually going from one point to another, but in such a way that the inherent dangers of this circulation are cancelled out. (Foucault 2007b: 65)

Security mechanisms allow “circulation in the very broad sense of movement, exchange, and contact” (ibid 64) to take place. The freedoms of liberalism and its attempts at guaranteeing ‘free,’ ‘more’ and ‘better’ circulation are going hand in hand with controlling the conditions of ‘good circulation,’ with calculating the costs and risks of creating and opening up new spaces of circulation, and, thus, with identifying possible spheres and categories that endanger the interests of both individuals and collectives. For Foucault “freedom in the regime of liberalism is not a given, it is not a ready-made region which has to be respected” (2008a: 65). Rather, it “is something which is constantly produced.” According to this concept of liberalism, it continuously proposes to manufacture freedom, “to arouse it and produce it, with, of course, the system of constraints and the problems of cost raised by this production” (ibid). The political economies of power related to liberalism are consequently internally related to the nexus of freedom and security and to how their interplay “must ensure that individuals or the community have the least exposure to danger” (ibid 66).

This ambivalence of liberal modes of governmentality can be framed in terms of a permanent tension between a centrifugal and a centripetal dimension of liberal government. The necessity for liberalism to encourage free circulation and respect the autonomy of the domains outside ‘politics’ unleashes centrifugal forces that can endanger social stability. Yet, to maintain and develop social order, centripetal forces need to be unleashed that have to create a certain degree of social uniformity and integration (Foucault 2007b: 44-45; Stenson 1998; Deuber-Mankowsky 2008). This second, disciplinary or even authoritarian tendency that goes with liberalism implies that the government of freedom is always related to a kind of stratification of various kinds of freedom, from those forms that are considered as in line with ‘effective’ liberal government to ‘excessive’ modes of freedom that are seen as counterproductive and threats to economic efficiency and social stability. Therefore, governing in a liberal way does not necessarily involve government through freedom; it could imply a way of governing that disrespects individual liberty (Hindess 2001; Dean 2002; Huysmans 2006).7 Though the illiberal dimension of liberal-

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7 The centripetal dimension of liberalism also clarifies why even some illiberal or non-liberal forms of modern governmentality could still be considered (but up to a point) as ‘liberal’ (Dean 1999: chapter 7;
ism finally touches upon the complex way in which sovereign, disciplinary, and governmental forms of power constantly interact, we need to avoid mixing up mechanisms of security with sovereign or disciplinary technologies of power.

Fundamental to mechanisms of security is the way in which they ‘stand back sufficiently’ with respect to the problematized phenomenon—crime, illness, unemployment, migration, development, etc.—that they would like to regulate in favor of the production of freedom. Whereas mechanisms of sovereignty and discipline both start from the aim and possibility to nullify the phenomenon in question, security mechanisms operate on the basis of an optimal average and within a bandwidth of what is still acceptable. Consequently, the operation of security mechanisms does not start from a strict binary division between what is allowed or obliged on the one hand, and what is forbidden, on the other—as in sovereign and disciplinary technologies of power. Rather, mechanisms of security insert a problematized phenomenon within a series of probable events and relate it to risk and cost analyses. The costs of eliminating a particular form of illness or illegal migration, for instance, can be much higher than those of allowing this form to happen within certain socially, culturally, politically, and economically acceptable limits. Central to security mechanisms is, therefore, that they ‘count’ with the entity of the population and that the regulation of ‘individual cases’ is largely made dependent on the ‘behavior’ of the population as both an object of indirect intervention and a subject that is called upon to conduct itself in ‘proper’ ways. Thus, liberal modes of governmentality and its mechanisms of security open up a dimension of power that is irreducible to legal-juridical and disciplinary mechanisms. This does not imply that sovereignty and discipline as forms of power are seriously displaced. However, it does mean that both have become functions of power that are redeployed in interaction with security mechanisms, which now aspire to recode and reinscribe sovereign and disciplinary tools as tactics to regulate populations, rather than as direct means to control them through sovereign exclusion or disciplinary isolation. What is at the core of the Foucauldian perspective on governmentality is “not the displacement of one form of power by another, nor the historical substitution of feudal [pastoral] by modern [liberal] governmentality, but the complex triangulation involved in sustaining many forms of power put to the purpose of security and regulation” (Watts 2003: 14; see also Foucault 2007b: 107-08).

What is important in relation to the role of the positive sciences and fields of expertise discussed above, is that the centrifugal, fragmentary forces of liberalism engender new problem spaces, which demand new types of knowledge and new forms of expertise that create again new subjects and objects of government. Because of the emergence of these new problem spaces, liberal governmentality is also involved with the development of, for example, new forms of minority governance and involves specific ways to problematize and articulate their identities and mobilities. As I will discuss in part two of this study in the particular case of the Roma, the emergence of modern, liberal forms of governmentality goes with the development of governmental rationalities and technologies, such as early modern statistics, that inherently contribute to processes of minoritization and, thus, to the construction of particular minority-majority binaries. As I will

2002). Mariana Valverde has considered this centripetal dimension as a form of despotism central to liberal rule (1996, see also Foucault 2008a: 68).
show in part two, and in chapter 4 in particular, the emergence of liberal governmentality implies, on the one hand, opportunities for forms of minority self-government or self-articulation. On the other hand, however, the ambivalent relation between freedom and security in liberal governmentality implies that some minoritized parts of the population will always be considered as ‘not or not yet ready for freedom’ and, therefore, subject of gradual ‘improvement.’ Consequently, at the heart of liberalism an engine is at work that operates centripetally to fine-tune the production of ‘freedom’ and also the need for social stability through social, cultural or economic projects of reform, which are often framed in terms of development, integration, inclusion, or empowerment. Here, we not only need to think of how an individual state employs illiberal means elsewhere, such as in a colonial, imperial or war context. We also need to include the various ways in which liberalism has been evoked to justify paternalistic interventions to deal with different kinds of subjects in Europe, such as the unemployed, the elderly, the homeless, the youth, the mentally ill, the poor more generally, and itinerant or migrant groups. These subject formations are themselves largely the effects of intersecting governmentalities.

Liberal inter-state governmentality

The discussion of the emergence of liberal governmentality at the freedom-security nexus leads me back to the question that I raised at the end of the previous section: how does inter-state governmentality in Europe change with the parallel shifts in intra-state governmentality? As has often remained unnoticed in examinations of Foucault’s work, he considered the ways in which inter-state government in Europe changes at the turn of the eighteenth century as one of the crucial characteristics of modern, liberal governmentality itself (Foucault 2008a: 50-62). To conceptualize the difference between the idea of the balance of Europe characteristic of police governmentality, on the one hand, and the kind of Europe that emerges with liberalism, on the other, he compares how European economies are represented according to both arts of government. The idea of a European balance understands economic interactions between states primarily in terms of a literal monetary balance: if one state becomes richer, another one becomes poorer. Consequently, the idea of a European equilibrium embodies a complex mechanism of

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8 Here, we could think of how, for instance, John Stuart Mill and Alexis de Tocqueville justified despotic forms of rule toward subject peoples in colonized India and Algeria in the name of liberalism. We could also think of how the Bush administration allowed private military companies, such as Blackwater, to use unorthodox conquest tactics and strategies during and after the US military intervention in Iraq in 2003 (Ferguson 2005b; Klein 2007).

9 It is not entirely clear whether Foucault took into account this latter option as fundamentally related to liberalism. In one of his lectures, he refers to what he calls the ‘Napoleon paradox,’ that is how liberal and illiberal ways of governing are simultaneously combined in one and the same political system. On the other hand, he presents a rather out-dated image of Napoleon, for he contrasts Napoleon’s domestic, liberal policy with his foreign, imperial one (2008a: 59-62). Foucault seemingly suggests that the illiberal, police-like tendencies in Napoleon’s liberalism were only external to the kernel of his empire and related to the countries that he wanted to conquer—a suggestion that is difficult to maintain (Cobb 1970; Emsley 1999). He remained unclear of whether we need to see illiberal practices in liberalism as based on either the liberal grounds of freedom (N Rose 1999b) or a fundamental interplay between liberal and other, more authoritarian modes of government (Lemke 1997; Hindess 2001; Collier 2009). My own position is closest to the latter option.
various balance systems that all need to be stable to guarantee that no single European state becomes ‘wealthier and healthier’ than any of the others. With the emergence of the economy as a relatively autonomous and self-regulating sphere, however, the idea of such a balance makes place for the idea and practices of ‘natural’ competition, in which, at least in principle, both trade partners—the sellers and buyers—can effectively take profit of the transaction. This implies that the effects of economic competition are not necessarily divided unequally between the two partners, but, rather, that these effects could lead to the enrichment of both or to the enrichment of a number of states if more than two state economies are involved.

Foucault relates this idea of the liberal market economy to the emergence of new practices in which Europe appears as the site of the perpetual and common enrichment of its member states. Though Europe’s colonial expansion had begun much earlier, he argues, since the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries Europe has started to represent itself as an economic unity and as an economic subject, which needs ‘the world’ as its limitless market. According to Foucault, the representation of Europe as a region of unlimited expansion, and the globalization of the European market, embody a new art of European government in which new governmental rationalities and technologies appear, which are now global in their scope. In this context, Foucault refers to the ways in which both peace and the world’s seas started to be problematized in terms of global free trade. In the latter case, the appearance of international maritime law started to problematize the world’s seas as ‘natural’ free-trade zones from a Eurocentric point of view. In the former case, Foucault considers how Kant, in his essay on peace, understands the globalization of free trade as a necessary condition of the possible realization of worldwide, perpetual peace (Kant 1983; Foucault 2008a: 56-58).

More in general, we need to ask what kind of inter-state or transnational governmentalization is exactly involved in this shift to modern governmentality in Europe. In his rudimentary sketch of the new, modern Europe, Foucault clearly suggests that liberal governmentality at a state level also involves a parallel—yet not necessarily isomorphic—form of inter-state government at a European level that itself transcends Europe’s borders in an unparalleled, imperial way. However, his genealogy of inter-state governmentality pays little attention to how it has been problematized since the end of the eighteenth century and how it has affected forms of population regulation within and at Europe’s own territorial, representational, and bio-political borders. More in general, it is quite remarkable that Foucault’s work, in which the bio-political element has been so crucially important for an understanding of governmentality, does not explicitly discuss this element in the examination of inter-state forms of governmentality and their transformation. Such an interrogation could gain insight into how inter-state or other forms of governmentality beyond the state are related to the construction of Europeanness itself and, thus, to the separation of different kinds of population groups at Europe’s contested territorial, representational, and bio-political borders.

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10 Halvard Leira (2009) argues that Foucault’s analysis of the developments of forms of intra-state governmentality is also more differentiated than his examination of similar developments of inter-state governmentality in Europe.
Apart from these lacunas in Foucault’s discussion of governmentalities beyond the state, we can distinguish at least two important features that are implied by his analysis of Europe’s governmentalization and the development of the European system of states (Hindess 2002). Firstly, liberal government and its gradual development within the member states of this system could only be effective on the basis of the socioeconomic, political, and cultural conditions that were safeguarded by the system itself. Indeed, the absence of large-scale, destabilizing ‘outside’ interventions in Europe, which has enabled European states to exercise and develop modern forms of liberal government, has mainly been made possible by the European states system and the sovereignty that it guaranteed for its members.11 Secondly, in the long nineteenth century and at least until the end of Europe’s global colonial hegemony, the European ‘liberal’ states system did not do much to limit ‘less liberal’ kind of interventions in populations and territories that did not belong to this system and were considered as not truthfully enlightened and liberal.

These two, still rather general implications of Europe’s governmentalization are inherently related to the globalization of the European states system and the ways in which supposedly non-European and not-yet-enlightened populations have been approached in the course of modern world history. Foucault’s own discussion of the emergence of a modern, liberal form of European government, however, does not tell us much about its consequences for a more up-to-date view on the disciplinary and bio-political regulation of those parts of the European and global population that fall outside the ‘desired forms of freedom.’ He does not consider, for instance, what the effects were of the various encounters between allegedly European and allegedly non-European populations, nor does he discuss the ways in which these encounters have influenced the formation of contemporary modes of liberal governmentality, the construction of various ideas (histories, geographies, cultures, etc.) of Europe, Europeanness, and what would be distinct from them, as well as the contestations of such ideas. To get a better and more adequate sense of these encounters and their influences as well as of the current forms of the bio-political regulation of populations, we need to look more extensively at the limits of liberal modes of governmentality. Reflecting on these limits involves a more thorough analysis of the intersections of liberal and illiberal forms of contemporary rule, and—in the context of this study—of current forms of European minority governance in particular.

A TRANSIT TO PART TWO

As I have argued up until now, we cannot simply apply the Foucauldian concept of government to either a state or Europe. The governmentalization of the state and that of Europe are interrelated, as some recent studies on European governmentality have also discussed (Leira 2009; McMillan 2010). These two trajectories of governmentalization need to be considered as two sides of the same coin. Foucault’s primary focus on the state and its contestation as a timeless abstraction or an instrument of domination was

11 Hindess (2002: 131) remarks that contract theorists from Hobbes to Rawls usually perceive of sovereignty as a matter of the internal relations between a state and its citizens. By so doing, they would have neglected how state sovereignty is also a central artifact of the system of states.
not arbitrary. He developed the notion of governmentality to avoid considering the state as a conceptual ceiling (chapter 1). Yet, even in his late works and despite his rudimentary and original discussion of European arts of government, Foucault treats contemporary government as something that operates primarily at the level of or within states, even while they are now contestable. This treatment has led to a serious underestimation of the importance of present governmental relations between states—both within and outside postcolonial and post-communist Europe, and both with regard to old and contemporary forms of imperialism.¹² Just as importantly, Foucault’s introduction of liberal forms of European government tells us little to nothing about their consequences for a postcolonial and post-communist perspective of current modes of population regulation within and at Europe’s bio-politically constructed borders. In the remainder of this chapter, I will delineate what bodies of literature I want to mobilize and combine to critically renew Foucault’s analysis of the interdependences of state and inter-state governmentality in the European context. In the second and third parts of this study, I will mobilize these literatures to analyze the governmentalization of Europe vis-à-vis the emergence of forms of Romani minority governance.

State-dominated views of contemporary governmental practices have mostly and extensively been discussed and questioned by governance studies and, in the case of Europe, by their European variants. Yet, these studies often start from the identification of government with the state and do usually not take into account the dimensions of government that a Foucauldian conceptualization brings into view (introduction, chapter 1). Moreover, even while European governance studies, and theories of multi-level governance in particular, accept multiple and dispersed governing agencies, many of these studies have limited their analytical scope to Western European modes of governance. Often, they do not sufficiently address how forms of European governance are related to contexts of colonial or communist legacies and governmentalities. Therefore, many European governance studies are classically Euro-centric to the degree that they do not sufficiently consider how the emergence of European governance as a new or renewed constellation of governmentality in a postcolonial and post-communist European context relates to similar earlier constellations across Europe’s contested borders. In light of this critique, a number of interdisciplinary studies have productively cross-fertilized a study of governmentality with, for instance, postcolonial studies or a critical approach to forms and theories of European governance.

The studies that have brought governmentality and European governance critically together have tried to show that we cannot consider current modes of European governance without interrogating the explicit problematization, development, and transformation of forms and arts of European government in the course of modern European history. William Walters and Jens Henrik Haahr (2005), for instance, approach the formation of Europe and the European Union from the point of view of Europe’s ongoing governmentalization. To understand contemporary forms, patterns, and processes of

¹² Hindess makes a more radical claim by putting forward that Foucault considers the relations between states as “largely ungoverned” (2005: 405, 408). However, as I have shown, this claim is too strong, for Foucault explicitly relates the governmentality of raison d’état and police as well as modern, liberal modes of governmentality to forms of inter-state governing at the level of the European states system (Foucault 2007b: 298-306, 312-16; 2008a: 51-62).
European governance and identity formation, they argue, we need to interrogate Europe genealogically and show how the gradual convergence that is often suggested by the term ‘Europeanization’ is quite misleading:

The governmentalization of Europe should not be confused with Europeanization. Governmentalization certainly does entail the construction of political and administrative structures at a European level (what we might call, after Foucault, its ‘apparatuses of security’). And it does involve the dissemination of certain norms and procedures … But the notion of Europeanization implies that there is a substance or a core to Europe—a relatively coherent set of values, norms or perhaps institutions. In speaking of the governmentalization of Europe we call attention to the production of a plurality of Europes within discontinuous regimes and practices of knowledge. Not Europe but Europes. (Walters and Haahr 2005: 139)

The notion of Europeanization often presupposes the European values, norms, identities, and institutions that a governmentality approach would like to include as contestable constructions ‘in progress’ in its analyses of distinct rationalities and technologies of European government. Walters and Haahr and others (Barry 1993; Barnett 2001; Shore 2009; Münch 2010) have largely limited their focus to analysis of EU discourses, tools, and programs, as well as to analyses of more or less successful forms of Europe’s post-war governmentalization. Alternatively, I extend and reposition my center of attention to Central and Eastern Europe and Romani minority populations, on the one hand, and to those instances where liberal or neo-liberal governmentality as a form of power has also been contested, on the other. This perspective will shed light on the ambivalent impact of concrete articulations of modern governmentalities on Romani minorities in Central and Eastern Europe (part three). This view will also put into question analyses of European governance that remain methodologically limited to examinations of how European institutions operate or to the study of European governmentalities in terms of key texts and discourses that make particular forms of rule possible (chapters 6, 7, 8).

The studies that link governmentality and postcolonial critique have shed light on how Foucault’s genealogies of race, sexuality, and desire have not taken into consideration the profound role of colonialism in changing states and power relations, both in and outside Europe and both in and after the colonial era.13 Ann Laura Stoler has formulated how these studies have contributed to an important reconsideration of ‘Europe,’ and of ‘the West’ more generally:

[These studies] have pushed us to rethink European cultural genealogies across the board and to question whether the key symbols of modern western societies—liberalism, nationalism, state welfare, citizenship, culture, and ‘Europeanness’ itself—were not

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13 Various authors have discussed governmentality alongside forms of postcolonial critique (Mitchell 1988; 2002; Ferguson 1994; Scott 1995; Stoler 1995; Appadurai 1996; Ferguson and Gupta 2002; Bhabha 2004; Chatterjee 2004; Li 2007b; Sharma 2008). A good example is Timothy Mitchell’s (1988) relocation of the panopticon as a modern diagram of power (see chapter 1). He has shown that the panopticon could actually be seen as a colonial invention that first appeared in the Ottoman Empire and not, as Foucault suggested, in North Western Europe.
clarified among Europe’s colonial exiles and by those colonized classes caught in their pedagogic net in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and only then brought ‘home.’ In sorting out these colonial etiologies of Western culture and its reformist gestures, one cannot help but ask whether Foucault’s [genealogies] … might also be traced through imperial maps of wider breadth that locate racial thinking and notions of ‘whiteness’ as formative and formidable coordinates of them. (Stoler 1995: 16, my italics)

Put differently, these studies have tried to unveil Foucault’s genealogies as essentially incomplete and, more specifically, as one-sidedly concentrated on the influence of European forms of imperialism on non-Europeans—rather than on the reverse influence and the encounters between allegedly European and non-European populations and territories. These studies have carefully looked at forms of governmentality and their contestations outside Europe or in the encounters between the European ‘centers’ and the colonial ‘peripheries.’ Alternatively, in this study’s next two parts, I will focus on European governmentalities and their limits in what has often been considered as Europe’s periphery, in Central and Eastern Europe and with respect to Romani minorities in particular. This shift implies that I will also look at how post-communist social and cultural formations and the legacies of communism complicate contemporary processes of Europe’s governmentalization (chapters 6, 7, 8).14

Sympathizing with both discussed bodies of scholarly literature, the current study is positioned in the still largely unexplored domain where these two recently investigated fields of analysis meet and could fruitfully complement one another. A more thorough understanding of the exact shape and content of this domain, its relation to the situation of Romani minorities in particular, is crucial to analyze the limits of practices of liberal and neo-liberal governmentality in contemporary Europe. Historically, the regulation of Romani minority populations in Europe has inherently and ambiguously gone together with the will to improve them (see this study’s introduction). Since 1989, the appearance of new forms of European governmentality has explicitly gone together with the devising of various inclusion, empowerment, and development programs for the Roma. In the literature on the post-1989 changes in post-communist Europe, some scholars have suggested that the impact of ‘Western norms’ and ‘standards’ on Central and Eastern European states and societies have resulted into a kind of neo-imperial or neo-colonial dependency mechanism. This would have also negatively impacted on the situation of the Roma. József Böröcz, for instance, suggests that the political discourses and mechanisms of EU enlargement represent a new kind of empire building, in which Western norms are imposed on populations in Central and Eastern Europe. He speaks of the

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14 At the same time, the framing of the socialist pasts in terms of ‘legacies’ needs to be addressed as part of the more general problematic of those contemporary European governmentalities that particularly affect Central and Eastern Europe. Indeed, referring to the socialist pasts as legacies could suggest that we are already more or less familiar with the main parameters of these pasts and with the ways in which they have influenced post-communist societies and realities. Part of the problem, however, is that post-communism relates to communist ‘pasts’ in a somewhat similar way as post-colonialism relates to colonial ‘pasts’: the prefix ‘post’ does not only and necessarily refer to an ‘after’ (after the communist times), but also, and more importantly, to how these not-bygone pasts still largely influence present-day circumstances (Stenning and Hörschelmann 2008; Hörschelmann and Stenning 2008).
“export of governmentality” and “the imposition of a … Euro-governmentality on the applicant societies” in Central and Eastern Europe (Böröcz 2001: 18, 19). Some other scholars, who have particularly looked at the Roma’s situation, state that we have been confronted with “the ‘Americanization’ of Eastern Europe” (Sigona and Trehan 2009b: 3). A neo-imperial, neo-liberal order would have been imposed on Central and Eastern Europe and dramatically impacted on the situation of the Roma (see also Trehan 2009a; 2009b). In the third part of this study, I will challenge these and similar claims that are based on reading the EU or neo-liberalism as new, hegemonic orders that primarily reproduce cultures of exclusion and dependency. A brief analysis of the debate in postcolonial studies on the contested relation between dependency and development helps to show why these views are problematic. At the same time, this debate provides me a bridge to the second part of this study.

Some postcolonial scholars have argued that the maintenance of illiberal practices in the name of liberalism has particularly become manifest in practices of development. According to them, a modernist, developmental logic is key to the new regimes of European and global governmentality. The notion of development that was introduced after the Second World War and in the aftermath of various independence-movements in the ‘Third World’ has often been considered as a subtler, though not necessarily less harsh embodiment of the asymmetrical power relations between western countries on the one hand, and non-western or non-European states and populations, on the other (Cowan and Shenton 1996). The main idea behind this critical approach of development discourses and practices is that they would project a form of underdevelopment, traditionalism, and passivity onto these states and populations—a projection that is directly connoted with the incentives to develop, improve, and empower them, and integrate them more effectively into global markets (Escobar 1995). This mechanism could be well illustrated by the way in which the former World Bank Vice President Joseph Stiglitz defines development:

Development represents a transformation of society, a movement from traditional relations, traditional ways of thinking, traditional ways of dealing with health and education, traditional methods of production, to more ‘modern’ ways. For instance, a characteristic of traditional societies is the acceptance of the world as it is; the modern perspective recognizes change, it recognizes that we, as individuals and societies, can take actions that, for instance, reduce infant mortality, extend lifespan, and increase productivity. (Stiglitz 1998 cited Rojas 2004: 107, his emphasis)

Postcolonial critics, such as Akhil Gupta (1998), state that such conceptions of an opposition between a supposedly modern and a supposedly traditional and underdeveloped

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15 Wendy Larner and William Walters have emphasized the importance of acknowledging the differences between imperialism and developmentalism: “Unlike imperialism, which was based on naturalized conceptions of ‘primitives’ and ‘savages,’ the moral claims that underpinned developmentalism did not assume the inevitability of ‘backwardness.’ Whereas imperialism assumed a natural division of labor in which some places and people were destined to be poor, developmentalism believed that structural disadvantages could be overcome. Developing countries and their populations were seen as children who could be educated, integrated, and would eventually reach maturity” (2002: 404).
world show that ‘development’ is actually a postcolonial form of orientalism transformed into a de-politicized, ‘neutral’ science for action in the contemporary world. A number of postmodern critics have strongly rejected this and similar modernist understandings of development and, alternatively, proposed a so-called ‘post-development’ approach. The proponents of this approach reject development as such, for it would embody a modern rationality that is equivalent to modernity, western imperialism, rapacious capitalism, and cultural homogenization. In short, development “is the problem not the solution” (Rist 1997 cited Watts 2003: 9). Seen from this perspective, development embodies everything that was and continues to be destructive for non-western and supposedly non-European cultures. Some of these critiques, such as the one of Arturo Escobar, rely heavily on Foucault’s work, and on the disciplinary logic that is central to his Discipline and Punish in particular. On the basis of a rather one-sided interpretation of Foucault’s works, Escobar and other proponents of post-development approaches reject every form of alternative development, for such forms would only reproduce the same old modernist developmentalist attitude and lead those subjected to development into a dependency trap. Instead, they propose to look for alternatives to development and for anti-authoritarian, radically democratic ways to approach disadvantaged and marginalized groups. What is “needed is the expansion and articulation of anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist, anti-productivist, [and] anti-market struggles” that can lead to “new power-knowledge regimes” (Escobar 1992: 431, 432). For that reason, Escobar and others (Rahnema 1997; Esteva and Prakash 1998) focus on various kinds of grassroots movements. Escobar calls these subaltern, indigenous social movements essentially local and plural and considers them “as vehicles for other ways of doing politics (non-party, non-mass, cultural, and self-organizing), and of doing ‘post-development’ (decentralized, community-based, participatory, indigenous, and autonomous)” (paraphrased in Watts 2003: 9). These grassroots movements would often distrust organized politics and the development establishment and include movements as diverse as women, peasants, urban, ethnic minority, indigenous people, civic, youth, ecological, and squatter movements (Escobar 1992).

This approach to development is problematic for three reasons. Firstly, it subsumes various, not necessarily uniform and congruent forms of development under the homogeneous label of modernity or Development with a capital D. The proponents of the post-development approach suggest that successive forms and different articulations of development embody one and the same governmental rationality, rather than adjacent, overlapping, or even divergent and contradictory rationalities and technologies of government—as a governmentality approach emphasizes (chapter 1).

Secondly, advocating alternatives to development, rather than variants of it, post-development and anti-dependency theorists propagate a somewhat romantic view of resistance as a principally bottom-up movement. Such a movement would be essentially local and based on something that is not entangled with the power relations that they want to challenge. A post-development movement, thus, would be able to contest the

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17 Such a view of development has also been compared with a conspiracy theory for it strongly suggests a ‘western’ conspiracy against marginalized groups or impoverished countries (see Li 2007b: 9n22, 287).
supposed hegemony of western forms of developmentalism. While such a view of the relation between power and resistance is already hard to defend on the basis of Foucault’s *Discipline and Punish*, it is even harder to maintain on the basis of a governmentality-inspired analysis (chapter 1). Indeed, the latter not only rejects any understanding of power that considers it as a kind of property and that victimizes the ‘dispossessed’ as powerless, it also supports an approach to grassroots movements beyond easy power-resistance and center-periphery dichotomies. In chapter 7, I will discuss how recently expressed comparable calls for mobilizing Romani grassroots communities are equally problematic and adopt a disputable distinction between know-how and knowledge developed at the local level, on the one hand, and externally developed knowledge systems imposed on the ‘grassroots,’ on the other.

Thirdly, an analysis of present-day forms of the governmentalization of development shows that many of the characteristics of what Escobar and others defend as an alternative approach—from grassroots movements, subaltern knowledge formations, cultural economics, and hybrid indigenous politics to community-based, decentralized, and participatory forms of post-development—have been ambivalently redeployed and incorporated in current technologies of government. As I will show, many of what could be considered as the central features of post-development have become central components of currently influential neo-liberal forms of governmentality (chapters 5, 6, 7). These redeployments have gone together with substantially different relationships between state and society and with significantly shifting roles of civil society movements and organizations in the management of development and empowerment programs. These flexible redeployments do not imply that ‘alternatives’ to developmentalism are not possible, but, rather, that we need to reconsider how we could articulate them beyond *both* the suggestion of the Western developmentalist hegemony *and* development-postdevelopment binaries (Chatterjee 2004; Corbridge 2007). It is not primarily “the claustrophobic closure of the development project—its singular character and its oppressiveness—that is so striking,” but, rather, the “complexities, and frequent failures, of securing rule, producing governable subjects and governable spaces” (Watts 2003: 13).

Having arrived at this point, I want to return to my remark that postcolonial critiques, when cross-fertilized with a governmentality approach to Europe, can productively contribute to rethinking European cultural genealogies beyond one-sided claims of Western hegemonies and beyond power-resistance binaries that are also typical of the post-development movement. But how can postcolonial critiques if not in terms of scholarship on post-development? I suggest they can by diversifying genealogies of ‘Europeanness’ and questioning the uniformity that underlies modernist narratives, such as those of developmentalism. Postcolonial settings “provide the rationale for the idea of alternative modernities” and can interrupt “the redemptive narratives of the West” (Gupta 1998: 232). Recent contributions to postcolonial studies have identified various strategies to ‘provincialize’ Europe (Chakrabarty 2000) and re-narrate the histories of the Enlightenment, and of modernity more generally, in order to unravel heterogeneous, plural modernities, rather than one, singular modernity (Bhabha 1990; 2004). The processes of narrating Europe and its supposed constituencies have not only unsettled Euro-centric conceptions of nation, culture, modernity, and development, but also led to the articulation of what some call a “minoritarian modernity” (Pollock et al 2000: 582). This concept points to past
and present practices where minoritized groups have allied themselves beyond what has be called grand, ‘Kantian’ narratives of cosmopolitanism. In the next two chapters, I will show how a diversification of Enlightenment narratives can shed new light on the role that minoritized Romani populations have played in the history of modern Europe. In postcolonial studies, little to no research has been done to unsettle the ways in which various past and present governmental engagements with Europe’s Romani minorities represent a complex mixture of attempts to govern, develop, and improve them, as well as various failures to actually do so. Development studies, on the other hand, have prevailingly focused on development outside ‘Europe’, on the relations between ‘the West’ and non-Western subjects and objects targeted for development, or—in those cases that actually focus on Europe—on ‘failed’ or post-conflict states in the former Yugoslavia and Soviet Union. The ways in which the Roma have increasingly been targeted as a transnational minority population to be developed, empowered, and improved within and at Europe’s contested borders have hitherto been understudied. Addressing this lacuna is one of the main aims of this study.

The Roma represent more than simply one among other case studies, for their histories in Europe and the various ways in which they have been treated in the course of European history can tell us more about how the regulation of Europe’s own representational, territorial, and bio-political borders has been constituted and contested. To shed light on how current transnational approaches to Romani minorities are actually legacies of a European modernity that is more heterogeneous than has been suggested in Romarelated historiographies, I will analyze past and present approaches toward the Roma and interrogate them beyond a one-dimensional perspective of the Enlightenment, and of modernity more in general. This interrogation is the central aim of the second part of this study. From the perspective of a pluralized conception of modernity, I will discuss the relationship between the way in which Romani groups have historically become the focus of policy interventions, the Roma representation in minority terms, and the emergence of Gypsy or Romani studies.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I have examined the interrelationships between intra-state and inter-state governmentality and showed how we need to consider them as two inherently related forms of power that have simultaneously been developed in Europe since the seventeenth century. I have discussed Foucault’s analysis of the transformation of state/inter-state relations during the Enlightenment and his view of the gradual appearance of what he calls liberal forms of governmentality. I have explained how modes of governing through freedom—which characterize liberal governmentalties—have often ambivalently been related to less liberal or even illiberal forms of rule, in particular when it has

19 See, for instance, Duffield (2001; 2007) and Li (2007b; 2009).
21 See, for instance, Merlingen and Ostrauskaite (2006) and Vrbensky (2009).
come to governing minoritized population groups. I have argued that Foucault’s work, though it critically reflects on the interrelationships between state and inter-state forms of governmentality and on the emergence of different ‘arts of European government,’ does not relate the latter to both new forms of knowledge formation about Europe and the bio-political dimension of his analytics of government.

To interrogate past and current European governmentalities, and particularly the ways in which they are intrinsically related to influential forms of population regulation within and at Europe’s own contestable domain and contested borders, I have suggested analyzing the hitherto mostly unexplored domain where governmentality studies, critical studies of European governance, postcolonial studies, and development studies intersect. At the intersection of these literatures, I have proposed, we can discuss how forms of global or European governmentality have been related to transnational forms of bio-political population regulation in Europe. Where these literatures meet, the histories and current situation of Romani minorities in Europe also come into view. Historically situated at Europe’s own representational and bio-political borders and currently the target of large and ambitious transnational inclusion programs, the Roma represent a unique case study for analyzing the impact of how diverse forms of European governmentality have been articulated in the modern history of Europe. Before, in the third part of this study, I will analyze contemporary European governmentalities and their impact on the Roma, I want to shed light on how it has been made possible at all that Romani groups and individuals are problematized in terms of minorities and on how their minoritization has inaugurated diverse forms of Romani minority governance in Europe’s modern history. Spelling out these two issues is one of the central aims of the second part of this study. In part two, I will analyze these two issues through a critical interrogation of how reason of state and police governmentalities were articulated and transformed in late-eighteenth-century Central and Eastern Europe and affected the governance of Romani populations.
Part II
Historicity and Romani Minority Formation in Europe
Chapter 3
Contaminated Grounds: Disputing the Roma’s Origins

INTRODUCTION

The central aim of the second part of this study is to understand the relationship between the representation and formation of Gypsy or Romani groups in Europe as minorities on the one hand, and the emergence and transformation of late-eighteenth century European governmentalities, on the other. In this part, I firstly analyze how it has become possible that Gypsy or Romani groups in Europe, since the late eighteenth century, have been problematized in terms of minorities. Secondly, I scrutinize how their minoritization has inaugurated diverse forms of Romani minority governance and different representations of their history in modern Europe.

These themes relate in two important ways to the questions that I brought up at the end of chapter 2. Firstly, I will address the relation between, on the one hand, new kinds of knowledge formation about Europe that appeared for the first time in the eighteenth century, and, on the other, the then emerging bio-political approach to supposedly non-European Gypsy groups. Secondly, I discuss how the prevailing scholarly understanding of the impact of the Enlightenment and its legacies on Romani groups and their minority formation has hitherto underestimated the relevance of transforming governmentalities, including the role of scholars in governing Romani representations. I will contribute to re-narrating European modernity by interrogating the appearance of liberal forms of governmentality in East Central Europe and by analyzing the parallel emergence and development of so-called ‘Gypsy’ or ‘Romani studies.’ In chapter 4, I will analyze Gypsy minoritization and the formation of Gypsy studies in light of the transformation of police governmentalities and the emergence of liberal ones in the eighteenth-century Habsburg Empire. At the end of chapter 4, this discussion will lead to a revision of the currently prevailing interpretations of the emergence of Gypsy studies. These interpretations and how they relate to different readings of European modernity are the central focus of the present chapter.

The current debate about the eighteenth-century emergence of Gypsy studies and its crucial impact on modern forms of Romani minority governance has been dominated by two eighteenth-century scholars and by two contemporary scholarly strategies to represent these scholars’ works and legacies. These early ‘Gypsy scholars’ are Johann Rüdiger (1751-1822) and Heinrich Grellmann (1753-1804). In 1782, Rüdiger, a scholar in the then
emerging field of comparative linguistics who would become professor of political economy at the University of Halle in 1791, published *Von der Sprache und Herkunft der Zigeuner aus Indien* (*On the Language and Indian Origin of the Gypsies*). In this essay, he describes the dubious way in which the Europeans have dealt with the Gypsies and makes a fervent plea for their better treatment. In the second part of his essay, he tries to scientifically prove their Indian origin by comparing a Romani language sample with a Hindustani one.

In 1783, Grellmann, a historian and theologian at the University of Jena who would become professor at the University of Göttingen in 1787, published his book *Die Zigeuner* (*The Gypsies*), which also lengthily discusses the Indian origins of the Gypsies. He embeds his analysis in a rather monolithic narrative that considers them as the representatives of an underdeveloped, uncivilized, non-European pariah culture, which is heavily spoilt and only really adjustable to European civilized cultures by a radically assimilationist approach. Whereas Grellmann praises the assimilative Gypsy policies of his contemporary Habsburg enlightened absolutist rulers Maria Theresa and Joseph II, Rüdiger heavily criticizes the imperialist approaches of the European nations toward the peoples whom they had colonized and toward groups such as the Jews and the Gypsies. Rather than condemning the latter for their supposedly bad behavior, as Grellmann does, Rüdiger considers ‘their way of life’ as the effect, rather than the cause, of how European majorities have treated them. He understands the fact that the Gypsies represent and maintain their own unique culture, with their own language, customs, and traditions, as a condition of possibility for developing their nation in its own right.

Since the first prints of these publications in the late eighteenth century, however, Grellmann’s work has become much better known and widespread than Rüdiger’s. Not only has Grellmann’s work been quickly translated in various other European languages and, thus, widely disseminated throughout Europe, but at least until the early 1960s it has also been considered as an authoritative source about ‘Gypsy culture’. Only quite recently have a number of scholars tried to make Rüdiger’s work topical again. This renewed attention has also and indirectly led to the development of two dominant contemporary scholarly strategies to represent the works and legacies of eighteenth-century Gypsy studies.

Firstly, some authors (Lucassen et al 1998a) have argued that we need to reject or, at least, correct the entire tradition of Gypsy studies, because of its highly dubious connection with a long modern European history of orientalization and correlated Gypsy

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1 A delicate example is the way in which this legacy was mobilized against Sinti and Roma in the 1950s in the Federal Republic of Germany. References to Grellmann’s Gypsy representations, as well as to those who followed in his footsteps, were used in the post-genocide German court cases to scientifically document the supposedly asocial and criminal behavior of Sinti and Romani victims of the Nazis and to seriously hamper war reparations and the persecution of the perpetrators (Margalit 2002: 136-38; 2007: 495). In chapter 8, I will discuss the dramatic impact of persistent stereotypical representations on the slow recognition of the Nazi genocide of the Roma and Sinti in Germany and beyond. Willems has argued that Grellmann’s Gypsy representations were also uncritically in several postwar German scholarly studies (eg, Arnold 1965; Mode and Wölflling 1968). He also suggests that a significant number of MA and PhD theses, which were written at Austrian universities in the 1980s, remained uncritical about Grellmann’s work (Willems 1997: 22). For an excellent overview of anti-Gypsyism in German-speaking scholarly studies, see Severin (2009).

2 See, for instance, Wolf (1960), Ruch (1986), Haarmann (1990), and Matras (1999; 2002).
stigmatization. Annemarie Cottaar, Leo Lucassen, and Wim Willems have followed this first strategy and argued that Gypsy studies, at least until very recently, have never fundamentally disputed the orientalizing, late-eighteenth-century works of the early Gypsy scholars, their search for ‘true Gypsies’ with their alleged non-European origins and culture, and the dramatic effects of these scholarly Gypsy representations on marginalizing and criminalizing policy formations in modern European history. The advocates of this strategy, whose views I will discuss in the first part of this chapter, argue that we should resist what they consider as “the lure of the Gypsy-lorists and scholars working in their tradition, who have been quite successful in spreading the image of Gypsies as a remarkable and century old ethnic group” (Lucassen et al 1998b: 8). Their negative reception of the long and, as they argue, still continuing tradition of the Gypsy folklorists and their ‘founding fathers,’ has led Lucassen, Willems, and Cottaar to reject the reference to ‘Gypsies’ in terms of ethnicity and diaspora. With their groundbreaking work, published in the last decade of the twentieth century, these three Dutch authors have introduced an original and new approach to the study of Romani and Gypsy groups. Whereas they themselves have named their perspective socio-historical, others have usually called it constructivist. Arguing for considering the Gypsies’ ethnic minority and identity status as the result of several modern European invented national traditions, the Dutch trio questions the legitimacy of essentialist Gypsy or Roma approaches and their reliance on late-eighteenth and nineteenth-century forms of nationalism.

At the same time, we can distinguish an ostensibly more moderate scholarly strategy in the current debate. This strategy rejects some so-called pre-scientific and mystifying early Gypsy studies and their impact on modern European Romani minority formation and governance. However, this strategy defends those Enlightenment engagements with the Gypsies that could be connected with their acceptance as a minority in its own right (Matras 1999; 2004b) and, thus, with past and present forms of Romani minority self-articulation. Whereas the advocates of the first strategy consider the works of both Grellmann and Rüdiger as part of one and the same orientalizing tradition of Gypsy studies, Yaron Matras, the main advocate of the second strategy, considers only the legacy of Grellmann as highly problematic. The linguist Matras has developed his position largely in reply to the Dutch constructivist approach. Strongly based on a linguistically informed argument, he defends Rüdiger’s work and its legacy against the critique of the three Dutch authors and, implicitly, calls for a reconsideration of the latter’s rejection to discuss Romani groups in ethnic terms. Matras’s position, which I will discuss at the end of this chapter, implies that the ability to speak their own language allows Romani individuals and groups to express a form of cultural agency and to maintain and develop their ethnic minority status in its own, yet not necessarily unambiguous right.

In this third chapter, I primarily investigate how we need to understand these two strategies vis-à-vis the ways in which their advocates have interpreted European modernity, and the Enlightenment, its engagements with the Gypsies, and its legacies in particular. The proponents of these two strategies have discussed the eighteenth-century preoccupation with the Gypsies and its legacies as part of their scholarly engagements with the position of Romani groups in contemporary European societies and cultures. Whereas Cottaar, Lucassen, and Willems have focused on a reconsideration of the socio-historical conditions under which we could understand past and current, often violent
mechanisms of marginalization toward Romani groups, Matras’s work has been clearly committed to the powerful, yet vulnerable dynamics of Romani minority self-articulation. For him, underrating this dynamics and its significance seems to represent a form of epistemic violence against Romani groups that the Dutch trio of scholars has overlooked. Whereas it has sometimes been suggested—most of all by Matras himself—that Matras’s position is irreconcilable with that of the three Dutch scholars, in this and the next chapter I argue that we need to create new grounds for bringing their valuable positions in contact again. In order to introduce their positions as two sides of the same coin and to show that neither of these views can be maintained unambiguously, in the next section, I discuss these two scholarly strategies in the context of current debates about the roles of globalization and nationalism in violating the rights and cultures of different kinds of minorities.

ENDANGERED MINORITIES IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION

In his essay Fear of Small Numbers (2006), the anthropologist Arjun Appadurai tries to unravel the complex relations between contemporary processes of globalization, the endangered position of various kinds of minorities in the world, and initiatives of transnational activist networks to challenge violations of minority rights and cultures. His point of departure is that, if we take a closer look at global inter-state and intra-state conflicts, they are basically about jeopardizing minorities and their ‘ways of life,’ whether these groups represent political, religious, migrant, or cultural minorities. Appadurai puts forward that this global pattern of violence against minorities necessitates a global answer, and that many of the best-known analyses of global conflicts are not much satisfying. Samuel Huntington’s (1996) thesis that we currently deal with a clash of civilizations, for instance, cannot explain why many of these violent conflicts are ‘intra-civilizational,’ hence take place within the alleged civilizational boundaries that he presupposes. On the other hand, Michael Ignatieff’s (1998) suggestion that we have become insensitive to violence because of how the mass media have mediated it and kept it at a distance from us cannot explain the simultaneous growth of and support for grassroots initiatives to challenge violence against minorities.

In contradistinction to these kinds of answers, Appadurai suggests that worldwide violence against minorities has to do with the relatively recent construction of both minorities and majorities. They were primarily constructed at the time of the birth of the nation state and its various bio-political techniques to map, count, demarcate, and order population groups—tools developed mostly since the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries:

Minorities and majorities are recent historical inventions, essentially tied up with ideas about nations, populations, representation, and enumeration, which are no more than a few centuries old. (Appadurai 2006: 49)

Now that several global forces have seriously put nation states under pressure and destabilized their sovereignty, Appadurai argues, minorities have become the sites par
excellence where these states try to rearticulate and reestablish their power by various, often newly developed bio-political means and instruments. According to him, minorities challenge constitutional and legal orders, their cross-border movements and transactions complicate various kinds of control, their languages, ‘lifestyles,’ and memories question supposed cultural, national, and social homogeneity, and their politics could be at variance with majority interests. He puts forward that the uncertainties ‘caused by’ minority groups, aggravated by the difficulty for many states to secure employment, welfare, health care, and the like in an era of globalization can translate into various forms of majority violence toward minorities. Whereas globalization, because of its faceless and abstract character, cannot become the concrete site of violence, “minorities can” (ibid 44). As a result, Appadurai contests the interpretation that minority groups themselves produce violence. Conversely, he provocatively puts forward that “violence … requires minorities” (ibid 46, my emphasis). Violence requires minority formation as well as the perpetual performance and affirmation of the socio-cultural matrix in which minorities and majorities appear as if they really have a natural and uncontestable origin.

Appadurai is not alone in his view that in order to adequately understand the current relation between minority and majority groups as well as various forms of contemporary nationalism and minority formation we need to carefully look at the circumstances under which minorities and majorities have historically and mutually been formed and identified as such. A great number of scholars who have analyzed Enlightenment thinking, and modernity more generally, have focused on seventeenth and eighteenth-century developments, discourses, and practices to clarify what they have considered as one of the most influential epistemological shifts in modern history. Despite significant differences between their theories and methodologies, influential and diverse theorists of nationalism, such as Hans Kohn, Miroslav Hroch, Ernest Gellner, Eric Hobsbawm, Benedict Anderson, Anthony Smith, Homi Bhabha, and Partha Chatterjee have all emphasized the crucial importance of the late eighteenth century for the emergence and understanding of modern nationalism and, to some extent, for an analysis of the conflations of nationalism and racism of somewhat later date. In this context, the supposedly particularistic view of the influential eighteenth-century scholar Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744-1803) has often been considered as one of the most important culprits in spreading ideas about nationalism and about the inextricable and essentialist relations between a nation, a people, and their culture and language. Herderian philosophy, and other late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth-century forms of cultural particularism more generally, have frequently been considered responsible for the emergence of a form of essentialism in which cultures basically develop autonomously and at different speeds. These forms of particularism are usually linked with the parallel emergence of the idea of superior and inferior or civilized and ‘not yet’ civilized cultures, nations, and races.

For many interpreters of modernity, the obsession with the origins of nations, cultures, and races that started to dominate political, scientific, and cultural debates throughout Europe from the late-eighteenth century onward represents one of the important problematics of modern thought. The obsession with origins and the inclination to separate ‘us’ from ‘them’ and order cultures, nations, and races hierarchically according to their alleged level of civilization have repeatedly been considered characteristics that do not belong to a distant past at all. Rather, as some have argued, they have
influentially and often devastatingly determined modern history from Western colonial hegemony and genocides to contemporary forms of violence legitimated in the name of human rights and the spread of liberal values from the West to ‘developing countries’ and ‘transitional democracies’ elsewhere in the world.

In this chapter, by discussing the example of Romani minority formation in Europe and its relation to processes of (nation) state building and to new forms of knowledge formation, I challenge this primarily negative perspective of the legacy of Enlightenment and Romantic thinking. I maintain Appadurai’s view that an interrogation of late-eighteenth-century discourses and practices concerning nation and state-building is crucial to understanding processes of minoritization and majoritization and their violent effects. Yet, I want to challenge the view that the dynamic of these processes has only had negative and violent consequences for minoritized groups, such as the Romani. Having said this, my analysis does not imply that the theme of violence toward minorities and its complex relation to processes of globalization, nation-state building, and ‘othering’ is not relevant to analyzing the situation of Romani minorities in Europe. It certainly is. As a number of authors have emphasized—Annemarie Cottaar, Leo Lucassen, and Wim Willems most pressingly (Lucassen et al 1998a)—we need to understand past and current forms of violence toward Romani groups in the context of the legacy of Enlightenment thought and of modern processes of nation state formation and the centralization of rule. This also implies that we need to avoid focusing on the Roma’s alleged homogeneity, poverty, marginality, or criminality. Rather, we need to emphasize the various ways in which these groups have historically been homogenized, minoritized, marginalized, and criminalized with determination—a process that these three influential Dutch authors have generally reformulated as one of combined categorizing, labeling, and stigmatizing.

In general, there is a clear tendency in the study of Romani groups to focus on how late-eighteenth-century political, cultural, and scientific approaches to the Roma—including the emergence of the field of Gypsy studies itself—have time and again influenced historically later forms of Romani identity formation, representation, and self-representation, from the period of Romanticism to the Nazi genocide of the Sinti and Roma, and from communism and Western European ‘welfarism’ to post-communism and the current politics of minority integration. In some of these studies it has been argued that modern European forms of knowledge formation about ‘the Gypsies’ as well as interrelated modern European forms of their representation have significantly

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3 By violence, I mean not only physical forms of violence, but also symbolic, constitutional, institutional, epistemic, and verbal forms of violence, such as institutional and non-institutional racism, direct and indirect discrimination, stereotypical and stigmatized forms of representation, exclusion from human, civil, social, or minority rights, denied or limited access to social and public services, exclusion from history writing and from institutionalized forms of representation more general (in academies, school curricula, museums, etc.).


5 Many authors have discussed the influence of eighteenth-century thought and practices on current or contemporary approaches toward Romani groups (Fraser 1995; Crowe 1995; Willems 1997; Lucassen et al 1998a; Matras 1999; Lemon 2000; Guy 2001a; Barany 2002; Mayall 2004; Saul and Tebbutt 2004; Bancroft 2005; Zimmermann 2007c).
contributed to their socioeconomic, political, and cultural marginalization. Cottaar, Lucassen, and Willems (Lucassen et al. 1998b), for instance, have argued that the persistent scholarly representation of Gypsies as a people who have no territorial, cultural, or whatsoever bond with the states in which they live, has also implied that the history of Gypsy or Romani groups has remained a “history in footnotes” in most historiographical traditions. This trend to exclude their histories from national historiographies and from those of the Holocaust has also been strengthened because the histories on the Roma have mostly been written by non-Roma (but see Hancock 2002; Belton 2005; Le Bas and Acton 2010). Correlatively, as, for instance, Katie Trumpener (1992) has argued, the Roma are “a ‘people without history’ in the narratives of the West.” Since ‘the Gypsies’ have over and over again been represented stereotypically in fairy tales, children’s books, novels, travel reports, encyclopedias, operas, films, and popular culture—as Trumpener’s argument goes—they have been deprived of their own histories and memories in western cultures. To various extents, these contemporary studies of Gypsy or Romani groups suggest that there is a close relationship between their intellectual and cultural representation and diverse forms of violence against them.

In these and other studies of Romani groups, specific attention has often been paid to references to the Roma’s alleged Indian and diasporic origins in past and contemporary processes of Romani identity formation and in Roma representations and self-representations. As several authors have analyzed, the references to the Roma’s supposed origins were made for the first time in the eighteenth-century Habsburg Empire, when the first ‘Gypsy scholars,’ most notably Samuel Augustini ab Hortis (1729-1792), Johann Rüdiger (1751-1822), and Heinrich Grellmann (1753-1804) were tracing back the origins of the European Gypsies to India, mainly on the basis of linguistic arguments. Many contemporary scholars consider the works of these eighteenth-century scholars and their legacies as enormously influential when it comes to the scope as well as limitations of how Romani groups could be represented and could represent themselves throughout modern European history. Yet, these contemporary scholars do not agree upon how we need to appreciate the influence of these early modern Habsburg scholars and upon how their legacy relates to a long tradition of violent displacements of Romani groups in European history. As I have discussed in this chapter’s introduction, we can distinguish between two dominant positions in the reception of this influence and legacy.

Cottaar, Lucassen, and Willems—who, together, have been considered as the representatives of the so-called Dutch School—have assessed the work and legacy of these eighteenth-century scholars as predominantly negative. They consider their influence and the repeated yet basically unchanged rearticulation of their ideas in the course of modern European history as largely responsible for a persistent tradition of the Roma’s

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6 Various authors have discussed diverse forms of stereotypical Roma representations in cultural objects (Solms and Strauss 1995; Tebbutt 1998; Iordanova 2001; 2003; Malvinni 2004; Gay y Blasco and Iordanova 2008; Imre 2009). In chapter 8, I will analyze the history of Roma representations in light of contemporary Romani memorial practices. There, I will also discuss Trumpener’s work at length.

7 During a summer school in Romani Studies at the Central European University in Budapest in 2003, Cottaar, Lucassen, and Willems were collectively represented as ‘the Dutch School.’ For the sake of convenience and also because they have collectively presented their works in their The Gypsies and Other Itinerant Groups (1998), I use this expression in this study to refer to their scholarly position.
stigmatization and racialization. In a line of thought that is similar to that of Edward Said’s seminal study *Orientalism* (1978), Willems (1997; 1998) has put forward that the early Gypsy scholars were the first in a long series of academics who effectively orientalized the Gypsies as a non-European, essentially nomadic, and ethnically, culturally, and linguistically homogeneous people with their own diasporic history. According to Willems, since the emergence of these eighteenth-century scholarly Gypsy representations, state authorities have time and again mobilized them to legitimize anti-Gypsy measures, from assimilation policies under Habsburg enlightened absolutist rule to genocide under Nazism to post-war exclusions of Romani migrants. Lucassen (1996; 2008) has related the possibility to make such measures effective at all to the increased centralization of the state or to what he also called the institutionalization of ‘direct rule.’

The representatives of the Dutch School have identified three dominant reasons for the persistent history of modern European processes of Roma or Gypsy labeling and stigmatization, namely: (1) the cultural particularism of eighteenth-century nationalistic thought exemplified by Herderian philosophy; (2) the Enlightenment belief in the improbability of human nature, and (3) the gradually increasing ability of emerging state institutions and scientific conceptualizations to determine the representational boundaries of Romani identities. The Dutch authors have explicitly extended this line of thought to the present-day circumstances under which Roma representations and self-representations take place. According to them, every attempt to represent the Roma and Sinti as one homogeneous people—also by group members themselves—and every attempt to speak of the Roma and Sinti as an ethnic minority group that already existed before the twentieth century risks reinforcing the dubious language of eighteenth-century particularism and nationalism. Therefore, the Dutch School rejects the reference to Romani groups in terms of an ethnic and diasporic group. Though they do not want “to deny a ‘Gypsy’ or ‘Traveller’ ethnicity” (Lucassen et al 1998b: 2), they consider the power of state and scientific authorities so big and influential that “the Roma and Sinti approach” falls easily and dangerously back into the reinforcement of racist or nationalistic categories (Lucassen 1998c: 93; Willems 1998: 33). In short, since the representatives of the Dutch School consider the late-eighteenth-century epistemological preoccupation with Gypsy groups as the primary source of various forms of violence against them, they also reject the reference to Gypsies in ethnic and diasporic terms, which they understand to be inherently related to the legacy of the early modernity. Since the way in which dominant forms of knowledge formation about Gypsy groups has led to their minoritization as a combined and persistent process of labeling and stigmatization, the Dutch authors call for a radical break with the prevailing Roma-related historiography and how it is dubiously connected with the entire tradition of Gypsy studies.

More than once, the linguist Yaron Matras has expressed dissatisfaction with how the Dutch School, and Willems in particular, has represented the influence of eighteenth-century thought (Matras 1999; 2004b). Since Matras has most clearly and extensively formulated an opposite point of view, he could also be considered as the main represen-

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tative of the other position in what could be called the ‘origins debate.’\textsuperscript{9} Unlike the Dutch School, Matras considers the eighteenth-century comparison of the language of the Roma with Indian languages, including the subsequent analysis of their great similarities, as a major achievement and a “sensational discovery” in the history of the Roma (Matras 2002: 2)—and not as a basically romanticized or even racist or nationalist representation of diverse itinerant groups as one homogeneous ‘Gypsy people’ (Matras 2004b). Though Matras agrees with Cottaar, Lucassen, and Willems that the ‘one nation-one people-one language’ idea has historically been mobilized to make dubious political, legal, and cultural claims, and that this tendency needs to be interrogated critically, he wants to clarify the role of the Romani language in what he considers as the mystification of Romani identity by scholars such as Willems.\textsuperscript{10} His main strategy in doing so is to distinguish the position of Rüdiger clearly from those of Augustini ab Hortis and Grellmann. Matras considers the works of latter two ‘pseudo-scientific’ and those of the former linguistically innovative. Based on this appreciation of Rüdiger’s position, Matras generally considers the eighteenth-century emergence of the field of Gypsy studies as positive. For him, the “sensational discovery” of the linguistic origins of Romanes—that is the language of the Roma—is also related to the Roma’s ability to articulate their identity without automatically risking what Willems has called the “death-trap of ethnicity” (1998). Matras offers a much more positive interpretation of the reference to the Roma in ethnic terms than the Dutch School does. His view allows for linking the legacy of European modernity with forms of Romani cultural agency and self-articulation and, thus, with ways to approach Romani groups that are not necessarily violent.

How are we to assess these two dominant positions in the ‘origins debate’? In the remainder of this chapter, I will further unravel these positions. In the next two sections, I will focus on the how Willems’s and Lucassen’s negative interpretation of modernity and its legacy and, as a result, their view of the modern history of Gypsy groups rely on a one-sided perspective of Enlightenment thought.\textsuperscript{11} In the penultimate section of this chapter, I show how Matras potentially offer an alternative, more positive view of European modernity and its effects on Romani groups and their representation. However, in the conclusion of this chapter I will argue that his view could be considered as a missed opportunity to combine the strengths of the Dutch School’s perspective with a more heterogeneous and ambivalent reading of the Enlightenment, its legacy, and its impact on past and contemporary problematizations of Gypsy or Romani groups. I will argue that neither the intellectual strategy of the Dutch School—to abandon the entire tradition of Gypsy studies—nor the one proposed by Matras—to distinguish between a bad and a good tradition within Gypsy studies and advocate for the latter—can be maintained. These strategies need to be combined to acknowledge the ambivalent role of scholars in past and contemporary forms of Romani identity formation.


\textsuperscript{10} See Matras (1998; 2004a; 2004b) and Margalit and Matras (2007).

\textsuperscript{11} Since Cottaar’s work focuses on the history and position of caravan dwellers in the Netherlands, in the rest of this chapter, I will discuss the works of Lucassen and Willems.
In 2002, Ian Hancock published his *We are the Romani People – Ame sam e Romane džene*. The back of his book presents it as “invaluable to anybody who wants to know more about these fascinating people who left India a thousand years ago.” Following this style of presentation, the book’s first chapter begins with the quotation “no nation knows itself until it knows its past” (Ben Ames Williams cited Hancock 2002: 1). Hancock, professor of Romani studies at the University of Texas and director of the Romani Archives and Documentation Center, is the best-known representative of an essentialist approach to Romani groups.12 As the quotation at the beginning of his book’s first chapter suggests, he considers unraveling the past of the Romani nation as a necessary condition for the development of Romani national identity and for contributing to the awareness of the Roma’s alleged Indian origins. In chapters with suggestive titles, such as “How Indian are Romanies?” and “How European are Romanies?” he traces the contemporary European Romani population to its Indian homeland, while he, at the same time, remarks that most of the Roma would consider Europe as their “home” (2002: 78). On the one hand, he considers many Romani customs, beliefs, and traditions as well as the Romani language in contemporary Europe as “incontrovertibly Indian” and, therefore, as a proof of the Roma’s Indian origins:

Culture, language, and identity are not inherited genetically but socially, and apart from the genetic and linguistic evidence [of the Roma’s Indian origins], a core of direct, unbroken transmission from India in these other areas may also be readily identified. (Hancock 2002: 71, my emphasis) 13

On the other hand, Hancock puts forward that “our Romani language, and a good part of our core culture, only crystallized once the migration westwards [from India] had reached Anatolia” in contemporary Turkey. From this perspective, Romani identity formation is a European process and needs to be understood as “a western phenomenon, albeit one with early and significant Asian roots.”14 Knowledge about these Asian origins, Hancock adds, “gives us a history and a legitimacy as a people” (2001: viii, my emphasis).

Tracing the origins of the Roma to India is not yet enough for Hancock. He even takes the argument a step further and suggests that the Roma had to leave India and were brought to Europe against their will, where they were—again—forced into the position of the ultimate underdog (Hancock 2002: chapter 1 and 2). By simultaneously tracing the Roma’s origins to India and suggesting that they were time and again evicted or re-

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12 See also Hancock (1987; 1991; 2000; 2004; 2010).
13 The genetification of Roma identity has a rather long tradition and dubious contemporary equivalents (Kohn 1995). Nonetheless, Hancock does not hesitate to mobilize genetic arguments and to refer to recent and contemporary research into genetics to prove the Roma’s Indian origins.
14 This viewpoint differs from Hancock’s earlier, more radical statement that “[a]fter all, Gypsies made the journey from India to Europe intact” (1991: 139). However, what has remained unchanged in his view is that the Roma’s dispersion over Europe and the fragmentation of their identity need to be seen as the result of how they have aggressively and coercively been approached from the outside, not of any internal factors or of the co-constitution of both the insider and the outsider perspectives.
pressed, Hancock universalizes the narrative of a suffering Romani nation, forced to travel and victims of anti-Roma societies in India, Europe, and in every temporary halting place of their journey from the East to the West. By doing so, he also tends to project ideas about nationalism that appeared for the first time in modern history in the eighteenth century onto pre-eighteenth-century histories. The situation in which ‘the Romani people’ finally ended up in Europe leads Hancock to conclude that “the overall effect of this [repressive approach to them] was devastating and turned a skilled, self-sufficient people into dependent, dispirited chattel” (2002: 16, see also Hancock 1987).

Lucassen, Willems, and Cottaar have criticized essentialist and homogeneous Roma representations such as Hancock’s. More particularly, they consider the representation of the Roma as an Indian diasporic people and perpetual victims as historically dubious, politically, and intellectually counterproductive, and one of the main reasons for “the splendid isolation’ of Gypsy studies” in the academic world (Willems 1997: 305). Hancock suggests that knowledge about the Roma’s origins is a necessary condition to make particular cultural, juridical, or political claims, to being included in the history of Europe, and to become more visible internationally. In contrast, the Dutch trio argues that it is exactly this way of thinking about Roma in terms of nationhood, diaspora, and victimization that has greatly contributed to their invisibility in society and interdisciplinary academic debates (Lucassen et al 1998b: 2). Partly due to what Lucassen, Willems, and Cottaar consider as a lack of self-criticism in Gypsy or Romani studies, the history of Romani groups risks remaining “a history in footnotes” (ibid 1), staying “excluded” from comparative and interdisciplinary research, and being “reduced to a litany of repression and persecution” (ibid 5, see also Willems 1997: 306-07).

The representatives of the Dutch School, among others, have aimed at updating the methodologically outdated field of Romani studies and opening it up to more contemporary methods, paradigms, and programs of research, migration historical research in particular. Using a specific form (van Arkel 1985) of frame analysis (Goffman 1963; 1974), Lucassen, Willems, and Cottaar have repeatedly defended a constructivist perspective on what they prefer to call “Gypsies and other itinerant groups” (Lucassen et al 1998a). They have put forward that, due to a problematic amalgamation of a new scholarly approach to itinerant groups in the eighteenth century and the parallel emergence of various processes of nation-state formation in Europe, principally diverse peripatetic groups were conceptually and pragmatically categorized and unified, and, thus, constructed, under the Gypsy label. According to the Dutch trio, the scholarly framing of unrelated and dissimilar itinerant groups as Gypsies has had a great impact on how these groups have been perceived and approached by state officials and in popular cultural discourses in the course of modern European history. Due to the eighteenth-century tendency to conflate nation and culture—in this context the Dutch trio refers to Herder’s philosophy of language and culture—the Gypsies were equally approached as a unique people with their own history, tradition, culture, and language. Perceived as a primarily nomadic people that did not belong to the states where they were supposed to stay only temporarily, various itinerant groups were considered as having their own, separate yet common cultural and linguistic traditions, which did not fit those of the sedentary peoples of the emerging European states. Predominantly based on linguistic comparisons, the Dutch trio argues, eighteenth-century scholars began to perceive of this
'Gypsy people' as an originally Indian and, thus, non-European one that had traveled westward in the course of medieval history.

In particular Willems (1997) argues that the eighteenth-century construction of the Gypsies as one homogeneous people with non-European origins could to a large extent be considered as responsible for their stigmatic representation as uncivilized, backward, marginal, criminal, and racially inferior. With reference to Said’s study on orientalism, Willems (1997: 300-03) clarifies how the ‘enlightened’ works of some eighteenth-century scholars and scientists, those of Augustini ab Hortis, Rüdiger, and Grellmann in particular, effectively orientalized the Gypsies as one clearly demarcated and homogeneous people who, due to their ‘uncivilized’ way of life, did not fit the prevailing contemporary representations of the cultures of western, occidental peoples. In addition and to explain the influence of the Gypsies’ orientalization on nineteenth and twentieth-century generations, Willems refers to Said’s notion of the dictates of authoritative texts. This notion refers to the uncritical reproduction of the same historical (scholarly, folkloristic, etc.) sources and to how this cultural-political mechanism persistently upholds particular group stereotypes and legitimizes stigmatization or even repressive policies toward the target group.

By tracing the ‘roots’ of the persistent tradition of the Gypsies’ orientalization to the times of Habsburg enlightened absolutist rule under empress Maria Theresa and her son Joseph II, Willems does not suggest that these roots are absolute, nor that stigmatization processes have not undergone influential changes in the course of European history. Willems shows that Grellmann, Rüdiger, and their contemporaries also reproduced older sources on the Gypsies uncritically. At the same time, however, he argues that particularly Grellmann unified a wide range of Gypsy stereotypes that circulated already long before his days. This unity not only consisted of bringing together these stereotypes under the label of one and the same Gypsy culture, it also had a profound temporal and spatial dimension: Grellmann constructed a representation in which the Gypsies had one common non-European history, one common origin in India, and one common culture that basically resembled and descended from pariah-like castes, the lowest ones in the Indian caste system. According to Willems, it is precisely the construction of this unity and homogeneity that distinguishes Grellmann from historically earlier forms of categorizing (1997: chapter 2).

15 See Augustini ab Hortis (1994), Rüdiger (1782), and Grellmann (1783; 1787a).

16 Said’s work (1978) shows how influential scholarly texts have historically and discursively shaped an inherently dual notion of the Orient (‘the East’) and the Occident (‘the West’). Though Willems pays much attention to how Gypsy groups have been orientalized in the course of European history and, thus, to how they have been minoritized, his work does not include a substantial analysis of processes of occidentalization or majoritization. As a result, Willems’s work sometimes creates the impression that these two processes are not inherently related. At the end of chapter 4, I will explain that this under-representation of processes of occidentalization has big consequences for how Willems reads Rüdiger’s work.

17 In his notorious book on the Gypsies, Heinrich Grellmann plagiarized substantial parts of the work of Samuel Augustini ab Hortis (Ruch 1986; Willems 1997).

18 In addition, Willems points to the wide dissemination of Grellmann’s work, which, quickly after the publication of its first (1783) and second (1787) edition, was translated into other languages, such as English (1787; 1807), French (1788; 1810), Dutch (1791), and Polish (1824). The fact that the original German term ‘Zigeuner’ was translated into the French as ‘Bohéliens’ (Bohemians) and into the Dutch as ‘heidens’
Additionally, Willems argues that the articulation of this match between Gypsy culture and its alleged non-European origins first led to the nineteenth-century Romantic variant of this unity and then, under national-socialism, to its genocidal counterpart (1997: chapters 3, 4, 5). He avoids framing this history as a linear or necessary one, as if Grellmann’s Gypsy representation had inevitably led to what finally happened to Romani groups in the Second World War. Nonetheless, Willems argues that the authority of the works of Grellmann and his followers was never fundamentally disputed. When nineteenth-century anthropologists started to conduct fieldwork, for instance, and could not find people that looked like Grellmann’s Gypsies, these ethnographers did not conclude that his categories had to be false. Quite the opposite, they started to differentiate between a true, endangered Gypsy culture on the one hand, and a false, imitated one that was largely responsible for endangering the true one, on the other. In other words, the fixation on the alleged unity of the Gypsies and on the possibility to describe ‘the true Gypsies’ and their culture—elements that were typical of Grellmann’s Gypsy representation—continued unabated. In its turn, the Romantic differentiation between ‘true’ and ‘false’ Gypsies was again to be rearticulated in the form of the Nazi terminological distinction between ‘full blood Gypsies’ (Rassezieuner) and ‘mixed blood’ ones (Zigeunermischlinge) who had ‘dangerously infiltrated’ in the ‘superior, Aryan race.’ Again, Willems argues, the scientifically supported labeling of the Gypsies as an essentially different, non-European people dominated, this time with genocidal consequences.  

Whereas Willems focuses on scientific discourses and how they have historically framed Gypsy or Romani identities, Lucassen concentrates on the role of pre-state and state institutions in determining forms of Roma or Gypsy representation. Lucassen has primarily related the possibility of stigmatization to the late-eighteenth and nineteenth-century shift from types of indirect rule to those of direct rule. To explain the adequacy and efficiency of the kind of stigmatization processes that Willems describes, Lucassen argues that we can neither rely on arguments that consider the Gypsies as social outcasts nor on interpretations of repression “as a way to discipline and control people who do not fit the ideal of the dominant classes” (Lucassen 1998b: 71). Rather, we need to take into account the ways in which nation-states were gradually formed, bureaucracies increasingly centralized, systems of poor relief (workhouses, poorhouses, and other welfare systems) developed, and systems of supervision and apparatuses of control (police, customs) autonomously established and institutionalized. Following Charles Tilly’s (1992) typology, Lucassen describes these shifts as the steady installation of the institution of ‘direct rule’: all these processes have made it possible to approach minoritized groups more directly than before and have made it much more difficult for them to escape stigmatization (Lucassen et al 1998b: 12; Lucassen 1998b: 57-66; 2008: 431-33). According to him, this can to a large extent explain why traveling groups have often been labeled and stigmatized so thoroughly. For example, poor relief became gradually more limited to the local and later to the ‘national’ poor. Therefore, poor relief needs to be considered as a key element in excluding poor immigrants and traveling groups from

(pagans) points to the diverse way in which Gypsy groups were framed at that time (see Willems 1997; Grellmann 1787b; 1788/1810; 1791; 1807).

19 See also Zimmermann (1996a; 2007d), Lucassen (1996; 1998c), and Lewy (2000).
the provision of welfare. Furthermore, the professionalization of police institutions resulted in the shift from a reactive to a proactive approach toward the tracing, supervising, and exclusion of aliens. The amalgamation of the identity construction of Gypsy groups as ethnically and linguistically homogeneous, non-European, and diasporic on the one hand, and the ‘statization,’ nationalization, and increased centralization of systems of poor relief and control, on the other, has historically led to deep-rooted forms of Gypsy labeling and stigmatizing to which the Dutch scholars lengthily point in their common and individual works.

How exactly we need to understand this important amalgamation between scientific forms of framing Gypsy groups and processes of nation-state formation and centralization does not become entirely clear from the works of Lucassen and Willems. On the basis of their critical analysis of the Gypsy label and correlated processes of framing, they conclude that any reference to Gypsy or Romani ethnicity and their diasporic character needs to be seen as highly problematic: it even symbolizes a “deathtrap” (Willems 1998; see also Willems and Lucassen 2000). A key argument in Willems’s line of thought is related to the roles that language, comparative forms of scientific analysis, and cultural particularism have played in delineating Gypsy cultures as diasporic and ethnically homogeneous. The focus on language and the parallel development of Gypsy studies in the eighteenth-century Habsburg Empire need to be seen in light of the Zeitgeist, enlightened absolutism, and Herder’s intimate linkage of language, culture, people, and nation in particular (Willems 1997: 36-41, 82-83). Willems explicitly relates the emergence of comparative forms of research to the preoccupation of late-eighteenth-century scholars and scientists with linking the alleged ‘national spirit’ to issues of culture, history, and language:

The idea began to win ground that language expressed the mentality of a people and that implied a yoking of philology and historical analysis … The idea was that when the deep structures of languages, but also of literature, fairy tales, myths and other narratives were similar, then the speakers and writers of these must be kindred as well. This prompted a tidal wave of publications about national literatures. The notion flourished that language, like peoples and societies, developed in stages, in a manner analogous to the laws of nature … The method of the analogy infiltrated every discipline and, around 1780, had come to dominate scientific thinking to a marked degree. (Willems 1997: 36-37, my emphasis)

At the same time, the suggestion that languages and peoples developed in stages led to the idea that some peoples, most notably those of the West, had developed quicker and better:

Ethnographers and natural scientists developed the scientific methods of comparison and classification necessary to impose order on their observations. These interpretations, however, were colored by classical notions of beauty, middle-class values (moderation, honor, and hard work), and by national myths and symbols, all of which paved the way for conceptions about superior and inferior peoples. Enlightened thought in terms of
It is in this eighteenth-century context that Willems also observes a deep-rooted “ambivalence” in Grellmann’s work (1997: 296). Willems describes it as an ambivalence between what he considers the Enlightenment belief in the improbability of human nature on the one hand, and, on the other, the essential invariability of ‘a people’—which he understands as central to Herder’s philosophy of language and culture. More than once, the representatives of the Dutch School have suggested that their rejection of references to Gypsy groups in terms of ethnicity and diaspora is intimately linked to the legacy of this ambivalence. On the topicality of the ambivalence in Grellmann’s work, Willems remarks, for instance, that its traces “remain detectable all the way into the twentieth century.” In broader terms, he puts forward that this ambivalence “is characteristic of general European thinking about Gypsies” (1998: 24, my emphasis). He does not consider the impact of this ambivalence limited to ‘non-Gypsy’ scientists and policy makers, for he explicitly extends it to those who are presently referring to themselves as Roma and Sinti. Lucassen as well has been critical of current attempts to emancipate ‘Gypsy groups’ under the explicit reference to a common ethnic Romani or Sinti historical and linguistic background:

From a scholarly point of view, the disadvantage of the Sinti und Roma approach is that all kinds of contemporary racist as well as present-day ethnic categories are thus used, which easily leads to anachronistic and unjustified interpretations. Assuming that there ever was a clearly ethnically defined Sinti und Roma group in the past means that we in fact accept the point of departure … that it was possible to define who was a ‘real’ Gypsy … What was the relationship between labeling and ethnicity? Did Gypsies always regard themselves as Sinti or Rom or was this feeling [sic] reinforced or even initiated by a long period of intensive stigmatization and labeling? (Lucassen 1998c: 93, italics in original)

Lucassen and Willems clearly answer the last question in favor of their second option, even though they acknowledge some of the achievements of what they call the Sinti und Roma approach. The post-Second World War use of the autonyms Roma and Sinti and the simultaneous intermingling of scientific and political discourses have “generated a number of analyses critical of government policy but at the same time they have confirmed some stereotypical ideas about the folk character of the Gypsies.” In the end, however, the Dutch School is not much charmed by how Romani and Sinti organizations and their advocacy groups have recently mobilized the Sinti und Roma approach:

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20 Elsewhere, Lucassen suggests that ‘this feeling’ to regard themselves as Roma and Sinti could, at least to some extent, be considered as the result of a self-fulfilling prophecy: “The final stage in the fixing of the stigma is the self-fulfilling prophecy. People who where treated as riff-raff in some cases started to behave as such and developed their own subculture” (1998b: 73). Similar ideas have been expressed elsewhere, for instance in terms of the development of a supposed Romani ethnic ‘underclass’ (Ladányi and Szelényi 2006).
[Indeed] it remains questionable ... whether corrections are to be anticipated from this corner since the intelligentsia in Gypsy circles are not likely to profit very much by challenging the core concepts of Gypsy studies. For political and pragmatic reasons they will sooner close ranks in support of the idea of a collective Gypsy identity, including a language that belongs to them ... Recognition as an ethnic minority certainly culminated in more agreements pertaining to specific rights. (Willems 1997: 306-07; 1998: 33-34, his emphasis) ²¹

To be sure, these ‘corrections’ imply a rectification that affects the entire tradition of Gypsy studies. Indeed, Willems concludes that Grellmann’s work on the Gypsies marks a decisive turning point in the history of Gypsy groups in Europe. Until about the mid-eighteenth century, “writers followed for the most part in the footsteps of the government and considered Gypsies as one of many categories of vagrants.” However, from the time that Rüdiger, Grellmann, and a few others believed that they had proven that the Gypsies come from India, “governments and judicial authorities could legitimize their stigmatizing policy by invoking scientific arguments.” Thus, while scholars before Grellmann were “more followers than leaders” in initiating processes of categorization and stigmatization, since his days the role of scholars and that of governmental and judicial bodies have been roughly inverted (Willems 1998: 19; Lucassen et al 1998b: 7). Thus, the Dutch School considers the invention of one common Romani language and origin as a sound theoretical basis for the Gypsies’ cultural unity and ethnic otherness as the crucial historical marker of the stigmatization process that has dominated the history of modern European Roma representations and self-representations.

TOWARD A PLURALIZED UNDERSTANDING OF ENLIGHTENMENT THOUGHT

In the Dutch School’s representation of the history of Romani studies and of approaches toward Gypsy or Romani groups, the combined Enlightenment belief in the improvability of human nature and Herderian cultural particularism appear as a historical nexus that has persistently decided against these groups. Whereas the alleged improvability of human nature has led to repressive measures against them, in its turn cultural particularism has resulted in forms of nationalism and racism that have excluded the Gypsies from mainstream European societies and cultures.

I do not doubt that this frequently happened and continues to happen. I also agree that scientific conceptualizations and state institutional discourses and measures have had a deep impact on how Gypsy and Romani groups have been treated throughout modern European history. Yet, I want to challenge the suggestion that dealing with Romani groups in terms of ethnicity and diaspora necessarily implies a deathtrap. The Dutch School’s strong hesitation to refer to Romani groups in such a way has much to do

²¹ Please, note how, in this quote, “the intelligentsia in Gypsy circles” has implicitly been represented as one homogeneous group. As I will show in the third part of this study, however, we cannot represent current Romani activists and elites as homogeneous. They represent different viewpoints and have represented diverse approaches to Romani identity formation and self-representation.
with their representation of modernity, and of the Enlightenment, Herderian philosophy, and the emergence of Gypsy studies in particular. Though Willems does make a few references to the enlightened scientific attitude to critique state power and its abuses (1997: 36), the role of critique in Enlightenment thought entirely disappears in how the Dutch School represents late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth-century thought, as well as its legacy. Their central theses build on, firstly, a singularized and overly negative representation of Enlightenment thought and, secondly, on the suggestion that the ‘core’ of Enlightenment thought has been preserved in all later events, at least when it comes to how this supposed core has continuously reinforced Roma stigmatization. As I argue in this section and beyond, this twofold reliance has far-reaching implications for their consideration of the relationship between science and the state, for how they embed the emergence of Gypsy studies in the Zeitgeist, and, finally, for their primarily negative estimation of present-day forms of Romani self-representation. My critique of their work does not primarily focus on how stigmatization, and framing processes more generally, could hinder or intensely limit forms of Romani self-representation. Rather, my analysis is a philosophical critique of how the Dutch trio’s form of history writing, that of modernity in particular, understates the much more ambivalent role that government in the broad Foucauldian sense (chapter 1) plays in attempts to determine processes of Romani minority and identity formation. My critique implies that—even while stigmatization processes do of course hinder forms of Romani self-representation—we need to be open to these forms and their conditions of possibility (I will return to this issue in chapter 4). To explain my disagreement with the Dutch School’s representation of Enlightenment thinking, and European modernity more generally, let me quote what I consider as a central passage in Willems’s work:

At the core of the Enlightenment is the thought that people are improvable, which condones government policy directed towards this aim. In such a perspective culture is presumed more potent than nature. Incompatible with this position was the Herderian idea of a people, a notion which was founded on the essence of a Nationalgeist, thus on a principle of exclusivity. What is essentially innate is by its very nature unchangeable. According to Grellmann, Gypsies, as Orientals, clung very tightly to their own norms and values, which explained why they had been able to preserve their essence as a people for so many centuries. Yet he still thought it necessary that they must be ruled with an iron hand so that they would obey the orders of [the Habsburg Emperor] Joseph II. (Willems 1998: 24, my emphasis)

This quotation illustrates very well the rather monolithic representation of both the Enlightenment and the Herderian idea of a people. Willems identifies two features as the central and uniform characteristics of what he perceives of as the Enlightenment. Firstly, the Enlightenment symbolizes a form of universalism in which there is little place for cultural differences. Secondly and correlative, the Enlightenment embodies a form of imperialism according to which other ‘cultures’ need to develop toward the ‘universal’ standards and values that are set by Western civilization. On the basis of this imperialism, repressive measures toward allegedly non-European peoples, including ‘Gypsies,’ could be legitimized.
However, as several authors have emphasized (Pocock 1999; Muthu 2003), this view of the Enlightenment does not do justice to other, critical strands that could just as well be considered as part of Enlightenment thought and its legacies. In particular, Willems’s representation understates those political and cultural developments in the eighteenth century that tried to combine universalistic and particularistic arguments in ways that seriously complicate his own view of the period under study. This becomes clearer when we focus on his interpretation of Herderian philosophy.

Willems puts forward that Herder’s idea of a people with its own individual culture and language ultimately rests upon ‘a principle of exclusivity’ and upon the essentially unchangeable character of an individual nation. However, as a number of authors have argued, this still widely articulated contention about Herder’s work, and about the particularism ‘side’ of the Enlightenment more generally, articulates a somewhat oversimplified point of view. With important implications for Willems’s stance on the emergence of Gypsy studies (see below), Willems undervalues the complex way in which Herder’s philosophy of language and culture tries to interweave particularistic and universalistic arguments. Indeed, together with Denis Diderot, Immanuel Kant, and others, Herder could just as well be considered as one of the important Enlightenment critics of European imperialism and as someone who defended universal dignity and (the possibility of) cultural agency at the same time. Notwithstanding various dubious remarks about race, nation, and culture and manifest forms of orientalism in the works of Herder (as well as of Kant), his Enlightenment critique of imperialism includes both a critique of how European countries treated non-European peoples in their colonial enterprises and a critique of the European states system as a reliable way to create balance and peace in Europe (see chapter 2). Herder attacked European imperialism—outside but also inside Europe—on the basis of its violent behavior toward other peoples and of its aggressive arrogance to frame them in terms of cultural inferiority, moral decline, and backwardness. With respect to the devastating influence of Europe’s imperialism outside Europe, Herder stated:

Can we name a land where Europeans have entered without defiling themselves forever before defenseless, trusting mankind, by the unjust word, greedy conceit, crushing oppression, diseases, fatal gifts they have brought? Our part of the earth

23 Brian Belton (2010) also points to the crucial role of critique in Enlightenment thought in relation to knowledge formation about Romani groups. He has also extensively written on the works of the Dutch School (Belton 2005). However, he does not elaborate on how the lack of emphasis on a pluralized notion of Enlightenment thought in the history of Romani studies has led to a limited understanding of the influence of modern epistemological and governmental paradigms on Roma representation and Romani identity formation.

24 Both Herder and Kant commented on the Gypsies and ‘their culture’ in an extremely stereotypical way (see, for instance, Kant 1968: 187-89; Herder 2002: part 4, book XVI.5, §4). In this context, Thomas Fricke puts forward that, “how quickly an inhuman economy appears behind a façade of moral enrichment, best illustrate [Herder’s] brief remarks about the Gypsies” (1996a: 138, my translation). However, Fricke’s suggestion that, therefore, Herder’s work needs to be exposed as only pretending to deal with morality and cultural agency too easily assumes that the tensions between particularism and universalism in Herder’s philosophy ultimately decide in favor of a latent form racism or nationalism.
should not be called the wisest, but the most arrogant, aggressive, money-minded: what it has given these peoples is not civilization but the destruction of the rudiments of their own cultures wherever they could achieve this. (Herder 1978: vol. 17, 63; English translation cited Herder 1969: 206, 209)

As for forms of intra-European imperialism, Herder considered Habsburg enlightened absolutism as a “terrible illness” (1978: vol. 5, 557) that embodied a ‘reason of state’ mentality. This enlightened absolutism represented a dangerous “despotism” (Herder 1989: vol. 8, 111) that dramatically oppressed the cultural development of the nations that the Habsburg Empire encompassed. This critique is closely related to Herder’s critique of the system of states in Europe. He considered it as an immoral diplomatic chess game and “a sort of solidarity in crime between despots, established on the backs of the European peoples” (Eggel 2006: 32).

More generally, anti-imperialist thought à la Herder defended universal dignity, cultural agency, and ‘moral incommensurability’ without falling back on either universalistic or particularistic arguments.\(^2\) Universal dignity, on the one hand, implied that all humans deserve moral and political respect for the simple reason that they are all human beings. However, defending humanity in this way would not be enough to avoid violence toward other cultures if humans were not also seen as cultural agents. Indeed, a concept of human dignity has historically been mobilized not only for egalitarian and humanitarian reasons but also to exclude those who were seen as not yet fully human—which is the point that Willems stresses. To view human beings as cultural agents, then, implies not only the view that humans are always partly a product of their social and cultural contexts. It also implies that “through their actions and through changing perceptions [they] alter such contexts themselves” (Muthu 2003: 274, my emphasis). The philosophy of humans as cultural agents articulated a form of anti-imperialism because it also considered peoples and their cultures as morally incommensurable. The notion of moral incommensurability refers to the incommensurability of different sets of cultural and moral values that could be related to different groups of people and their cultures. It means that there are no neutral cross-cultural standards that could be applied to compare these different sets and consider some as better than others. Enlightenment anti-imperialist thinkers, such as Diderot, Kant, and Herder, thought, in the interpretation of Sankar Muthu, that

\[\text{[It] is delusional to think that European institutions, mores, practices, or religious beliefs should serve as the benchmark against which other peoples ought to be judged ... [T]here are no cross-cultural standards with which one could make universal judgments about the superiority or inferiority of the diverse ... practices that, in part, were seen to differentiate Europeans from most of the non-European peoples. (Muthu 2003: 275, 277)}\]

\(^{2}\) I have derived these three philosophical sources of Enlightenment anti-imperialist thought from Muthu (2003: 266-81).
We need to understand the Herderian philosophy of nation, language, and people from the viewpoint of the combination of universal dignity, cultural agency, and moral incommensurability. Herder remarked:

There is no such thing as a specially favored nation (Favoritvolk) on earth … there can not, therefore, be any order of rank … Least of all must we think of European culture as a universal standard of human values. To apply such a standard is not just misleading; it is meaningless … The culture of man is not the culture of the European; it manifests itself according to place and time in every people. (Herder 1978: vol. 18, 247-49; English translation cited Muth 2003: 276, emphasis in original)

In this passage, the elements of universal dignity, cultural agency, and moral incommensurability come together. Since Herder claims that there is nothing from which we can derive the superiority of European cultures in relation to other, supposedly non-European ones, he starts from the idea that all humans deserve moral and political respect and, thus, from a principle of universal dignity. His remark that the application of an alleged standard of humanity is meaningless, rather than merely misleading, implies that we cannot even compare human values according to one universal, moral measure, and, thus, that various sets of human values are morally incommensurable. Herder’s final remark that human culture manifests itself in every people, dependent on their historical and geographical circumstances, implies that human beings are a product of their social contexts and are also able to change them through their actions and perceptions.

This perception of culture does not automatically imply, as Willems suggests, that cultures, nations, and peoples are mutually exclusive. Herder’s defense of a form of moral incommensurability implies neither cultural exclusivity nor intra-cultural homogeneity. The emphasis on diversity within cultures and on the importance of dialogue and interaction between them are integral parts of how Herder perceived the dynamics of any culture and its ability to change (1978: vol. 14, 66-67; see also Spencer 1997; 2007; Parekh 2000). Willems’s interpretation of Herderian philosophy inaccurately celebrates and reifies cultural difference. But this celebration can only be understood in its intimate relationship with Herder’s critique of Western political and cultural hegemony. On similar grounds, Juan Flores criticizes those who suggest that Herder simply celebrated cultural difference:

The celebration of difference [does not come] first, followed by the denunciation of Western cultural hegemony. The example of Herder shows that progressive multiculturalism is motivated in the contrary direction, that is, from denunciation to celebration, or that the two are thoroughly and dialectically intertwined. For it is in its suspicion toward and suppression of difference that hegemonic universalism, Western cultural hegemony, makes its most characteristic intellectual move. (Flores 2005: 193)

To cut a long story short, a closer look at Herderian philosophy enables us to pluralize the understanding of what we often refer to as ‘the Enlightenment’ and to show its internal ambivalences. Indeed, “that part of the eighteenth century that we call ‘the Enlight-
enment’ was a state of intellectual tension rather than a sequence of simple propositions” (Shklar 1998: 94).

Moreover, we cannot reject a tradition in its entirety that, at least partly and in a particular way, still forms the basis of our contemporary condition. Following Foucault, we could argue:

We must try to proceed with the analysis of ourselves as beings who are historically determined, to a certain extent, by the Enlightenment. Such an analysis implies a series of historical inquiries that are as precise as possible; and these inquiries will not be oriented retrospectively toward the ‘essential kernel of rationality that can be found in the Enlightenment, which would have to be preserved in any event; they will be oriented toward the ‘contemporary limits of the necessary,’ that is, toward what is not or no longer indispensable for the constitution of ourselves as autonomous subjects. (Foucault 1997e: 313, my emphasis)

Such an analysis implies that we need to free ourselves “from the intellectual blackmail of ‘being for or against the Enlightenment’” (ibid 314):

It ... means ... that one must refuse everything that might present itself in the form of a simplistic and authoritarian alternative: you either accept the Enlightenment and remain within the tradition of its rationalism (this is considered a positive term by some and used by others, on the contrary, as a reproach), or else you criticize the Enlightenment and then try to escape from its principles of rationality (which may be seen once again as good or bad). And we do not break free of this blackmail by introducing ‘dialectical’ nuances while seeking to determine what good and bad elements there may have been in the Enlightenment. (ibid 313)

Foucault clarifies that the way in which the Enlightenment and modernity more generally, still form the basis of our contemporary condition is not primarily related to the development of a particular, ‘modern’ rationality, but, rather, to a critical attitude of human thought to interrogate its own present reality:

[At the end of the eighteenth century] a new way of posing the question of modernity appears or surfaces, which is no longer in a longitudinal relationship to the Ancients [concerning a polarity between tradition and modernity], but in ... a vertical relationship of the discourse to its own present reality. The discourse has to take its own present reality into account in order, [first], to find its own place in it, second to express its meaning, and third to designate and specify the mode of action, the mode of effectuation that it realizes within the present reality. What is my present reality? What is the meaning of this present reality? And what am I doing when I speak of this present reality? (Foucault 2010: 13-14)

Whereas Foucault rejects the Enlightenment’s humanistic and transcendental legacy, he defends its ‘critical’ attitude (see also Foucault 1997e; 2002). This attitude challenges dominant forms of governmentality and bio-power on the basis of a genealogical investi-
gation of the contemporary condition (Gros 2010: 379). This critical diagnosis of ‘what we are’ is related to my discussion of governmentality as an analytics of the government of self and others, according to which individuals can innovatively rearticulate and recombine heterogeneous existing elements to modify actions by acting on the acts and actions of others (chapter 1). Consequently, this critical attitude includes the possibility that humans, by acting upon the actions of others, challenge the social and cultural contexts that have also, to a large extent, produced their form of subjectivity.

The more heterogeneous approach to the Enlightenment that I have discussed in this section implies that we cannot easily look for a ‘core of the Enlightenment,’ map its supposed rationality, critique and finally reject it in order to escape from its principles of rationality and their legacies. Willems’s critique of the origins of Gypsy studies mirrors the monolithic interpretation of Enlightenment thought. He has artificially juxtaposed Enlightenment universalism and particularism by analyzing them separately and in rather uniform terms, instead of taking their interactions seriously enough. He considers this juxtaposition as the main ambivalence of Grellmann’s work and, by extension, of both his time and the entire modern European history of ‘the Gypsies,’ at least until very recently. In this context, it is telling that Willems does and does not represent Rüdiger as a contemporary of Grellmann. He considers them as contemporaries when it comes to their representation of the Gypsies as a people with a common Indian origin. But when it comes to Rüdiger’s critique of eighteenth-century forms of imperialism imposed on Gypsy groups, Willems considers Rüdiger as a romanticist avant la lettre. Indeed, Willems remarks that Rüdiger “was of the romantic school which would come to maturity only decades later” (1997: 80, my emphasis). Though we could undoubtedly consider Rüdiger’s work—as well as Herder’s—as representatives of early Romanticism, we cannot maintain Willems’s view that we, in their cases, only deal with the articulations of dubious forms of particularism and interrelated forms of nationalism. As I will show in greater detail in chapter 4, Willems’s artificial juxtaposition between universalism and particularism does not allow him to represent Rüdiger’s work as yet another strand of Enlightenment thought, that is as a more critical (though not necessarily non-stereotypical) one than Grellmann’s. In Willems’s representation, the general character of Rüdiger’s work appears too easily as consonant with that of Grellmann’s. In the end, Willems’s and in his wake Lucassen’s and Cottaar’s inability to appreciate the mutual differences between Grellmann and Rüdiger as ambivalences that are integral to Enlightenment thought more generally has led to a one-sided analysis of the emergence and legacy of the early Gypsy studies. The Dutch School’s suggestion that the framing of Gypsy groups in terms of ethnicity and diaspora has remained problematic up till now, and that this problematics is primarily related to how the eighteenth-century Gypsy discourse has incessantly been reinforced in other contexts, largely relies on their reading of the Enlightenment and its legacy. Consequently, the more heterogeneous approach to the Enlightenment and its legacies that I have presented in this section implies that we cannot unproblematically maintain the Dutch School’s thesis that the framing in terms of ethnicity and diaspora symbolizes a deathtrap. The Dutch School’s underestimation of the role of

26 At the end of chapter 4, where I will critically reconsider the history of Romani studies, I will discuss Rüdiger’s critique of eighteenth-century forms of imperialism imposed on Gypsy groups.
cultural human agency in the possibilities to shape and alter representations and self-representations of ethnicized groups such as the Romani lead me to discuss another approach to the relevance and legacy of the early Gypsy studies.

LINGUISTICS AND THE FOUNDATION OF MODERN COMPARATIVE RESEARCH

The linguist Yaron Matras associates the eighteenth-century discovery of the linguistic origins of the Romani language with the Roma’s acceptance as a minority in its own right and, indirectly, with the opportunity of past and present forms of Romani minority self-articulation. Matras’s position implies that the ability to speak one’s own language allows Romani individuals and groups to express a form of cultural agency and to maintain and develop their ethnic minority status in its own, yet not necessarily unambiguous right.

Whereas the Dutch School’s representation of the eighteenth century is to a large extent based on identifying Rüdiger’s position with that of Grellmann’s, Matras’s view of this period and its legacy is mainly founded on a differentiation between their respective views. His view is anchored in two closely related differentiations. Firstly, he distinguishes between Rüdiger’s work as a form of pure and innovative science and Grellmann’s work as an example of contaminated or pseudo-science. Secondly, Matras differentiates between itinerant groups that historically do not necessarily have affinity with Romanes (the Romani language) and itinerant or sedentarized groups that traditionally spoke or have since long spoken one of the many dialects of Romanes (Matras 1999; 2004b).

Partly encouraged by what Matras perceives of as the Dutch School’s “discrediting” (2004b: 75) of pioneering linguistic research, he has stood up for Rüdiger who, for the first time in history, traced the origins of the Romani language to Indian languages.\(^{27}\) In contrast to Willems’s view, Matras emphasizes the necessity to distinguish between peripatetics as a social phenomenon and the Roma of Indian origin. He describes the former category as encompassing “communities of peripatetics or commercial nomads, irrespective of origin and language,” while he describes the latter one as denoting “all speakers of Romanes ..., regardless of their own self-ascription” (2004b: 53). Acknowledging important socio-cultural and linguistic differences within the latter category, Matras considers it, historically at least, as a sub-set of the former.\(^{28}\)

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\(^{27}\) In Romani studies, there is still no agreement on who would have been the very first who traced this (linguistic) origins (Ruch 1986; Willems 1997; Matras 1999; 2002). Yet, all of the participants in this debate suggest that the tracing of these linguistic origins took first place in the 1770s and 1780s.

\(^{28}\) ‘Between’ these two group categories, Matras and others linguists (Bakker and van der Voort 1991; Courthiade 1991) distinguish yet a third group that denotes a linguistic contact zone between Romani and other languages and that is formed by those communities who speak what these linguists have called Para-Romani. Para-Romani refers to the linguistic phenomenon in which a population does not speak or no longer speaks a variant of the Romani language, but where a Romani-derived special vocabulary is retained and inserted into discourse in the respective majority language. So-called Angloramani in Britain, Scandoromani in the Scandinavian countries, Basque Romani in the Basque Country, Caló in Spain, and Finikas romani and Dortika in Greece are considered as examples of “the inclusion of extensive Romani vocabulary as well as some, mainly fossilised, grammatical structures, as a special lexicon in varieties of the major-
Matras considers the eighteenth-century linkage of the Gypsies with an individual language that has clear affinity with Indic languages as a scientific discovery that has inaugurated modern comparative and historical linguistics. Considering the eighteenth-century ideas on the Romani language and its so-called Indo-Aryan origins, Matras even speaks in terms of a “sensational discovery” (2002: 2). He criticizes Willems above all for mobilizing his argument of the supposed non-existence of a common Romani origin and language against the persistent tendency to orientalize Romani groups by either stigmatizing or emancipating them with reference to their racial, ethnic, Indian, diasporic, or linguistic background. Matras claims that Willems has consistently mystified the role of language in processes of Romani identity formation. He suggests that, contrary to what Willems believes, the latter’s constructivist point of view itself relies on a hidden form of essentialism. This has to do with the way in which Willems rhetorically uses the past to make claims about current forms of Romani identity politics:

Willems’s agenda … is to expose a fallacy, a hoax, by criticizing text. His political agenda is to trace the roots of racism to the Enlightenment, and so enlighten us in respect of our naïve acceptance of the Romanticism of that period, the beliefs that were formed in that time, which we still hold on to. To prove his point, Willems needs to demonstrate that there was no Indian origin, and that there is also no Indian language, at least not one that could only have been brought to Europe by an immigrant population. (Matras 2004b: 74)

In this regard, Matras considers Willems’s position just as essentialist as Hancock’s. Indeed, whereas Hancock and a number of contemporary Romani activists have mobilized an essentialist narrative of a collective Romani past to attempt to effectively combat racism against Romani groups in the present, Willems has articulated a narrative in which any rearticulation of such a collective Romani past essentially implies the imposition of racism and orientalism time after time by other means.29

Willems (1997: 82) suggests that Romanes and its various regional dialects do not represent an independent language, but that they are based on a mixture of specific Romani vocabularies and the grammatical and lexical structures of majority languages. According to Matras, however, Willems’s position is largely dependent on two related forms of discrediting and mystifying philologist and linguistic research on the Romani language. Firstly, in his research Willems exclusively focuses on words or lexicon, and not on an analysis of grammatical structures—which Matras considers as a necessary

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29 In this respect, Matras’s view differs substantially from that of Thomas Acton’s for the former considers the latter also one of the propagators of the view that Romani nationalism is strategically necessary to effectively combat racism in the present (Matras 2004b: 75-76). Willems and Lucassen (2000) criticize Acton’s viewpoint on similar grounds. On the other hand, Acton accuses Matras of being someone who apparently believes that “a scientific approach is self-correcting, while a political approach is inherently unreliable” (2008: 33). Acton states that Matras’s “commonsense positivistic search for a magic epistemological bullet to kill off sloppy scholarship is fundamentally a mistaken approach” (ibid). Though Acton does not really elaborate on his position, I consider his argument against Matras’s ‘neutral scientific position’ valuable (see my own arguments at the end of this section).
condition to do qualitatively adequate comparative and historical linguistics. Secondly, Matras relates Willems’s one-sided focus to an equally one-sided analysis of the eighteenth-century emergence of Gypsy studies. Though Willems also looks at the works of Grellmann’s contemporaries, in the end he considers all of them as equally orientalist, including the studies of Rüdiger. Matras suggests that he himself presents a more differentiated and subtle view of the early Gypsy studies by distinguishing Grellmann’s orientalist view from Rüdiger’s more careful and insightful methods.

Matras’s differentiation between Grellmann and Rüdiger plays a crucial role in his line of reasoning. He stands up for Rüdiger and distinguishes him from Grellmann not only because of Rüdiger’s sympathy with the Gypsies, but also because of his linguistic methodology:

Nominally, Rüdiger is one in a series of scholars who speculate on the origin of the Gypsies. But in examining language he is certainly doing more than demonstrating mere fascination with the exotic. Rather, he takes a methodological approach to language as a stable indicator of origin and affinity, knowing that languages are usually not invented by populations, and that populations do not simply adopt foreign languages unless there has been some obvious motivation to do this, for instance colonial rule by another nation. (Matras 2004b: 58)

Thus, it is Rüdiger’s methodology that Matras considers as “original, coherent, and genuinely insightful” and, therefore, as “pioneer work in linguistic typology and language contact” (1999: 91). Rather than valuing the Romani language for the most part on the basis of words and lexicon—as has been done in a long tradition from Grellmann to contemporary scholars such as Judith Okely (1983), Vania de Gila Kochanowski (1994), Ian Hancock (1998), and, last but not least, Wim Willems—Rüdiger has been the first who analyzes the language first and foremost on the basis of grammatical structures (Matras 1999). In this context, Matras refers frequently to the objectivity and originality of what he calls Rüdiger’s comparative analysis. Rüdiger compared a Romani language sample with a Hindustani one on the basis of the most essential grammatical paradigms.

Matras also discusses the kind of humanism that leads Rüdiger in his sympathy with the Gypsies and in his critique of how his contemporaries approached them. What is remarkable, however, is that Matras does not clarify the relationship between Rüdiger’s attention to grammar and his humanism. On the basis of his humanism, Rüdiger comes to the conclusion, for instance:

[T]he survivors among this unfortunate people have not yet fully received compensation against their ancestors. For nowhere have they obtained full civic status and equality with the rest of us humans—to which they are naturally entitled. (Rüdiger 1782: 47, my emphasis, English translation cited Matras 1999: 93-94)

On the basis of this view, Rüdiger also presents the Gypsies as victims of historical circumstances. He suggests, for instance, that their arrival in Europe took place during an unhappy period of social-political unrest, and transition “between barbarism and culture” (1782: 43, Matras’s translation). Therefore, from Rüdiger’s
perspective, Grellmann’s view that the Gypsies’ misery was merely due to their refusal to integrate and the bad influence of the environment in which they used to live, has to be seen as a reversal of cause and effect (Matras 1999; 2002). The Gypsies’ difficulty to integrate and their ‘inclination’ to petty crime had much more to do with how authorities were approaching them. Indeed, the “mistreatment of the Gypsies has no other cause but deeply rooted xenophobia [eingewurzelten Volkshaft]” (Rüdiger 1782: 49, translation cited Matras 1999: 93). In his discussion of Rüdiger’s humanism, however, Matras makes a misleading move when he suggests that it could be separately discussed from his linguistic methodology. Indeed, Matras distances himself from the moral undertone of Rüdiger’s humanism and the related reproduction of stereotypes of Romani or Gypsy groups. Yet, at the same time he praises the objectivity of his linguistic investigation:

Objectivity and humanism … characterize Rüdiger’s essay [on the language and Indian origins of the Gypsies]. His humanism is expressed as an emotional, moral appeal. His objectivity however is argued, and in the center of the argument he places the reliability of empirical data. (Matras 1999: 94, my emphasis)

This observation leads Matras to characterize the Zeitgeist of Rüdiger’s days as primarily one in which the foundations had been laid for modern comparative and historical linguistics. In delineating the eighteenth-century Zeitgeist, Matras emphasizes the importance of “the emergence of comparative research with high academic standards, where the notion of objectivity and originality in science was gradually beginning to take precedence over conformity and submissiveness” (1999: 91-92). It is the emergence of the comparative methodology in historical and linguistic research in which Matras sees his most crucial argument for defending Rüdiger against Willems’s “inappropriate understatement,” “deconstruction,” and even “mockery” of his work (Matras 2004b: 60). On the basis of Rüdiger’s comparative linguistic analysis, Matras endorses what he sees as Rüdiger’s “sensational discovery” (2002: 2) of the linguistic Indian origins of the Romani language.30

30 At the same time, Matras argues that this discovery does not justify the suggestion that the present-day European Roma have a direct and clear affinity with contemporary Indian population groups, as, for instance, Hancock has put forward:

While the linguistic evidence clearly points to India, as Rüdiger had already proved, the case for an origin in peripatetic populations cannot be made on linguistic grounds. Rather, it relies on piecing together the linguistic and ethnographic evidence … Although no direct connection with any of the [contemporary Indian population] groups can be established, the phenomenon of westward migration of Indian commercial nomads is historically well attested. Any alternative interpretation of the origin of the Rom would need to explain the combination of circumstances as a historical coincidence: a Central Indic language; ethnonyms that are cognate with caste-names and shared with other commercial nomads; and a socio-economic profile as a peripatetic population. (Matras 2004b: 62-63, my emphasis)

Since Willems and some other scholars (Okely 1983) have no serious debate with Rüdiger or any subsequent philologist, it is often these scholars themselves who have constructed “the image of a conspiracy among biased, Romantic, even racists philologists” throughout modern European history (Matras 2004b: 61, 75). In addition, Matras criticizes both Willems’s and Okely’s linguistic analyses for how they have constantly mistaken Romani for Para-Romani (for its meaning, see note 28 on Para-Romani above). In the eyes
Let me evaluate where Matras’s contribution to the origins debate has taken us. Though he refers explicitly to the Zeitgeist of the eighteenth century, he nonetheless does not consider the relationship between Rüdiger’s ‘discovery,’ emergent methods of comparative research, and Enlightenment humanism as part of the Zeitgeist. Indeed, Matras does not reflect on the relation between how Gypsy groups, their traditions, their language, and the like emerged as objects of knowledge, on the one hand, and how the role of humans—scholars in particular—as knowing subjects was simultaneously redefined in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries. In other words, Matras does not address how the newly emerging eighteenth-century scientific methods of comparison and analogy are mutually dependent on the emergence of a new conception of the knowing subject as a cultural agent and on a parallel transformation of the dominant forms of governmentality. A striking case in point is the way in which Matras juxtaposes Rüdiger’s humanism, which he considers as something that is only “expressed as an emotional, moral appeal” with Rüdiger’s objectivity, which he judges well “argued” (Matras 1999: 94). Thus, Matras reduces Rüdiger’s humanism to something that is merely a private or emotional expression, while he, at the same time, politically neutralizes Rüdiger’s ‘objective’ scientific discovery as the rational, well-explained “foundation for Romani linguistics” (1999: 89). Matras’s narrow focus on the emergence of modern scientific, comparative methods as the clear foundation for Romani linguistics under-exposes how these methods of Gypsy problematization (in linguistic, cultural, developmental, or territorial, and, thus, spatially or temporally comparative terms) were inextricably related to attempts to govern them at the political level. Whereas Matras appropriately argues that we need to differentiate between the Gypsy representations of Grellmann and Rüdiger, he nonetheless largely passes over the Dutch School’s most important point of the crucial entanglement of the emergent Gypsy representations and the eighteenth-century development of new epistemological paradigms. Therefore, Matras also misses the opportunity to critique the Dutch School’s largely negative and one-sided consideration of the period of time under study, the emergence and modern development of Gypsy studies in particular.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I have engaged with contemporary debates about the legacies of Enlightenment thought and their influence on the maintenance and development of modern political, institutional, cultural, and scholarly representations of Romani groups in Europe. I have shown how disputes about the Roma’s supposed origins have historically and to date played a significant role in these debates and in the defence of the two,

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of Matras, Willems and Okely deny the existence of the Romani language on the basis of their assumption that, in the case of the Gypsies, we do not deal with an individual grammatical system, but only with a ‘Romani vocabulary’ that had been incorporated into the grammatical and lexical systems of majority languages (Matras 2004b: 66-67).
currently prevailing positions in these discussions. In the first part of this chapter, I have elaborated on the first of these views, which has been taken by the Dutch School of Annemarie Cottaar, Leo Lucassen, and Wim Willems. I have argued that their primarily negative reception of the legacies of the Enlightenment and their refusal to refer to Romani groups in terms of ethnicity and diaspora are implicitly yet inherently related to a one-sided view of modernity, and of Enlightenment particularism and the parallel emergence of Gypsy Studies in particular. As a result, I have argued, the position of the Dutch School offers us a rather bleak image of Romani self-representations and the possibility to develop them.

In line with my proposal to re-narrate Europe’s modernity and to interrogate what such an attempt could imply for the study of Romani groups (see chapter 2), in this chapter I have explained how we can read the Enlightenment and its legacies more heterogeneously. I have argued how a pluralized understanding of Enlightenment thought challenges the position of the Dutch School and opens up the way for a more ambivalent, rather than an overly pessimistic, reading of the history of Gypsy Studies and their legacies. In the previous section, I have discussed the second leading position in the ‘origins debate,’ that of the linguist Yaron Matras, to show that several narratives of the Enlightenment and its legacies co-exist. Alongside a reading of modernity that constantly tends to displace and mystify Romani culture and identity, Matras puts forward an alternative reading. I have argued that his differentiation between different Gypsy representations since the appearance of Gypsy Studies in the eighteenth century can be considered as a necessary condition to rethink the legacy of these studies.

Yet, I have also questioned the grounds on which Matras differentiates his reading of European modernity. Suggesting that we could solely do so along the lines of scientific argumentation—by differentiating between pseudo-scientific, mystifying and objective, innovative forms of reasoning—Matras leaves undisputed that the comparative scientific methods that were for the first time developed in the eighteenth century were central to the newly emerged forms of governmentality. As I will argue in the next chapter, these comparative methods themselves were a crucial part of the tendency to increasingly problematize Romani groups in linguistic, cultural, developmental, and territorial terms.

To summarize, we could say that something is peculiar about the two discussed positions in the ‘origins debate.’ On the one hand, each of the discussed authors has stressed the enormous influence of the works of the early ‘Gypsy scholars’ on past and current processes of Romani identity formation. On the other hand, however, none of these authors have adequately reflected upon their own positions as scholars in the field of what is nowadays called Romani studies as well as on the possible influence of their own work on contemporary approaches to identity formation of Romani groups. They have firmly concluded that eighteenth-century scholarly and scientific discourses as well as their continuous rearticulations of later date have radically influenced processes of Roma representation and self-representation. At the same time, however, they have conspicuously refused to analyze the role of their own scholarly discourses in governing

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31 I do not want to suggest that there are no other positions in this debate. Recently, we have noticed a gradual increase of cross-fertilizations of poststructuralist theories of narratology and performativity with issues of Romani identity formation (Lemon 2000; Malvinni 2004; Belton 2005).
contemporary debates on Romani groups and in determining the parameters within which Romani identity formations could currently take shape. Rather, both the representatives of the Dutch School and Matras suggest, though in different ways, that they belong to another or even an essentially different tradition than that of the early Gypsy studies. On the one hand, Matras distinguishes his own work from that of Augustini ab Hortis and Grellmann, sympathizes basically with the pioneering scientific and comparative methods of Rüdiger, but dissociates his own work from what he sees as the Romanticism in Rüdiger’s work (Matras 1999). On the other hand, the representatives of the Dutch School reject the entire tradition of Gypsy studies and suggest that they belong to a decisively other and new one that does not fall into what they have called the trap of referring to Romani groups in terms of ethnicity and diaspora (Lucassen et al 1998b; Willems 1998; Willems and Lucassen 2000).

At a more theoretical level, however, the viewpoints of both the Dutch School and Matras show surprising similarities. On the one hand, the representatives of the Dutch School have suggested that we can clearly distinguish a core rationality of the Enlightenment and trace how this original core has been rearticulated time and again in historically later theories, discourses, and practices of Gypsy or Roma stigmatization. On the other hand, Matras has suggested that we can trace how Romani linguistics has historically acquired its pure and politically neutral modern scientific foundation. Thus, both the representatives of the Dutch School and Matras are preoccupied with origins when they look for the true face of the Enlightenment and its unmistakable legacy (the Dutch School) or for a form of Romani studies that, historically at least, has not been contaminated by pseudo-scientific, pre-scientific, or mystifying and, thus, politicized approaches to Romani groups (Matras). Thus, whereas both Matras and the representatives of the Dutch School have suggested that they give a decisive answer in the debate on the Roma’s origins and go beyond thinking in terms of origins, at a second order of analysis their preoccupations with origins remain an integral part of their scholarly examinations. In the next chapter, I will explain how we can discuss Romani identity and minority formation beyond these preoccupations. I will do so by analyzing the late-eighteenth-century emergence of Gypsy studies from the angle of the parallel appearance of new forms of governmentality to problematize groups such as the Romani.
Chapter 4
Digging the Pit of Babel: 
The Ambiguity of Romani Minority Formation

INTRODUCTION

We are digging the pit of Babel. (Kafka 1994: 95)

It is no longer origin that gives rise to historicity; it is historicity that, in its very fabric, makes possible the necessity of an origin which must be both internal and foreign to it. (Foucault 2005b: 359)

This chapter contributes to debates in governmentality studies about how we need to assess the influential changes in patterns and structures of European governance that appeared in the late eighteenth century. In chapter 2, I positioned the current study and my focus on the bio-political regulation of Europe’s borders in the largely unexplored domain where governmentality studies, critical studies of European governance, and postcolonial studies intersect. In chapter 3, I discussed the prospects and limits of how two leading positions in present-day scholarship on the Roma have analyzed the late-eighteenth-century emergence of Gypsy studies and their legacies. In this chapter, I bring these two domains together by analyzing the parallel late-eighteenth-century East Central European transformations of population policy, administrative practices and discourses, and scholarly approaches to the Gypsies. I try to contribute to current scholarship on the Roma by looking at one of the first moments of their minority formation in Europe from the angle of governmentality, and the late-eighteenth-century transformation of the so-called ‘police and Cameralistic sciences’ (Polizei- und Kameralwissenschaften) in particular.

In the next section, I will explain that Cameralism (Kameralistik) is the name given to a German and Habsburg scientific tradition of public administration and political reflections on how states should be governed. Cameralism represents the specific Central European articulation of forms of police and reason of state governmentality that I discussed more generally in chapter 2. As I will show in the third section, an analysis of Cameralism and how it was intimately related to Habsburg discourses and practices of rule, as well as to their transformations, will shed new light on the assimilationist approaches adopted by the enlightened absolutist Habsburg empress Maria Theresa and her son and successor Joseph II. As I will argue, to adequately understand the relation-
ship between the newly emerging scientific methods of comparison in the late-eighteenth century and the simultaneous emergence of Gypsy studies discussed in chapter 3, we need to reflect on the impact of Cameralistic and police sciences on the scholarly and governmental approaches to the Gypsies.

Yet, none of the authors whose works I discussed in chapter 3, nor anyone else who discusses the European history of Romani groups, has hitherto adequately taken into account the importance of Cameralism and its relevance for the emergence of Gypsy studies. It is remarkable that Leo Lucassen—who has dedicated an important and rich study to the history of how German police institutions developed specific Gypsy labels to regulate alien and itinerant groups between 1700 and 1945—does not discuss the eighteenth-century tradition of Cameralism and the police sciences. He only remarks that the concept of police had originally had a much wider meaning. At the same time, however, he considers this wider meaning of minor importance for an analysis of Gypsy groups and studies, because of a supposed emergent restriction of the actual practices of police in the discussed period of time (Lucassen 1996: 17). In this chapter, I will explain that this view is only partly tenable and results in understating the importance of the development of police sciences for scrutinizing the emergence of Gypsy studies and the minority formation of Gypsy groups.

In his turn, Wim Willems (1997) discusses the function that statistics had in German academic circles. However, he does not embed this role within the more general context of the police sciences, nor does he clarify how statistics exactly relates to the emergence of Gypsy studies. This becomes particularly clear when he isolates Heinrich Grellmann’s and Johann Rüdiger’s writings on Gypsies from their other work. Willems remarks on Grellmann’s work:

Perusal of the tables of content of [Grellmann’s] other writings discloses that he primarily brought into print descriptive surveys of political-scientific topics. In this respect, his book on the Gypsies is unique within his total production ... A predilection for ethnological subjects also appears in later publications, it is true, but these were consistently minor, self-contained contributions. The greatest part of his work, however, had to do with affairs of the state. (Willems 1997: 45-46, my emphasis)

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1 As far as I know only Karl Härter (2003) refers to the role of police sciences for studying Romani groups. Yet, he does not substantially reflect on the impact of shifting Cameralistic discourses and practices on the emergence of the eighteenth-century Gypsy studies and on the parallel problematization of Gypsy groups as minority parts of the population. While Härter, for instance, discusses the disappearance of death penalties and other severe measures against Gypsy groups in the second half of the eighteenth century, he does not relate this shift to the more general transformation of administrative practices and discourses in the German and Habsburg lands (2003: 54-55, 75, 80). Yet, he also argues against the Dutch School’s thesis that the Gypsies do not form an ethnic group, but need to be seen as an eighteenth-century construction developed on the basis of categorization and stigmatization (ibid 43, 66, 81). Similar to my view, Härter suggests that the reference to Gypsies in ethnic terms “was and, consequently, remains ambivalent” (ibid 66, my translation). I largely agree with Härter’s view that this ambivalence is fundamentally unsolvable (ibid 81) and that we need to consider ethnic minorization and Gypsy labeling and stigmatizing as processes that have been mutually developed in the course of modern European history. Yet, in the present chapter, I argue for this ambivalence and interaction along different lines than he does.
Whereas Willems is right in his suggestion that Grellmann’s book on the Gypsies forms an exception to his oeuvre, it is nonetheless important to remark that, from the angle of police sciences, the main topic of his Gypsy book has as much to do with ‘affairs of the state’ as his other writings. Indeed, in its early modern European conception, ‘police’ encompassed regulations with respect to a wide variety of things and matters, such as religion, morality, health, supplies, funerals, public safety, mines, clothing, the arts, poor relief, the sciences, trade, betrothals, factories, and menservants (Tribe 1988; Pasquino 1991, see also chapter 2 and below). Thus, from a conceptual point of view, Cameralistic and police scientists did not distinguish between the regulation of a minority group and that of bridges or between the management of health care and that of mines or forests. Grellmann extensively wrote on issues that belonged to the most important fields of police sciences and,² therefore, we could also interrogate his work on the Gypsies in the context of this eighteenth-century European tradition.

That Willems is not aware of this specific governmental background also becomes clear when he remarks that Rüdiger, who “was professor of political economy in Halle and an authority in the field of comparative linguistics,” had probably “cut his academic career prematurely short” because, “in the last 26 years of his life ... [he] didn’t publish anything more” and “a reference work informs us that he was a mine inspector” (1997: 80, 81, my emphasis). Willems presents these biographical details as if Rüdiger’s academic career in Halle was incompatible with his profession as a mine inspector. In actual fact, mining was considered as one of the most important fields of the police sciences and the mine, and particularly how it was dug and administered, was considered as a model for how the state should be governed (Small 2001; Wakefield 2009). Cameralistic and police scientists were preferably combining a position at a university with a job in one of the so-called bureaus of the imperial chamber. Even more important in the current context is that Rüdiger himself wrote extensively on Cameralism and taught an almost unchanged course on Cameralism and police sciences at the university of Halle until three years before his death. This course was predominantly based on the seminal works of the Viennese Cameralists, but was also an integral part of a specific Cameralistic tradition at the University of Halle.³

Cameralism and police sciences had their individual tradition at some of the most important and innovative Prussian universities, such as those of Halle and Göttingen. At the end of the eighteenth century, these academic circles were highly influenced by the Viennese Cameralistic and police scientific ‘school’ of Johann von Justi and Joseph von Sonnenfels (Sieg 2003).⁴ Their main works “rapidly gained canonical status in the

² See Grellmann (1792; 1795-1802; 1801-1804), Osterloh (1970), and Dickson (1987; 1991).
³ See Rüdiger (1777; 1781; 1786; 1792; 1795a; 1795b; 1798), Riedel (1839), Kähler (1898), and Tribe (1988). In his work on Cameralism, Rüdiger explains why an academic career needs to be based on a thorough study and the widest possible pedagogic dissemination of Cameralistic and police scientific literature as well as of its basic principles (Fischer 1982: 414-15). Rüdiger’s work on Cameralism can be considered as the end of a long academic tradition at the university of Halle that started with the appointment of Simon Peter Gasser to a Chair in ‘Oeconomie, Polizey und Cameralsachen’ in 1727 (see note 10 below).
⁴ In 1755, von Justi moved from Vienna to Göttingen, where he became Councilor for Mines and Police Director and where he simultaneously started to teach Cameralism at the university. In the two following years, and before his departure to Berlin, he lectured on several subjects that were directly or indirectly related to Cameralism. He also taught on the ‘culture of countries’ and on ‘the new history of commerce,
subsequent expansion of Cameralistic teaching [at Habsburg and in particular Austrian and Prussian universities] ... The manner in which these two writers set up the basic terms and categories of Cameralism was fundamental to the literature of this period” (Tribe 1988: 90, 117-18, my emphasis). While von Justi and von Sonnenfels were pioneering authors in Cameralism, Grellmann and Rüdiger were not really innovative writers in this scholarly field. Nevertheless, their works, including those on the Gypsies, were shaped in an academic environment that was not separable from the Cameralistic and police scientific tradition. Moreover, since both Grellmann and Rüdiger commented on the Habsburg assimilationist Gypsy policies—the former enthusiastically assenting and the latter critical and condemnatory—their comments and the conclusions of their works could be read as articulations of their viewpoints vis-à-vis the police scientific governmentality and the correlated ‘populationist turn’ that are typical of eighteenth-century enlightened Habsburg absolutism.

This theme brings me to the second aim of this chapter. I want to contribute to debates in governmentality studies about how we need to perceive the changes in patterns of European governance that emerged in the eighteenth century. Governmentality studies, following Foucault’s own work, have focused on distinguishing police and reason of state rationalities and technologies from modern, liberal ones (Lemke 1997; N Rose 1999b; Dean 1999). Foucault has carefully described the gradual internal transformation of forms of police governmentality (2007b). Excellent genealogical case studies (Dean 1991) have been published on the transformation from police to liberal governance. Moreover, a valuable, ongoing debate discusses how exactly we need to understand the relationship between police and liberal governmentality in post-eighteenth-century and contemporary contexts of governance.5

Yet, one or more of the three following trends characterize many contemporary governmentality studies. Firstly, police and liberal governmentality are sometimes not only distinguished, but also separated. A too strict separation of these forms of rule, however, leads to a questionable periodization of forms of governmentality (chapter 1) or to a disputable demarcation of illiberal and liberal forms of conduct (chapter 2). Secondly, many of the studies that discuss police scientific traditions in early modern Europe are characterized by a state-centric focus, rather than by a discussion of their transnational consequences.6 Thirdly, governmentality studies often focus on the impact of the police scientific tradition on the bio-political regulation, stratification, and normalization of social groups in Western European countries. Little attention has hitherto been

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6 These studies share this state-centric characteristic with some seminal historical studies of early modern administrative practices, including the codification of criminal, administrative, and civil law (Maier 1980; Oestreich 1982; Raeff 1983; Stolleis 1988; 1996; Tribe 1988; 1995; Härter 2000; Small 2001).
paid to how police scientific discourses and practices have influenced minority formation and corresponding forms of population regulation on a Europe-wide level and, thus, demarcated Europe’s own internal and external borders biopolitically.

In this chapter, I show how an analysis of the Romani case sheds new light on the impact of transforming late-eighteenth-century police and Cameralistic discourses and practices on modern processes of minority formation and on the regulation of Europe’s bio-political borders. In order to explain that minoritization has not only led to marginalization and stigmatization, but also to opportunities for minority self-articulation, I focus on Joseph von Sonnenfels’s work and its wider social, political, and cultural context. Largely following Foucault’s work (2000b; 2000c; 2007b), many contributors to governmentality studies consider the work of the Viennese Cameralist von Justi as the most exemplary illustration of how technologies and rationalities of police became the focus of an independent academic discipline and how the concept of population was finally turned into the central concept of the police sciences (Pasquino 1991; Lemke 1997; Dean 1999). If von Sonnenfels is mentioned at all, it is only in passing.

However, as some prominent historians of police sciences and Cameralism have emphasized, in passing from von Justi to von Sonnenfels, the police scientific tradition undergoes one of its important last renewals. Von Sonnenfels’s work reflects, so to speak, “a fin de siècle phase of Cameralism” (Small 2001: 410). While, in the next section, I will explain how we could understand the shift from von Justi to von Sonnenfels as in line with the general characteristics of the police and Cameralistic scientific tradition, in the fourth section, I will particularly focus on how von Sonnenfels’s work announces the slow but sure breakdown of this tradition. More than any other representative of this tradition, his work prefigures the emergence of liberal forms of governmentality and represents—to put it in the context of the political changes of the late-eighteenth century—the cracks in the pavements of enlightened absolutism. Yet, I am not going to read his work as an unproblematic basis of changing governmental discourses and practices in the Habsburg Empire. His work shows many internal contradictions and—even though von Sonnenfels was a prominent advisor of a series of Habsburg emperors and even though his work functioned as the intellectual backbone of administrative practices in the Empire—we need to avoid overvaluing his influence.

Alternatively, in this chapter, I read von Sonnenfels’s work genealogically to explain that he is an important, often overlooked, and ambivalent figure of transition. I will discuss his work, and the fin de siècle of Cameralism more generally, alongside the Habsburgs’ assimilationist Gypsy policies and the parallel emergent Gypsy problematization in minority terms. This reading allows me to unravel the ambivalent—rather than only negative—effects of the bio-political preoccupation with Gypsy groups. In the fourth and

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7 Thomas Lemke (1997: 165n36) has suggested that Foucault’s selection of original police scientific sources could also be considered as a basis for periodizing the history of police technologies from an utopia (Turquet de Mayerne’s work of the early seventeenth century) and an applied praxis (de Lamare’s work of the early eighteenth century), to an independent academic discipline (von Justi’s work of the mid eighteenth century). Yet, though we could interpret Foucault’s interrogation of police and reason of state governmentality in this way, we need to avoid to understand the history of governmentality and power technologies as a linear one (chapter 1, Collier 2009).

fifth section, I will show how the gradual decline of problematizing a state’s government in mechanistic and police scientific terms and the parallel increase of problematizing it in organismic terms has importantly shaped the conditions of possibility for forms of minority self-articulation. In the sixth section, finally, I will bring the results of my analyses in chapters 3 and 4 together to revise the way in which the emergence and development of Gypsy studies have usually been discussed.

CAMERALISM AND POLICE SCIENCES IN THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY HABSBURG EMPIRE

Cameralism and police sciences represent an odd yet influential episode in the Central European history of governmental approaches to the state. In general, Cameralism has been explained as follows:

The term Cameralism has two connotations. On the one hand, it designates the ideas that appeared to explain, justify, and guide the centralizing tendencies and practices in administration and economic policy of the absolute monarchy in the German states during the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. On the other hand, it refers to the various attempts of the same period to work out in terms of emerging contemporary political and social science a systematic account of the functioning of the various administrative services as a basis for the training of public officials. (Rosen 1953: 24)

Whereas Cameralism has had an impact on a number of early modern European scholarly, scientific, and political traditions in, for instance, Italy, France, and Russia, it reached its widest dissemination in the German and Habsburg lands, especially in the second half of the eighteenth century. In those days, the practices of Cameralism were going to get their firm scientific foundation at Russian and Austrian universities, most notably at the ones of Halle, Frankfurt on Oder, Göttingen, and Vienna. In the practical and pragmatic sense of the word, Cameralists were administrative practitioners or servants of the Kammer, the imperial chamber of the Habsburg Empire. They could be commissars, mining officials, tax councilors, privy councilors, forestry inspectors, or other professionals who worked at the imperial bureaus. In much of the literature on Cameralism and police sciences, however, Cameralists have increasingly been identified as those scholars and scientists who reflected on the activities of these administrative practitioners, on the way in which they embodied a specific form of bureaucracy, and, most importantly, on how this developing bureaucratic system was related to the arts, practices, objects, and aims of the government of a state. While Cameralism in the German lands has had a long tradition that goes back to the early-sixteenth century, the explicit problematization of Cameralistic practices and the institutionalization of Cameralism

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9 By 1798 thirty-six universities had posts in the Cameralistic sciences, occupied by thirty-two professors (Tribe 1988: 116). Moreover, only in the German-speaking areas, between 1600 and 1800 more than 3,200 articles and books on Cameralistic and police sciences were published. A bibliography of European Cameralistic and police sciences of 1937 includes over 14,000 titles (Humpert 1937).
and police sciences as individual academic disciplines and orthodoxies emerged in the eighteenth century, when Cameralism and police sciences were used as largely comparable terms (Johnson 1964; Tribe 1988; 1995).

From a historical point of view, the eighteenth-century institutionalization of Cameralistic and police sciences is related to the Prussian king Friedrich Wilhelm I’s dissatisfaction with how his Cameral officials were educated. Too often, he believed, they behaved like ‘ABC-schoolboys’ when confronted with important administrative matters; something that resulted in their incompetence to function well, in the lack of efficient knowledge of the wealth of the empire, and in the loss of potential income for the imperial chamber (Wakefield 2005). There was a shortage of competent, well-trained state administrators, who could make an inventory of the empire’s wealth, contribute to its maintenance and further development as well as to the effective centralization of control, order, and security. The notions of ‘good government’ and ‘good police’ (gute Polizei) emerged as equivalents and meant the promotion and maintenance of good order. An eighteenth-century text on the task of the police sciences describes the range of activities comprehended by good police as follows:

The first care of a complete Polizei is that it creates around us a condition of security, such that we in no way might fear a transgression. Its prime intention is solely directed to opening the way to welfare and happiness, and rendering it accessible. It thus clears away that which could hinder us from entering upon it, and that which might disturb our free passage. (Langemack 1747: 52, §17, English translation cited Tribe 1988: 32-33)

This description points to one of the most important elements that is typical of the eighteenth-century police sciences, namely the constant encouragement of the happiness of the state’s subjects in order to strengthen the welfare of the state (chapter 2). This element is best illustrated by the works of Johann von Justi (1720-71) who, along with his contemporary Joseph von Sonnenfels, was to become the most important and influential police scientist and the founder of what Keith Tribe (1988) has called the Viennese orthodoxy in Cameralistic and police sciences. In one of his main works, the Grundsätze der Polizey-Wissenschaft (The Foundations of Police Sciences), von Justi describes police as follows:

In the broadest sense, under the name police we include all the laws and regulations that concern the internal affairs of a state, which endeavor to permanently strengthen

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10 On the instigation of king Friedrich Wilhelm I Cameralistic teaching was established in 1727 at the Prussian universities of Halle and Frankfurt on Oder (Small 2001: 207-10, 222). He intended to incorporate academics and universities more generally into the extensive network of the Kammer (Stolleis 1988; Wakefield 2005). In particular in Halle, the teaching of Cameralistic and police sciences was going to get a long and steady tradition that had begun with the appointment of Simon Peter Gasser to a Chair in ‘Oeconomie, Polizey und Cameralsachen’ in 1727 and that ended more than a century later with the teaching by, most notably, Fischer, Lamprechnt, and, last but not least, the early Gypsy scholar Rüdiger, who became professor in Halle in 1791. The latter three professors were highly influenced by the works of the Viennese Cameralistic school (Tribe 1988, see also below).
and increase its power, to make better use of its forces, and to encourage the happiness of all its subjects; in a word, commerce, the sciences, urban and rural economies, and the administration of agriculture, mining, forestry, and the like, in view of the fact that the welfare of the state depends on the wisdom with which all these things are governed. (von Justi 1756: 4; my translation, partly based on Foucault 2007b: 330 n8)

The happiness of the state’s subjects on which the happiness and welfare of the state are simultaneously based is a rather technical, analytic, and encompassing term in von Justi’s work (von Justi 1760-61). The concept of police circumscribes the entire scope of happiness—from welfare to well-being—and marks what can be called the populationist turn in late Cameralism. A number of features characterize the specific Cameralistic articulation of police. Police refers to being as living. Police needs to guarantee living in the sense that it needs, for instance, to avoid war, to encourage fertility, to prevent suicide or early death, and to attract foreigners who could contribute to the state’s welfare. In general, this first aim of police is to promote the state’s happiness at the level of the abundance, the number of citizens. The idea behind a large quantity of a state’s inhabitants is that the more people there are, the more needs they embody and the greater the growth of the means of subsistence. Therefore, the quantitative argument for a large population is not exclusively related to its number, but is also a matter of the exact size of the state’s territory, its wealth, commercial activities, and the availability of various resources.

At the same time, the number of inhabitants is intrinsically related to the aim of police to guarantee happiness at a qualitative level. This implies, firstly, the accommodation of the most basic needs, such as the provision of food, clothes, heating, housing, and the like. The provision of the basic needs includes not only its material aspects, but also what we could call its governmental ones: ensuring that these material needs are not spoiled at the time of transfer and sale. Secondly, the qualitative level of happiness encloses the securing and maintenance of health in the most general sense of the word. Police is dedicated to ensuring the everyday health of everyone and, where necessary, to intervening in everything that could endanger a proper health situation. Therefore, police perform not only the taking of adequate measures in case of illness, starvation, epidemics or plagues, but also the regulation and supervision of urban and rural spaces such as cemeteries, water supplies, abattoirs, sewerages, roads, bridges, hospitals, street lighting, schools, inns, coffee-houses, and so on. In this context, von Justi also promoted insurances against storm, fire, and flood, and measures for the melioration of natural infertility (Tribe 1988).

In von Justi’s eyes, however, the quantity and quality of the lives of a state’s subjects are not yet enough to ensure the welfare and happiness of the state. In order to achieve these aims the activities of the population itself need to be known and regulated, from their habits and mobility to their professions, from their abilities to their disabilities, and from their customs to their religious, heathen, and leisure practices. This objective of police is closely related to its aim to promote the good ‘circulation’ of both goods and human beings. Hence, police also encompasses the development of infrastructure (roads, rivers, canals, bridges, tollhouses, public spaces, signposts, etc.), the supervision of the distribution and circulation of goods, the administration of the state’s resources (mines,
forests, farming land, etc.), the regulation of markets and labor forces more generally, the protection of good order at Church services, the control and prevention of idleness and begging, the suppression of vagrancy, vagabondism, and crime, and the regulation of borders. Circulation is also to be taken into account at a second order level, in the sense that it includes its own conditions, such as the laws and regulations that deal with the improvement of profitable forms of mobility and circulation, the standardization of weights and measures, and the establishment of guidelines for cultivation. To sum up, we could say that the tasks of police are infinite and that its central objective encompasses “everything from being to well-being” (Foucault 2007b: 328) and “from womb to tomb” (Carroll 2002: 473).

As some commentaries of von Justi’s work have remarked (Osterloh 1970; Tribe 1988) his conception of a state’s happiness seems to be circular or even contradictory. Indeed, it is based on the happiness of the state’s subjects, but they, to be and become happy, are dependent on the state’s calculated interventions in their lives and circumstances. Following Foucault, Thomas Lemke (1997) considers this seemingly contradictory aspect of the political rationality of police as one of its novelties: the happiness and welfare of individuals are no longer just the result and aim of good government, but also the necessary condition for the survival and strength of a state. Thus, we can consider the incessant Cameralistic involvement with enhancing individual happiness as a process of individualization and “a government of individuals in terms of what could be called their marginal utility vis-à-vis the objective of strengthening the state by maximizing the appropriate and particular contributions of each and all” (Burchell 1991: 124).

The emergence of governmental rationalities and technologies characteristic of Cameralism and the police sciences mark the displacement of classical juridico-political thought or, at any rate, a differentiation between sovereignty and governmentality. Theories and practices of state sovereignty that were in fashion before the emergence of the police scientific governmentality, such as those related to Niccolò Machiavelli’s The Prince, primarily focused on the maintenance of the relation between the sovereign and the territory over which he ruled. The people or the population did not really matter or only did in as far as they could form a shield to protect the ruler and his treasury. However, the problem posed by police and reason of state is that of the very existence, the strength, and nature of the state itself (chapter 2). In order to govern a state adequately, thorough knowledge of the state’s strength—hence of everything that is covered by the police’s central objectives—is indispensable. In other words, police becomes the crucial mediator in “linking together the state’s strength and individual felicity” and embodies the infinite attempt to govern all and each—omnes et singulatim (Foucault 2007b: 327). Though the governmental position of the sovereign is not yet disputed—Cameralism and the police sciences still assume that the sovereign can know her or his object of government entirely—at the same time the targets, instruments, and ends of government can no longer be codified and framed in the juridico-political terms in which problems of sovereignty are prevailingly conceptualized (Burchell 1991).

Von Justi’s contemporary von Sonnenfels (1732-1817) is the first to conceive of police as the crucial intermediary between a state and its population, while simultaneously
avoiding von Justi’s quasi-circular formulation in terms of happiness.\footnote{Von Sonnenfels was one of the most remarkable and important intellectuals of the Habsburg reformist era. While his grandfather had still been chief rabbi of Brandenburg in Berlin, and his own father had emigrated to the Habsburg realms and converted to Catholicism in the 1730s, the converted Jew von Sonnenfels was to become one of the key figures behind the reforms of the Habsburg emperors Maria Theresa (1740-80), Joseph II (1780-90), Leopold II (1790-92), and Franz II (1792-1835). Below I will return to his influence.} Von Sonnenfels chiefly agrees with von Justi that the promotion of general happiness has to be a leading principle of the science of the state. To avoid the problem of circularity, however, von Sonnenfels develops another, yet closely related idea of how happiness has to be reached. Rather than happiness as such, von Sonnenfels considers the concept of population as the highest and sole principle of the Cameralistic doctrine:

The only one, who has founded the science of the state including all its subdivisions on a general principle, was … [von] Justi: with this aim, he assumed the promotion of general happiness. This is a true, yet not sufficient principle. Admittedly, the promotion of general happiness is the aim of emerging states and their everlasting final object. Yet, in particular because of the fact that the appropriateness of measures needs to be demonstrated by their correspondence to the final objective [of a state], it cannot be accepted as the proof or the general principle … Therefore, I consider the extension of civil society by the increase of the population as the common general principle of the science of the state [Staatwissenschaft] and its subdivisions; the demonstration of any measure, which needs to lead to the promotion of general welfare, is: Does it contribute advantageously to the population? Does it contribute disadvantageously to the population? (von Sonnenfels 2003 [1765]: 22-23, §24, §25, emphasis in original, my translation)

Von Sonnenfels’s reference to civil society (bürgerliche Gesellschaft) can easily mislead one. Seen from a liberal point of view—liberal in the Foucauldian sense (chapter 2)—neither von Justi’s consideration of general happiness (Glückseligkeit) nor von Sonnenfels’s reliance on the principle of population (Bevölkerung) start from a distinction between state and society. According to the rationale behind police sciences, the state is not distinguished from the spheres that we generally consider as part of society, such as the economy, civil society, and the private sphere. Accordingly, human beings are not yet considered on the basis of their free interactions and interests, but on the basis of their spontaneous and collective inclination to interact in a disorderly fashion. The aim of good government or good police is to identify a desirable state of order and direct as many human resources as possible toward such an order:

Humanity confronts the state as ‘population,’ a subject mass to be regulated, enhanced, and supervised. Thus ‘society’ and ‘polity’ are genuinely synonymous, for without the latter the former cannot exist; and since they do coexist, no conceptual distinction is made between them. (Tribe 1988: 29)

For similar reasons, we cannot clearly distinguish between the political and economic objectives of police either. The economy cannot yet be perceived as something that is
autonomously ruled by ‘an invisible hand’ (Smith 1976), that is, by principles that are inherent to a market logic and individual interests and actions. Under Cameralistic conditions, the attempt to secure and increase the welfare of the state begins with the assumption of the immanence of the state and, therefore, starts with the presupposition that the state’s instruments and objectives are both entirely internal to the state’s own mechanisms:

[T]he politics and economics of the territorial state turn out to involve a constant work of regulation in which no sharp distinction can be made between ‘political’ and ‘economic’ tasks. The [eighteenth-century] Polizeistaat is a state in which the good of the ruler is indistinguishable from the good of the populace; the administrative apparatus is devoted to the increase of the ruler’s wealth through the optimization of the happiness of his subjects. (Tribe 1988: 34)

The state has to condition its subjects in such a way that not only their possessions, but also their skills, strength, endurance, and knowledge constitute the state’s wealth. Hence, in the Cameralistic approach to individuals, their happiness does not yet have a liberal component; instead, their behaviors and talents have to be mobilized maximally to useful effect. The proper conduct of households and of the population more generally is not based on a subject’s freedom from constraints—in contrast, every subject is constrained by regulations that limit and direct her action (Tribe 1988; Small 2001). The role of Polizei is to organize the state according to this principle of effectiveness:

The least offence and deviation, if they become general, can give rise to great disorder and have very damaging consequences for the welfare of the state. Thus Polizei has to demonstrate its wakefulness in all changes in the condition of the common weal. (von Justi 1756: 208, English translation cited Tribe 1988: 77)

The police scientific conception of the common weal clearly legitimizes practices of punishment. Yet, we cannot understand the eighteenth-century police state as a system that is entirely based on the specification of offences and their punishment, as in the most usual contemporary understanding of the police state. In particular because of police’s continuous obsession with disorder and with its governing too little, police involves a system that permanently tries to identify new areas of disorder, which it attempts to regulate and monitor through positive, proactive, and preventive measures. Seen from this angle, we can only fully grasp the eighteenth-century institutionalization of divisions of the police apparatuses that are specifically dedicated to, for instance, crime prevention and the repression of idleness, begging, and vagrancy in the context of the more general objective of police rationalities and their gradual transformation.

In the context of Prussia and the history of Gypsy approaches in Germany more generally, Lucassen remarks that the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth-century police system was already reducing its general scope to crime prevention. He has framed this transformation in terms of a parallel shift from a reactive to a proactive approach to crime (Lucassen 1996: 17, 115, 225). Such a shift undoubtedly took place, but certainly not only in the field that we currently understand as police. It also took place in many
other fields that were considered as an integral part of the tasks of police in the eighteenth-century sense, such as in the field of medicine or what was at that moment called medical police (medizinische Polizey) (Rau 1764; Frank 1779-1827). Thus, while we can speak of a preliminary turn from a reactive to a proactive approach to crime in the late eighteenth century, we cannot identify this shift—as, for instance, Lucassen (1996) and Härter (2003) tend to do—with the limitation of the overall police system to crime prevention. Consequently, we can only adequately understand this transition from a reactive to a proactive approach within the context of a much more general shift that also included a new approach to marginalized groups in terms of population regulation, rather than only in those of sovereignty and discipline (chapter 1). This gradual shift toward new forms of governmentality became manifest in both the internal transformation of Cameralistic theories and the transformation of Habsburg policies under enlightened absolutist rule. As I will explain in the second half of this chapter, an analysis of this transition makes it possible to understand these transformations beyond the mere centralization of (crime) control, and state institutions more generally.

HABSBURG GYPSY ASSIMILATIONIST POLICIES IN LIGHT OF GOVERNMENTALITY

Both the internal transformation of Cameralistic theories and the profound change of Habsburg absolutist policies in the eighteenth century occurred at the same time as the emergence of a new approach to the Habsburg Empire’s Gypsies. In this section, I interrogate the various ‘Gypsy-related’ measures that were taken in the eighteenth-century Habsburg Empire. I look at these measures through the analytic lens of governmentality and analyze their relationship with the doctrines and practices of police and their transformations. In the Roma-related historiography, there is a trend to understand these Gypsy-related measures either as a dramatic culmination of historically earlier approaches to Gypsy groups or as a more or less clear rupture with previous actions against them. Ian Hancock (2002), for instance, considers the Habsburg enlightened absolutist approach to Romani groups as a radical outcome of a Europe-wide history of persecution and violent expulsion of them. In one of his early works (Hancock 1987), he even understands the Habsburg approach as the first serious large-scale effort in European history to exterminate the Roma. However, in the majority of academic works that have analyzed or commented on Habsburg enlightened absolutism, these measures are understood as the first large-scale attempt in Europe at fully assimilating and settling Romani groups. The works of Willems, Lucassen, and Matras discussed in the previous chapter directly or indirectly follow this latter interpretation.

What the representatives of both academic traditions share, though, is to consider the Habsburg measures taken in the second half of the eighteenth century as internally coherent and uniform and as predominantly anti-Gypsy. The four so-called Gypsy

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12 Various authors have reflected on the concept of medical police and its transformation at the end of the eighteenth century (Rosen 1953; 1957; Lesky 1976; Foucault 2000d; 2000a; 2007b; Carroll 2002).

13 This has been put forward by a great number of authors (Liégeois 1986; Mayerhofer 1988; Kalvoda 1991; Crowe 1991; Fraser 1995; Fricke 1996b; Stewart 1997; Guy 2001b; Kovats 2001b; Barany 2002; Achim 2004; Acton 2004; Klimová-Alexander 2004; Bancroft 2005; Ladányi and Szélényi 2006; Zimmermann 2007c).
measures that the Habsburg empress Maria Theresa introduced between 1758 and 1773, for instance, have usually been analyzed as one consistent homogeneous set of assimilationist measures. What is more, many of the scholars who have discussed these and other Habsburg measures suggest that they largely failed to achieve their aim of Gypsy assimilation and settlement because the laws and regulations were not or not well implemented at local levels. In this section, I contest both the assumption that these measures were internally coherent or uniform, and that policy failure had primarily to do with resistance against central rule at local levels. Analyzing the assimilationist measures from the angle of police governmentality and its transformation, I will show that these measures represent substantially different yet overlapping stages of the Habsburg population approach. In this chapter, I will also argue that they gradually and ambivalently contributed to the formation of the Gypsies as a minority. Looking at the Habsburg measures through the lens of governmentality also enables me to show that resistance is at work within the systems of power themselves, rather than outside policy measures and power mechanisms (chapter 1). Toward the end of this section, I will interrogate some of the Habsburg technologies of population regulation beyond the policy-implementation or power-resistance binaries.

If we look more closely at the development of the Habsburg policies in the second half of the eighteenth century, we notice more than one important change in the approach to Gypsy groups. Therefore, I argue for a more heterogeneous and ambivalent analysis of these Habsburg policies than has usually been made in existing scholarship on this theme. The first of the policy shifts is still in accordance with the rupture that several scholars have observed: from expulsion to settlement and assimilation. Whereas, in 1749, empress Maria Theresa still ordered that vagrants, beggars from abroad, and Gypsies had to be totally expelled from the Habsburg territories, less than a decade later she changed her mind and chose a substantially different strategy. In what would be the first in a series of four decrees, she ordained that the Gypsies had to be settled, taxed, and subjected to the services of local rulers and landlords. This first edict of 1758 also decreed that the Gypsies had to give up their horses and carts, and that they could only leave towns and villages with permission from the local authorities, who had to register the Gypsies’ exact routes in case of approval (Fraser 1995). In general, we can consider

14 More generally, particularly studies on the history of religious minorities in the Habsburg lands have convincingly shown that we need to distinguish, at least, between the reigns of Maria Theresa and Joseph II. In particular during the period of their co-regency (1765-1780), mother and son had many disputes on how to solve social unrest among the population. In these conflicts, Maria Theresa considered any form of tolerance toward minority groups as a way to encourage lawlessness and anarchy and, therefore, as a way to undermine her reign. On the other hand, Joseph II—partly influenced by how tolerance toward religious groups had led to effectively managing social problems and to economic profits in other European countries—was much in favor of a politics of relative tolerance toward minority groups (Katz 1973; Kann 1974; Karniel 1986; McCagg 1989, see also below).

15 The eighteenth-century Habsburg Gypsy settlement policies were certainly not the first in European history, for settlement was one of the central strategies to govern itinerant groups, including Gypsy ones, in the Ottoman Empire. These settlement policies started after the Ottoman occupation of the Balkans, and no later than the sixteenth century (Marushiakova and Popov 2001b). The eighteenth-century Spanish Gypsy approach bears resemblance to the Habsburg one, though the decisive shift from an approach dominated by expulsion to one characterized by assimilation took only place after 1783 (Bernecker 2007).
this edict as a way to achieve settlement through coercive yet primarily external measures. Though these measures affected the daily lives of traveling Gypsy groups, these actions did not aim at direct and internal interference with their lives but primarily at immobilizing and fixing them. By means of external tools—that they had to give up their horses and carts expresses this externality best—their ‘nomadic way of life’ had to change into a settled one. We can understand these measures as compliant with mercantilism: the main aim of the policy was to enrich the imperial treasury, no matter what would be the (internal) consequences for those who were targeted. Indeed, restricting the Gypsies’ movement, taking away their means to move, and enforcing settlement were necessary means to adequately tax them and turn them into productive workers under the supervision of local landlords—hence to make financial profit from them at the imperial level.

The radical and sudden change in the approach toward Gypsy groups under Maria Theresa’s reign needs to be seen, at least partly, in light of the first decisive steps toward a more comprehensive population policy in the Habsburg Empire and a structural reform and centralization of the Austrian-Habsburg government. Due to severe population losses as the consequence of violent conflicts with the Ottoman Empire, the Habsburgs wanted to repopulate their territories and focus on strengthening their Empire internally. As some authors have observed (Fraser 1995; Ladányi and Szelényi 2006) the need to increase the population also increased the economic and social incorporation of Gypsies in the Habsburg Empire in the latter half of the eighteenth century. From then on, the Habsburgs tried to attract foreigners. Though they preferred German settlers, Serbian, Bulgarian, Jewish, and Gypsy migrants also entered the Empire (Karniel 1986; Ladányi and Szelényi 2006). Yet, we cannot fully understand the sudden shift in Maria Theresa’s Gypsy policy without analyzing the change of the political and scientific approach to the role of state sovereignty.

In 1746, Maria Theresa established the prestigious Theresianum, an institution that was founded to educate the young nobility for state service and to sail round the conservative influences of the Jesuits in the Empire’s educational system (Tribe 1988). More generally, the founding of the Theresianum and the recalibrating of other imperial institutions had to strengthen the Empire internally, rather than extend it territorially. In 1750, von Justi became one of the leading intellectuals at the Theresianum and also one of the first who was going to contribute to a general reconsideration of the imperial population policy and administrative practices. Then, in 1763, eight years after von Justi had left Vienna for the University of Göttingen, von Sonnenfels became the first Viennese professor of Cameralistic and police sciences and one of the most influential instructors at the Theresianum. He is usually considered as one of the most important advisors to Maria Theresa and Joseph II, and the leading person behind the codification of Austrian criminal, administrative, and civil law. Von Sonnenfels substantially contributed to Joseph’s Toleranzpolitik—his politics of tolerance toward religious minorities—and to the reform of the Habsburg police system, including state-church relationships, education, poor relief, and the abolition of torture (von Sonnenfels 1775; Kann 1960; Karniel 1986). His influence within the Habsburg educational system was significant. His main scholarly work, the three-volume Grundsätze der Polizey, Handlung und Finanzwissenschaft, went through eight editions between 1765 and 1822 and was required reading at all Austrian
and some foreign universities between 1770 and 1845 (Ogris 2003). Moreover, for a long period of time von Sonnenfels’s work was fully integrated into the daily practice of the Habsburg Cameralists because, by imperial resolution it functioned as a test from 1767. Administrative practices had to be adjusted to the main Cameralistic and police scientific principles:

Following the will of the empress and her advisors, the Cameralistic science had to work as a control mechanism. By continuously comparing theory and praxis, Cameralism not only had to reveal deviances in the existing constitution, but also to initiate directions and guidelines for future developments. (Osterloh 1970: 133, my translation)

The ongoing development of the Habsburgs’ Gypsy-related measures and the emergence of Gypsy studies need to be seen in view of the rapidly increasing influence of the Viennese Cameralistic orthodoxy on the imperial policies and on the Prussian academic world, in particular after the 1750s.

Following the Cameralists’ claim on regulating the entire social body and the way in which their pretensions and the rulers’ interests had become radically intermingled, the next three of Maria Theresa’s ‘Gypsy decrees’ express a clear shift toward the internal interference with ‘Gypsy’ affairs and lives.\(^{16}\) The second decree of 1761 illustrates this turn toward a much more direct involvement. It mandates compulsory military service for ‘fit’ Gypsy men older than sixteen. The decree also ordains that the last names of Gypsies have to be changed into the neologisms ‘new Hungarians’ (újmagyarok), ‘new peasants’ (Neubauer, újparasztok or neo-rustici), ‘new citizens’ (Neubürger or újpolgár) or ‘new settlers’ (Neusiedler, újlakosok or neocolonii).\(^ {17}\) Six years later, in 1767, the third decree surpasses the second one when it comes to internal interference. It calls for the entire abolition of the prevailing self-organization of the Roma in the form of chieftains and local tax collectors (voivodes) in order to fully integrate the Roma into the newly developed centralized judicial system.\(^ {18}\) Moreover, from now on the use of the Romani language as well as the wearing of ‘Gypsy-specific’ dresses and the occupation of ‘Gypsy-specific’ professions is forbidden. In addition, each village has to organize a census of its Gypsy population. The fourth and final decree of 1773 even interferes internally in Romani family affairs by forbidding marriages between Roma and ordering that Romani children older than five have to be taken away from their parents for the rest of their childhood and educated by non-Romani foster families, who had to be paid

\(^ {16}\) Education, the administrative practices, and rule were strictly connected under Habsburg Enlightened Absolutism. Maria Theresa and Joseph II were strongly opposed to scientific and educational developments “which in pursuit of uncontrolled free research would deviate from utilitarian vocational goals for the training of administrators and professional men” (Kann 1974: 192). As I have outlined above, these ‘vocational goals’ were mainly related to the Cameralistic and police scientific aims.

\(^ {17}\) This element of the Habsburg policies also resembled the Spanish Gypsy policy. At the end of the eighteenth century, the reference to ‘Gitanos’ was forbidden in Spain; as of 1783 the Roma were considered to be Castellanos Nuevos or ‘new Castilians’ (Fraser 1995: 160-66; Bernecker 2007).

\(^ {18}\) In terms of governmentality, we could consider the efforts of the Habsburg rulers to destroy the voivodes structures as attempts to radically displace a specific form of Romani pastoral power based on chieftainship and to replace them by new forms of governmentality (see also below).
for their adoption services. From now on, intermarriages are encouraged—even financially—though they can only take place if the future household is considered sustainable and catholic (Mayerhofer 1988).

To an increasing extent, these edicts aim at the full, direct regulation of Romani lives. This tendency would even go further under the rule of Maria Theresa’s son Joseph II, who wanted to regulate the status of Romani groups in the Empire in a way as detailed and all-encompassing as possible. The Gypsy-related measures that he installed represent even more clearly the Habsburgs’ assimilative philosophy and their closely related attempts to govern through an explicit concern with population. Apart from a number of measures that were comparable to those of his mother, in De Regulatione Zingarorum (On the Regulation of the Gypsies) of 1782, Joseph decreed that the Roma had to follow the customs, eating habits, dress codes, and language of the village where they lived; that they had to attend Roman Catholic church services weekly, follow the priest’s advice, work in agriculture, and give up horse trading; that they could only perform music when the work was done; and that Romani girls and boys had to be dressed and had to sleep separately. In 1783, Joseph synthesized most of the measures that he and his mother had taken before in a new decree, the so-called Hauptregulatio, which consisted of almost hundred regulations. A number of important new ones were added, such as the restriction of the Roma’s market attendance and access to forges, the prohibition of name changes and the return to a ‘Gypsy way of life,’ obligatory counting of Romani houses, and obligatory monthly village reports on the Roma (Achim 2004).

Though these measures excel in attempts to regulate not only Romani lives but also their ‘souls,’ it is important to note that Joseph’s measures differ at least in one important respect from Maria Theresa’s. His measures also include some rights for the Roma. From then on, landowners were charged with providing a parcel of land to the Roma who worked on it. Gypsies were also given permission to build their own houses and to own land. In a separate decree of 1783, Joseph II also forbade Gypsy serfdom in the county of Bukovina, a part of the Ottoman Empire that had been incorporated in the Habsburg lands in 1775 (Mayerhofer 1988; Achim 2004). As far as it is possible to interpret these kinds of measures as a form of relaxation toward Romani groups, we could understand them in light of Joseph’s politics of tolerance toward minorities. Though this politics—of which von Sonnenfels has often been considered as one of the architects—in principle affected religious minorities such as the Protestant, the Jewish, and the Orthodox, it is hardly possible that the politics of tolerance, alongside the general tendency to humanize the relationships with minorities, did not also affect the Gypsies.

The radicalism of the population policies of Maria Theresa and Joseph II was not at all limited to the treatment of Gypsy groups. Until the codification of Joseph’s politics of tolerance in the first half of the 1780s, Protestant and Jewish parents, for instance, were also confronted with the often-violent removal of their children in order to reeducate them in the ‘good Catholic way.’ Jews were not allowed to trade horses, their marriages

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19 Whereas Maria Theresa’s four decrees concerned the Roma in the Kingdom of Hungary (that is, today’s Hungary including substantial parts of today’s Slovakia, Austria, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia, Ukraine, and Romania), Joseph’s measures of 1782 involved Transylvania exclusively. However, his regulation of 1783 involved both Transylvania and the Hungarian Kingdom.
were heavily taxed to try to reduce the number of Jewish births, and they were often criminalized—even seen as the most important group involved in banditry and religious rebellion against the Empire and its interests (Karniel 1986; McCagg 1989). The tendency in scholarship on the Roma to isolate the Habsburg Roma-related measures from the Zeitgeist, and from the treatment of other minority groups in particular, could easily lead to taking these measures out of context and to suggesting that only Gypsy groups were singled out for extreme measures.20 Similarly, we need to see the gradual change in the character of the Gypsy-related measures under Joseph II, as well as the main differences between his policy and that of Maria Theresa, in light of his politics of tolerance, even while this politics did not explicitly target Romani groups. Joseph’s extensive regulations toward the Gypsies of 1782-83, for instance, show important similarities in style and attitude with the edicts of tolerance (Toleranzpatente) of 1781-85 toward Jewish minorities in the Habsburg Empire.21 The general attitude toward both minority groups is based on the belief that it is necessary to reform their daily practices and behavior in order that they could be tolerated. Of course, this could also be said of Maria Theresa’s approach. But the crucial difference is that her measures toward both Jews and Gypsies were chiefly based on a radically antagonistic approach, whereas Joseph’s politics of tolerance gradually develops toward a form of regulation that also allows these minorities to express some rights and freedom, though still at a minimum level.22 To be sure, Joseph’s politics of tolerance did not really aim at equality for Protestants, let alone for Jews or Roma. The tolerance discourse at the end of the eighteenth century became a substantial

20 However, Lucassen’s study (1996) on how police institutions in Germany dealt with Gypsy groups and Härter’s analyses (2003) of similar issues include important comparisons with how Jewish groups had historically been categorized.

21 According to both sets of regulations the Gypsies and Jews are, for instance, required to give up the use of their own language (Romanes and Hebrew or Yiddish respectively), have the right to own land (but under specific circumstances), need to give up certain ‘bodily practices’ (Jews were not allowed to wear beards; Gypsies had to wear body-covering cloths), and need to follow special rules to include their children into the system of education. More generally, it is remarkable how group-specific stereotypes have seemingly governed the ways in which these regulations had been formulated. The fear that Jewish groups would secretly conspire against the empire, for instance, resulted in a number of regulations that forbid them to print books in their own language or to import them from abroad (Karniel 1986: 564-85, in particular 578). Similarly, the fear that Gypsies would steal led to forbidding them to have or work for forges (to avoid counterfeiting) or to wear dresses in which they “could conceal stolen items” ( Achim 2004: 72). Nonetheless, both sets of regulations show also important differences. One of the most important ones is the ‘right’ of Jewish groups to maintain some of their own institutions, most notably Jewish schools (though these schools, their teachers, and their curricula had to be supervised strictly).

22 This is also the way in which Wendy Brown has described the general policy shift toward Jewish minorities in late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth-century European societies: “the formulation of and the answer to the Jewish Question was framed as much by raison d’état as by political principle or considerations of Jewish welfare, though the latter sometimes figured importantly in the justification and legitimization of emancipation. One clear instance of this change in political orientation toward the Jews is the difference in both tenor and aim between two Viennese policies separated by less than twenty years. Empress Maria Theresa’s Judenordnung of 1764 was hostile and punitive, while Emperor Joseph II’s Toleranzpatent of 1782 was rational, benevolent, and administrative” (Brown 2006: 52, 220n9, my emphasis). Though Brown’s distinction between the two emperors is probably too strict, we can describe the shift in the approach toward Romani groups in similar words, at least when we take into account the major differences between Maria Theresa’s five ‘Gypsy decrees’ of 1749-73 on the one hand, and Joseph II’s De Regulatione Zingororum and Hauptregulatio of 1782-83, on the other.
and integral governmental part of the Habsburg population policy and an instrument to strengthen the empire internally and to compete with Prussia (Katz 1973; Karniel 1986; Brown 2006). Nonetheless, one of the unforeseen outcomes was that—in the course of the years, particularly toward the Hungarian revolution of 1848—this politics of tolerance would lead toward greater possibilities for minority emancipation.

Let me now turn to the ways in which various scholars have interpreted the Habsburg population policies vis-à-vis their outcomes. As I have argued, Joseph’s politics of tolerance toward different kinds of minorities articulates a crucial stage in the transformation of how the Habsburg authorities addressed the question of population. The authors who have analyzed Habsburg absolutism as a rupture in the history of Roma-related policies and regulations usually give one of the following explanations. Either they suggest that these measures represented daily practices of assimilation on the ground. Or they put forward that these measures largely failed due to discrepancies between the ‘intentions’ of the Habsburg Gypsy measures and the ways in which they were implemented or resisted at local levels. In Willems’s and Lucassen’s works, for instance, such resistances have not been part of their analyses.23 They have generally restricted their analyses to the measures introduced by authorities, but not discussed whether or not they were resisted in one way or another. The authors who explicitly address the outcomes of the Habsburg Gypsy measures focus on the influential, yet often unexpected outcomes of the Habsburg policies on the one hand, and their simultaneous failure to really assimilate the target groups, on the other. They emphasize that the desired sedentarization of these groups was achieved in some of the Empire’s central regions, such as in Austria’s Burgenland (Mayerhofer 1988), but certainly not in all of its territories. These authors also stress that ethnic and linguistic assimilation did not really take place on the intended scale and that Gypsy groups were able to develop, maintain, or even strengthen their ethnic and linguistic identity. In the literature, we find several reasons for forms of resistance against the imperial measures: landlords and landowners did not want to conform to centralized rule for they had their own reasons to maintain local governance systems (Guy 1975; Achim 2004; Trehan and Kóczé 2009); financial and logistic means to implement the measures simply lacked (Mayerhofer 1988; Zimmermann 2007c); Roma escaped to places where the policies were not or not strictly implemented; Roma continued to marry and interact with each other according to their own laws (Fraser 1995; Barany 2002; Härter 2003); the impact of the measures was only temporary for after Joseph’s death many Roma returned to an itinerant ‘way of life’ (Tkáčová 2002; Achim 2004), the impact of the actions was very indirect for only by the mid-nineteenth century these policies began to work (Ladányi and Szelenyi 2006), etc.

Yet, while these elements certainly point to discrepancies between rule and its outcome, the idea behind these various interpretations of resistance seems to be to juxtapose (central) rule to (local) resistance in a way that I have criticized (chapter 1). Such distinctions assume that we can separate out governmental policies on the one hand, from the processes of their ‘messy’ enactment and implementation, on the other. Juxtaposing rule

23 Nevertheless, Willems (1997: 32-34) addresses the discrepancies between policies and their implementations when he discusses the Habsburg enlightened absolutist rules’ approach to begging (a view that he mainly derives from Bernard 1979).
and contestation in this way also assumes that resistance is something that is external to how rule functions and comes into force. Admittedly, we could see, for instance, the refusal of landowners and local rulers to implement centralized imperial rules as a form of resistance that is to some extent internal to rule. Yet, we need to acknowledge in a more fundamental way the constitutive role of resistance in how rule operates. This issue relates to my remark in the previous section that, in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the dominant art and rationality of government—represented by the view that the sovereign can entirely know and govern his subjects—was increasingly at variance with the developing Cameralistic, police scientific governmental technologies that aimed at the thorough regulation of population groups. Put differently, increasingly the instruments that were developed to problematize the question of population did not fit with the general juridico-political way in which problems of sovereignty and the state were framed and codified. The dystopian dream of a totally administered society and the belief in the possibility of the full institutionalization of direct rule (chapter 3) were seriously challenged by how this vision was actually materialized and discussed.24

The way in which the police scientific rationalities and technologies gradually transformed and, as we will see below, collapsed, can be illustrated by how the census was incorporated in the developing Habsburg population policy. I consider the census as a specific way in which Gypsy groups were problematized at the turn of the eighteenth century and as a governmental instrument that tells us more about the transformation of Gypsy problematization occurring at the time. In the census, the discursive and technological dimensions in which these groups were framed come together. In light of transforming governmentalities at the end of the eighteenth century, I analyze the census as an ambiguous tool in which the internal contestation and transformation of rule became manifest. As I explained in chapter 1, an understanding of resistance as something that is integral to the shaping of power relations allows for a conception of politics as “relations of contest or struggle which are constitutive of government, rather than simply a source of programmatic failure and (later) redesign” (O’Malley et al 1997: 505). By means of an analysis of the Habsburg census, I will show that the ‘policy tools’ themselves were already constitutive of a form of government that could no longer be considered as an unproblematic, uniform representation of the Cameralistic aim at governing the population directly and in its entirety.

24 In one of the latest (and best) articles that the German historian Michael Zimmermann wrote before his death in 2007, he suggests that, since the end of the eighteenth century, the difficulty for state authorities to implement a coherent Gypsy policy was not in the first place related to the discrepancy between the formulated policy and the reach of state institutions—as it had often been before that time. Rather, from now on “the differentiation of the political system has blocked the sought ‘solution of the Gypsy Question’” (2007c: 35, my translation). Without any further explanation, Zimmermann interestingly suggests that the functional differentiation of society into different relatively autonomous social spheres has basically challenged any attempt at directly governing Romani groups. Yet, whereas Zimmermann’s work could generally be characterized by his careful description of the internal differences and paradoxes of regimes, discourses, and policies—most of all of those during the Nazi times—in his representation of the emergence of Gypsy studies in the eighteenth century he generally follows Willems’s attitude to highlight the influence of Grellmann’s work and to understate the many-voiced character of Enlightenment approaches to Gypsy groups (see 2007c: 34-35).
The codification of Joseph’s politics of tolerance in the first half of the 1780s was introduced at the same time as the census among substantial parts of the imperial population (Dickson 1987), including Gypsy groups (Achim 2004). These censuses illustrated very well the way in which Habsburg authorities tried to map the Romani part of the population in its entirety. The censuses gave information on issues as diverse as the Gypsies’ professions, their eating habits, on how many of them lived in huts or in houses, their ways of dressing, and how many of them owned land or were engaged in horse trading. These censuses paid special attention to the behavior and circumstances of children and how their family lives were organized. The censuses inform us, for instance, about the number of Gypsy children ordered by gender, how many of them lived separated from their parents and how many of these children went to school, for what kind of professions these young Gypsies were trained, etc. (Achim 2004).

We cannot interpret these ‘data’ on Gypsy behavior and family relations, their dress and housekeeping, their customs and productivity, their life expectancy and more or less risky lifestyles without relating them to the Habsburg regulations discussed above. Some scholars (Mayerhofer 1988; Achim 2004) understand these statistical data as merely ‘the state of affairs,’ representing the situation of the Gypsies in the Empire after measures that were implemented by the rulers. Consequently, they read these data directly and quantitatively: as a means to see how many Gypsies actually changed their lives in the direction of assimilation and sedentarization. However, we need to be cautious with such a-historical and straight interpretations. These statistics themselves embody a central technique of government that does not simply “offer us a comprehensive tableau of the Gypsy population” (Achim 2004: 74), but, rather, tells us something important about the transformation of the approaches to the Gypsy population. Put differently, these statistics do not simply represent the new demographic situation, but articulate a newly emerging problematization of Gypsies.

These statistics do not inform us about how they passively articulate existing or emergent differences between the submissive and the restive or the assimilated and the not-yet-assimilated. Rather, they inform us about how statistical tools actively produce these differences and categories, as well as their postponements and displacements. Seen from this perspective, it becomes possible to consider the 1780–83 censuses among the Habsburg Gypsy population, and the parallel introduction of the 1782–83 Gypsy regulations, as the appearance of a new set of problems—or better as a new set of what I, following Foucault, call problematizations (see the introduction, chapter 1). In what way do these statistics inherently relate the regulation of Gypsy groups to a new set of problems? In a tentative yet clear way, these Gypsy regulations and censuses relate ‘Gypsy lifestyles’ and ‘professions’ to issues such as their productivity, fertility, life expectancy, health in general, and the possible improvement of their children’s educational background and mental and physical condition. In other words, we can observe an increasing focus on their biological and bodily traits, on the environment in which they live, and, more generally, on variables, which clearly transcend the juridico-political sphere and have a dynamics that cannot be governed directly, at least not by juridico-political instruments. How do we need to understand this dynamics and the way in which it functions as a kind of quasi-autonomous, self-governing mechanism, like a living organism? I will only fully answer this question later, when I address the relationship
between bio-politics and forms of minority self-articulation that have appeared since the late eighteenth century. Yet, I could give a first, tentative answer to this question by analyzing how the sphere of the family, considered as an object of government, became rearticulated at the end of the eighteenth century. As I will argue below, these censuses show, firstly, that the members of a family are no longer only subjects “bound together in a territory who are obliged to submit to their sovereign” (Dean 1999: 107). As the censuses clarify, family members are also “living, working, and social beings, with their own customs, habits, histories, and forms of labor and leisure” (ibid). Thus, the way in which these censuses approach the conception of family represents a different notion of the governed: they are no longer primarily seen as the servants of the sovereign, but, rather, as living, working, and social beings who are included in a population characterized by its own biological, economic, and social dynamics. Secondly, these censuses show that the Habsburg Gypsy population was not primarily targeted in terms of its size, as merely a more or less extensive collection of living human beings. Rather, from the late eighteenth century on the Gypsy population has increasingly been approached as a “kind of living entity with a history and a development, and with possibilities of pathology” (ibid), and, consequently, it has been problematized in bio-political terms that have also made it possible to approach Gypsy populations in terms of origin, belonging, and development (see chapter 3 and below).

The way in which the regulations and censuses pay attention to the body, mind, and development of the Gypsy child, for instance, expresses not so much a preoccupation with the number of children and, hence, with the necessity of achieving a large and healthy population—as the focus of ‘good police’ would imply. Rather, this focus articulates a preoccupation with childhood as the crucial period of life in which the physical, moral, and economic conditions of the survival to adulthood need to be fulfilled and, therefore, as an age of life that needs to be carefully regulated. Measures such as the required wearing of clothes, the obligatory separation of boys and girls during their sleep, the desired fostering of children by non-Gypsy parents, the prohibition of Gypsy marriages, the simultaneous encouragement and supervision of intermarriages, and the mapping of the professions for which the children were trained can all be read in light of the increased focus on the bio-political management of Gypsy childhood and of the Gypsies as a minority part of the population more generally. Moreover, these measures express the emergence of the simultaneous regulation of the Gypsies at the individual and the collective level. Two different strategies intersect, namely the efforts to direct the reproduction of the collective Gypsy part of the population by making them productive and profitable on the one hand, and the attempts to regulate their individual gender, sex, and marital relationships, on the other. The family, which, in classic Camerallistic thinking, could not be thought of as something outside the realm of the government of the state, is increasingly going to appear as a kind of quasi-independent and autonomous bio-political relay between the individual and the collective and as both a source and an instrument of medical, biological, economic, and social forms of regulation:

The family is no longer to be just a system of relations inscribed in a social status, a kinship system, a mechanism for the transmission of property; it is to become a dense, saturated, permanent, continuous physical environment that envelops, maintains, and
develops the child’s body ... [The family] organizes itself as the child’s immediate environment, tending increasingly to become its basic framework for survival and growth. (Foucault 2000d: 96, my italics)

Of course, the required tutoring of Gypsy children by non-Gypsy foster parents incontrovertibly points to the conviction that the ‘detrimental’ Gypsy parental environment is a central part of the ‘problem.’ Yet, the same belief expresses the idea that a ‘decent and healthy’ parental milieu in itself would contribute to the good government of a child’s life toward courteous and responsible adulthood.

Indubitably, the rationale behind the Gypsy regulations and censuses was still the belief in the malleability and precise conduct of Gypsy families—and of the Gypsy minority population more generally. However, the meticulous mapping of ‘Gypsy habits and customs’ from gender and sex relations to school attendance, and from family planning to career records shows that these statistics themselves started to focus on the regulation of processes that had no juridico-political nature nor could be straightforwardly dealt with by sovereign mechanisms. Hence, with the emergence of this modern form of statistics

Population was no longer pliable, to be manipulated by enlightened leaders, but the product of recalcitrant customs and natural laws that stood outside the domain of mere politics. Government could not dominate society, for it was itself constrained by society. (Porter 1986: 26, my emphasis)

The conviction that thorough knowledge of a state was indispensable in order to govern it in its entirety had led to the emergence of Cameralistic and police sciences as ‘the sciences of the state.’ Yet, the various ways in which these sciences gradually started to map populations and their dynamics simultaneously revealed that these form of statistics were less and less compatible with the centralization and institutionalization of direct rule. Put differently, the emergent forms of the “government of population require[d] regulations and modes of intervention, which gradually transcend[ed] the absolutistic sovereignty’s opportunities to operate” (Lemke 1997: 168, my translation). The statistics to which the Cameralistic obsession with the total regulation of the population led expose that the model of sovereign government that was based on the possibility to entirely know and govern the population and all its internal relations—as if it was a family household led by a houseparent—was going to be broken:

Whereas statistics had previously worked within the administrative frame and thus in terms of the functioning of sovereignty, it now gradually reveals that population has its own regularities, its own rate of deaths and diseases, its cycles of scarcity, and so on; statistics also shows that the domain of population involves a range of intrinsic, aggregate effects, phenomena that are irreducible to those of the family, such as epidemics, endemic levels of mortality, ascending spirals of labor and wealth; lastly it shows that, through its shifts, customs, activities, etc., population has specific economic effects. Statistics, by making it possible to quantify these specific phenomena of population, also shows that this specificity is irreducible to the dimensions of the
family. The latter now disappears as the [central] model of government ... On the other hand, what now emerges into prominence is the family considered as an element internal to population, and as a fundamental instrument in its government. (Foucault 1991a: 99, my emphasis)

Consequently, the gradual shift of how the developed governmental technologies affected their subjects and objects of government implies, firstly, the slow but sure recognition of spheres—the economy, the family, and society more generally—outside the realm of the state that could not effectively be governed by sovereign instruments. Secondly, this shift went together with the development of bodies of knowledge that began to analyze the processes and mechanisms by which these spheres were internally organized. These two implications are related to the gradual and parallel emergence of the state-society distinction and the social and human sciences that I discussed in chapters 1 and 2 and to which I will return more extensively in the context of Cameralism below.

Having arrived at this point, we could also ask whether this late-eighteenth-century development of an assimilationist form of Gypsy minority governance implies the continuation of forms of population regulation, now with other means, namely indirect, biopolitical ones. Does this transformation, though it complicates the idea of direct rule, not merely point to closer, rather than weaker ties between stigmatization, racialization, biopoliticization, and diminished opportunities for Romani minority self-articulation? To some extent, it clearly does, as a number of historians have argued. In chapter 3, I discussed how Willems and Lucassen approach the issue of Gypsy stigmatization. However, in this chapter my main point at issue is not primarily associated with the question of whether the late-eighteenth-century transformation of population regulation is related to such closer or weaker ties between stigmatization and self-articulation. Rather, in what follows, I will argue for an interlinking of these newly emerging, biopolitical forms of population regulation with new opportunities to express forms of cultural agency. Willems and Lucassen suggest that the ‘one nation-one people-one language’ narrative has solely contributed to a tradition of Gypsy stigmatization. Contrary to their view, in the next part of this chapter, I will argue that these forms of ‘nationalism’ have also had intimate relations with opportunities for minoritized groups to represent themselves along the lines of ethnicity, culture, or nation in order to critique their own stigmatization and bio-politicization. In this line of reasoning, it is possible to perceive the emergence of the articulation of ‘nation’ and ‘culture’ in terms of Bildung as much more ambivalent—at least not necessarily only negative—than Willems and Lucassen suggest. The explanation of the ambivalence of this tradition will also show that this emergent articulation in terms of Bildung has something important in common with late Cameralism that will finally also shed another light on the works of Grellmann and Rüdiger.
The gradual transformation of the Habsburg policies can be better understood by analyzing the parallel transformation of Cameralistic theories. In this section, I will analyze how the latter transformation gradually opened up a space for critiquing forms of biopolitical population regulation. As I have discussed above, in the case of the prevailing police scientific conception of population regulation, we cannot yet speak of society as a separate, self-organizing, and quasi-autonomous sphere, at least not in the sense of the state-society distinction typical of liberal forms of governmentality (chapter 2). Yet, in von Sonnenfels’s works we can observe the emergence of an important ‘proto-liberal’ distinction between the social and the political sphere:

Gradually more and for the first time, the scope of the political starts to be distinguished from that of the social, which is founded on human dignity and humanity and which has become an aim in itself. In particular when it comes to this new orientation, the influence of von Sonnenfels on the Austrian period of reform cannot be overestimated. (Osterloh 1970: 74, my translation)

George Rosen has formulated the emergent distinction between the social and the political sphere as follows:

In passing from Justi to Sonnenfels, there is a definite feeling of having passed from one intellectual climate to another. While Sonnenfels stood squarely on Cameralist grounds, adhering to the idea of enlightened absolutism, he also reflected the contemporary humanitarian demand for social justice as well as the enlightenment of the French philosophes. (Rosen 1953: 34) 25

A state-society distinction is not yet established on liberal grounds. Nonetheless, it is made on the basis of the emergence of an understanding of human dignity that touches upon the way in which critics of eighteenth-century imperialism, such as Kant and Herder, conceptualized it in connection with cultural human agency (chapter 3). The emergence of such a separate social sphere could be illustrated by, for instance, von Sonnenfels’s insistence on the simultaneous development of workhouses, poorhouses, and the like, on the one hand, and of adequate poor relief, care of the elderly, and other forms of welfare provision, on the other. Without the latter institutions, he puts forward, the former would radically fail in achieving their main aims.

The proximity of von Sonnenfels’s thought to disclosing a social sphere is also expressed in his understanding of dignity (Ehre). Dignity is “the esteem of the honesty of a citizen” (von Sonnenfels 2003 [1765]: 193, § 294, his emphasis, my translation). There are different reasons why dignity is brought into discussion. Von Sonnenfels points to the

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25 Albion Small, one of the first historians of Cameralism, describes the shift from von Justi to von Sonnenfels in similar terms: “One feels in passing from Justi to Sonnenfels that a watershed has been crossed, and that one is within the borders of another territory. Speaking literally, the mere fact that Sonnenfels makes the conscious attempt at modernism involved in adopting a corrected orthography makes the reader aware of a transition” (2001: 411).
fact that, in many countries, disrespect is caused by a dubious tradition in which disrespect is directly linked with someone’s birth, a lifestyle, a profession, an act that someone practices purposely or accidentally, or with a legal punishment. In this context, von Sonnenfels mentions the Gypsies (Zigeuner) as a group that in many countries is considered as not deserving respect and dignity at all. Von Sonnenfels, however, unambiguously rejects practices that instigate individual or collective disrespect on one of these grounds, because such disrespect harms “the public and private welfare.” Such practices, von Sonnenfels argues, are based on the untenable idea that disrespect is transferable from individuals to collectives or from the one generation to the next (2003: 193-94, § 295-96).

More generally, we can observe a number of important transformations in Von Sonnenfels’s version of Cameralism that indicate a shift toward early liberal forms of population regulation. In studies of governmentality, the transition from police scientific to liberal forms of governmentality and the related emergence of a state-society distinction are usually related to three important parallel transformations that I have already discussed in passing: (1) the displacement of the position and politico-juridical instruments of the sovereign; (2) a farewell to a family or household-based conception of the economy, and (3) the emergence of a notion of population that does not primarily rely on its permanent extension, but, rather, on its own autonomous regularities and principles, which are no longer directly knowable and governable by state institutions and their sovereign means (Lemke 1997). These three points are closely related and overlap, for the emergence of an autonomous social sphere that encompasses the economy, the private and familiar sphere, and other dimensions of civil society implies that the sovereign can no longer directly know and govern these spheres as if she is in the position of someone who rules and governs the state as an extended household (see also chapter 2).

At each of these three points we can observe a clear transformation in the works of von Sonnenfels. Firstly, he breaks with the kind of mercantilism that was still central to von Justi’s Cameralism. Unlike the latter’s idea that the welfare of the state in itself is its central aim, von Sonnenfels argues that the increase of wealth of the imperial chamber can only be a means to the end to increase the welfare of every single citizen. Thus, the augmentation of the general welfare of the state is no aim in itself, but always and ultimately a means to a social goal (von Sonnenfels 1787). Accordingly, the role of sovereignty changes under these conditions of population regulation. The sovereign no longer rules the state as if it is an extended household, but has to accept the population’s own regularities, which she cannot directly influence. The implication of this aspect of von Sonnenfels’s thought is that the role of the monarch vis-à-vis society is going to be redefined: “the welfare of the people no longer depends on the ruler, but, conversely, the position of the ruler is dependent on the own dynamics of the salus publica” (Osterloh 1970: 43, my translation). While von Sonnenfels does not clearly explain what he considers as salus publica—literally the health of the public or a population—the reference in his work to its own dynamics suggests a displacement of the sovereign and her juridico-political instruments to govern a territorialized population. Indeed, if the population has a dynamics that is different from that of the state, the sovereign is not well able to know and, consequently, to govern the population directly. What ‘remains’ for the state, is to
try to fulfill as adequately as possible the conditions under which a population can develop in a ‘healthy’ way.

In the context of the emerging social sphere, a striking case in point is that von Sonnenfels is in favor of abandoning every form of state interference and of every privileged form of economic interaction that hinders the development of an individual’s pursuit of profit (von Sonnenfels 1771). He suggests that we need to encourage forms of entrepreneurship and individual development that first of all contribute to the happiness of the individual and, indirectly, to that of the state. Von Sonnenfels’s profound transformation of classic Cameralism has led Karl-Heinz Osterloh to conclude that:

[Von Sonnenfels’s] newly constructed model of society, which is based on the emancipated individual, essentially no longer allows for any kind of limitation to the citizen’s pursuit of profit. From now on, the aims of the enlightened Cameralistic sciences are the far-reaching development of the social-economic foundations of urban and rural forms of production and the transition to a system of individualistic market economy ... Thus, enlightened Cameralism resulted into the large wave of liberalization that the Austrian monarchy underwent during the last decade [HvB: the 1770s] of Maria Theresa’s reign. (Osterloh 1970: 80-81, 95, my translation)

Once more, I want to emphasize that we can only understand these forms of liberalization from a proto-liberal point of view. Nevertheless, in von Sonnenfels’s work a clear, internal ambivalence, if not contradiction, becomes manifest. On the one hand, he still does not want to relinquish the Cameralistic belief in the possibility to know and govern a population in its entirety. Moreover, his conception of population relies on its qualitative and quantitative extension and on a balance between production and consumption that is at odds with classic liberal market economic principles.26 At the same time, however, von Sonnenfels’s plea for social forms of population regulation is at odds with the principal ways in which he conceptualizes population. Consequently, his renewed conceptualization of the classic Cameralistic and police scientific principles simultaneously inaugurates the dissolution of the Cameralistic orthodoxy. Indeed, his understanding of dignity, inter-subjective relations, economic interaction, and an individual’s pursuit of profit and happiness relies on a vitality of the social milieu, with the individual embedded in it, who needs to be left untouched by state institutions. Von Sonnenfels

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26 Mitchell Dean has put forward that “we should insist on at least a primary disjunction between pre- and post-Malthusian conceptions of population and its ramifications for governmental rationalities” for only a Malthusian conception of population considers it as governed according to its own regularities (Dean 1999: 94). Thomas Malthus (1798) was one of the first who formulated a liberal concept of population, which re-conceptualizes the relationship between state interventions, human happiness, and the internal, ‘natural’ dynamics of a population. According to Dean, “the core of the Malthusian theory of population is its postulation of a constant, unalterable tendency towards overpopulation which is given by the comparative rates of increase of human population and its means of subsistence” (1991: 76). Though I agree with Dean and others who suggest distinguishing between pre- and post-Malthusian conceptions of population, one of the arguments of this chapter, and of my analysis of von Sonnenfels’s work in particular, is that any clear distinction between such concepts and correlated practices needs to be contested. Foucault (2000d), in his analysis of health in the eighteenth century, also suggests a more gradual transformation than Dean has proposed on the basis of his discursive analysis of Malthusian theories.
discourages intervention not only on the basis of moral reasons, but also, and more importantly, because such interferences would harm the individual and, thus, govern the state ineffectively. Thus, on the one hand, von Sonnenfels’s call for a radical relaxation of those Habsburg imperial interventions that hindered the individual’s development is motivated on proto-liberal grounds. On the other hand, however, his suggestion that such interventions harm any well-governed state comes very close to the liberal idea that population developments have their own, internal dynamics, which cannot directly be governed by state institutions (see also chapter 2).

Insofar as von Sonnenfels’s reconceptualization of Cameralism implies its unavoidable contamination by a kind of proto-liberalism and inaugurates Cameralism’s slow but sure breakdown, we can also link the spirit of his work to the ambivalence of Enlightenment thought and the plural way in which we need to understand it (chapter 3). His thought—including its influence on scientific developments and Habsburg imperial policies—reveals the internal ambivalences of Cameralism. It shows that the counter-conducts with regard to police scientific forms of rationality are not external, but entirely internal to them (for my discussion of the concept of counter-conduct, see chapter 1). At the same time, this is yet another important motivation against a too easy opposition between universalism and particularism or between imperialism and anti-imperialism in Enlightenment thinking (chapter 3).

BIOPOLITICS, ORGANISM, AND PROSPECTS FOR MINORITY SELF-ARTICULATION

If the vital milieu to which I have referred above can be considered as a precursor to the liberal perception of a self-organizing society, which is governed by its own relatively autonomous mechanisms and principles, we also need to dwell on its meaning more extensively. We could understand the emergence of this vital environment in view of “the historical coincidence of the rise of European nationalism with the decline of the mechanistic metaphor of the state and the corresponding articulation of an organismic metaphor” in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries (Cheah 2003: 19, my emphasis). In moral and political philosophy, as well as in theories of political and cultural nationalism, the reform of the late-eighteenth-century enlightened absolutist state has often been figured as “the transformation of a machine into a living creature” (ibid 26), which involved imparting the state with the capacity of self-organization. What I, following Pheng Cheah, introduce here as the ‘organismic metaphor’ includes the different ways in which, since the late-eighteenth century, various modes of governance have been compared with forms of “organic life as a dynamic process of self-formation and self-generation, a spontaneous, rational-purposive and auto-causal becoming” (ibid 25). As I will explain in this section, “the idea of organic life represents a rupture from rigidly mechanistic conceptions of the world” (ibid). Different conceptions of the organism

27 Therefore, the word ‘counter’ in Foucault’s concept of counter-conduct is somewhat unhappy (see 2007b: 201-02, 214-15). It too much suggests that counter-conducts are a reply to dominant forms of conduct and governmentality, while, as I argued in chapter 1, ‘dominant’ and ‘counter’ forms of conduct need to be considered as largely co-constitutive of governmental practices.
“give rise to different uses of the organismic metaphor” (ibid) in the context of political organization, but also, more generally, in those of human life, language, and labor and the ways in which these categories have become historicized. Following Foucault, we can understand these epistemological transformations as processes in which the “entry of life into history” (1990a: 141) takes place and, simultaneously, the entry of historicity into notions of life, language, and labor (Foucault 2005b: chapter 8).28 In this section, I will explain how the articulation of the organismic metaphor and the closely related emergence of bio-politics have historically gone hand in hand with opportunities for minority self-articulation.

In the police scientific rationality of the state, its welfare is primarily understood in terms of mechanical balance and cause and effect. Indeed, specific measures and regulations are regarded as directly affecting individuals and their behaviors. In their turn, these affects are considered as directly influencing the welfare of the entire state. Cameralism is generally preoccupied with ideas of balance, such as those between production and consumption and between a state’s internal and external order that have to guarantee ‘the balance of Europe’ that I discussed in chapter 2. The relationships between a state’s subjects, between them and the state, as well as between various European states are all largely modeled on the laws of mechanics. More in general and most importantly, the enlightened absolutist way in which the Habsburg Empire was governed in itself expresses the view that a state can be governed from the top down and from the outside, by an external power or force. Indeed, the police sciences start from the idea that the sovereign occupies a place above the state from which he could entirely oversee his reign—an idea that could be considered as a reinforcement of the Hobbesian notion of the state as an artificial man and of the Cartesian mechanistic perception of the human body (Cheah 2003).

However, as soon as individuals as well as groups of individuals are to be understood as embedded in a milieu that needs to be left untouched by direct interventions, and on which one can only act indirectly, the mechanistic metaphor of the state loses ground to an organismic one as the basis for how social spheres are organized. The reform of Habsburg enlightened rule as von Sonnenfels envisioned it implied imparting the state the capacity of a fundamental form of self-organization. In this conception, the modern state functions increasingly “like an organism conceived as a living system that must survive by means of its feedback mechanisms” (Deuber-Mankowsky 2008: 139). In the modern liberal conception of the state to which the organic idea of political organization would gradually lead, state institutions are not external, but entirely internal to the social body and, therefore, can no longer control it in its entirety. In Foucault’s reflection on the late-eighteenth-century transformations of the perception of population, he suggests that the milieu appears as a field of intervention in which, instead of affecting individuals as a set of legal subjects capable of voluntary actions—which would be the case of sovereignty—and instead of affecting them as a multiplicity of organisms, of bodies

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28 John Neubauer (1999) has convincingly argued that Foucault (2005b) tends to present these entries as relatively clear and homogeneous epistemological changes, rather than as unstable, polyphonic, and, thus, ambivalent processes of cultural and historical transformation.
capable of performances, and of required performances—as in discipline—one tries to affect, precisely, a population. I mean a multiplicity of individuals who are and fundamentally and essentially only exist biologically bound to the materiality within which they live. What one tries to reach through this milieu, is precisely the conjunction of a series of events produced by these individuals, populations, and groups, and quasi natural events which occur around them ... [In the various ways in which population starts to be problematized at the end of the eighteenth century] we see the sudden emergence of the problem of the ‘naturalness’ of the human species within an artificial milieu. (Foucault 2007b: 21-22)

The ‘naturalness’ of a population has several meanings, which all start from the assumption that a population can no longer be seen as something that is simply something out there, as a kind of primary datum that can be quantitatively extended—as most of the police scientists and Cameralists still believed. Rather, it needs to be understood as dependent on various variables, such as climate, material surroundings, commerce, the circulation of wealth, customs, habits, public opinion, moral and religious values, and the conditions of means of subsistence. These variables are not and cannot be transparent to the sovereign’s action and, therefore, to a very considerable extent escape “the sovereign’s voluntarist and direct action in the form of the law” (Foucault 2007b: 71). At another level, this naturalness is related to a notion of freedom, which we necessarily need to adopt to understand, for instance, the forms of disrespect that von Sonnenfels wanted to minimize (see the previous section). Following the spirit of his work, we could say that, in order to govern a state effectively, individuals need to be governed through a conception of freedom that at least enables those actions and behaviors that are considered as profitable for both them and the state (see also chapter 2). Finally, this naturalness of a population is linked to the entry of ‘nature’ into the field of governmental technologies of power—an entry that has become known in the context of Foucault’s concept of bio-power (chapter 1). A population becomes conceptualized as something ‘natural’ as soon as it is considered as a complex set of essentially infinite elements in which we can observe constants and regularities as if it is an organic whole that lives its own life. Here, we need to think of rates of birth and death, diseases, scarcity, fertility, longevity, and the like, as well as of the parallel birth of modern statistics, demography, medicine, etc., as the scientific disciplines that study and map these ‘natural’ phenomena. Thus, speaking about the vitality of a population or about a vital environment implies that a population and the processes by which it is governed are considered as developing according to their own dynamics as if this population and these processes are self-organizing and organic wholes, whose healthiness can only be influenced by acting on “a range of factors and elements that seem far removed from the population itself and its immediate behavior, fecundity, and desire to reproduce” (Foucault 2007b: 72).

Foucault relates the emergence of bio-politics in the eighteenth century to the simultaneous emergence of the modern social and human sciences as well as of what he has called their disciplinarization (2005b). These sciences gradually developed into several different disciplines or fields of study that increasingly started to focus on their own ‘well-demarcated’ objects of study, their internal relationships, and their own criteria of
selecting what could be qualified as relevant knowledge and what not. These developments are not only in partnership; they are also dependent on each other. The attempts at disciplining individual and collective bodies to make them productive and profitable come with the disciplinarization of various fields of knowledge. They start to study how human beings and the social, cultural, biological, and economic processes through which they are governed can be separately analyzed and developed. As I have discussed above, the problematization of population went hand in hand with a shift from sovereign transcendence to vital immanence. Simultaneously, a state’s direct governability was questioned. Similarly, the topicality of population starts to intervene in the novel fields of knowledge and their internal organization. Population now appears as a general category in newly emerging disciplines, such as political economy, biology, and historical and comparative philology and linguistics. In each of these fields of knowledge the organismic metaphor starts to largely determine the internal organization of the discipline and how their objects of knowledge are reproblematized (Foucault 2005b: chapter 8). Capital and the cumulative time of population and production are now conceived of as having their own internal dynamics, which are related to the specific economic climate in which they appear. Prefiguring the development of Darwinism, the human species, and organic forms of life in general are increasingly understood as evolving according to their own internal laws and regulations, which are dependent on the natural environment in which the organisms are embedded and ‘struggle for survival.’ Languages are no longer conceived as rooted in the things perceived, but in the active subjects that speak them. Analyses of the emerging social and human scientific disciplines in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries clarify that the historicizing of life, language, and labor as spheres that develop according to their own biological, linguistic, and economic rules and principles was not caused by, but led to the focus on the alleged origins of life, races, languages, scarcities, and needs:

it would be ... inadequate to attribute this [late-eighteenth-century and early-nineteenth-century] mutation to the discovery of hitherto unknown objects, such as the grammatical system of Sanskrit, or the relation between anatomical arrangements and organic functions in living beings, or the economic role of capital. And it would be no more accurate to imagine that general grammar became philology, natural history biology, and the analysis of wealth political economy, because all these modes of knowledge corrected their methods, came closer to their objects, rationalized their concepts, selected better models of formalization—in short, because they freed themselves from their prehistories through a sort of auto-analysis achieved by reason itself. What changed at the turn of the [eighteenth] century, and underwent an irremediable modification, was knowledge itself as an anterior and indivisible mode of being between the knowing subject and the object of knowledge. (Foucault 2005b: 274)

These complex developments are also related to how new kinds of knowledge formation and novel methods of comparison have led to the problematization and historicization of Gypsy groups in cultural, racial, linguistic, developmental, and territorial terms. The populationist turn at the end of the eighteenth century led, for the first time in Europe’s
history, to homogenizing ‘the Gypsies’ as a ‘minority’ in the modern sense of this word, and to problematizing them explicitly in terms of their government and self-government. Therefore, what we can call the emergence of the discipline of ‘Gypsy Studies’ represents neither, as Matras (1999) suggests, the discovery of the hitherto unknown Indian roots of the Romani languages, nor a necessarily better model of formalizing the relationship between the Romani languages, their origin, and the subjects that speak them. Rather, the materialization of the discipline of Gypsy Studies, as part of the more general articulation of new rationalities and technologies of power that took place at that time, represents the formation of new bodies of knowledge and expertise that enabled scholars and others to think of itinerant, marginal, non-white, and otherwise ‘non-fitting’ groups in new ways and problematize them in terms of origin, development, Europeanness, and the like. I will return to this theme at the end of this chapter.

From a more general point of view, we can say that, in the late eighteenth century, life was introduced into politics and has generated bio-politics, whereas historicity was simultaneously introduced into notions of economy, nature, and language in the respective forms of relatively autonomous economic laws, biological modes of evolution, and linguistic rules:

Just as the living organism manifests, by its inner coherence, the functions that it keeps alive, so language, in the whole architecture of its grammar, makes visible the fundamental will that keeps a whole people alive and gives it the power to speak a language belonging solely to itself. This means that the conditions of historicity of language are changed at once: its mutations no longer come from above (from the learned elite, from the small group of merchants and travelers, from victorious armies, from an invading aristocracy), but take their being obscurely from below, for language is neither an instrument nor a product—an ergon ... but a ceaseless activity—an energēia. (Foucault 2005b: 316, my emphasis)

The fact that the intrinsic logic of a language is no longer determined from above but from below expresses that it is not perceived as something that is conditioned by something that is external to language itself, but by something that organically regulates it from within. This change—in which we can also recognize the central idea behind various concepts of Bildung that emerged in German Enlightenment and Romantic thought—is related to another approach to language that, since the late eighteenth century, was going to determine the development of modern linguistics:

The birth of philology became possible when a series of investigations in different countries, particularly in Central Europe and also in Russia, for political reasons, succeeded in identifying the relationship between a population and a language, and in which, as a result, the problem was how in the course of history, and in terms of its specific regularities, not of the population, but of its language, the population, as collective subject, could transform the language it spoke. (Foucault 2007b: 78)

The political reasons for the birth of philology to which Foucault points have much to do with the political developments in the Habsburg Empire I discussed and with the more
general Enlightenment critiques of how different population groups were approached in the Russian and Habsburg empires. In chapter 3, we saw how critics of Enlightenment imperialism, such as Kant and Herder, called for the recognition of a kind of cultural difference that did not simply mobilize a reified, essentially unchangeable or mechanistic notion of culture. Rather, in these critiques culture and its Bildung are conceived as based on an irreducible mode of cultural agency. Human beings, as the bearers of culture, are seen as agents, who are not ‘mechanically’ determined by natural laws, but who are able to transform themselves and their surroundings (Muthu 2003: chapter 2). Language, and the notions of culture, Bildung, and nation more generally, appear as key concepts in attempts to articulate individual and collective forms of social organization that go beyond conceptions of human beings as merely determined by either natural laws or some irreducible and unchangeable origins. Hence, the way in which the organismic metaphor is articulated in the conceptualization of both population and nation plays a crucial role in the emergence of both bio-politics and a new understanding of the human subject and her ability to express herself ‘freely’:

Organic life qua organized matter [is seen] as an analogue of freedom and, therefore, as the paradigmatic metaphor for social organization and political life. [Instead of being merely] an ideological mystification, the organismic metaphor can be seen as fundamental to a new rational understanding of human action. (Cheah 2003: 5, 6)

I do not want to defend a concept of nation that expresses culture or a people genuinely or organically. Rather, I have argued that thinking in terms of nation, Bildung or culture is not only—and most of all not immediately and seamlessly—linked to cultural or political nationalisms and their legacies—as, among many others, Willems suggests (chapter 3). The organismic metaphor is inherent both to forms of cultural agency and forms of nationalism. This implies that the nation-form—and the concept of population more generally—has an ambivalent and not necessarily only negative character. The metaphor does not unavoidably and solely express itself in various forms of nationalism—for instance by means of the mystification and mythologizing of the true origin of a

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29 At the end of the eighteenth century, the exact meanings of terms such as culture, nation, Bildung, and Enlightenment were not yet clearly demarcated at all. In 1784, Moses Mendelsohn wrote that “the words ‘enlightenment’ [Aufklärung], ‘culture’ [Kultur], and ‘education’ [Bildung] are still newcomers to our language. At the present time they belong merely to the language of books. The common masses scarcely understand them … Linguistic usage, meanwhile, appears to want to make a distinction among these words which have similar meanings, but it has not yet had time to establish their borders. Education, culture and enlightenment are modifications of social life, effects of the hard work and efforts of human beings to improve their social condition” (1997: 313). For similar reasons, Foucault has suggested that we cannot yet frame the eighteenth-century emergence of the ‘nation’-form in terms of its historically somewhat later conflations with the state. Indeed, at this moment, “the nation is by no means something that is defined by its territorial unity, a definite political morphology, or its systematic subordination to some imperium. The nation has no frontiers, no definite system of power, and no State. The nation circulates behind frontiers and institutions” (Foucault 2004: 134). In the spirit of his late work, we can say that, while ‘national’ discourses and practices have emerged as heterogeneous forms of counter-conduct, these modes of conduct had gradually been governmentalized by the state and its apparatuses (in a similar way in which the Catholic Church had increasingly adapted the counter-conducts typical of the Reformation for the Church’s own ends at the times of the Counter Reformation).
people. Such interpretations underexpose how the same metaphor has also motivated practices of freedom and self-actualization, and a tradition of dissent and critique against imperialism and states’ attempts to regulate their (minority) populations bio-politically. In the next section, I will explain how we can read the work of the early ‘Gypsy scholar’ Rüdiger in this way.

Put somewhat differently, at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century population appears as an epistemological form that is articulated into two different yet interconnected directions: firstly, as a form of bio-politics that aims at, for instance, regulating minorities such as the Romani beyond but in constant inter-relationship with their juridico-territorial regulation. Secondly, population has been articulated as a historically and geographically specific form of human (inter)action that is based on cultural agency and that could (but does not necessarily) challenge forms of population regulation. Neither of these two forms of articulating population operates in a vacuum; they are mutually dependent, but, at the same time, cannot be reduced to each other. Perhaps we could even perceive these two forms as part of different kinds of repertoires:

From one direction, then, population is the human species, and from another it is what will be called the public ... The population is ... everything that extends from biological rootedness through the species up to the surface that gives one a hold provided by the public. From the species to the public; we have here a whole field of new realities in the sense that they are the pertinent elements for mechanisms of power, the pertinent space within which and regarding which one must act. (Foucault 2007b: 75)

In other words, population can be diversely articulated, and with different aims and effects. The public sphere is not just one of the spheres through which a state tries to govern its population, as in the practices of censorship under Habsburg enlightened absolutism (von Sonnenfels 1765-73; Ogris 2003) or in those of Richelieu’s publicistes, who were predecessors of modern election campaigners and employed to influence the public opinion in Richelieu’s favor. The public sphere, whether articulated as a people, a nation, or as civil society, is concomitantly a space in which individuals and collectives can criticize state action and challenge existing modes of governmentality. The emerging possibility to critique the dominant governmental reason in some individual or collective form not only implies that there are moral reasons for critiquing state practices, hence that we could adopt moral motivations to limit state action. It also and more importantly implies a kind of Kantian, yet non-transcendental critique according to which govern-

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30 My critique of a one-sided interpretation of the nation-form or population has affinity with Homi Bhabha’s articulation of the ambivalence of how ‘the nation’ has historically been addressed. As he puts forward “we ... have a contested conceptual territory where the nation’s people must be thought in double-time; the people are the historical ‘objects’ of a nationalist pedagogy, giving the discourse an authority that is based on the pre-given or constituted historical origin in the past; the people are also the ‘subjects’ of a process of signification that must erase any prior or originary presence of the nation-people to demonstrate the prodigious, living principles of the people as contemporaneity: as that sign of the present through which national life is redeemed and iterated as a reproductive process” (2004: 208-09, his emphasis).
mental reason is necessarily limited, because it cannot entirely know and, therefore, also
not directly govern its main target—the population.

THE EMERGENCE OF ‘GYPSEY STUDIES’ REVISITED

All atrocities that one once committed in state and religious prosecutions against
Jews, Christians, Waldenses or maroon Negroes, were brought together in the outrage
against the Gypsies [Zigeuner]. (Rüdiger 1782: 46, my translation)

In light of the relationships between the various developments that I have analyzed in
the current and previous chapters, we can finally reevaluate the works of the early Gyp-
sy scholars Grellmann and Rüdiger and their perception of the assimilative measures of
the Habsburg emperors. Rüdiger’s and Grellmann’s works on the Gypsies appeared at
almost the same time, in 1782 and 1783 respectively. Though every bio-graphy has its
own specificity and peculiarities, these works were written in more or less the same aca-
demic climate. They were influenced by and embedded in the same scientific traditions,
from the gradually ground-losing but still influential Cameralistic and police scientific
tradition to the developing modern human and social sciences with their preoccupation
with organismic representations and figures. Yet, it was possible for two authors to write
with very different outlooks. This becomes clear from the very first pages of their works.
Grellmann starts with the observation that the Gypsies “are a people of the orient and
have an oriental way of thinking” (1783: 3, my emphasis and translation). In his entire
study, he does not discuss at all whether they are who they seem to be. Rather, he
considers their way of appearance identical with how they and their culture basically
are: “every custom, every understanding, which has once become usual among them ... 
drags on endlessly” (ibid).

Rüdiger, on the other hand, opens his essay with questioning whether the Gypsies
really are who they seem to be. Indeed, he stipulates that “the Gypsies are today, accord-
ing to the way in which we see them traveling in front of our eyes ...” (1782: 37, my emphasis
and translation). This sentence continues with some of the contemporary stereotypical
Gypsy representations. In the way in which his contemporaries approached the Gypsies,
Rüdiger immediately points to matters of subjectivity, historicity, self-restriction, and
visualization. He questions how the Gypsies are perceived in his days, according to what
he calls the “costumes of the time and circumstances” and “our new-fashioned, arbitrary
constitutional and international law” (1782: 42, 41, my translation). Rüdiger also ex-
presses a sense of self-restriction. He suggests that the subjective perceptions of the
Gypsies of his days can only be based on a one-sided interrogation of ‘their culture.’ Both
from a scholarly and from a moral point of view, modesty is desirable and necessary for
we cannot pretend to know ‘their culture’ in its entirety.31

31 The expression of this self-restriction and modesty returns more explicitly in a scholarly context, when, at
the end of his essay, Rüdiger remarks that he can only speculate about the historical reasons for the
Gypsies’ migration to Europe: “I dare not give a more detailed description of the reasons that motivated
their migrations. However, I am, even without the use of supportive tools too much of an outsider to this particular
The difference between the two authors becomes even more pronounced, when they discuss contemporary imperial and states’ approaches to Gypsy groups. Grellmann praises the regulations of Maria Theresa and Joseph II to try turning the Gypsies into useful, productive, and good Catholic citizens. He perceives the imperial measures as in correspondence with the police scientifically rationale to aim at welfare and a healthy and extensive population. He criticizes the emperors’ predecessors—but implicitly also Maria Theresa’s early approach—to expel the Gypsies from the Habsburg territories as a hasty, unwise, and, most of all, an unprofitable decision. At this point, it helps quoting Grellmann at length, for it is in this context that he most clearly expresses his general point of view:

However, it was not only hastiness to expel [the Gypsies] directly from the country; it was also wasteful. Maybe it sounds surprising, but it is undeniable as long as the science of the state [Staatswissenschaft] tells that a bigger population would be better than a smaller one … In a Gypsy, as Gypsy, no state would really lose something; yet, it would profit by means of his estrangement [Entfernung], for then the state would remove the barrier, which so far blocked common welfare. Every human being has skills and strengths; the Gypsy, however, does not have these in the slightest. When he does not know how to obediently deal with them, the state has to teach and harness him until the aim has been achieved. Though the root of ruin [Wurzel des Verderbens] lays already too deep in the first generation to be eradicated from scratch, yet, from the second or third generation onward a continuous effort will be rewarded. Now, think of the Gypsy, when he has stopped being a Gypsy; think of him with his productiveness and his many descendants, who are all transformed into useful citizens; and one will feel how uneconomical it was to throw them away like trash … Neither expulsion from the country would one have to fix on this people, nor would one recommend discipline and galley slavery, but, rather, ensuring improvement of their reason and ensuring a better heart. (Grellmann 1783: 139-40, 141-42, my translation)

Grellmann comes to this conclusion after a long exposé of what he considers as the Gypsies’ habits, customs, laws, professions, rituals, religious practices, and their physical and moral abilities and disabilities. The reiteration of the same kind of Gypsy oriental characteristics, yet in different settings (social, cultural, economic, religious, habitual, historical, etc.), clearly guides his book toward a more extensive discussion of the danger and the possible usefulness of the Gypsies for the state. The transformation of the Gypsies implies nothing else than their full assimilation, which would finally lead to their entire disappearance. From the beginning of Grellmann’s book, it becomes clear that the Gypsies do not have the ability to transform themselves; it is only the state’s strict Gypsy majority government that could change and improve them into useful citizens. The ‘true Gypsy’ is unmistakably characterized by evil and immorality. ‘Gypsy-ness’ itself is the only reason for a Gypsy’s evilness and if it were to disappear, the ‘Gypsy problem’

field of history in general and will leave it therefore to the actual historians” (1782: 84, my emphasis; translation cited Matras 1999: 97).
would be automatically solved. The improvement of the Gypsies means making them completely profitable for the state, no matter what the internal consequences would or could be for the people involved. In order to make full assimilation possible and its successful implementation teachable, Grellmann perceives of them as potential ‘whiteys,’ only camouflaged by a persistent yet surmountable flavor of black filthiness.\textsuperscript{32}

Rüdiger, on the other hand, puts the Gypsies’ repeated displacement and repression by European majorities as well as the Gypsies’ slipping down into a ‘bad lifestyle’ firmly in the perspective of his critique of how the European imperial powers have dealt with population groups on the European continent and elsewhere in the world. He starts his essay with a sturdy condemnation of how the Jews have been treated domestically and how the European powers—from the Germans and the Spanish to the Dutch, the Russians, and the British—have often cooked up excuses for the expansion of their territories, religions, and lucrative forms of trade. Time and again, they found new ways to justify their indefensible colonial adventures, their predatory incursions, and their subjection or even erasure of entire peoples in parts of their countries or overseas colonies (Rüdiger 1782: 39-42). From the beginning of his analysis, Rüdiger is clearly not ‘in search of the true Gypsy,’ at least not in the way in which Willems (1997) interprets the title of his own book, namely as an attempt to clearly demarcate the Gypsies’ true nature. Conversely, Rüdiger tries to unravel how socio-cultural values and achievements that are perceived as universal are actually related not only to an enlightened society, but also to one that has cunningly suppressed how some of its ‘triumphs’ are achieved by heavily abusing its powers. For that reason, Rüdiger’s discourse of social and cultural transformation is in many respects different from Grellmann’s. When the former discusses the improvement of the Gypsies, he does not mean assimilation. Rather, he calls for the opportunity for Gypsies to be treated equally and to develop as a specific culture or nation in their own right.

Matras remarks that “at the center of [Rüdiger’s] essay is an appeal for the acceptance of the Gypsies as a nation in its own right and for a revision of society’s attitudes towards them” (1999: 92). Willems, on the other hand, suggests that Rüdiger ultimately does nothing else than depict the Gypsies as the last representatives of truly free natural humans. They have justified theft on the basis of rejecting the existence of private property and been marginalized because of this disdainful lifestyle and the final triumph of the law of the jungle—that is, of the majority (Willems 1997: 80). Admittedly, Rüdiger speaks of “strangers who live by their own laws of nature” (1782: 44, my translation and emphasis) and of a world of difference (himmelsweit entfernt) between their and our way of thinking, which has nonetheless been imposed upon theirs with disastrous consequences. Though Rüdiger certainly expresses a number of stereotypes, his suggestion that the Gypsies live closer to nature than others is, even in his own narrative, not without ambivalences. He presents this view while discussing past conflicts between the

\textsuperscript{32} Indeed, he puts forward that “experience … has proven that the Gypsy reproduces his dark color from generation to generation because of his education and lifestyle, rather than because he is born that way” (Grellmann 1783: 31, my translation). This perception of skin color is all the more remarkable in the light of Grellmann’s introductory remark that “Africa does not make [the Gypsies] blacker [and] Europe does not make them whiter” (1783: 1, my translation). Obviously, Grellmann makes them blacker and whiter at the same time.
Gypsies and majority societies. Therefore, he historicizes both the Gypsies’ and the majority’s culture, even though the former is still considered as ‘closer’ to nature. On further consideration, Rüdiger also adds a second layer to his explanation why we had “blackened [the Gypsies’] nature in an even more radical way than the color of their skin” (1782: 45, my translation). He puts forward that the effects of the imposition of ‘our’ principles on the Gypsies also needs to be seen in light of the recent transformation from natural law (Naturrechte) to Roman and papist law in ‘our’ society. Rüdiger expresses several stereotypes—not only about the Gypsies but also about a particular kind of original state of nature. Yet, in his essay many of these stereotypes are framed in the context of how the Gypsies have been treated by majority societies in Europe as well as in light of how these societies themselves have recently undergone a transformation from an allegedly more primitive to a supposedly more civilized world.

As a result, we need to be careful with interpreting Rüdiger’s cultural references as a one-dimensional juxtaposition between nature and culture, as Willems and Matras do. We need to be receptive to his rhetoric. More than once, he expresses the viewpoint that the Gypsies have historically slipped down into “a bad lifestyle” because they were rejected and continue to be excluded by the neighboring societies. In light of their radical rejection, he speaks of “hate against a people” (Volkshaß), “hate against a nation” (Nationalhaß) or a “nation’s contempt” (Nationalverachtung) (Rüdiger 1782: 49, 46, 48). His linkage of the Gypsies’ exclusion and their lifestyle is well illustrated when he remarks:

But does the demotion itself not cause [their bad lifestyle]? Do we ourselves not perpetuate the mistake and push them into this lifestyle out of necessity, while the contempt of this nation hinders their path to prosperity, to their political and moral improvement. (Rüdiger 1782: 48, my translation)

Part of the ambivalence of how Rüdiger represents the nature of the Gypsies and of majority societies is related to how he refers to them as nations. His essay is structured according to the ways in which several distinct nations—the Jewish nation, the German nation, and other ‘great European’ nations—have been able to ‘enlighten’ themselves. He shows how the ‘great European’ nations, by adopting systems of law and by defending their rights, territories, and religious convictions on an often-dubious basis, have all been transformed into strong nations. He also does not hesitate to add that, though these nations seem to believe that their achievements are based on the basis of moral superiority, strength or universality, in actual fact they have often been achieved by trampling on marginalized or minoritized groups and, thus, by cunning and the law of the jungle.

At the same time, the metaphor of a nation’s physical strength appears as something of the quality of nature and as a dynamics that is both inherent to this nation and affiliated with an organism. Indeed, the nature of the Gypsies or of any other nation is not something fixed or reified, but something that can be internally transformed into something else. This transformation takes place on the basis of its relatively autonomous

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33 Please, note how Rüdiger indirectly suggests, by comparing the blackening of the Gypsies’ nature with their skin color, that the relation between how they are perceived and their skin color is also dependent on the Zeitgeist—a world of difference with how Grellmann represents their physical appearance (see note 32).
ability to develop, reorganize, and internally strengthen its national ‘body,’ though always in interaction with other, neighboring nations. Thus, the way in which Rüdiger represents the nation and its ability to transform expresses many of the ambivalences that I have discussed while analyzing the relations between the organismic metaphor and the articulations of population and the nation-form. Put in this perspective, it is telling that Rüdiger models the possibility of the Gypsies’ national development on how other nations have already been able to transform themselves toward ‘enlightened adulthood.’ Rüdiger suggests that the age and development of a people could be compared to those of a human being. This comparison has important implications for the methods of scholarly analysis. Rüdiger remarks that

no [people] on earth has ever fully been able to prove its origins and history. Everything that even the most enlightened peoples have said about their origins and history has only been based on oral tradition, on dark legends about certain events jumbled up with fables. (Rüdiger 1782: 51, my translation)

Similar to how a human being does not know anything of her birth and needs to rely on others to get knowledge of it, historians can only study a people’s history on the basis of comparisons between various trajectories of nation-formation. Undoubtedly, with the metaphor of aging Rüdiger comes close to suggesting that we can distinguish more and less developed or enlightened peoples or nations. Yet, we need to perceive this comparison in relation to his critique of imperialism and his analysis of language. Though Rüdiger certainly and naïvely distinguishes between various degrees of cultural development, in his critique of imperialism he explains that we cannot reify, naturalize, or—even worse—justify these differences. Rather, we need to see them as the temporary outcomes of historical, contingent, and often-unfair circumstances and power relationships. These differences between cultures can certainly not be equated with impartially conceived degrees of civilization, of which some are superior to others. Rüdiger’s anti-imperialism implies a defense of a moral incommensurability of cultures or nations (chapter 3). Indeed, ‘we,’ with ‘our’ supposedly stable and universal values, cannot simply judge or reject other cultural norms and values on the basis of ours, for also our ‘own’ values are historically unstable and, thus, non-universalizable or imposable on other cultures.

At the same time, the unmasking of habits, customs, cultural values, and the like as unreliable and incompatible frames of reference leads Rüdiger to his focus on language. He remarks that, in spite of the Gypsies’ long-lasting marginalization and repression, and despite their long history of extensive interrelationships and hybridization with other cultures, customs, and languages, it is the Gypsies’ language in which we can find something that is typical of their nation. Regardless of all what has happened to them, they have still kept their language alive. Rüdiger does not consider language as something fixed or static, but as something that is vital and organically changing. He speaks of “the lively language of the Gypsies” (1782: 60, my translation). By means of his comparative method, he shows that we cannot distinguish a kind of absolute or ultimate origin of a people, but only the complex ways in which a people maintains, articulates, and also transforms its unifying activities. In these processes, language plays a vital role.
Comparing grammar, studying inflections of radicals and cases, formulating the laws of vowel gradation and consonantal changes—to put it briefly: the body of work that characterizes the emerging comparative, historical philology in the late-eighteenth century—profoundly changed the general perception of language. In many respects, Rüdiger pioneered in this development. In the end, his and his contemporary philologists’ comparative linguistic methods paved the way for the direct and lateral comparison of languages:

Direct, because it is no longer necessary to pass through pure representations of the absolutely primitive root; it is enough to study the modifications of the radical, the system of inflections, the series of variable terminations. Lateral, because the comparison does not reach back to the elements shared by all languages or to the representative stock upon which they draw; it is therefore not possible to relate a language to the form or the principles that render all languages possible; they must be grouped according to their formal proximity … Grammatical systems, since they lay down a certain number of laws of evolution and mutation, make it possible, up to a certain point, to fix the age-scale of a language; for such and such a form to be produced from a certain radical, such and such a transformation must have occurred … [W]hen two languages present analogous systems, one must be able to decide either that one of them is derived from the other, or that they have both issued from a third, from which they have each developed systems which are partly different and also partly analogous … [I]f there had not been a suspension of the [prevailing seventeenth and eighteenth-century] analysis of those endless derivations and limitless mixtures that general grammar perpetually presupposed, then language would never have been affected by an internal historicity. (Foucault 2005b: 317, 318, 319, my emphasis)

Rüdiger and the early representatives of modern comparative and historical philology did their research in a period of transition in which the basic terms and principles of their methods were only emerging. Their preoccupations with origins, though unquestionably mixed with some proto-modern articulations of nationalism, had much to do with the desire to reveal the internal and formal dynamics of a language. To some extent, the focus on formal and ‘horizontal’ comparisons between two or more languages implies a sense of perspective or, as Foucault puts it, a ‘suspension’ of the universal ambitions of any method that tries to dig for linguistic sources ‘vertically.’ In this respect, the obsession with origins that emerges in the eighteenth century embodies a deep ambivalence, according to which the stress on linguistic origins and a language’s organic development at the same time implies a retreat of its absolute origins. The focus on what Foucault calls the formal proximity of languages involves a gradual shift of attention from theories of an alleged correspondence between linguistic signs and their material representations (as if these could be the same in every language) to investigations of linguistic laws and regularities that are based on formal comparisons without an (allegedly) absolute point of reference. In other words and in line with my earlier observations, we can point to an important formal similarity between (1) the critique of governmental reason typical of then emerging forms of liberalism, (2) the kind of self-restriction that characterizes Rüdiger’s analysis of the Gypsies, and (3) the epistemologically relative,
rather than absolute, conditions under which languages can be compared. As I have argued right through this chapter, it would be inadequate to understand the newly emerging paradigms of comparative philology—and those of the comparative studies of economy, biology, and the like—primarily in terms of the developing “objectivity and originality in science” (Matras 1999: 91).34 Following my observations of the previous section, we need to understand the emerging narrative in which language is taken as the vital expression of an organically, self-articulating people as an ambivalent articulation of the epistemological figure of population. Rüdiger’s and Grellmann’s works clearly express how the ambivalent articulations of population can be considered as highly responsible for the emergence of Gypsy studies.

Willems and in his wake Lucassen and Cottaar consider Grellmann’s work as the more important of the two for its influential and notorious legacy. They interpret Rüdiger’s work as merely a representation of the same racist or nationalist discourse that Grellmann’s has introduced and prefigured. I share Matras’s opinion that we need to carefully differentiate between the Gypsy representations of both authors. The fact that Grellmann’s work became a kind of source book on the Gypsies in the course of the nineteenth century and that it has been referred to much more frequently than to Rüdiger’s, which fell into oblivion soon after its appearance, is in itself not yet a justification for the overrepresentation of analyses of the work of the former in the historiography on Romani groups. For sure, it is no corroboration for reducing Rüdiger’s main theoretical and moral points and ambivalences to the often-straightforward racist or proto-racist discourse of his contemporary Grellmann—as Willems does. Quite the reverse, it is an important reason for carefully investigating the ambivalences out of which Gypsy studies could emerge and for analyzing the grounds on which Rüdiger’s work and what it represents could have been forgotten so easily.

In his Über den Begriff der Geschichte (Theses on the Concept of History), the philosopher Walter Benjamin (1974) suggests that those in power usually write history and that, consequently, history writing always risks overemphasizing the histories of the ‘winners’ and to understate those of the ‘losers.’ Therefore, he puts forward, we need to look for a way of history writing in which we avoid to rearticulate the dominant voices and in which we give space and voice to those who do not automatically fit with or are even harshly excluded from our prevailing historical narratives.35 We can consider this view as a call for a genealogical approach to history according to which we show that, in the context of the previous and the current chapter, our general understanding of the emergence of Gypsy studies needs to be contested and reconsidered. In this chapter, I have shown that a reconsideration of how Gypsy studies (could have) emerged seriously complicates the most widespread representations thereof in the historiography.

34 Consequently, we can also not maintain that Rüdiger has subordinated the historically variable features of Gypsy culture “to the objective discussion of language” (Matras 1999: 92, my emphasis).
35 Benjamin’s view on the necessity to represent minor voices in history writing did not keep him from suggesting that the Habsburg Emperor Joseph II was the first in European history, who took into account “to improve the Gypsies with human means” (1985: 106, my translation). For a critical analysis of forms of anti-Gypsyism in the philosophy of the Frankfurter Schule (Adorno in particular), see End (2009).
CONCLUSION

At the end of this chapter, the reader may ask: Didn’t we simply dig for yet another source? Isn’t the current analysis just a way to express that we need to be receptive to yet another significant eighteenth-century tradition with which the then emergent Gypsy studies were strongly intermingled? To some extent, the answer to these questions is yes. The tradition of Cameralism and the police sciences played a profound role in the early history of Gypsy studies and has hitherto been underexposed in the historiography. A consideration of the eighteenth-century preoccupation, if not obsession, with population and the techniques to regulate it notably contributes to our understanding of how the Gypsies could have become the subject and object of something that we, from a contemporary point of view, can call Romani minority governance. To a large extent, the Roma’s contemporary minoritization in Europe can be related to the eighteenth-century preoccupation with population, the gradual transformation of the attempts to govern it, as well as the long legacy of liberal, bio-political forms of population regulation that have not yet come to an end.

However, my analysis of the eighteenth century has not simply been a way to trace yet another important ‘root’ or ‘origin’ of Romani minority governance in Europe. Rather, it has been a way to show that the emergence of Romani minority governance in Europe has ambivalently yet undeniably gone together with prospects for Romani minority self-articulation that, so far, have been widely unnoticed. Usually, the first large-scale attempts at assimilating Romani groups, exemplified by the Gypsy regulations taken by Habsburg absolutist rulers, have been interpreted in light of the rising centralization and institutionalization of forms of direct rule. The simultaneous emergence of Gypsy studies in the Prussian academic world has accordingly been perceived as compliant with, on the one hand, early forms of nation-state formation, nationalism or even racism, or, on the other, with the crystallization of modern, objective scientific methods of analysis. This artificial juxtaposition has gone together with opposing the suggestion that, since the emergence of Gypsy studies, Romani groups have been stigmatized and marginalized, against the suggestion that this emergence has enabled Romani groups to articulate themselves as ethnic groups in their own right. I have argued that, at a second order of analysis, either perception of the emergence of Gypsy studies and their legacy is still preoccupied with origins. Indeed, the defenders of the former position in the debate, the representatives of the Dutch School in particular, argue that every articulation of Romani ethnicity implies a rearticulation of the essentially nationalist and racist paradigm that inevitably went together with the emergence of Gypsy studies. Though the representatives of the Dutch School accurately argue that notions of culture, Bildung, and nation highly ‘contaminated’ this emergence, their conclusion that, therefore, Romani ethnicity is a ‘deathtrap’ is far too rigid. The representatives of the Dutch School do not reflect enough on the important way in which this contamination has historically been related to twofold articulations of population, from those related to forms of nationalism and racism to those related to historically specific notions of freedom and minority self-articulation. The importance of the investigation and influence of this double and, thus, ambivalent articulation of population, finally, is also absent in Matras’s analysis of the supposedly objective scientific methods that
emerged in the late-eighteenth century. His analysis presupposes that we can analyze the appearance of Romani linguistics, and Gypsy Studies more generally, without investigating the relation between the emergent problematization of the Gypsies in terms of their origins and the overall changes in the then contemporary epistemological and governmental paradigms.

The duality of articulating population is historically closely tied to how the police scientific governmental attempts to govern a population directly and in its entirety were increasingly problematized in the eighteenth century. The distopian dream of a totally administered society vanished as soon as the means to regulate parts of the population increasingly started to be at odds with the rationales of total control and direct rule. The analysis of this development has far-reaching consequences for the suggestion, including that of the Dutch School, that state actions toward Romani groups after Grellmann have been carried out on the basis of scientific Gypsy stigmatizations. State-institutional and scientific practices and discourses have hitherto largely influenced the marginalization of Gypsy groups. Yet, the simultaneous appearance and displacement of direct rule have also enabled forms of critiquing their bio-politicization.

I started chapter 3 with a consideration of Appadurai’s proposal to carefully look at the circumstances under which minorities and majorities have historically and reciprocally been formed. According to him, such an interrogation contests the idea that minority groups themselves produce the conflicts in which they are involved. He explains why many manifestations of violence against minorities are related to the complex, reciprocal processes of minoritization and majoritization themselves. Polemically, he has put forward that “violence ... requires minorities,” that is, practices of minoritization (Appadurai 2006: 46). In chapters 3 and 4, I genealogically embedded the early history of Gypsy studies in a parallel history of shifting forms of population regulation. I argued that we need to examine the eighteenth-century emergence of Gypsy studies in relation to the development of new power relationships and new bodies of knowledge. My investigation of the history of Gypsy studies has revealed that their emergence needs to be considered as more ambivalent and less homogeneous than the prevailing historiographies suggest. My analysis has clarified that, in a genealogy of Romani studies, we need to incorporate an interrogation of the conditions of possibility of the Gypsy/Roma problematization in terms of origin, culture, development, minority, and Europeanness. My examination of the governmental and epistemological paradigms developed at the end of the eighteenth century has shown that the ways in which the Gypsies could be represented changed and were differently demarcated than before that time. To be sure, my analysis does not imply that ‘Gypsy-related’ practices of agency or forms of population regulation did not exist prior to the late-eighteenth century (Fricke 1991; 1996b; Lucassen 1996; Härter 2003; Bogdal 2011). Rather, I have argued that, since then, the emergent forms of conducting minoritized groups and their conduct have been based on other, or at least shifting epistemological and governmental parameters.

Walking in the footsteps of Foucault, Appadurai does not go back to the period of nation state-formation to say something about those days, but, rather, writes a history of the present. He unravels the relations between globalizing socioeconomic, political, and cultural orders, the endangered position of various kinds of minorities in the world, and attempts to challenge violations of minority rights and cultures. Similarly, I suggest that,
to understand the situation of Romani minorities in contemporary Europe, including violence toward them and efforts to challenge hostility, requires that we take into consideration the complex relationship between historicity, governmentality, and minority formation that I have addressed in this part of this study. As I will discuss in the following chapters, we have recently been able to notice the emergence of the problematization of the Roma in terms of a European minority. We can observe a Europeanization of Roma representations and self-representations. In this chapter, I have analyzed how the eighteenth-century development of new bodies of knowledge and of new forms of governmentality inaugurated both Gypsy studies and the problematization of Gypsies in terms of minorities. Likewise, writing the post-1989 history of the present requires an interrogation of the relation between the representation of the Roma as a European minority, new form of knowledge formation, and recently emerged forms of European governance. Unraveling this complex relation is the main challenge of the third part of this study.
Part III

Placing, Scaling, and Timing the Roma in the New Europe
Chapter 5

The Europeanization of the Roma and Neo-liberal Governmentality after 1989

INTRODUCTION

Lacking a territory or government of their own ... the Roma today are in many ways Europe’s quintessential minority. (Goldston 2002: 147)

In the aftermath of the fall of communism in Central and Eastern Europe, we have been able to notice the emergence of a profoundly new way to problematize Gypsy or Romani groups: as a European minority. In the second part of this study, I analyzed how, in the eighteenth century, for the first time in Europe’s history Gypsy or Romani groups were explicitly problematized in minority terms. I showed that this problematization emerged alongside new forms of governmentality and knowledge formation. In the present, third part of this study, I will argue that the current Roma problematization as a European minority has gone together with the emergence of new kinds of governmentality and with new modes and sites of knowledge formation. I will analyze the complex nexus of these three phenomena and their relations to the will to change the situation of Europe’s Roma. In chapters 7 and 8, I will focus on the link between this threefold nexus and the emergence of a heterogeneous, Europe-wide Romani social and civil movement. The present chapter has three aims. First, it clarifies how we are to understand the Europeanization of Romani minority representation. Second, this chapter elucidates why and how we can understand the newly emerged forms of governmentality as neo-liberal. Third, this chapter delineates how the Roma have emerged at Europe’s institutional horizon and have become the target of a huge variety of development programs.

In this chapter, I will explain that the newly emerged forms of governmentality can be regarded as neo-liberal. I understand neo-liberalism primarily as a constructivist project that aims at extending market relationships and enterprise models to the entire social domain, including that of the state, civil society, and the self. My analysis of neo-liberalism as a specific form of governmentality differs from two of the most prevailing interpretations of neo-liberalism. First, it differs from those who interpret neo-liberalism as a set of policies that aim at the ‘rolling back’ of the state from traditional areas of intervention through measures of deregulation, privatization, and ‘marketization.’ Those who view neo-liberalism as a policy framework usually consider neo-liberalism as an imperative of representatives of the New Right. They would have effectively mobilized their
political ideas of laissez faire, a reduced, minimal government, and freedom of choice to transform societies, develop new ways and instruments of capital accumulation, and, by so doing, reinforce their own power position (eg, Harvey 2005). This view of neo-liberalism often relates the emergence of a ‘neo-liberal world order’ to the ideas of neo-classical schools of economics, represented by theoreticians such as Friedrich von Hayek, Milton Friedman, Theodore Schultz, and Gary Becker. This view of neo-liberalism identifies it with the names of those world leaders who are considered as responsible for the ‘neo-liberal turn’ (Thatcher, Reagan, etc.) as well as with the names of related reform movements and key economic institutions, such as the Washington and post-Washington Consensus, and the World Bank and the IMF (Fine 2001).

My analysis of neo-liberalism as a form of governmentality also differs from those who understand neo-liberalism as an ideology. Proponents of this view usually consider neo-liberalism not simply as a set of ideas of the New Right, brought successfully into practice and imposed on ‘the powerless’ to maintain or augment the class positions of ‘the powerful.’ Rather, these proponents conceive of neo-liberalism as a set of discourses and practices that are disseminated through the entire social body to produce and reproduce subject positions that are supportive of the extension of market relationships to various social domains. Neo-liberalism as ideology, thus, does not dismiss the attractiveness of neo-liberal ideas and practices for, for instance, working and middle classes. Rather, this view of neo-liberalism tries to explain it in terms of processes through which individual and group identities are transformed in such a way that people (tend to) consent with the neo-liberal ideology. Gramscian ideas of hegemony might also be included into this view of neo-liberalism to explain that complex processes of struggle and contestation are involved in the ways in which the new, neo-liberal ideology has now been consolidated in various parts of the world, if not globally (eg, Hall 1988).

My emphasis on neo-liberalism as a constructivist project and on the significance of a topological reading of power relations (chapter 1) has two important implications for an analysis of neo-liberalism. Firstly, the view of neo-liberalism as governmentality calls into question the way in which the other two interpretations consider neo-liberalism as something that has been devolved downward and outward from the ‘neo-liberal heartlands’ (the US, the UK) or from global IGOs (the EU, the World Bank, the IMF, etc.) to other places in the world or to specific regions in the global south or Central and Eastern Europe (Larner 2003; Castree 2006). Neo-liberalism as policy framework or ideology does not adequately address the uneven ways in which neo-liberalism has been articulated around the globe. These two views tend to overlook how processes of neoliberalization are always cross-fertilized and assembled with other than neo-liberal relations, cultures, instruments, and discourses (Ong 2006; Li 2007a). Furthermore, other actors in diverse parts around the globe, including Central and Eastern Europe, have developed their own neo-liberal projects vis-à-vis their economies, bureaucracies, and populations (Stenning et al 2010). Thus, views that put neo-liberalism down to Western powers and influential IGOs or INGOs too easily assume a division between active, initiating Western authors of neo-liberal discourses, doctrines, or policies, and passive, non-Western recipients, who would merely reproduce or imitate what has been developed elsewhere (Bockman and Eyal 2002). I will show that a consideration of neo-liberalism as governmentality helps to shed light on such uneven and ‘indigenous’ articulations over space.
and on transformations in governance that the views as policy framework or ideology tend to fail to notice. While, in this chapter, I will discuss how we can theoretically understand neo-liberalism as governmentality, in the chapters 6 and 7 I will focus on how neo-liberalism’s unevenness and indigenousness look like when we confront my alternative reading with the present-day situation of the Roma in Central and Eastern Europe.

In this chapter, I mobilize the interpretation of neo-liberalism as governmentality to shed another light on the emergence of Europe-wide programs aimed at developing the situation of Romani minorities. Usually, the will to develop the Roma’s situation is explained in terms of how, since the fall of communism, they have become a human rights and a security issue. The Roma’s rights have been violated and they have been discriminated. Hence, as the argument usually goes, since the early 1990s they have become a human and minority rights issue. The Roma have also become the ‘greatest losers’ of the transition. They have massively become unemployed. They have been displaced and forced to look for other means of support at home or elsewhere. Hence, they have become a social, human, or public security issue. Indeed, as the argument goes, after the fall of communism many Roma have started to live on state benefits. Some have entered a situation of frequent or even constant starvation and have, therefore, become the target of bio-political programs focusing on guaranteeing human security. Yet others—such as those who have migrated or asked for asylum elsewhere—have (increasingly) become a central topic of public order in the political debate about post-1989 migration. Starting from such analyses, the will to turning the tide for Europe’s Roma is explained in terms of the aim to improve their rights position, to reduce their reliance on systems of social security, to combat their poverty, to improve their self-sustainability, and to avoid that they need to travel elsewhere to look for a better life. This is all true and I confirm that these transformations have taken place in post-1989 Europe, as well as that the Roma have become human rights and security issues.

What my view of Europe in terms of shifting and intersecting governmentalities helps to explain, though, is that the ‘human rights’ and ‘security’ dimensions of the current approaches have also changed as a result of newly emerged tools, discourses, and patterns of European governance. In this chapter, I will map how the emergence of neo-liberal forms of governmentality has gone together with significant configurations of European governance. I will focus on the question of how the changes within the structures, approaches, and practices of governance of influential IGOs and NGOs did allow them to incorporate ‘the Roma’ in their policies, mandates, and visions in the way they did. I will suggest that the recently emerged policy approaches of these organizations—from social inclusion and good governance to human security and human development—can be seen in light of emergent neo-liberal governmental technologies. This does not imply that these policies or the governance agendas in which they are incorporated are fully ‘neo-liberal,’ but that they have influentially been assembled with neo-liberal technologies of governing and resulted into another view of issues of security, development, and human rights.
In the early 1990s, shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Council of Europe was one of the first institutions that started to discuss the Roma in terms of a European minority. In a policy document on the supposed ‘Europeanness’ of the Roma, the Council claims:

A special place among the minorities [of Europe] is reserved for the Gypsies. Living scattered all over Europe, not having a country to call their own, they are a true European minority, but one that does not fit into the definitions of national or linguistic minorities. As a non-territorial minority, the Gypsies greatly contribute to the cultural diversity of Europe. In different parts of Europe they contribute in different ways, be it by language and music or by their trades and crafts. With central and east European countries now member states [of the Council of Europe], the number of Gypsies living in the area of the Council of Europe has increased drastically. (CoE 1993: §2-4 cited Danbakli 2001: 146)

The Council of Europe included Gypsy or Roma-related issues in its policy agendas much earlier than 1993. The Council’s first discussions of the situation of ‘nomads,’ ‘populations of nomadic origin,’ and ‘Gypsies and other travelers in Europe’ goes back to the late 1960s (CoE 1969; 1975; 1981). The first proposals to recognize the Roma as an ethnic minority group in Europe also date from before the fall of communism (CoE 1983). Yet, discussing them explicitly in terms of a European minority and developing large-scale European programs and monitor mechanisms to deal with Romani minorities happened for the first time in the early 1990s. Similarly, the Roma’s representation as a European minority has increasingly appeared in the discourses of EU institutions and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In 1996, for instance, the European Commission called a roundtable meeting under the title “the Roma: a truly European people” (EC 1996a). In 1993, the EU declared that the protection of minority cultures and respect for their rights was one of the accession criteria that countries needed to meet if they wanted to join the Union. Since the publication of its first reports on progress towards EU accession in 1998, the European Commission has explicitly discussed and monitored the protection of minorities, and of the Romani in particular, in EU candidate member states in Eastern and Central Europe. In addition, since 2005, the European Parliament has explicitly called on the European Commission and the EU member states to consider recognizing the Roma as a European minority (EP 2005b; 2006; 2008; see also EC 2008c; EC 2010b).

In the early 1990s, both the Council of Europe and the OSCE (then still the CSCE) published overview reports on the situation of the Roma in Europe (van der Stoel 1993; 2000; Verspaget 1995) and developed special bodies within their institutions to deal with Romani issues. The OSCE, for instance, established the Contact Point for Roma and Sinti Issues (CPRSI) within its Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in 1994. The OSCE also created the position of Adviser on Roma and Sinti Issues and adopted the so-called Action Plan on Improving the Situation of Roma and Sinti within the OSCE Area (OSCE 2003; 2008). The Council of Europe appointed a Coordinator for Roma Issues in 1994, established the Specialist Group on Roma, Gypsies and Travellers
in 1995,1 and initiated the European Roma and Travellers Forum (ERTF) in 2004. Since the beginning of the new millennium, the Roma in Europe have also come under the attention of other IGOs, the World Bank and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in particular.2

The discussion of the Roma in terms of a European minority has not been limited to the domain of IGOs. To various degrees, diverse NGOs, such as the Open Society Institute, the European Roma Rights Centre, Minority Rights Group International, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and the European Centre for Minority Issues have also contributed to this tendency. These NGOs have also formed alliances with Romani associations, such as the European Roma Information Office (ERIO) and the European Roma Grassroots Organizations network (ERGO). More recently, they have jointly mobilized themselves in the context of transnational activist and advocacy networks, most notably the EU Roma Policy Coalition.3 This coalition, for instance, has called for the development of a coherent EU Roma policy within EU institutions and continued to lobby at the European institutional level to achieve this aim. Their attempts could be considered as yet another example of how agencies have increasingly discussed the Roma in the European context.

Last but not least, we have been able to notice similar trends to discuss the Roma in terms of a European minority in the media and academia. The number of newspaper articles, different kinds of documentaries, and web pages that have started to discuss the Roma in the European context has increased exponentially. In the study of Romani groups, we have also been able to notice a tendency to break with the state-centric or area studies focus that dominated until the late 1990s and, instead, discuss Roma-related issues in the context of their (contested) relationship to 'Europe.'4

To cut a long story short, since the early 1990s international governing organizations, alongside Romani groups in many countries, governmental and non-governmental organizations, scholars, and various media have increasingly represented the Roma as a European minority. This is a unique case, as no other minority has recently become the explicit target of such processes of Europeanization. At the same time, the Roma’s Europeanization marks a new phase in the history of their representation.5 Indeed, during the Enlightenment, nineteenth and early twentieth century processes of nation state formation, and under Nazism and communism, the Roma and their cultures were often con-

1 The specialist group was later renamed MS-G-ROM.
3 See ERPC (2008a; 2008b; 2008c). I will discuss the significance of the transnational Romani activist and Roma advocacy networks in chapter 7.
5 The Roma had gradually become an object of Cold War European policy formations. Yet, in that period European institutions considered the challenge of ‘Roma-related problems’ primarily a responsibility of their member states and did not develop large-scale supranational programs that specifically addressed the Roma (Simhandl 2006).
sidered as non-European, alien, and barriers to ‘progress’ and ‘civilization’ in Europe (chapters 3, 4). How are we to understand the current Europeanization?

**Concepts and practices of Europeanization**

There circulate many different understandings of Europeanization in the literature on Europeanization. A dominant approach characterizes it as “how national political structures, political actors, policy processes and policies are increasingly orientating, or are being oriented, in a European direction” (Nugent 2003: 442). Similarly, Europeanization has been conceptualized as comprising “a redirection of policies and/or practices and/or preferences in the domestic arena towards those advanced by dominant EU level actors/institutions” (Bache 2003: 2). According to this widely accepted conceptualization, Europeanization is primarily understood as the impact of supranational, European institutions—often equated with the EU—on national social, economic, political, and cultural life and its consequent transformation.

However, as particularly political geographers have emphasized, this concept of Europeanization tends to reify political or institutional scale (eg. EU vs. member states) and to neglect the ways in which different ‘politics of scaling’ contribute to reinforcing or diminishing the authority of the involved governing agencies. Here, politics of scaling refers to various strategies and related instruments that are mobilized to attempt to govern and address something at a particular (contested and contestable) level and to produce and reproduce certain territories (regions, states, cities, communities) as governable spaces (Brenner 2001; Guarnini 2006). Reflecting upon the trend to assume, on the one hand, a political site where Europeanization has been produced (EU institutions) and, on the other, domestic political sites that, as a result of Europeanization, have been radically transformed, Clark and Jones put forward:

> The EU’s depiction as the *sui generis* originator of Europeanization tends to overlook the centrality of territorial sites of authority and power (that is, nation-state sovereignties) in the Union’s establishment … Europeanization does not just take place, but also originates within member-states. (Clark and Jones 2009: 195)

An example from the Czech Republic concerning the Europeanization of Roma representation substantiates Clark and Jones’s argument. In the late 1990s, the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs financed a conference organized by the Czech Institute for International Relations under the title “The Roma Community and Multi-Ethnicity in the Countries of Central Europe—A European Problem?” (see Vermeersch 2003: 894-95) In his contribution to the conference, Martin Palouš, the then Czech deputy minister of foreign affairs, put forward:

> As the title of the conference reveals, it [the Roma issue] is an all-European problem … We must always bear in mind that the successful solution of our domestic

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difficulties as regards the integration of the Romani ethnic group will to a large extent be inseparable from these broader links. (Palouš 1998: 11-12)

According to Palouš, it is particularly the *European* character of the Roma's identity that necessitates addressing the 'Roma problem' primarily at the European level and in the European context:

If the Roma are the most European nation, then the reason could well be that they hold up a kind of specific mirror to Europe in which Europe can see itself, and where they can expect from European institutions a little bit more than other European nations which have their own European states and enter the process of European integration precisely in the light of their experience. (Palouš 1998: 16)

A few years later, the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs explicitly mobilized the concept of Europeanization to challenge recurrent accusations at the address of the Czech Republic regarding racism against its national Romani minority and to shift the primary responsibility to improve their situation to international and European agencies:

[The first aim of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should be the] promotion of the concept of the Europeanization of the Romani problematic on all levels of Czech foreign policy. We understand Europeanization here, as to grasp the Romani issue as an affair which concerns every European state where a Romani minority lives today. From this follows also the will to seek a solution for the Romani issue at the international/European level, and this includes a financial safeguard for such a solution. (GCR 2000: 15, English translation cited Vermeersch 2003: 895, my italics)

As this Czech case illustrates, Europeanization also takes place at the level of state-related institutions and has been mobilized to reinforce or renew state-related strategies to discuss, rescale, or even displace Roma-related issues. Thus, approaches that conceptualize Europeanization primarily in terms of the impact of the EU on domestic issues structurally overlook the strategic capacity of state-related agencies to develop and articulate constructions of Europeanization supportive of their own aims. Moreover, the Europeanization of Roma representation has not been reserved to EU and state-related institutions, but has been articulated at various sites and by diverse social agents to achieve different overlapping, mutually strengthening, or even contradictory aims. Put differently and more generally, we need to acknowledge the 'situated-ness' of Europeanization, recognize that it is an effect of practices located in place and time and, thus,

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7 States are often involved in different politics of scaling at the same time. Whereas Czech governmental officials, for instance, have called for the Europeanization of the Roma issue to transfer state responsibilities to European authorities, they have also suggested that the EU is not allowed to interfere in what they consider 'their own internal affairs.' The latter happened, for instance, when the EU criticized the 1993 Czech citizenship law and its negative effects on Czech Roma (Nedelsky 2003). It also happened when the EU called on the Czech authorities to recognize more adequately the Roma Holocaust by removing a pig farm situated on the site of a former Nazi concentration camp for the Roma (see chapter 8).
avoid assuming “an underlying common process that [only] manifests itself differently in different contexts” (Larner and Walters 2004: 506).

As the Czech example also illustrates, the Europeanization of Roma representation is related to strategies to govern Roma-related issues in specific ways and directions and, thus, to the development of new discourses and techniques to govern the Roma and rearticulate their identities. Developing and (re)assembling particular discursive and technical instruments make the Roma governable and identifiable in certain ways. Accordingly, I understand Europeanization as a form of governmentality. Approaching Europeanization from this angle can clarify how ‘Europe’—as an emergent global region with contested and contestable territorial, political, cultural, economic, and social boundaries—has been made ‘real.’ This understanding of Europeanization helps to illuminate how institutions such as the EU have been naturalized as authoritative centers of global governance, where endeavors to guarantee the security and welfare of its heterogeneous population are increasingly addressed at the European level.

When I discussed the state’s governmentalization, I explained that the state can be understood neither as a universal or master category of political organization, nor as an autonomous source or center of power (chapter 1). Rather, the historically variable ways in which states have gradually been governmentalized show how they have been the mobile effects of a variety of dispersed technologies of power, enacted by various kinds of agencies. At the same time, it has been the state’s governmentalization that has contributed to its authorization as a crucial center of power. Seen from this angle, it has been the state’s governmentalization that “has allowed the state to survive” (Foucault 2007b: 109) as such an authoritative center. Similarly, the focus on Europe from the angle of its governmentalization de-naturalizes ‘Europe’ as a pre-existing category—a culture, a civilization, a geographical location, an economic region, a supranational institution—and understands it as a historically and spatially specific artifact of representations, histories, memories, and geographies. Policy makers, bureaucrats, academics, and activists have all contributed to producing knowledge about Europe and its alleged populations. The diverse discourses and tools that they have developed have turned ‘Europe’ into something ‘real.’ The analysis of these processes helps to unravel the new forms of European government that have recently emerged (see also Larner and Walters 2002; Walters and Haahr 2005). Let me now turn to how such discourses and tools have recently been developed with regard to the Roma.

New centers of expertise and knowledge formation
One of the most remarkable things of post-1989 involvements with the Roma is that knowledge and expertise about them, their status, and their situation has increasingly been produced at newly created bodies and within new and reshaped organizational and institutional forms and structures. Reports on the situation of the Roma, for instance, were also written before 1989 (Liégeois 1987), but both their number and the diversity of agencies who produce such reports have rapidly increased since the mid 1990s. Human rights organizations, NGOs, European institutions, international organizations, Romani self-organizations, private foundations, and state-related bodies have all produced reports and other documents about the Roma’s situation. Some of these centers of expertise and knowledge production are entirely new, such as the OSCE’s Contact Point for Roma
and Sinti Issues (1994), the Council of Europe’s Specialist Group on Roma, Gypsies and Travellers (1995), the European Roma and Travellers Forum (2004), the EURoma network (2007), and the European Platform for Roma Inclusion, launched by the European Commission in 2009. Others, such as diverse kinds of Romani community and cultural centers and, more generally, the entire Roma-related NGO sector did only exist rudimentarily before 1989—if they did at all—and have mushroomed since then.

Consequently, we need to reflect upon what it means that the Roma have come to be a concern of so many NGOs and IGOs. State-related institutions—such as ministries, planning offices, municipalities, universities, and police authorities—have continued to be sites of Roma-related knowledge and data production. Yet, this production has been multiplied since the mid 1990s and significantly been extended into the direction of IGOs and NGOs, including Romani self-organizations and networks. These changes have resulted in the radical increase of the number of actors who deal with the Roma. They have also, and more importantly, resulted in new forms of knowledge and in the re-articulation of Romani identities (see also chapters 6, 7, 8). Indeed, information “is not the outcome of a neutral recording function. It is itself a way of acting upon the real, a way of devising techniques for inscription in such a way as to make the domain in question susceptible to evaluation, calculation, and intervention” (Miller and Rose 2008: 66). Roma-related issues—their health, education, housing, integration, segregation, discrimination, rights, cultures, life expectancies, etc.—are increasingly discussed in a European context. These debates are inherently related to how the Roma are targeted for, for instance, ‘social inclusion’ in EU policies, ‘human development’ in UN programs, ‘activation’ policies in World Bank approaches, ‘grassroots empowerment’ in NGO projects, and ‘community policing’ in OSCE policies.

When, in the eighteenth century, statistics emerged as a scientific discipline—initially as ‘the science of the state’—this appearance went together with the first modern, large-scale mapping of allegedly ‘non-fitting’ Romani and Jewish minorities. The Habsburg censuses on the Roma, for instance, were no passive, neutral forms of data collection, but active contributions to new ways to approach the Roma, identify them, and make minority self-articulations as well as interventions in their lives possible at all (chapter 4). Akin to how these information technologies and bodies of knowledge and expertise have rendered minorities classifiable and manageable at state levels and contributed to the state’s governmentality, emergent transnational tools render the Roma manageable at the transnational, European level and contribute to Europe’s governmentality. Tools such as the EU’s Euro-barometers (EC 2008a) or the UNDP’s Roma human development

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8 The European Commission emphasizes that this Platform is not a new body: “The Platform is … a process and not a new body which could replace European Union or international decision making bodies … Rationale of the Platform is to make the existing parallel policy processes at European and international level more coherent” (EC 2010b: 5) and “to create synergies” (ibid 28). “The Platform is not only a place for inter-governmental and international cooperation, but regards civil society as a constitutive element” (ibid 28). At the same time, “the Platform is not a place for decision-making, but it can help to identify the best solutions for problems. It can, thus, prepare the ground that the decision making bodies at EU, national and international levels make their choices” (ibid 29, my italics).

indices (2002) are no non-political, neutral tools to measure specific states of affairs, but active contributions to the Roma’s Europeanization. The UNDP, for instance, has been very clear about how it perceives the relationship between what it considers as assistance to the Roma in Europe and the development of new data:

"Developing policies to assist the Roma requires access to reliable data. But comparative statistical information on the Roma in Central and Eastern Europe has been lacking. Consequently, policymakers so far have relied primarily on qualitative rather than quantitative information. In some cases, statistics were available for some countries, but the data sets did not cover all countries in the region and were therefore not comparable or standardized ... This study seeks to provide national and international policy makers, academics and representatives of civil society with accurate, reliable, and comparative data, which are necessary to design and implement sound policy. (UNDP 2002: 1, my italics)"

In its long list of recommendations, this UNDP report concludes that “donors should invest in extensive collection and development of comparable socioeconomic data sets in order to avoid ungrounded interpretations and speculations on minority issues” (ibid 6, my italics). My main issue here is not whether we should collect such data, but how—if the Roma are targeted for these forms of knowledge production—such approaches are related to questions of legitimacy, power, the de-politicization or re-politicization of delicate issues, and the reshaping of Romani minority governance in Europe.10 Expertise is a form of authority that emerges as a correlate of political authority and that arises out of a claim to neutral, efficient, and effective knowledge (chapter 2). The accumulation of expertise and knowledge in specific locales, “by certain persons and groups, makes them powerful in the sense that it confers upon them the capacity to engage in certain calculations and to lay a claim to legitimacy for their plans and strategies because they are, in a real sense, in the know about that which they seek to govern” (Miller and Rose 2008: 66, their italics). According to the UNDP’s more general approach to expertise, ‘the Roma’ can only be dealt with adequately at local levels if we, first and foremost, problematize them as a European issue and as subjects of what the UN frame as ‘human development’.11 The UNDP presents its development instruments and mechanisms, such as transnationally comparable data on the Roma and various kinds of risk analyses regarding them, as neutral, non-political, and technical tools. They could help various agents, from different kinds of policy makers to academics and NGOs, to improve their Roma approaches and, ultimately, the Roma’s situation on the ground.12

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10 At the same time, I acknowledge the question of both the delicacy and importance of data collection on Romani issues (PER 2000a; ERRC 2004e; OSI 2010).
12 The Open Society Institute (OSI), an international, Soros-funded NGO that, together with the World Bank, launched the Decade of Roma Inclusion 2005-2015 has suggested something similar when it, in a report that evaluates the Decade project, claims that “without comprehensive data to evaluate government efforts and guide policies, the situation of the Roma—a group already on the margins of Europe—is like to remain dire” (OSI 2010: 10). In chapter 7, I will discuss how we can understand the ways in which transnational
My main interest in current IGO and NGO problematizations of the Roma is how these agencies contribute to authorizing themselves to speak in the name of the Roma, to making Roma-related interventions possible at all, and to rearticulating forms of Romani minority governance and self-governance in Europe. What does it mean, for instance, that the OSCE—an institutional body that, according to its ‘original’ mandate, focuses on security in Europe—has incorporated Roma-related issues in its executive bodies and policy mandates? What does it mean that IGOs such as the UNDP and the World Bank that, until recently, focused on development issues in the global south and, thus, outside Europe, have extended their mandates to Europe’s Romani minorities? What is the relevance of the various ways in which NGOs—but also EU, OSCE, and state-related bodies—approach the Roma in terms of ‘community’ governance, such as in community development, community policing, community empowerment, and minority self-governance projects?

Some recent valuable studies have dealt with similar kinds of questions. Martin Kovats, for instance, puts forward that the OSCE did not engage with the Roma prior to the 1990s “as they were not perceived as representing a security issue” (2001a: 95). He, as well as Peter Vermeersch (2006) and Rachel Guglielmo and Timothy Waters (2005), has focused on how the Roma approaches of international organizations have developed since they began to devise Roma-related programs in the early 1990s. Others, such as Katrin Simhandl (2007; 2009), have analyzed longer periods of time and studied how, for instance, the Roma discourses of the EU and its institutional forerunners have changed since the 1970s. These studies primarily focus on how various IGOs have dealt with the Roma and how their Roma approaches have changed in the course of the years (Kovats, Guglielmo and Waters, Vermeersch) or decades (Simhandl). To a much lesser degree, these studies pay attention to how and under what kinds of conditions the changes within these IGOs have enabled them to incorporate Roma-related issues into their executive bodies and policy mandates in the way they did. An interrogation of these changes and, more importantly, of the new governance agendas with which they can be connected will elucidate how post-1989 Roma problematizations have engendered new forms of Romani minority governance. In the next but one section, I will show that we can shed another light on the new governance agendas of institutions such as the EU, the OSCE, and the World Bank, when we approach these agendas from the angle of their articulation with neo-liberal forms of governmentality. But how are we to understand neo-liberalism as governmentality?

NEO-LIBERALISM AS GOVERNMENTALITY

There is a bizarre, somewhat paradoxical contemporary phenomenon that is called neo-liberalism. When we try to get an overview of how scholars have recently analyzed it, we can easily get lost in various kinds of claims and arguments about its possibilities and impossibilities. In an intriguing article, entitled “Living with/in and without neo-

advocacy and activist networks, such as ERGO and ERPC, have become involved in the production of new forms of knowledge and expertise.
liberalism,” John Clarke (2008) puts forward that the notion of ‘neo-liberalism’ seems to suffer from promiscuity, omnipresence, and omnipotence at the same time. Its promiscuity comes from hanging out with various kinds of theoretical perspectives, ranging from classic or neo-Marxist preoccupations with class, political economy, and capitalism to various post-constructivist approaches to ideology, hegemony, and governmentality. Diverse kinds of scholars and disciplines have focused on the phenomenon of neo-liberalism in an attempt to reveal what is going on in the world and, most usually, going wrong. At the same time, “neo-liberalism seems to mean many different things depending on one’s vantage point” (Ong 2006: 1).

Neo-liberalism’s supposed omnipresence has led some to characterize our present-day time as a neo-liberal order, age, or era (eg, Ferguson 2005a; Cooper 2008; Sigona and Trehan 2009c). Some scholars disagree about its origins—the US, the UK, the IMF, the World Bank, etc.—but, nevertheless, believe that it has started somewhere and has been disseminated from there to other places on earth. Others scholars reject any discussion of neo-liberalism in terms of origins: “when we identify specific variants of neo-liberalism we are not examining varieties of a really existing, homogenous genus” (Castree 2006: 4, his italics). Nonetheless, neo-liberalism seems to have spread all over the globe to become either a dominant, if not the most dominant feature of contemporary societies or an uncontrollable, mobile virus that infects everything and everybody on its ongoing journey (or both). Even though neo-liberalism’s intellectual project has been declared virtually dead, it has been argued that neo-liberalism continues to haunt us now that it has entered its ‘zombie’ phase (Smith 2008; Peck 2010).

Neo-liberalism’s high mobility and ability to change things drastically relate to neo-liberalism’s alleged omnipresence: wherever it ends up, it seems to change things permanently and usually not for the good. “Much like ‘globalization’ in the previous decade and ‘capitalism’ before that,” ‘neo-liberalism’ has become “a kind of dustbin into which we pour our interpretations of bad things” (Newman 2010: 7-8). In particular when the poor are spotted, neo-liberalism has become an analytical weapon to reveal the continuation of their marginalization and exclusion with new, powerful means (eg, Wacquant 2009). Clive Barnett states that neo-liberalism has also infected our academic work or, at least, specific, ‘leftist’ parts of it. He claims that the scholarly projection of hegemonic qualities onto neo-liberalism consoles some of us and helps to legitimize their scholarly work:

[The vocabulary of neo-liberalism] supplies [leftist academics] with plentiful opportunities for unveiling the real workings of hegemonic ideologies in a characteristic gesture of revelation; and in so doing, it invites us to align our own professional roles with the activities of various actors ‘out there,’ who are always framed as engaging in resistance or contestation. (Barnett 2005: 10)

Barnett finds the geographer Noel Castree on his side, who suspects that “‘neoliberal’ will remain a necessary illusion for those on the geographical left: something we know does not exist as such, but the idea of whose existence allows our ‘local’ research finding to connect to a much bigger and apparently important conversation” (2006: 6).
As with most newly emerging or fashionable scholarly concepts, and particularly with those with large pretensions, neo-liberalism had also to be hazed and deconstructed: it is not as ‘new’ as has frequently been suggested, it has its own peculiar histories, it has no clear if any origins, it cannot be held responsible for everything, it has its own spatio-temporal specificities, and so on, and so forth. Yet, after having started my own discussion of neo-liberalism with some of the most critical comments in the ongoing neo-liberalism debate, it seems almost impossible to use the concept without falling in one of the traps that has already been or will soon be revealed in the debate. In this and the next chapters, I will nevertheless try to use ‘neo-liberalism’ as an analytical tool to examine the current situation of Romani minorities in Europe. I will start from some of the insights that the neo-liberalism debate offers us for mobilizing this concept critically. Many critical reflections on neo-liberalism and how it has been used critique the ways in which it has been interpreted as a primarily ‘bad’ phenomenon that has even been able to incorporate and co-opt its ‘enemies.’ In order to use neo-liberalism in a more moderate yet still productive way, many participants in the debate suggest, we need to acknowledge that it “does not exist as such” and requires inquiries into its ‘local’ manifestations. These two points are among the starting points of my own interrogation of the relations between neo-liberal forms of governmentality, Roma problematizations, and new and reshaped forms of knowledge formation.

My standpoint in the debate on neo-liberalism certainly bears resemblance with the positions discussed in the introduction. Like those who interpret neo-liberalism as policy or ideology, for instance, I also consider it as a political-cultural project that aspires to transnational hegemony. Yet, I consider this a constructivist project and doubt whether neo-liberalism really succeeds in establishing the proposed hegemony. And like those who understand neo-liberalism as ideology, I also take it as a complex process of struggle and contestation, in which new identities and new ethnic, class, gender, and other kinds of boundaries are produced and reshaped. Yet, I doubt whether neo-liberalism has primarily led to ‘bad’ outcomes and has been spread as evenly and unambiguously as has often been claimed. I analyze neo-liberalism beyond assessing it in terms of either its ‘bad’ or its ‘good’ effects and look, instead, at its ambivalent and hybrid nature. In order to doing so, surely, we also need to blur the boundaries between the different, currently circulating interpretations of neo-liberalism, such as those that consider it as policy, ideology, or governmentality (Larner 2000; Clarke 2008). Nevertheless, I will explain that the perspective of governmentality brings into view some aspects of neo-liberalism that the other two standpoints do not sufficiently address and that can productively be related to how it has been articulated in post-communist Europe.

My emphasis on neo-liberalism as a constructivist project and on the significance of a topological reading of power relations (chapter 1) has two important implications. We cannot assume that neo-liberal governmental technologies are smoothly brought into practice and in alignment with local circumstances. We need to examine how the local translations of these tools and practices have unforeseeably and often uncomfortably impacted on the ground. Moreover, we always deal with specific configurations of power in which different—and, thus, not necessarily only neo-liberal—technologies of power are combined and assembled. A topological analysis of power “examines how existing techniques and technologies of power are re-deployed and recombined in diverse
assemblies of bio-political government” (Collier 2009: 79). In other words, if we read neo-liberalism as a form of governmentality, we start from analyzing how mobile, connective neo-liberal technologies, techniques, and practices have been selectively assembled with ‘local’ cultures, political conditions, and traditions of governance. These neo-liberal technologies, techniques, and practices are then not ‘global’ in nature, but can only get their specific form, content, and manifestation through how they are assembled and appropriated in a specific context. This approach encourages ethnographic accounts of neo-liberalism in which the specific ‘local’ conditions are analyzed beyond how they would have been colonized from outside and incorporated into an all-encompassing and overshadowing neo-liberal structure or order:

As an array of [bio-political] techniques centered on the optimization of life, neo-liberalism migrates from site to site, interacting with various assemblages that cannot be analytically reduced to cases of a uniform global condition of ‘Neo-liberalism’ writ large … It therefore seems appropriate to study neo-liberalism not as ‘culture’ or a ‘structure’ but as mobile calculative techniques of governing that can be decontextualized from their original sources and recontextualized in constellations of mutually constitutive and contingent relationships. (Ong 2006: 14, 13)

This approach of neo-liberalism as governmentality has three consequences for how we analyze contemporary manifestations of neo-liberalism. Firstly, we need to avoid “to identify any program with neo-liberal elements as essentially neo-liberal, and to proceed as if this subsumption of the particular under a more general category provides a sufficient account of its nature or explanation of its existence” (Rose et al 2006: 97-98). Accordingly, we need to challenge the assumption that there is, or has to be, an efficient, one-to-one correspondence between a supposedly hegemonic, global political-economic neo-liberal project and specific neo-liberal technologies of power.

Secondly, neo-liberalism as governmentality leads us beyond the suggestion that we have currently ended up in a neo-liberal order, at least, if by that is meant the arrival of a new, ‘neo-liberal’ time, characterized by clear and sudden breaks or ruptures with the past. The view of neo-liberalism as governmentality, thus, does also not adhere to a periodized model of Europe’s history in which it is clearly divided into periods before and after 1989 (chapter 1). As I will show in chapter 6, neo-liberalism has its own, Central and Eastern European history. Moreover, the event of communism’s fall requires a reading of the ‘post’ of post-communism beyond easy periodization (chapter 2, Hörschelmann and Stenning 2008; Collier 2011). Thus, neo-liberalism as governmentality cannot be understood as a new grand theory of society and socio-cultural change, even though some scholars of governmentality have discussed our present-day time in terms of the ‘death of the social’ (Rose 1996a) and ‘post-social governance’ (Rose et al 2006: 97). For example, qualifications of our current states or societies as ‘post-welfarist’ or ‘neo-liberal’ regimes often tend to overestimate the discontinuities and underestimate the continuities with past socioeconomic and cultural formations. We need to acknowledge that different governmental technologies, which are sometimes presented as corresponding to distinct historical phases, are often flexibly combined:
At the level of technical detail, neo-liberalism does not imply the wholesale replacement of one form of social organization with another. Indeed, the diversity of ‘variants’ of reform … underscores the substantive ambiguity of neo-liberal reform … At the level of social description, … the process of transformation … does not seem usefully described as the replacement of … social modernity with a ‘market society.’ Rather, what are to be traced are the novel articulations between market-type mechanisms, old bio-political forms, and the actual substantive fabric of existing human communities. (Collier 2005: 388, his emphasis)

Here, Stephen Collier also points to what I see as the third feature of approaching neo-liberalism from the angle of governmentality: it underlines the crucial importance of the issue of articulation. The articulation of technologies of power is always dependent on complex processes of assembling and reassembling several disparate elements (chapter 1, Li 2007a). Articulation can be understood a key element of all sorts of political work:

[Articulation embodies] the hard labor of assembling a political project, creating both its directions, its relationship to the field of discourses and its ability to mobilize social groups in support of it … while marginalizing or de-mobilizing other discourses and other groups. (Newman and Clarke 2009: 18-19)

The practice of articulation points to the necessity to interrogate how neo-liberal technologies of government are actually assembled with other, disparate elements and how these hybrid assemblages can also result in practices that might be at odds with what is usually described as neo-liberal (Li 2007a; Sharma 2008; Stenning et al 2010).

Now I have delineated my methodological approach of neo-liberalism, I want to move on to describe some of the features of this constructivist project that deploys and articulates neo-liberal technologies of government. Despite—or, more probably, because of—all warnings that we should avoid adopting a ‘thick’ concept of neo-liberalism, most scholars in the neo-liberalism debate have difficulty in affirmatively describing the character of neo-liberal ways of thinking and doing. Jamie Peck, for instance, argues that “neo-liberalism does not, cannot, exist in pure form, but only manifests itself in hybrid formations” (2004: 403). At the same time, he remarks that “the fact that a range of critical analysts … continue to draw attention to the shared neo-liberal features of these hybrids points to the importance of developing adequate accounts of neo-liberalism-in-general, without succumbing to the fallacies of monolithism, functionalism, or convergence thinking” (ibid, my italics). Peck acknowledges that, from the outset, all varieties of neo-liberalism are hybrid—no matter whether we start ‘locally,’ in the alleged neo-liberal heartland of the US, or within the institutional setting of the World Bank (each of these ‘sites’ represents a ‘local’ variant). At the same time, he claims that “splitting differences over varieties of neo-liberalism cannot be an end in itself, not least because it begs questions about the common roots and shared features of the unevenly neo-liberalized landscape that confronts us” (ibid 403, my italics). Similarly, John Clarke, when he raises the question what might be understood the “neo-liberal character or form” of this coreless neo-liberalism, suggests that “the coherence is provided by the combination” of a couple of elements (2008: 141). He describes these elements and, then, states that “it is their
Radically contested state-economy and state-society boundaries

Neo-liberalism and (classic) liberalism differ on two fundamental points, namely (1) the relationships between the state and the economy and between state and (civil) society, and (2) the basis of free, liberal government (Lemke 2001). Since the market itself has to become the central organizing and regulative principle underlying the state, its ‘original’ liberal tasks to respect for the freedom of those involved in market exchanges and to guarantee and monitor the market from this point of view are displaced:

There will not be the market game, which must be left free, and then the domain in which the state begins to intervene, since the market … can only appear if it is produced, and if it is produced by an active governmentality. There will thus be a sort of complete superimposition of market mechanisms, indexed to competition, and governmental policy. Government must accompany the market economy from start to finish. The market economy does not take something away from government. Rather, it indicates, it constitutes the general index in which one must place the rule for defining all governmental action. One must govern for the market, rather than because of the market. (Foucault 2008a: 121, my emphasis)

Neo-liberalism, thus, does not simply assume a kind of universal market rationality that underlies both state and society, but starts from the idea that the market and related enterprise models have to be actively produced:

Neo-liberalism does not simply assume that all aspects of social, cultural and political life can be reduced to … a calculus [of utility, benefit, or satisfaction], rather it develops institutional practices and rewards for enacting this vision … Neo-liberalism is a constructivist project: it does not presume the ontological givenness of a thoroughgoing economic rationality for all domains of society but rather takes as its task the development, dissemination, and institutionalization of such a rationality. (Brown 2003: §9, my emphasis)

This relationship between state and economy also affects the more or less clear boundary between state and society, typical of liberal forms of governmentality. These effects can be clarified by briefly discussing what some have called “governing from the social point of view” (N Rose 1999b: chapter 3). This notion refers to various, primarily liberal ways of governing state-society relationships that have dominated in post-war Europe, in what we usually refer to as welfare states.14 ‘Welfarist’ systems can be imagined as a kind

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14 Nikolas Rose describes these forms of government as follows: “government from the social point of view aimed to connect the ‘prophylactic’ dimensions of social government—those concerned with preventing possible social risk and danger by pre-emptive means ranging from social insurance through the promotion of full employment and measures to ensure social hygiene to the inculcation of norms of child rearing—with the ‘reactive’ element of social government. Thus labor exchanges, courts, child guidance clinics, schools, and factories all provide institutional loci for identifying pathological men, women, and children, classifying and judging them, not only prescribing measures of individual reformation but tracking them out again, through the activities of social workers and others, into a web of social relations which can be made visible and subject to normalizing intervention. But what was at stake here, overarching the different
combination and interplay that marks the distinctiveness of neo-liberalism, and it is their co-existence that enables neo-liberalism’s flexibility in processes of appropriation and articulation” (ibid). The difficulty to depart from a thick understanding of neo-liberalism on the one hand, and to describe some of its feature, on the other, seems to be part of neo-liberalism’s slipperiness—and, probably, of any concept with big pretensions. I do not think that there is necessarily a problem with describing some shared neo-liberal elements. We only need to recognize that these are no ‘essential,’ universal features and that they only get shape in the processes in which they are articulated with other meaning and value systems and with other tools, forms, and traditions of governance. These elements can be approached from the viewpoint of rationalities of government, if we recognize that they are continually undergoing modification and cannot be equated with knowledge or thought in the sense of ideas (chapter 1).\footnote{Alternatively, we could approach these shared neo-liberal elements, as Peck does, from the viewpoint of family resemblances (if understood in a Wittgensteinian, non-essentialist way). We could also approach them, as Clarke does, from the angle of a distinction between the ‘preliminary grammar’ of neo-liberalism and its ‘disjointed, disjunctured articulations’ in particular places” (2008: 142). He derives this distinction from Catherine Kingfisher, who argues that “It is, in fact, only in the circulation of neoliberal related meanings and their articulation with other meaning systems that neoliberalism takes on its multiple and contradictory lives” (Kingfisher 2002: 12).}

So, how are we to describe the elements that make up this ‘coreless’ neo-liberalism? Neo-liberal forms of governmentality are of the liberal sort, for they are still based on ways of governing through freedom (chapter 2). Liberalism has always been about looking for the right governmental balance between state and economy, state and society, and the public and private, even though ‘right’ can be defined differently (chapter 2). What is new in neo-liberalism is that it puts governmental technologies developed in private and business spheres to work within the domain of the state itself, so that even key functions of the state are delegated to private providers and run ‘like a business’:

The question of what should be public and what private becomes blurred, as the state itself increasingly organizes itself around ‘profit centers,’ ‘enterprise models,’ and so on. Rather than shifting the line between state and market, then, neo-liberalism in this account involved the deployment of new, market-based techniques of government within the terrain of the state itself. At the same time, new constructions of ‘active’ and ‘responsible’ citizens and communities are deployed to produce governmental results that do not depend on direct state intervention. The ‘responsibilized’ citizen comes to operate as a miniature firm, responding to incentives, rationally assessing risks, and prudently choosing from among different courses of action. (Ferguson 2009: 172)

I take the elements that James Ferguson includes in this quotation as the starting points to describe the features of neo-liberal constructivist projects. First, I will discuss how they aim at the blurring of state-economy and state-society boundaries. Second, I will clarify how these rearrangements relate to attempts to disseminate enterprise models over the entire social body. Third, I will show how this dissemination connects to active and responsible forms of citizenship.
of social safety networks and complex back-up devices that have to secure a state’s citi-
zens against social risks, such as illness, accidents, disability, unemployment, retirement, and parenthood. ‘Welfarism’ relates to a specific kind of the governmentalization of the state, in which a relatively strict distinction between society and economy is reproduced to mitigate social inequalities and injustices. Social welfare “answer[s] a range of social and human ‘needs’ which the market [is] inherently incapable of meeting” (Walters 1997: 224). Consequently, “the welfare system [is] not meant to supplement the economic system, but to partner it on equal grounds” (ibid, my italics). One of the primary aims of governing from the social point of view is, thus, that it tries to protect citizens against the possibly harmful effects of the economy on society. In order to achieve this central aim, post-war societies have increasingly become the object and target of various kinds of expertise and administrative interventions, such as those implied by social work and social insurance.

However, the neo-liberal project and the way in which it intends to change relations between state and economy also affects state-society relationships:

[Neo-liberal governmental intervention is no less dense, frequent, active, and continuous than in any other system [of government]. But what is important is to see what the point of application of these governmental interventions is now. Since this is a liberal regime, it is understood that government must not intervene on effects of the market. Nor must … neo-liberal government correct the destructive effects of the market on society, and it is this that differentiates it from, let’s say, welfare and suchlike policies … Government must not form a counterpoint or a screen, as it were, between society and economic processes. It has to intervene on society as such, in its fabric and depth. Basically, it has to intervene on society so that competitive mechanisms can play a regulative role at every moment and every point in society and by intervening in this way its objective will become possible, that is to say, a general regulation of society by the market. (Foucault 2008a: 145, my emphasis)

Thus, the view of neo-liberalism as governmental stresses that neo-liberalism does not imply the ‘rolling back’ of the state or deregulation at large. Rather, we deal with forms of governmental re-regulation in which the distinctions between state and economy and institutional forms taken in different national contexts, was the endeavor to construct a new kind of human being, social citizens taking responsibility for their own physical and mental health and that of the family, and enwrapped in a range of other practices that actively promoted the values of a social way of life” (N Rose 1999b: 131). It would take another book to analyze the ways in which communist welfare regimes could be considered from the angle of social government, and how this viewpoint relates to governmentalities that affected the realities of Romani minorities. Several studies have discussed some of the elements central to understanding these relationships (Haney 2002; Sokolova 2008). In chapter 6, I will elaborate on the importance of taking into account the legacies of communist approaches to the Roma for understanding their current situation.

15 As numerous critics of ‘welfaris’ have argued, social security systems kept sizeable parts of the population outside the labor market and produced debatably gendered forms of socio-economic citizenship. These forms of critique have also contributed to the inauguration of neo-liberal forms of governmentality, something that has often been overlooked in analyses and assessments of processes of neo-liberalization (see Walters 1997).
those between state and non-state (including private and civil societal) actors are extensively blurred. At the same time, neo-liberalism as governmentality is still motivated, like its liberal forerunners, by a critique of ‘too much’ or ‘excessive’ government (chapter 2). However, the ‘excessive’ element is now reconceptualized as the escalation of dependency on welfare supplies of various groups and as “economic intervention, inflation of governmental apparatuses, overadministration, bureaucracy, and rigidification of power mechanisms, accompanied by the production of ever new economic distortions that would lead to new interventions” (Foucault 2008a: 323). The maintenance of ‘welfarist’ kinds of social security networks is perceived as an integral part of the problem. Seen from the neo-liberal viewpoint, social security systems only tend to promote dependency cultures and attitudes of passively relying on systems of benefits. In this way, these systems keep substantial parts of a population outside the labor force (Walters 2000). This is not only ‘bad’ for economies, but also bad for the entire way in which individuals and state apparatuses work. Indeed, so the argument goes, dependency leads to the erosion of the motivation and self-esteem of the unemployed, could have bad health effects, isolates the unemployed from social networks, and could lead to the loss of social obligation or, even worse, to criminality and lawlessness. In their turn, these dependency traps lead state apparatuses to initiate and invent ever-new intervention mechanisms and, by so doing, these institutions only keep a vicious circle of more administration, more bureaucracy, and more dependency in motion.

**Society and self as enterprises**

In order to avoid such dependencies and vicious circles, neo-liberal technologies usually rely on another approach to society and the self. They assume another starting point of free, liberal government, based on another type of politics of the self (Dean 1995; McNay 2009) and on redefining the workforce of the newly imagined social body (Walters 1997). The reconsideration of the social body as a part of the economic domain makes it possible to extend diverse kinds of market criteria, such as cost-benefit calculations and techniques of comparison and inspection (standardization, benchmarking, audit) to various social domains, such as those of individuals, families, communities, and NGOs. According to classic liberalism, the individual’s freedom is understood as a natural, human realm of non-intervention and as the prerequisite for rational, liberal government (chapter 2). In neo-liberal projects, this approach to freedom has changed:

[Neo-liberalism’s] point of reference is no longer some pre-given human nature, but an artificially created form of behavior. Neo-liberalism no longer locates the rational principle for regulating and limiting the action of government in a natural freedom that we should all respect, but instead it posits an artificially arranged liberty: in the entrepreneurial and competitive behavior of economic-rational individuals. Whereas in the classic liberal conception, *homo oeconomicus* forms an external limit and the inviolable core of governmental action, in ... neo-liberal thought ... he becomes a behavioristically manipulable being and the correlative of a governmentality which systematically changes the variables of the ‘environment’ and can count on the ‘rational choice’ of the individuals. (Lemke 2001: 200)
This shift entails not only perceptions of the individual in terms of the maximization of her or his labor power, as if we primarily deal with rationalities of government that are based on concepts of self-interest and economic capital. It also includes a profound re-conceptualization of what counts as capital or a source of an individual’s present and future performance. Thus, the neo-liberal “*homo oeconomicus* is an entrepreneur, an entrepreneur of himself, ... being for himself his own capital, ... his own producer, [and] the source of [his] earnings” (Foucault 2008a: 226). At the same time, these forms of entrepreneurship “invoke new forms of governmentality that are based on the inculcation of new forms of governable subject, subjects in which the person—his or her ‘inner will’—becomes a resource enabling the transformation” (Newman 2007: 367). The individual is re-conceptualized as an ‘enterprise’ and an investor not only of economic capital, but also of human and social forms of capital, such as education, training, skills, trust, and social relationships. The self has to be remade into a kind of permanent, manifold enterprise. The redefinition of the individual at the heart of various enterprising activities also problematizes the domains of education, culture, and training in new ways. The neo-liberal approach lays stress “on the fact that what should be called educational investment is much broader than simple schooling or professional training and that many more elements than these enter into the formation of human capital” (Foucault 2008a: 229, 233). Education is no longer limited to ‘schooling’ within the context of the traditional educational institutions. The new, ‘active’ citizen needs to “engage in a ceaseless work of training and retraining, skilling and reskilling, enhancement of credentials and preparation for a life of incessant job seeking: life is to become a continuous economic capitalization of the self” (N Rose 1999b: 161). The traditional educational investment needs to be turned into perpetual training and lifelong learning, including the participation in a variety of cultural activities, in order to permanently contribute to the formation of human and social capital.

The forms of ‘enterprising’ central to neo-liberal governmental technologies do not remain limited to the sphere of individuals. Rather, they need to become the leading dynamics for the reorganization of the entire social body:

[F]or what is private property if not an enterprise? What is a house if not an enterprise? What is the management of these small neighborhood communities ... if not other forms of enterprise? In other words, what is involved is the generalization of forms of ‘enterprise’ by diffusing and multiplying them as much as possible ... I think this multiplication of the ‘enterprise’ form within the social body is what is at stake in neo-liberal policy. It is a matter of making the market, competition, and so the enterprise, into what could be called the *formative power of society*. (Foucault 2008a: 148, my italics)

‘Active’ and ‘responsible’ actors

Neo-liberal governmentalities initialize new forms and models of citizenship, from the ‘worker-citizen’ to the ‘empowered’ and ‘contracted’ citizen, and from the ‘responsible’ to the ‘active’ citizen (Newman and Clarke 2009: chapter 8). Since the end of the 1980s, the notions of ‘active society’ and ‘active citizenship’ have emerged. The idea of an ‘active society,’ rather than a welfare one, is based on the participation of all its members, no matter what their status is: “The basic thrust of the notion of the ‘Active Society’ is to
foster economic opportunity and activity for everyone in order to combat poverty, dependency, and social exclusion” (OECD 1990b: xi). The way in which the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) describes the active society shows how the boundaries between the economic and the social domain should be blurred in favor of an enterprising and participatory society:

[The ‘active society’ approach] welcomes ... the entry of new groups into the labor market. It recognizes [that] the demand for participation in economic and social life is increasingly voiced by most groups in the population, and does not seek to resist the expression of this demand through a growth in aggregate labor force participation ... [T]he statistical distinction between those who are currently in the labor force and those who would like to be is increasingly a poor guide for policy-making. Hence, the goal becomes both to welcome into active life all those who wish to take part, and to enable them to do so. The aim is thus not to ‘define away’ unemployment by assigning those seeking work to some other status, but rather to recognize that realization of the full human potential of the population involves the employment not only of the unemployed, but of all those who wish to participate—whether working full-time, part-time, or in casual employment. (OECD 1989: 9, my italics; cited Walters 1997: 225)

Problematizing societies in terms of activity goes together with a reformulation of employment that changes the perception of the category of the ‘officially unemployed.’ Welfarist social security systems need to support the officially unemployed and facilitate their return to the workforce. Active society discourses start from the assumption that realizing “the full human potential of the population” (ibid) requires that “not only the unemployed, but an assortment of other marginalized groups—previously classified as non-employed—must be helped to access paid employment” (Walters 1997: 225). Practices of active citizenship—though variable, diverse, and contestable—expose citizens to neo-liberal technologies of government that shift the meaning of citizenship from a status carrying rights, benefits, and entitlements to individualized notions of risk, responsibility, and self-reliance (Borghi and van Berkel 2007; Newman and Clarke 2009).

This shift of approach has been called “the new contractualism” (Davis et al 1997; Sol and Westerveld 2005):

[This new contractualism] involves ‘offering’ individuals and collectivities active involvement in action to resolve the kind of issues hitherto held to be the responsibility of authorized governmental agencies. However, the price of this involvement is that they must assume active responsibility for these activities, both for carrying them out and, of course, for their outcomes, and in so doing they are required to conduct themselves in accordance with the appropriate (or approved) model of action. This might be described as a new form of ‘responsibilization’ corresponding to the new forms in which the governed are encouraged, freely and rationally, to conduct themselves. (Burchell 1996: 29)
Following the idea that neo-liberal projects aim at turning ‘the enterprise’ into the formative power of society, the notions of ‘new contractualism’ and ‘responsibilization’ have been extended to other actors than just individuals or collectives. This extension points to the aspiration of neo-liberal projects to model the relationships between experts (or centers of expertise) and their clients on the contracts between sellers and buyers. In this way, a variety of actors, ranging from corporations, ‘communities’, and NGOs to privatized and semi-privatized public service providers (hospitals, universities, railways, etc.) should become involved in such new, economized forms of social contract. Making these different actors responsible for how they perform has also gone together with the introduction and reshaping of tools to calculate risks and benchmark diverse mechanism of governance. At the international level, these forms of calculating efficient performance has led IGOs, such as the EU and the World Bank, to use ‘governance’ in a normative sense and promote ‘good,’ democratically sustainable and economically efficient forms of governance. This issue leads me to the main theme of the next section.

RESHAPING DEVELOPMENT, SECURITY, AND RIGHTS VIS-À-VIS EUROPE’S ROMA

I have ended the penultimate section with the observation that most scholars, who have hitherto analyzed the involvement of IGOs with the Roma, focus on the changes of the Roma approaches of these organizations in the course of time, and since the mid 1990s in particular. To a much lesser degree, they have analyzed how or why the Roma have actually appeared on these organizations’ agendas and become part of their policy mandates. One notable exception is Melanie Ram, who has turned these latter questions into the central issue of some of her recent articles (2010a; 2010b). Ram concentrates on why the Roma have emerged onto the EU’s agenda and begins with the observation:

What prompted the EU’s recent expanded interest in the Roma has been the subject of little study and can be less easily explained than the involvement of the human rights-focused Council of Europe or even the security-focused OSCE (which also had addressed human rights in the past). (Ram 2010a: 200)

Ram critically mobilizes insights from social movement theories to argue that the Roma for the most part appeared on the EU’s agenda as “the result of a complex transnational advocacy network that emerged to lobby on behalf of the Roma and was able to provide EU institutions with means of addressing both normative and practical interests” (ibid 201, her italics). In an illuminating way, Ram shows how the interplay between EU institutions and various INGOs, as well as a triangular transnational advocacy dynamic between local, national, and international actors have played a crucial role in getting the Roma on the EU’s agenda. Ram’s analysis is largely based on unraveling various practices of advocacy and minority governance in Europe. While doing so, she keeps the institutional boundaries and settings relatively fixed. To a much lesser degree, she investigates the ways in which the activities of the primary actors of her analysis—IGOs and NGOs—have taken place in the context of new, reshaped, and shifting forms, patterns, and mechanisms of governance. Why, for instance, did IGOs, such as the EU or
the World Bank, actually start to listen to NGOs and develop partnerships with them? Why did the OSCE, which traditionally focused on security issues at the inter-state level, start to focus on inter-group and, thus, intra-state conflict resolution? Why did these IGOs, whose policies had for a long time been based on the principal unit of national states and national economies, start to embrace a human, people-centered focus? At a more theoretical level, we also need to ask: Wasn’t the emergence of specific institutional environments, and those of NGOs in particular, also the effect of newly appearing forms of governing?

In what follows, I will explain that these reorientations can be better understood in light of the emergence of neo-liberal governmentalities. I do not claim that these changes and the developments of several new governance agendas can solely be explained on the basis of how neo-liberal technologies have recently been articulated with the policies, management cultures, and political traditions of these IGOs. I do suggest, though, that these articulations have been influential and also have explanatory power regarding the question of how the Roma could appear on the policy radars of these IGOs in the way they did. My discussion of how, since the end of the 1980s, approaches of development, security, and rights have changed and also affected IGO-NGO relationships does not explicitly explain why it were! particularly the Roma who came into the picture. Rather, retrospectively, I will describe three elements that have played an important role in how the Roma have recently been taken into account by IGOs and NGOs. I will delineate how the ‘social,’ the ‘human,’ and the ‘civic’ of newly emerged ‘social inclusion,’ ‘human development,’ and ‘civil society building’ programs point to new and reshaped relations of governance and, thus, to new ways in which the target groups of such programs are identified. At least partly, several of the development programs that have recently been devised to deal with the Roma’s situation can be related to new ways to govern through civil society and to the rise of what some call ‘non-governmentalism’ (Lewis 2005). We need to reflect on the rise of NGOs as new relays and actors in the governance tissue. This is the first of three elements I will discuss: NGOs have appeared in conjunction with new ideas, concepts, and practices of how to govern ‘development,’ improve democracy and reduce underdevelopment, poverty, and exclusion. The second element I will bring up relates to new ways in which underdevelopment and poverty are explained, and how these explanations have appeared alongside new approaches to security in particular. Next to security approaches based on inter-state relations and forms of conflict, security approaches that rely on intra-state, inter-group conflicts have increasingly started to play a key role in how development programs are devised. The third and final element that I will discuss relates to the way in which the EU’s support for the institutionalization of democratic forms of governance has impacted on human rights promotion.

One final caveat is in order. The remainder of this chapter introduces these three elements and their relation to changing approaches to ‘human rights’ and ‘security.’ I do not want to suggest that this sketch tells much about the concrete ways in which neo-liberal governmental technologies have been ‘locally’ articulated within the institutional settings of IGOs. Getting sufficient insight into these articulations requires thorough case studies of how, for instance, new governance tools and discourses have transformed the performance of the EU, the OSCE, or the World Bank as a governmental actor vis-à-vis Romani minorities and actors, as well as their advocates. The remainder of this chapter
can be read as a delineation of a research agenda, which takes such case studies on board and which is dedicated, more generally, to analyses of transformations of Romani minority governance in Europe beyond fixed institutional settings and boundaries. Some of the items on this agenda will also be discussed in the next three chapters.

**Capitalizing on the social: development and new governance in Europe**

Since the late 1980s, concepts such as governance, civil society, social capital, social inclusion, human security, human development, participation, and empowerment have rapidly popped up in the international development lexicon. At about the same time, the number of NGOs in the world, and particularly those operating in the global south and the former East Bloc has also radically increased. In post-1989 Central and Eastern Europe, NGOs have actually appeared for the first time at such a large scale and rapidly become an important part of the governance tissue. These two developments—the appearance of these development discourses centered on the ‘social,’ the ‘civic,’ and the ‘human’ as well as the reshaping of civil society as a sector for government—are closely related. The rapid rise of ‘non-governmentalism’ in the late 1980s and 1990s had various reasons. David Lewis (2005) mentions the disillusionment about the results of several decades of government-centered development programs in the South and North as one of these reasons. New ways and practices of development had to be explored and non-governmental, civil society channels were considered to be some of the most promising. Lewis also mentions the importance of how academic practices within development studies changed in favor of more ‘empirical’ analyses and direct involvements with ‘real, living people.’ Thus, non-governmental ways of governing partially appeared as kinds of experiments to solve the problems caused by earlier, unsuccessful means of governing development (including early neo-liberal programs of structural adjustment). Governments involved in development aid, but also IGOs embraced non-governmental ways of governing to redirect their governance agendas.

Since the early 1990s, IGOs such as the World Bank, the OECD, and the EU have explicitly started to establish and reshape strategic and funding relationships with civil societal actors.16 These IGOs have started to develop ways in which they, through building connections with such actors, could enhance ‘human and social capital’ formation, reduce poverty, and increase socioeconomic participation of individuals and collectives.17 Around 1990, the World Bank, for instance, decided to begin “an institution-wide effort to expand its work with NGOs” (Beckman 1991: 134). In its large scale engagement with NGOs, the World Bank (1997a) presented social capital formation as ‘the missing link’ in international development and as the key thing to promote in bridging the gap between socioeconomic growth and poverty reduction (Harriss 2002).18 Decisions such as those of the World Bank were, at least partially, “based on the recognition that states and markets had limited capacities to reduce poverty while NGOs had distinctive compe-

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18 Despite internal critique on the effectiveness of a social capital approach, the World Bank nevertheless set up various large scale social capital-based programs around the world (Harriss 2002; Li 2007b). The social capital-based approach to Albanian Roma (World Bank 2005a) is one of these programs.
societal events such as closeness to the poor, committed leadership and capacity to build access to services for the poor” (Lewis 2005: 204). Similar kinds of decisions to focus on civil society actors and to capitalize on the ‘social’ were made in the EU in the 1990s. This happened with regard to development issues in the global south, as well as with regard to development in Central and Eastern Europe. In what the European Commission considered “a far-reaching process of administrative reform” and an improvement of the EU’s “management culture” (EC 2000a: 2), civil societal agencies were introduced as vital partners in reshaping Europe and enhancing European integration:

The Union has encouraged the development of civil society in the applicant countries, as part of their preparation for membership. Non-governmental organizations play an important role at global level in development policy. (EC 2001: 14, 15) NGOs can make a contribution to fostering a more participatory democracy both within the European Union and beyond … The contribution of NGOs is particularly important in tackling social exclusion and discrimination, protecting the natural environment, and the provision of humanitarian and development aid. NGOs have been chosen as partners because of their specificity coupled with their expertise and technical capacity. (EC 2000a: 2, 5, 6)

The EU has followed a different path than the World Bank and introduced the term ‘social exclusion’ and, somewhat later, ‘social inclusion’. ‘Social capital formation’ in World Bank programs and ‘social inclusion’ in EU programs have become loosely defined, yet explicit policy aims:

Social policy makers tend to use the concepts [of social capital and social inclusion] in the service of a relatively loose analysis of existing dysfunctions and to fashion a set of prescriptions for how social factors can be mobilized for the purposes of economic and social reform. Social capital and social inclusion are ways to deal with market failure (high unemployment despite economic growth) and state failure (poor governance). Social exclusion and the lack of social capital are ‘deficits’ for policy to address. (Daly and Silver 2008: 550)

The reform of the management cultures of institutions such as the World Bank and the EU, including the building of new logistic structures to fund different kinds of civil societal agencies, was “the start of the period of explicit recognition of NGOs from within the unfolding neo-liberal development agenda, which gained confidence rapidly following the end of the cold war” (Lewis 2005: 204). These IGOs presented these changes as integral parts of their new governance agendas, such as the OECD’s active society agenda, the World Bank’s good governance agenda, and the EU’s European

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19 See, for instance, various documents and instruments that the EU has devised in the context of its development policy (EC 2003; 2006a; 2006b; 2008b; CEU 2005).
20 See, for instance, Daly and Silver (2008).
21 See OECD (1990b; 1990a; 2007).
22 See World Bank (1997b).
governance agenda. I want to suggest neither that these agendas were coherent and uniform, nor that they have become the single modes of governing within these institutions. What I want to highlight is that these governance agendas do not discuss the role of (political) government in terms of a de-regulation in favor of private and not-for-profit organizations. Rather, they discuss it in terms of a re-regulation of governance that encourages an enterprise approach to the social sphere. These agendas envisage “a new ‘enabling’ role in which the function of government [is] to secure the conditions in which markets [can] operate more fully across a range of areas of social and economic life” (Lewis 2005: 205, my italics). The OECD, for instance, introduced the notion of an active society as “a concept that associates the well-springs of job growth and economic and social well-being with wider participation in society and growth in the entrepreneurial culture” (OECD 1992 cited Walters 1997: 224, my emphasis). In the mid 1990s, the EU presented the reform of its social policies as a shift from a ‘passive’ to an ‘active’ approach of society:

[T]here needs to be a move away from more passive income maintenance measures towards active labor market measures designed to ensure the economic and social integration of all people … [T]hose who are not in the labor market also have a useful role to play in society. (EC 1994: 47, my italics)

The EU’s redefining of the workforce along the lines of an active society has gone together with the reshaping of its approach to education and with considering human and social capital formation as a crucial element for improving social inclusion in the Union:

It is clear that the new opportunities offered to people require an effort from each one to adapt, particularly in assembling one’s own qualifications on the basis of ‘building blocks’ of knowledge acquired at different times and in various situations. The society of the future will therefore be a learning society … Education and training will increasingly become the main vehicles for self-awareness, belonging, advancement and self-fulfillment. Education and training, whether acquired in the formal education system, on the job or in a more informal way, is the key for everyone to controlling their future and their personal development … Immaterial investment and getting the best out of our human resources will improve competitiveness, boost jobs, and safeguard social achievements … The position of everyone in relation to their fellow citizens in the context of knowledge and skills therefore will be decisive … The future of the EU and its development will depend largely on its ability to manage the progress towards this new society. (EC 1995: 2, emphasis in original)

After the Union’s launch of this ambitious approach to education and training in the mid 1990s, the EU also started to combine its ideal of an active, ‘lifelong’ learning society with its attempt to mobilize civil society agencies for achieving social inclusion in the Union. Since the second half of the 1990s, NGOs have been considered key agencies in renewing governance in Europe and vital partners in shaping newly devised private-public partnerships:

[NGOs] can become ‘centers of expertise’ and capitalize on their knowledge of communities by becoming trainers and advisors for mainstream providers or governmental authorities. They can also develop materials to be used in mainstream curricula for public administration staff, social workers, etc. (EC 2007: 26)

In post-1989 Central and Eastern Europe, the supposed underdevelopment of well-functioning civil societies was considered one of the key problems of the ‘transitional democracies’ in the region. After the fall of communism, ‘civil society’ has become the target of various governmental and non-governmental interventions. Civil society became a thing to be revived, designed, and encouraged and a project to be supported by expert training and various forms of capacity building. In the EU, various new governance tools have been developed to try to effectively link the social and economic elements of the Union’s politics of integration and enlargement. Since the late 1990s, new so-called soft governance tools, such as the ‘open method of coordination,’ have been launched to introduce civil society agencies—as well as social partners, governments, experts, and academics—as key stakeholders into decision-making and attempts to experimentally renew and improve European governance in the enlarging Union.\(^\text{24}\) The central idea behind including NGOs in the EU’s new governance approach was that they “would not just participate in designing and implementing development strategies closer to the needs of the people and mobilizing endogenous economic and social resources, but also activate civil society and boost grass roots democracy” (Kohler-Koch and Rittberger 2006: 29). In chapters 6 and 7, I will reflect more extensively on how the changing governance agendas of IGOs, such as the EU and the World Bank, relate to the ‘strengthening’ of civil society and encouraging ‘grassroots’ democratic movements.

Conflict at the nexus of development and security

The increased focus on supposedly underdeveloped civil societies and on supposedly inadequately developed forms of human and social capital has also led to another explanation and approach of poverty and underdevelopment. Many of the development policies and regimes that emerged after the Second World War were primarily based on a capitalist, technological model of expansion and inclusion. If states and economies in the Third World would conform to western state and market models, so the argument went, these countries would ‘catch up’ with the West and would gradually be incorporated in international market economies. Poverty reduction was related to this model:

Emerging in the 1950s and lasting until the 1970s, the initial post-colonial development regime was mainly concerned with reducing poverty in the South through the promotion of economic growth based on investment and the application of science and technology. This was to be achieved through planning, state intervention, and economic redistribution. (Duffield 2001: 23)

Until the 1970s, development regimes took the basic unit of its politics—the nation state and its national economy—largely for granted. Similarly, the international security

\(^{24}\) See, for instance, Eberlein and Kerwer (2004), Zeitlin et al (2005), and Radulova (2007).
approaches of these decades primarily focused on *inter*-state conflicts and, thus, also tended to presuppose the state as the principal unit of its politics. However, since the 1980s a gradual radicalization of the politics of development has taken place, caused by a change of its global political economy and by its merging with newly articulated security agendas (Duffield 2002). With the increased pressure on the state and its sovereignty that has gone hand in hand with what many analysts have called ‘globalization’ and some ‘new regionalism’ (Larner and Walters 2002), novel security agendas have also appeared. From now on, security has also been framed in terms of *intra*-state forms of conflict between ethnic, religious, or cultural groups. Parallel to the appearance of this security approach, development programs have increasingly embraced a human, people-centered focus that prioritizes the development of people ahead of states:

[This development resulted in] a move away from an earlier dominance of state-led modernization strategies based on the primacy of economic growth and assumptions that the underdeveloped world would, after passing through various stages, eventually resemble the developed. Rather than economic growth per se, a broader approach to development emerged based on aggregate improvements in health, education, employment, and social inclusion as an essential precursor for the realization of market opportunity. (Duffield and Waddell 2006: 44)

However, with the increased focus of development institutions on conflicts between different ethnic and religious groups, minorities, majorities, and migrants, conflicts also tend to be increasingly explained in terms of ethnic, religious, or cultural differences and the (lack of) socio-cultural cohesion of the involved communities. A development report of the Swedish government of the mid 1990s very well summarizes this redirecting of security agendas:

The ‘new’ conflicts are about identities and the status, culture, and values of various groups. They are enacted in the social sphere rather than in arenas familiar to traditional security policy. As a complement to the concepts that are the common currency of traditional power politics … we must now introduce concepts appropriate to the community level. (SMFA 1997: 16)

We have seen similar moves in the approaches to development in the policies of various IGOs. EU development projects, for instance, have also begun to explicitly address the social and political dimensions of instability:

[Development instruments now need to take into account] their potential for balancing the interests and opportunities of *different identity groups within a state*, for encouraging *democratic governments* that enjoy widespread legitimacy *among the population*, for fostering consensus on key national issues … and for building mechanisms for the *peaceful conciliation of group interests*. (EC 1996b: 4, my italics)

Conflict management and the simultaneous focus on ‘getting the social relations right’ at the level of communities have become part of both newly articulated development and
newly formulated security approaches. This has gone together with other approaches to conflict and poverty:

[U]nderstanding conflict has moved its locus from conflicts between states to conflicts within and across them ... Households, communities, and populations furnish the terrain on which such conflicts are fought ... Development ... take[s] communities, livelihood systems and social networks as their point of reference. (Duffield 2007: 117) The focus of new security concerns is ... the fear of underdevelopment as a source of conflict, criminalized activity, and international instability. This reinterpretation, moreover, means that ... the idea of underdevelopment as dangerous and destabilizing provides a justification for continued surveillance and engagement. (Duffield 2001: 7)

This confluence between security and development does not necessarily imply that poverty causes conflict, but that it increases its probability. The consideration of poverty and underdevelopment as potentially contributing to the creation of instability has also motivated IGOs, such as the UNDP and the OSCE, to devise ‘human development,’ ‘human security,’ and other kinds of conflict management and community governance projects. The focus on human security is often described as stemming from a growing humanism within IGOs. Increasingly, so the argument goes, they employ human and minority rights norms and conventions, such as the UN Declaration of Human Rights and the Geneva Conventions, to improve and redirect their development programs. In this line of reasoning, human security and human development are presented as “integrating human rights with sustainable development” (UNDP 1998).

However, rather than examining human security beforehand from a humanistic and supposedly progressive perspective, I follow those recent studies that consider human security a principle of formation:

[Concepts, discourses, and practices of human security contribute to] producing the ‘humans’ requiring securing and, at the same time, calling forth the state/non-state networks of aid, subjectivity, and political practice necessary for that undertaking ... [T]he concern here is with human security as a relation of governance. Rather than focusing on human security as a specific condition or measurable state of existence, the emphasis is on human security as informing how international institutions and actors categorize, separate, and act upon ... populations. (Duffield and Waddell 2006: 2)

Practices of human security or human development represent a bio-political fusion of development and security by perceiving human beings who are considered as ‘not well able’ to produce their own basic needs in terms of underdevelopment. Governmental interventions are necessary to secure their well-being and reduce the possibly negative effects on the wider human and political communities to which they belong. These different elements—the focus on intra-state conflict, the adoption of a human security notion, and the legitimatization of new kinds of development programs—come together in the way in which the OSCE has developed in the course of the last two decades.
Since the early 1990s, the OSCE has started to dedicate itself explicitly to its member states’ internal affairs, and to issues of minority protection, fundamental freedoms, human security, and liberal democratization in particular (Schlotter 1999; Thomas 2001). The OSCE’s reorientation has gone together with the introduction of its so-called ‘human dimension.’ In 1990, “a ‘human dimension’ was added “to the ‘economic dimension’ of structural reform, leading the OSCE to emphasize the reform of [state] internal relations, including support for human rights, civil society, and democratization” (Duffield 2001: 71, my italics). The introduction of the human dimension was followed, in 1993, by the launch of the office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM). This instrument and the redirection of its policy mandate in terms of a combined human and economic dimension have also allowed the OSCE to legitimize its engagements with minority groups, such as the Roma. The extension of its mandate has much to do with the changing dynamics in Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the promise it entailed for reuniting Europe. In the first few years after 1989, the OSCE overconfidently claimed that “Europe is liberating itself from the legacy of the past,” inaugurating “a new era of democracy, peace, and unity” (CSCE 1990b cited Bloed 1993: 537). The OSCE’s initial vision for a ‘New Europe’ (CSCE 1990a) started from the assumption that the East and West, at least potentially, had primarily similar cultural and political infrastructures and that the collapsed Communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe would relatively smoothly change into western-style liberal democracies.

However, only two years later, the initial optimism had completely vanished and the tone of the OSCE had changed drastically. It acknowledged that “the legacy of the past remain[ed] strong” and started to consider the ‘transitional democracies’ in Central and Eastern Europe serious dangers to the stability of Europe’s entire security community:

> Economic decline, social tension, aggressive nationalism, intolerance, xenophobia, and ethnic conflicts threaten stability in the CSCE area. Gross violations of CSCE commitments in the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including those related to national minorities, pose a special threat to the peaceful development of society, in particular in new democracies. (CSCE 1992 cited Bloed 1993: 703-04).

The immediate cause for the redirection of OSCE policies was the outbreak of war in the former Yugoslavia in 1992. However, since then, the OSCE has begun to problematize the entire former East Bloc as a region of instability and insecurity and to develop its European ‘project of improvement’ as a supposedly necessary intervention in the region to overcome the “imagined structural dissimilarity” between East and West (Merlingen 2003: 372). This shift of focus was not intentional; in the beginning there was no grand idea. In a contingent way, “step-by-step and in response to the practical problems the [Office of the HCNM] encountered in the field, a more or less coherent approach to

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25 In the 1970s, the CSCE was set up as a security organization to defuse East-West tensions during the Cold War and to create more predictable socio-economic interstate relations and more liberal state policies in the divided Europe (Merlingen 2003). The CSCE’s 1975 Helsinki Final Act also provided an important instrument to address human rights issues for dissident groups in the East Bloc, for instance for the Charta 77 movement in the former Czechoslovakia (see also chapter 7).

26 Before 1995, the OSCE was called the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).
socializing post-socialist countries into norms of peaceful conflict resolution emerged over time” (ibid 373-74, my emphasis). As Max van der Stoel, the OSCE’s first HCNM, has stressed, crucial part of such a coherent approach is acknowledging that conflict prevention and post-conflict resolution “can be a success only if due account is taken of the human dimension” (cited Zellner and Lange 2001: 105). Structurally linking conflict resolution with the OSCE’s human dimension, and alarmed by the ‘destabilizing’ effects of “migration-producing countries” in Central and Eastern Europe on the rest of the continent,27 in 1993, the OSCE also began to look at the situation of Romani minorities in Europe.

In other words, the Roma did not only come into view of the OSCE because they were now considered “as representing a security issue” (Kovats 2001a: 95). More generally, the Roma’s inclusion in OSCE policy mandates has been a consequence of a rearticulation of its security approach. This is strongly related to perceiving conflict and its resolution in terms of human security. The framing of the former East Bloc as haunted by the legacies of its past and, thus—if we have to believe the OSCE’s own descriptions—by decline, ethnic tensions, aggressive nationalisms, intolerance, and xenophobia, has enabled the OSCE to conceptualize the region’s recent, current, and potential conflicts in terms of social regression and having causes that have led or could lead to grim forms of socioeconomic and political breakdown. This OSCE approach implies neither a kind of coercive, ‘imperial’ approach to those who are or were involved in ethnic tensions, nor a view in which these individuals and communities are victimized as poor, helpless, and passive. Rather, by making use of neo-liberal technologies to ‘responsiblize’ and activate individuals and collectives, the OCSE considers those who are involved in ethnic tensions, including the Roma, as allies in their peace building and conflict resolution projects. The OSCE’s Romani community policing programs illustrate this approach to conflict management.28 Building on neo-liberal approaches to community policing and empowerment, the OSCE has suggested:

Members of Roma and Sinti communities should be empowered to make the most effective and efficient use of … forums [such as community advisory boards, joint police-community workshops, public meetings, and open police days] with regard to the joint identification and solving of problems … Closely related to ethnic diversity awareness-raising, training on community policing should … cover good practices in establishing a partnership-based problem-solving approach with Roma and Sinti communities. (OSCE 2010: 19, 77)

Mobilizing a broad concept of policing,29 the OSCE promotes forms of conflict management in which the police and Romani communities, but also NGOs, local governments,

27 In his first report on the situation of the Roma and Sinti in Europe, the OSCE’s commissioner Max van der Stoel discusses Central and Eastern Europe in terms of “migration-producing countries” (van der Stoel 1993: 11) and calls for adequate domestic improvements to reduce the pressure on international migration (see also Guglielmo and Waters 2005).

28 See OSCE (2006b; 2007b; 2010), see also its forerunners developed by PER (2000b).

29 According to this broad conception of policing, “police officers are agents of civic governance who, often in co-operation with other agencies, assist people who experience some kind of personal emergency such as
and other partners commonly look for ways to decrease the ethnic tensions in which these communities are involved. In this way, the OSCE aims not only at empowering the involved communities, but also at reducing conflict and correlated insecurity and instability:

[A central aspect of the OSCE’s governmental mentality] is the emphasis it puts on the responsibility of citizens for the provision of public security. In addition to executive policing concentrated in the hands of the public police, there is room, in this view, for civil policing, i.e., for citizens and non-governmental organizations to play an active role in the policing of their communities. The nexus of self-policing and external policing is regarded as containing the potential for both effective and democratic policing. (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2005: 346-47, my emphasis)

This neo-liberal technique of conflict resolution needs to contribute to the reduction of ethnic tensions and to the empowerment of the involved communities, but also to a structural reform of the way in which institutions such as the police function:

The OSCE believes that conceiving of the police as an agency of social improvement that seeks to promote individual-level security in all its aspects is an important aspect of transforming a transitional police force into a human rights-oriented police service that enjoys the trust of the population. (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2005: 247)

Put differently, the articulation of neo-liberal techniques of governance—such as human security mechanisms—needs to come with a transformation in which institutions gradually integrate a human rights-oriented approach into their daily operations and policy implementations.30 This view leads me to the last issue I want to delineate in this chapter: the role that human and minority rights discourses have played in addressing the situation of Europe’s Romani minorities.

Reshaping European governance, displacing human rights?
According to a widely shared view, the violations of the human and minority rights of particularly the Central and Eastern Europe Roma have been among the most important reasons why Roma-related issues have become an integral part of the policies of various IGOs and NGOs (Kymlicka 2007; O’Nions 2007). However, as I have indicated while discussing human security, we cannot consider human and minority rights approaches simply politically ‘neutral’ articulations of progressive, humanist agendas of minority empowerment. Rather, we need to critically reflect upon the role that the articulation of human and minority rights perspectives have played in new forms of governance and new ways to identify and produce the ‘humans’ subjected to these perspectives. Recognizing that we need to distinguish different politics of human and minority rights vis-à-vis-
vis the Roma will also enable us to differentiate between the different ways in which agencies have articulated neo-liberal techniques to address the rights of Roma. In chapter 7, I will discuss the role that civil societal agencies have played in this debate. Here I focus on how the new governance agendas of IGOs—most notably of the EU—tend to consider human and minority rights a derivative of good, democratic governance structures, patterns, and practices.

IGOs such as the World Bank and the EU have related ‘governance’ to a normative framework in which we can distinguish between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ forms of governance. For many agencies involved in minority issues, ‘governance’ has become one of the new buzzwords to indicate the novelty of their approach and to point out that their approaches can only be adequately taken into account if situated in the recent shift from government to governance (introduction, chapter 1). Many IGOs consider governance a naturally existing and improvable condition and “a key component of policies and reforms for poverty reduction, democratization, and global security” (EC 2003: 3 §3).

Subsequently, governance has been qualified as ‘good’ when governmental structures, patterns, practices, processes, and designs generally contribute to poverty reduction, global security, and democratic and well-functioning political and socio-economic institutions. In one of its governance papers, the European Commission refers to a new UN agenda to introduce its own approach:

The UN Millennium Declaration states that creating an environment that is conducive to development and to the elimination of poverty depends, inter alia, on good governance within each country, on good governance at the international level and on transparency in the financial, monetary and trading systems. (EC 2003: 3 §2, my italics)

For the EU, critically assessing and benchmarking how states and NGOs, but also IGOs govern has become crucial for improving various kinds of issues, ranging from a state’s economic performance, environmental issues, and societal ‘well-being’ to NGO accountability and respect for human and minority rights:

The structures and the quality of governance are critical determinants of social cohesion or social conflict, the success or failure of economic development, the preservation or deterioration of the natural environment as well as the respect or violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms. (EC 2003: 3 §1, my italics)

The EU legitimates its focus on what it considers quantifiably different modes and patterns of governance as follows:

Making NGOs more accountable for what they do, is central to the EU’s new governance agenda: “NGOs have a duty to demonstrate that they have the expertise, management systems and internal quality control systems appropriate to the work they are undertaking on behalf of the [European] Commission … Where it is the NGO community that nominates interlocutors for dialogue with the Commission, the NGO associations and networks should provide information on the criteria and reasons for selecting these NGOs” (EC 2000a: 7, 11).
[A broad approach to governance] allows conceptually to disaggregate governance and other topics such as human rights, democracy, or corruption. Governance refers to the rules, processes, and behavior by which interests are articulated, resources are managed, and power is exercised in society ... The real value of the concept of governance is that it provides a terminology that is more pragmatic than democracy, human rights, etc. (EC 2003: 3 §4)

However, whereas here the EC still suggests that the governance approach enables a pragmatically helpful tool to distinguish various concepts—such as the notion of human rights—in what follows, the EC takes a substantial step further. It claims that ‘governance’ can be understood and used as a neutral and technical tool to describe the general ‘state of affairs’ in a certain society:

In spite of its open and broad character, governance is a meaningful and practical concept relating to the very basic aspects of the functioning of any society and political and social systems. It can be described as a basic measure of stability and performance of a society. As the concepts of human rights, democratization and democracy, the rule of law, civil society, decentralized power sharing, and sound public administration gain importance and relevance as a society develops into a more sophisticated political system, governance evolves into good governance. Today governance is generally used as a basic measure of quality and performance of any political/administrative system. (EC 2003: 3 §4, my emphasis)

This conception of governance and, most of all, this notion of human rights as predominantly grounded in good, democratic forms of governance is at odds with concepts of human rights that consider them grounded in international law, and a liberal tool to limit the sovereign state’s possibility to intervene in other ones or in the lives of its own citizens. I do not suggest that the conception of human rights reflected in the EU approach to governance is not grounded in international or European law. But this approach tends to ground human rights largely in the formal ways in which concrete political communities and the legal foundations of existing political systems meet generalized benchmarks of ‘good governance.’ This attitude toward human rights tends to displace one of the most important characteristics of international law, namely where it, at least in theory, guarantees “the formal equality of states and [does] not operate any discrimination based upon the characteristics of these states” (Guilhot 2008: 511). Indeed, a human rights policy that, to a large extent, is dependent on the categorization of differently qualified and quantified modes of governance “clearly discriminates between regimes: tyrannies, illiberal democracies, failed states, liberalizing democracies, rogue states, etc.” (ibid). The ultimate consequence of such a human rights approach is that the “formal equivalence of states is ... replaced by the open-ended and fine-grained taxonomy of modes of government, which, in turn, results in differentiated treatment”
Such a replacement implies, ultimately, that human rights tend to be represented as a specific, ‘good’ form of governance typical of democratic regimes.

To look at the compliance with human and minority rights primarily from the angle of benchmarked forms of governance has two crucial consequences. First, this approach implies that “there can be no contradiction between the preservation, the defence, or the extension of such forms of governance and human rights, since the latter depend on the former” (Guilhot 2008: 509). Second, this view of human rights implies that they cannot simply be understood as politically or ideologically neutral tools. The latter has been done by the representatives of a long post-Second World War tradition of human rights and peace activism (e.g., Falk 1981; Neier 2003), which was primarily based on an approach to international law as an adequate legal instrument for limiting state sovereignty. In contrast to this view—which merely understands human rights as a kind of natural rights outside the political sphere and as tools to limit its sovereign power—the ‘good governance’ approach tends to incorporate the human rights conception into the nervous systems of governmental rationalities and technologies:

To the extent that human rights designate specific political practices, institutional mechanisms, positive jurisdiction, modes of governance, administrative functions, etc., a human rights policy can only be a policy of regulation and transformation of governmentality … The human rights policy they developed is a policy that aims at shaping forms of governance in which human rights are no longer a normative, formal, or external constraint, but the internal premise of governmental practices. Viewed in this light, human rights become constitutive of the political and civil order. They are to be found not in legal, but in practical norms of government; they belong to specific institutional contexts and political traditions. They are inscribed in constitutional setups, they innervate from within judiciary, legislative, governmental and societal practices. Their repository is not international institutions, but the concrete thickness of governmentality, the practical organization of power. In short, they are modes of governance, political technologies, and concrete social practices that ensure the upholding of such rights even outside the sphere of [political] government. Promoting human rights means disseminating and institutionalizing such democratic forms of governance. (Guilhot 2008: 509, 510)

The recognition that human and minority rights are integral parts of modern forms of governmentality is a necessary condition of possibility for addressing that they always need to be understood from the angle of a politics of human and minority rights. In this respect, we can say that the conception of human rights has “evolved by integrating the realist critique of universal rights: the legal deficit of international law and the indetermination of its norms have provided this critique with its main targets” (ibid 512). At the same time, however, we need to reflect on the consequences of a too easy and smooth

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32 For the way in which OSCE policies have articulated such a differentiated treatment of its member states, see Merlingen (2003).

33 As Nicolas Guilhot (2008) emphasizes, this critique is not new, but as old as the concept of human rights and its universal declaration (see, most notably, Arendt 1963).
reinterpretation of human rights “as the empirical outcome of context-specific institutional and political practices or, in other words, of concrete instances of good government” (ibid).

There are different ways in which we could relate this ambiguous reinterpretation of human rights to the current situation of the Roma in Europe. In post-1989 human rights approaches to the Roma, we have been able to notice an almost permanent tension between, on the one hand, ceaseless references to the continuing violation of the Roma’s fundamental rights and, on the other, a simultaneous de-politicization of human and minority rights in the context of how European states and their institutions formally perform at the level of their governmental procedures. The way in which compliance with the Copenhagen Criteria for membership of the EU was interpreted shortly before the actual entry of Central and Eastern European countries in 2004 and 2007 illustrates this tension. According to the European Commission’s final monitoring reports on the preparations for EU membership, all countries that applied for membership generally met the deadlines and criteria in time. However, the key Roma-related element for the European Commission’s decision on these states’ entry to the EU was not whether they had ended the violation of the rights of their Romani minorities, but whether they had reformed their institutions according to the EU’s norms of ‘good governance.’ In agreement with my observation, Will Guy—who has assessed various EU’s accession procedures—has concluded:

[T]he Copenhagen Criteria for EU membership, including ‘guaranteed … respect for minorities,’ were undoubtedly taken seriously by candidate governments, particularly when critical comments were made by the EU. Nevertheless, the end results of [the EC’s] sustained monitoring was mainly formal compliance with required legislative changes and projects, which at most achieved localized improvements [of the situation of the Roma] while leaving the bulk of the problems untouched. (Guy 2009: 38, see also Guy and Kovats 2006; and the EU’s own critical evaluation of its Roma approach during the accession procedure, EC 2004a)

Substantiating my observation that the discrepancy between actual violations of the Roma’s rights and formal compliance with EU criteria is related, at least partially, to how, since the 1990s, the EU has governmentalized human rights requires more research. Nevertheless, yet another case of the violation of the Roma’s rights seems to support my hypothesis. In the summer of 2010, a dispute arose between the EU and the French government on the expulsion of Romanian and Bulgarian Romani migrants from France. However, the EU canceled her initially announced infringement procedure against France (EC 2010a) as soon as the French government promised to comply with the formal EU regulations. Thus, while there was much evidence that the violation of the rights of the involved Roma did not stop (ERRC 2010b), for the EC, the French promise

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34 However, I do not want to suggest that we can fully understand this case from the tension between rights and modes of governance. For a more extensive discussion of the French case and its relationship to processes of Roma problematization and securitization, see van Baar (2010a; 2011b).
to comply with the EU’s formal governmental procedures was enough to cancel an inquiry into the legality of the French measures against the Romani migrants.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I have shown that, after the collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe, particularly the involvement of IGOs and NGOs with the situation of the Roma in Europe has rapidly increased and gone together with the development of new forms and sites of knowledge formation. Often, the involvement of these IGOs and NGOs has been represented as a decisive break with how the Roma were dealt with in the past. Rather than disciplining, controlling, policing, or simply excluding the Roma, from now on, the focus would have been on developing, emancipating, empowering, and, in the end, including them on their own terms. I have explained how these new approaches have also got a new European dimension, for, since the fall of communism, the Roma have increasingly been considered as a European minority and the improvement of their situation as an issue that needs to be addressed at the European level. I have put forward that we cannot simply consider the new development, security, and rights approaches to the Roma as part of humanist and progressive agendas of emancipation. I have argued, rather, that we need to understand the current problematization of the Roma in terms of a European minority in light of simultaneously emerged neo-liberal forms of governmentality in Europe.

This chapter has explained what a governmentality approach to neo-liberalism implies, how it differs from understandings of neo-liberalism as policy or ideology, and how it could address the spatial specificity and unevenness of neo-liberal articulations. I have also delineated how we can understand some of the development programs, which IGOs and NGOs have recently devised to deal with the Roma, in light of neo-liberal forms of governmentality. I have indicated how the current reshaping of discourses and tools of governance has gone together with a renewed focus on development, security, and human rights. To some extent, the reoriented focus of the governance agendas of IGOs can also explain how they began to pay attention to Europe’s Romani minorities in the ways they did. However, these observations alone are far from sufficient to analyze the impact of neo-liberal forms of governmentality on the situation of the Roma in Europe. To investigate the effects of neo-liberal governmental technologies on the situation of the Roma, I have argued, we need to look at the how these technologies have actually been articulated with ‘local’ cultures, politics, and traditions of governance. This analysis is the central theme of the next chapters.
Chapter 6
Articulating Neo-liberalism and the Legacies of Communism

INTRODUCTION

In chapter 5, I introduced and theorized neo-liberalism as a form of governmentality and as a way to address the unevenness and hybridity of how neo-liberalism has been articulated around the globe. In this chapter, I will clarify what this alternative view implies for an analysis of the concrete realities and socioeconomic participatory chances of the Roma in present-day Central and Eastern Europe. I will show how the domestic articulation of neo-liberalism in the region has ambivalently impacted on the situation of the Roma, even leading to their dehumanization. I will explain, though, that this is not simply the result of neo-liberalism “writ large” (Ong 2006: 14). Rather, this situation is the consequence of how recently introduced neo-liberal governmental techniques have collided and been assembled with various everyday social, political, cultural, and economic practices and institutional settings, which partly need to be understood in the context of the legacies of communism.

In the first part of this chapter, I will examine how neo-liberal development programs, and so-called activation schemes in particular, have recently been introduced to improve the labor market participation of East Central European Roma. I will begin with putting into context the way in which activation programs relate to changing ideas and practices of welfare and its distribution. I will call into question the way in which, in World Bank activation programs meant for improving the employment chances of the Roma, they are problematized as ‘inactive.’ By means of an analysis of how activation schemes have been introduced to deal with the Roma in Slovakia, I will show that these programs have gone together with highly ambiguous practices on the ground, ranging from eviction, exploitation, and dehumanization to difficulties for Roma to effectively enact their legal citizenship rights.

In order to clarify that we cannot explain these problematic outcomes on the basis of neo-liberalism alone, in the second part of this chapter, I will discuss three legacies of communism that have greatly impacted on the contemporary situation. First, I will show how ideas and practices of socio-economic reform, including neo-liberal ones, played a crucial role throughout East Central Europe’s twentieth-century history and, thus, not only after 1989. The legacy of these reform ideas, agendas, and practices contests the often proclaimed idea that neo-liberalism has recently been imported to the region and
largely imposed on it from outside (Sigona and Trehan 2009b). Second, neo-liberalism has been articulated with a range of other socio-cultural and economic relationships that are connected, but not simply reducible to market relations. I will clarify this issue through interrogating the legacy of diverse kinds of alternative economies that were developed under communism and that have continued to play a role after the fall of the Berlin Wall. I will argue that, even though the Roma were also involved in such ‘second’ economies, their difficulty to gain from these alternative and informal networks under communism has also impacted on their post-1989 situation. Third and finally, I will discuss the legacy of communist institutional and everyday practices of racism against the Roma. This examination helps to illuminate how governmental tools, such as those of activation, have recently been collided and cross-fertilized with discourses and practices in which the Roma are problematized as deviant and inadaptable subjects. These legacies of communism and the ways in which they have recently been articulated with neo-liberal techniques of governing urge us to reconsider ‘global’ notions of neo-liberalism.

CHALLENGING THE ROMA’S DEPENDENCY AND POVERTY THROUGH ACTIVATION POLICIES

At the beginning of the new millennium both the United Nations and the World Bank have published voluminous reports on the situation of the Romani minorities in Europe. In 2002, the United Nations Development Program published a so-called ‘human development report’ on the Central and Eastern European Roma under the title *Avoiding the Dependency Trap* (2002). In 2005, the World Bank followed with yet another large report, entitled *The Roma in an Expanding Europe: Breaking the Poverty Circle* (2005b). As the rhetoric of these two titles already indicates, these reports represent the current situation of the Roma in Europe as a tough and persistent one in which poverty and dependency are far-reaching, enduring, and hard to challenge phenomena. Nevertheless, as these titles show as well, the reports want to offer strategies and suggest interventions to break the allegedly vicious circles of poverty and exclusion and to avoid the dependency of many Roma on state support and other patterns that are considered as barriers to their societal inclusion and self-determination.

In a report on employment opportunities of the Roma in the Czech Republic, the World Bank has elaborated on one such strategy in the field of unemployment policies. In this report, the World Bank adds the term ‘inactivity trap’ to the rather heavily loaded language of other circles and traps. As the report explains, the inactivity trap points to the phenomenon that unemployed persons who receive social welfare benefits “have weaker motivation to look for a job” (World Bank 2008: 17). In order to deal with the specificity of the unemployment of many Roma—of whom many would have “skills constraints” (ibid 2)—the World Bank suggests reclassifying them and dividing them into three different categories: “In order to understand the nature of Roma joblessness it is important to divide the concepts of unemployment, inactivity, and discouragement” (44). The majority of the Czech Roma, the Bank suggests, is actually not unemployed, but “outside the labor force” or “economically inactive” (42n38). These so-called inactive Roma are persons of working age who “are not participating in the labor market [and] are also not actively looking for a job” (44). Additionally, the World Bank divides
between the “truly inactive” (33), who are simply “disinterested” (33) in work, and the “discouraged,” who had looked for a job in the past, but have lost confidence in finding one, “due to their actual or perceived inability to find employment” (44). In particular those who belong to one of these two categories are at risk of yet another trap: the “joblessness trap,” which is closely “associated with the erosion of skills and morale” (13). To avoid all these risky traps and vicious circles and to “make work pay” (24) in the future, the World Bank introduces again a new set of technical expressions. Effectively “closing the skills gap” (3) and avoiding the “path dependency” (13) of many Roma require “strategic vocational skill upgrading” (38), attempts to “incentivize” (39) the Roma, “measures to tighten responsibilities of job-seekers” (24), and efficient “client profiling” by employment offices (25). Particularly in the cases of the inactive and the discouraged Roma, the traps need to be challenged by the “outsourcing of activation services” (27) to private and non-governmental organizations, and by the building on “subsidized employment, public works programs, or ‘community employment’ as a central intervention for unskilled Roma” (38) and as a “crucial activation tool” (3) to turn the tide.

How should we assess this discourse of activation and inactivity and the introduction of various new instruments to deal with the Roma? The World Bank’s Roma approach has been developed in the context of a move toward the development of neo-liberal governmental technologies to deal with marginalized groups (chapter 5). The Bank’s study follows an international trend to describe social policy reform processes as ones moving toward active welfare regimes. The website of the Active Social Policies European Network, for instance, describes these processes as follows:

Existing welfare state arrangements are being reformed and new ones introduced, reflecting a shift in the main objectives of these arrangements: from citizens’ protection to citizens’ participation. Policy developments at EU level have a clear impact on these reforms. The European Employment Strategy as well as the Open Coordination Method on Social Inclusion are examples of EU policy interventions that stimulate and coordinate the development of active welfare states EU wide. The introduction of so-called ‘active social policies’ or ‘activation programs’ is an important ingredient of attempts to make welfare states more active and activating. These policies and programs are targeted at unemployed, marginalized, and excluded groups in society. Most of them aim at integrating these groups in the labor market and improving their employability. (ASPEN 2009)

The notion of activation contains different kinds of employment measures with diverse approaches and emphases dependent on the social, cultural, and political traditions of individual countries or even of different regions within a country:

Despite the existence of these socially determined differences, all the measures have in common the fact that they are based on a new definition of the relationship between

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1 The report puts forward that the category of the “truly inactive” has a clear gender dimension: most of them are women, for instance mothers who choose to stay at home to care for children (World Bank 2008: 1, 8, 9, 10-11, 44).
rights and responsibilities, in other words a new social contract. They all share the principle that the main responsibility for dealing with unemployment lies with the individual. In this context, responsibility is not simply taken to mean that the causes of unemployment are individual (that is, blame), but also in terms of making the individual responsible for implementing strategies to find work. (Crespo Suárez and Serrano Pascual 2004: 13)

Thus, the introduction of activation measures relates to the endeavor to reshape the relationships between state and society and those between state and economy (chapter 5). The redefinition of welfare according to the introduction of designs for developing an active society has gone together with the emergence of new forms of citizenship—such as those of the active, contracted, empowered, and responsible citizen—and with new approaches to unemployment (chapter 5). As the ASPEN website also explains, the aim of activation programs is not only labor market integration, but also social inclusion and participation in a more general sense. Thus, the introduction of activation policies in various European countries could be related to attempts to increase ‘human and social capital’ formation of groups who are or tend to be marginalized (chapter 5). The European Anti-Poverty Network, for instance, describes activation as “an investment in human, social, psychological, and cultural resources” (EAPN 2005). The EAPN also warns that—when activation policies are solely introduced to reduce dependency and the costs of social benefit schemes—these policies risk to increase, rather than decrease, poverty and social exclusion. Therefore, the EAPN introduces a number of criteria for what is called ‘good activation,’ that is, measures that are “capable of delivering alleviation of poverty and social exclusion” (ibid). It is particularly the wider notion of social activation, as well as its close relation with labor market integration, that has recently been incorporated in various programs aimed at improving economic and social participation of the Roma.2

What interests me in this chapter in the first place is not whether these activation programs have been successful or not. It is not primarily the discrepancy between policy formation and its implementation to which I want to pay attention. I am also not mainly interested in whether these schemes can be considered as examples of ‘good’ or ‘bad’ activation.3 Rather, I want to examine how the articulation of these neo-liberal forms of governmentality aimed at delineating and constituting post-communist forms of welfare have shaped and reshaped Roma representations and led to new or renewed forms of minority governance. This approach covers an analysis of the ways in which activation

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2 Examples of the mobilization of activation policies to deal with Romani minorities are known from Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Hungary, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, and Slovakia (UNDP 2002; GCR 2004b; GSR 2004a; CoE 2005; EC 2005; ERRC and Númena 2007; Syrjä and Valtakari 2008; World Bank 2008). In some cases—such as those in the Czech Republic, Croatia, and Slovakia—the development of these policies has been actively encouraged and partly funded by EU programs, such as PHARE and the European Social Fund (ESF). More generally, EU institutions have actively contributed to the dissemination of activation concepts and practices in EU member states (Crespo Suárez and Serrano Pascual 2004; Serrano Pascual and Crespo Suárez 2007; van Berkel and Valkenburg 2007).

3 For an excellent, comparative case study on the introduction of activation policies in East Central Europe, see Sirovátka (2008).
works on the ground, of how activation has been articulated, of how techniques and ideas that are related to this notion function in daily practice, and of what effects they have on how the Roma perceive themselves and are seen by others. As I explained in chapter 5, we can understand changing Roma problematizations in light of shifting discourses and practices of governance and in view of the latter’s impact on minority issues and conceptions. In chapter 4, I showed that conceptions of welfare and well-being are historically variable and unstable and, since the late eighteenth century, more closely related to bio-politics and the regulation of populations and minoritized subgroups. Thus, we need to think of contemporary welfare regimes as constructed, contested, and often contradictory constellations:

[Welfare states] create—not just reflect—arrangements of social divisions and differences, identities and inequalities, relationships and resources. Welfare states normalize a conception of a ‘way of life’ and the people who live it. They promote it, they naturalize it, and they enforce it. (Clarke 2004: 147-48)

In the various ways in which welfare is materialized, made intelligible, and related to certain desires and imaginaries, we can see how it is aligned with, for instance, equally contestable practices and conceptions of state, nation, and culture. New governmental technologies dealing with the distribution of welfare to a population reshape how welfare and well-being are understood, who are considered as the welfare recipients, and who are seen as contributors to a state’s welfare. Thus, changing systems of welfare provisions go with what we can call a politics of welfare and with new ways to invent and reconstitute the categories of the needy as well as of the privileged. Accordingly, activation policies, and new modes of welfare governance more generally, can only be adequately examined if we analyze how the ‘social problems’ they are considered to deal with, and the individuals or groups they should serve, are simultaneously shaped and reshaped.4 In the context of changing notions and instruments of welfare in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe, these shifts have gone together with new identity formations, including new approaches to ethnic, national, sexual, and religious minorities, as well as with new forms of inclusion and exclusion (Haney 2002; Szalai 2009).

These general remarks about changing welfare conceptions and practices lead me back to my earlier question of how we are to assess discourses of activation and inactivity, once they are related to the Roma’s situation in Central and Eastern Europe. It has been widely discussed that many Roma lost their work in the aftermath of the fall of communism. Will Guy, for instance, has outlined the huge impact of these transformations on the lives of many Roma:

[B]y their widespread loss of legal employment Roma have also been deprived of whatever improvements in social identity and limited popular legitimacy they had been grudgingly accorded in state socialist society ... [I]mpoverished Roma now subsist on insecure, short-term payments in the black economy or remain inactive in

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their urban slums or rural hovels by day ... In this way many Roma are forced daily to confirm their negative stereotype in local eyes as work-shy, scrounging thieves, while those who behave quite differently are nevertheless branded with the same image. (Guy 2001c: 22-23)

It is in light of the strong relation between the legacies of communism, the renewed corroboration of stereotypical Roma representations, and the current socioeconomic and cultural dynamics in Central and Eastern Europe that I want to call into question the notion that “inactivity is the technical term used to denote the status of being outside the labor force” (World Bank 2008: 6n1, my emphasis). The notions of activation and inactivity—when applied to the current situation of the Roma and attached to schemes aimed at enhancing their socioeconomic mobility—cannot simply be understood as technical and politically neutral. I will explore how new discourses and techniques of activation have been used to deal with the situation of the Roma in Slovakia. By so doing, I will show that their emergence has led to new forms of the Roma’s exclusion and to the reinforcement of stereotypical Roma representations.

CHANGING WELFARE, CHANGING STATES OF MIND

In the summer of 2002, some members of the Romani minority of the Eastern Slovak town of Bardejov told me that every now and then when evening falls, police officers show up in their neighborhood. Around 9.30 pm a police car usually drives slowly through their streets and turns on the car’s radiotelephone to announce: “Come on Gypsies, it’s time to go to bed! Take your kids away from the street and turn off your lights. Tomorrow is a new working day!” The local Roma consider this police behavior to be extremely humiliating, most of all because the majority of them became unemployed after 1989 and did not manage to find a new job since then. One man explained to me that this kind of degradation is usually not restricted to the police: “From time to time, when we stand in line at the municipal employment office and it’s our turn, the office suddenly closes or we are left out” (interview 2002f).

Many Central and Eastern European Roma have bad experiences with state institutions looking after employment, housing, health care, education, or public safety for the Roma, as well as with companies where Roma have tried to apply.\(^5\) Employment offices, for instance, often apply double standards when it comes to attempts to employ Roma. Frequently, employees of such labor offices express their prejudices openly. When the director of a labor office in Prague was asked in 2005 for the reasons of high unemployment among the Czech Roma, he suggested that “it’s because of the Romani culture and their lifestyle; they do not fit with the discipline of work. Roma do not have the motivation to work; they are unreliable, lazy, and prefer to live on social assistance [rather] than earn a living” (cited Hyde 2006: 3-4). While law in most Central and Eastern European countries forbids the registration of unemployed persons on the basis of

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\(^5\) Several reports have documented these experiences (see, for instance, CoE 2005; 2006; ERRC 2006a; 2007c; 2007b; ERRC and Númena 2007; OSI 2007; AI 2007; 2008; 2010a; 2010c; 2010d; 2010b).
ethnicity, several cases have been documented where labor offices register either the unemployed or vacancies with an ethnic reference. In 1999, the director of the Slovak National Labor Office, for instance, publicly announced that employment offices all over the country usually marked Romani applications with an R without informing the applicants. He suggested that this practice was not discriminatory, but, rather, necessary to deal efficiently with the Roma’s “complicated social adaptability” (RFE/RL 1999b: 26). He added that this form of registration helps the country to allocate EU monies aimed at improving the situation of the national Romani minority. More recently, the European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC)—a Budapest-based non-governmental human rights organization—has registered a case where a Hungarian labor office systematically enrolled companies that are unwilling to employ Roma by adding an R to the company’s name in the office’s computer system (Hyde 2006). Throughout the years of its existence, the ERRC has documented many cases where companies and state-related offices and services practiced discriminatory attitudes toward the Roma.

It is in this climate of prejudiced attitudes toward the Roma of many labor offices and companies that, between 2003 and 2004, the Slovak government introduced a thorough revision of its welfare programs, including activation policy and radical cuts in social benefits (GSR 2003a; 2004a; Smith and Rochovská 2007). In February 2004, the reduction of welfare allowances caused extreme social unrest among those who were affected by these measures. Many people who were getting social benefits, including a large number of Roma, started to demonstrate, mostly in peaceful ways and particularly in Central and Eastern Slovakia (Marušák and Singer 2009). However, after a few incidents where Roma looted shops, Slovak media persistently framed the protests as ‘Roma unrest,’ ‘Roma riots,’ or ‘Roma lootings’. In response to unorthodox measures taken by the Slovak government, a Slovak daily newspaper headed “This is war!” For the first time since the fall of communism, the Slovak government mobilized the national army to deal with internal affairs. State officials announced that this mobilization was necessary to “monitor Romani communities” and “restore public order”. Suggesting a state of emergency, the Slovak Minister of the Interior canceled all leaves of his police officers (ERRC 2004b). During a visit to Eastern Slovakia, Mikuláš Dzurinda, the country’s Prime Minister at that time, legitimized the mobilization of about thousand soldiers and a few thousand police officers as a security measure. He publicly stated that “state authorities will make use of any legal tools to punish violence so that people could feel safe” (cited SITA 2004c).

The Roma were particularly blamed for causing an insecure situation for their fellow citizens. Dzurinda stated that the mobilization of the army marked a turning point: “For

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6 While this practice was abandoned in 1999, some Slovak labor offices later introduced a system that marked non-Romani applications with a B of biely, meaning ‘white’ in Slovak (Zoon 2001b: 26, 109n54, n55; Vašeka 2001: 180).

7 Several cases have been reported, for instance, where Roma called a company that offered jobs. They were invited to come to their office, but once the Roma showed up, company representatives declared that the positions were already filled. However, after their visits it turned out that the vacancies were not filled at all or, later than their visit, given to non-Romani applicants (Bodrogi and Danka 2006; CoE 2006).


9 See SITA (2004h; 2004g; 2004e).
thirty years, we have lacked the courage to consider more deeply the fact that those people who do not work but abuse the social benefit earn more than employed people. Maybe it was necessary for this moment to come” (cited Magdolenová 2004). His remark that those who are unemployed make more money than the employed not only strained the truth and underestimated the consequences of the changing welfare system. It also neglected the reasons for extreme poverty among many, mostly long-term unemployed Roma. Moreover, his claim that the Roma had already started to abuse the system under socialism reversed the causes and effects of their current situation and reinforced a prevalent popular stereotype of the Roma as profiteers, parasites, and socially deviant subjects. In 2002, a shopkeeper in the center of Košice, for instance, told me: “We want to go forward, but the Gypsies don’t. They are feeble-minded and have a bad mentality. They will never change. If we give them money, they only abuse it” (interview 2002b). Someone else whom I interviewed came up with an explanation for this alleged behavior: “Mentally, the Roma have got stuck in the communist past. Then, they began to learn how to exploit the social system” (interview 2002c). This is a cynical remark or, interpreted differently, a troublesome outcome of a series of communist practices aimed at assimilating the Roma. As I will explain later in this chapter, under communism, the Roma’s alleged inadaptability was considered a result of the capitalist and feudal roots of their way of life. Cynically enough, the Roma’s alleged difficulty to adapt to the post-communist world order has frequently been interpreted as their pathological addiction to former communist living habits and behavioral patterns. The Roma’s supposed inadaptability under both communism and post-communism has therefore reinforced the idea that they are not able to adapt at all, no matter what political system dominates. As a result, the Roma’s marginalization is frequently problematized in terms of culture and behavior. Consequently, culture and poverty are racialized in a troublesome way.

The political responses to the social unrest clarify that Slovak politicians, the responsible ministers in particular, related the need for the reform of the social system more or less directly to the situation of the country’s Romani minority. In reply to the ‘Roma riots’ and in order to re-establish ‘public order,’ the government decided to raise “social benefits to those actively seeking work” (SITA 2004d). Introducing this measure, the government tried to compensate the general reduction of social benefits with the increase of the payments for those who are involved in activation policy.10 However, activation policy has not been introduced to exclusively deal with the situation of the Roma. In general, activation policy has been introduced to manage the trajectory of unemployed persons toward a paid job and, therefore, is officially considered as only a temporary solution to those who are looking for employment. As soon as they have increased their ‘employability’ and found a job, the policy’s aim is achieved. Those who follow skills trainings or are involved in educational programs to enter the labor market, get, for a limited period of six months, a so-called ‘activation payment’ in addition to some basic social benefits for the unemployed. Employers, including NGOs, who employ someone who is participating in an activation program, are subsidized. Many of those who are involved in activation policy participate in ‘public works programs’ or ‘community work,’ which are forms of employment considered as contributing to local or national

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10 See SITA (2004d; 2004a; 2004b) and Spolu (2004b).
welfare and well being. This form of work, which is generally referred to in Slovakia as activation work, includes employment in garbage collection, public garden work, and other low-skilled professions. As the new Slovak Act on Employment Services clarifies "activation activity [sic] is defined as support for maintaining the working habits of the job seeker … Activation activity may be performed in the form of minor communal services performed by the latter, or of voluntary works organized by a legal person or by a natural person” (GSR 2004a).

![Image of a Romani NGO in Eastern Slovakia, including the badge of the European Social Fund. This community center is called an 'activation center' (aktiváčné centrum). Photo: Yolande Jansen, 2005](image)

The Slovak government considers the introduction of its activation policy as a success and a contribution to meet the EU’s Lisbon Agenda and an expression of its ambition to help make the EU the world’s most competitive knowledge-based economy (EC 2000c). Only in the year 2004, more than 200,000 citizens participated in the activation programs, which were co-funded by the Slovak government and the European Social Fund (ESF) and mostly administered by municipalities and NGOs (UNDP 2007: 77). The welfare system reform has reduced the expenses of the Slovak government on social assistance. In November 2005, the Slovak newspaper Sme announced that this state budget would even have been dropped to 50 per cent of what was the common spending before 2004.
Yet, in order to evaluate the impact of this reform, we need to examine what has actually happened on the ground. The social policy reorganization has resulted into a deteriorated housing situation for many of the unemployed, including numerous Roma. Due to the cuts of the social allowances, the numbers of Roma who can no longer pay their rents on time have rapidly increased. After the introduction of the new welfare system, many more renters have decided to evict Roma from their apartments due to their arrears of rent. In many cases, Roma have been evicted to so-called ‘sub-standard housing’ or ‘houses for non-adaptable citizens,’ which are usually abandoned or newly created apartments or houses in segregated urban or rural areas where good facilities are rare. In many of these cases, the housing rights of the involved Roma have been violated (ERRC 2004a; 2006d; MŠF et al 2006).

However, even if we only examine the impact of the activation projects themselves the picture becomes gloomy. Whereas activation policy does not particularly target the Roma, many of them have been involved in ‘activation activities,’ activation work in particular. In some regions of the country, practically all who have been registered for activation projects have a Romani background. In the Central Slovak town of Brezno, for instance, one of the main local companies offers ‘activation activities’ to 275 employees, of whom 95 per cent is Romani. In the Brezno region, this company is commonly referred to as ‘the Gypsy Company’ (Oravec and Bošelová 2006). We need to evaluate this

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11 The eviction of Roma had already been made more easy by the introduction of a new law in 2001—the legislative act no. 261/2001—which has substantially weakened the legal position of tenants (MŠF et al 2006). More generally, we need to see this act and the acts on social assistance and employment services (GSR 2003a; 2004a) as part of a longer social policy reform trajectory, which started with the end of Mečiar’s neo-authoritarian rule (1993-97), the election of a center-right coalition government under the leadership of the Christian democratic party of Dzurinda (1998-2006), and the post-1997 introduction of neo-liberal governmental techniques to Slovakia’s political and socio-economic life (Smith and Rochovská 2007; Stenning et al 2010: 49-55).

12 In the Czech Republic, the authorities introduced yet another technical term to describe this form of sub-standard housing. In 1994, some municipalities started to experiment with evicting Roma to so-called holobyty (‘bare’ flats or apartments) in suburbs, at the fringes or even outside of municipal borders. In some cases, companies have been hired to produce a kind of container apartments that offer only rudimentary facilities. In the mid 1990s, many politicians and local authorities embraced the holobyty solution (interview 2003g; Višek 2003). Evictions have been motivated by the debts of tenants, but also by attempts to gentrify neighborhoods, and by the interests of ruling or campaigning political parties or mayors. In 1994, for instance, the then ruling political party ODS in the Czech town of Kladno campaigned by putting posters on walls in public spaces that explicitly promoted the segregation of Roma in holobyty. The poster stated that “civilized people [were] obliged to live in direct contact with asocial groups of citizens … If we want to influence these citizens positively … we need to concentrate them … The advantage of this solution is the long-term influence on the same group using a concentration of means. It is not possible to change their lifestyle in a positive way if they are scattered all over and not all of them are registered” (cited Zoon 2001a: 177). The posters also called for “alternative punishments” because “fines are only paid by civilized people” (ibid). In the course of the years, the devastating effects of the holobyty solution have become clear. The segregation of Roma in the Czech Republic has steadily grown and resulted in a number of new serious social and economic problems (COHRE et al 2002; Baršová 2003; ERRC 2006c; 2006b; OSCE 2008).

13 UNDP data suggest that almost 50 per cent of all Slovak Romani households receive a so-called ‘activation allowance’ (2007: 49-50).
ethnic labeling in light of how activation policies have contributed to new forms of exclusion.

In Slovakia activation policies do not at all function as a tool to increase the number of those who have a relatively stable job. In the first year of their existence, activation measures had only led to an independent job in the case of about one per cent of the participants. Moreover, in most of the cases, ‘activation activities’ have not been combined with training programs (UNDP 2007: 71). Laco Oravec and Zuzana Bošelová (2006) of the Milan Šimečka Foundation in Bratislava have remarked that this could not really come as a surprise for in this period, according to Slovak statistics, the number of registered jobs in Slovakia was twenty times lower than the number of registered unemployed persons. They have also put forward that, due to the government’s decision that an activation payment could be received on the basis of an open-ended term, rather than of a limited period of six months, “activation policy [has] evolved from a short-term active labor market policy tool into a new form of long-term social dependency” (2006: 14-15). Consequently, this policy has created the possibility to involve participants continuously in ‘activation activities,’ which have by now become the equivalent of underpaid jobs.\(^\text{15}\)

A serious consequence of how this policy has been enacted is that activation work has enabled employers to flexibly recruit a cheaper and well exploitable labor force. Several companies “have dismissed their employees and replaced them with individuals from the activation program” (Oravec and Bošelová 2006: 16). This has particularly hit many marginalized Roma. About 60 per cent of the members of this group who are currently involved in ‘activation activities’ are actually carrying out the same work as they did before (UNDP 2007: 80). In other words, their working status has shifted from doing work on the regular labor market to doing it as part of activation programs. However, the general payment for activation work is substantially lower than the official minimum wage in Slovakia—only about 60 per cent of the latter. For this reason, Oravec and Bošelová call this practice “a form of modern slavery” (2006: 15). Their research reveals that the Romani activation workers habitually need to do the worst, most degrading, physically heaviest, and most labor-intensive tasks. They have also documented cases where the Roma were demanded to do work that did not belong to their official duties, such as work in the households of non-Roma and the performance of personal tasks for mayors and activation project managers. Even in cases where activation involves public works, it regularly happens that municipalities mobilize the participants to do more or less useless work, such as the daily cleaning of the streets of the town where this was formerly done once a week.

\(^{14}\) Since then, the results have not substantially improved (ERRC 2007b; UNDP 2007). Comparable bad results of attempts to employ or reemploy Roma and Travelers through activation policies have recently been reported from the Czech Republic, France, and Portugal (Bedard 2007; ERRC and Númena 2007).

\(^{15}\) During fieldwork conducted in 2005 and 2006 in Slovakia and the Czech Republic, I discovered that almost all of the Roma who actually had a job were not employed on regular conditions, but participated more or less permanently in ‘activation’ and ‘community work’ (interview 2005g; 2005h; 2005j; 2005d; 2005m; 2005n; 2005k; 2005b; 2006a; 2006b; quantitative research corresponds to my field work experience, see UNDP 2007).
Due to the fact that the Roma are generally overrepresented in activation work, in many local cases the activation programs that have been initiated to enhance the ‘employability’ and “maintain the working habits of the job seeker” (GSR 2004a: art 52, §1) function as a form of ethnicity-based neo-liberal governmentality that racializes post-communist class formations, naturalizes ethnic differences, and maintains, rather than reduces, ‘the habits’ of the majority to sub-humanize or even dehumanize the Roma. Indeed, since the activation programs have thus far not resulted in regular employment for most of the involved Roma, these policies tend to reinforce stereotypical Roma representations as if they are lazy, useless, inadaptable, and inactive. The Slovak welfare reforms have thus produced effective sites of intervention in what call be considered the unforeseen dehumanizing effects of the activation approach. This bio-political regulation involves “not only a process through which regulatory power produces a set of subjects. It is also the process of … de-subjectivation, one with enormous political and legal consequences” (Butler 2004: 98). In many cases, Romani activation workers who are formally Slovak citizens do not enjoy basic housing, labor, and human rights, because their second-class work rank and tremendously marginalized position, rather than their official citizenship, determine their living conditions.

The troublesome temporal or even long-term evaporation of several important components of citizenship can be linked with the current trend toward ‘contractualism’ (Yeatman 1998). In neo-liberal market strategies, citizenship has less been conceptualized as a ‘status’—associated with rights, safety nets, benefits, and the like—and gradually more as a ‘contract’: a conditional access to rights. In accordance with this trend, in place of the term ‘right to employment’ the term ‘right to access to employment’ has recently been introduced to Slovak social policy reforms (UNDP 2007: 77). However, the contractualization of citizenship goes beyond the specific context of employment related contracts, such as ‘individual action plans’ and contracts with job seekers (chapter 5). This contractualization includes innovative social contracts:

[They invoke] new forms of governmentality that are based on the inculcation of new forms of governable subject, subjects in which the person—his or her ‘inner will’—becomes a resource enabling the transformation of welfare states through the transformation of obligations into commitments. (Newman 2007: 367)

From the angle of neo-liberalism as governmentality (chapter 5), the endeavor to activate marginalized groups can be seen as technologies in which individuals are innovatively constituted as governable subjects: “activation measures can be understood as opening up more of the person to governmental power, requiring them to collaborate in the development of new subjective orientations to the worlds of work and welfare” (ibid 366). Activation measures problematize citizens as freely choosing and responsible agents, rather than as passive welfare subjects, by incorporating them in processes in which responsibilities are increasingly dealt with at an individual, rather than a collective level. By shifting responsibilities toward private persons, they are encouraged to be ‘active’—yet only in particular ways—and engage themselves in partnership with the state “in finding solutions to the problems of welfare after the welfare state” (ibid 368).
Yet, the frequently one-sided focus on those who need to be ‘activated’ and on the enhancement of their ‘human and social capital’ to remove their “skills constraints” (World Bank 2008: 2) risks to neglect the socioeconomic, political, and historical reasons that have led to their exclusion. The discourses and practices of activation and the correlated narratives of social inclusion, cohesion, and self-empowerment tend to avoid the use of traditional categories—such as power, poverty, domination, equality, and exploitation—and often one-sidedly represent existing practices of exclusion as problems of inadequately mobilized social capital (Mayer 2003). This tendency to isolate an individual’s biography or group’s history from the larger political, historical, and socioeconomic context has strong moralizing and de-politicizing effects: politically complex trajectories toward marginalization and their intersections with practices of citizenship, governance, and identification tend to be transformed into problems of morality, decency, and individual responsibility, which primarily need to be solved by the marginalized themselves. As the Slovak case illustrates, governmental techniques that have officially been introduced to ‘activate’ citizens and encourage them to make choices on the basis of new social and labor market opportunities, have been turned into the exercise of coercive strategies that often require the Roma to take up what regularly remains badly paid work on the margins of the labor force in the face of the withdrawal of state welfare allowances.16

The World Bank has suggested that the employment opportunities of the ‘inactive’ Roma in Central and Eastern Europe should be improved by introducing activation policies while simultaneously taking into account the ‘nature of Roma joblessness.’ Interestingly enough, however, the World Bank approach relies heavily on references to ‘best practices’ of the governance of activation in Western states, such as Australia, Germany, the Netherlands, Scandinavian countries, and the United Kingdom. Apart from the question of whether the practices in these countries can be considered as ‘best’ ones,17 the World Bank study neglects that the history of welfare and other socioeconomic practices in former socialist countries, let alone the impact of socialist legacies on Romani minorities, cannot easily be compared with those in Western ones. The World Bank states that “the inactive” and “hard to place Roma long-term unemployed” (2008: 19) can be dealt with by adapting domestic policies to internationally established ‘best practices’ of activation. In the Czech case that the World Bank’s report discusses, it puts forward that this strategy involves “carefully reviewing international experience, adapting it to the Czech context, and designing promising pilot interventions with in-built impact evaluation” (ibid 37). The Bank considers this procedure of the permanent review, design, and

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16 The section on the impact of activation policies of the UNDP report on the living conditions of the Roma in Slovakia concludes: “welfare recipients are forced rather than motivated to work” (2007: 81). Despite this clearly critical note, this UNDP report has generally failed to address the relationship between the current governance of activation in Slovakia on the one hand, and the emergence of new forms of stereotypical Roma representations as well as of discriminatory attitudes toward them, on the other. It remains a mystery why the UNDP has explicitly decided to exclude an analysis of discrimination toward the Roma in the labor market from its investigations (ibid 76n29) for such an examination could have led to a better and more critical evaluation of how activation policies have been enacted in Slovakia.

17 Various studies have addressed the shortcomings of the articulation of activation schemes in Western countries (Bredgaard and Larsen 2008; Dahlstedt 2008; Fuller et al 2008; Newman and Tonkens 2011).
redesign of activation schemes a “reform laboratory” or “policy laboratory” approach (ibid 37).

However, as my examination of activation schemes in Slovakia implies, we need to critically interrogate how such reform laboratories have affected the socioeconomic position of those whom the World Bank describes as the “hard to place Roma long-termed unemployed.” The Slovak case shows that marginalized Roma, rather than being actively reintegrated and empowered to effectively enhance their opportunities, tend to be forced to perform well-established stereotypes. In this case, neo-liberal forms of governmentality have influentially rearranged disciplinary and sovereign practices of power. The ‘traditional’ seam between sovereignty and citizenship—which assumed an almost self-evident relation between a state, its territory, and full rights for this state’s citizens—has been broken open and produced spaces in which the poorest among the Roma are on a daily basis confronted with various degrees of insecurity. In order to claim their rights, more often than not, they need to look beyond the official state and market structures and rely on the interventions of NGOs and advocacy and human rights organizations (chapter 7). At the same time, the position of many Roma on the margins of the labor force largely exposes them to the disciplinary forces of arbitrariness and exploitation. We can consider this situation as a development toward a differential bio-political approach to different population groups:

Marginality itself … [has] become an organized zone within the social [sphere], toward which those persons [are] directed who are incapable of following more competitive pathways … In place of … older [social policy] practices, or rather alongside them, we are witnessing the development of differential modes of treatment of populations, which aim to maximize the returns on doing what is profitable and to marginalize the unprofitable. Instead of … eliminating undesirable elements from the social body, or reintegrating them more or less forcibly through corrective or therapeutic interventions, the emerging tendency is to assign different social destinies to individuals in line with their varying capacity to live up to the requirements of competitiveness and profitability. (Castel 1991: 294-95)

Castel puts forward that we can divide different types of population management vis-à-vis those groups who are minoritized as abject, deviant, or unable to catch up with the attitudes of the majority. In the case of the Roma, we could, for instance, distinguish between their elimination from the social body during Nazism, diverse corrective and therapeutic interventions during communism, and market-led forms of Roma population regulation during post-communism. However, we need to avoid an easy division of the region’s history in a wartime, communist, and post-communist period. As Castel acknowledges, new social policy practices do not necessarily replace older ones, but could continue to exist in conjunction with them. Similarly, the current changes of ‘transitional’ political systems in Central and Eastern Europe do not simply represent a decisive shift to regulatory modes of control, but embody an ambiguous mixture of regulatory and disciplinary ones. The Slovak Roma case illustrates that neo-liberal forms of market governmentality set out a combination of regulatory norms and ethnicized modes of discipline, where the latter are merely deployed to deal with those who
participate practically permanently in activation work. In other words, we deal with a differentiation of bio-political investment in different population groups, where majority groups are privileged over other, ethnicized minority ones, and professional work over what is euphemistically called ‘activation’ or ‘community work.’ This fusion of “market calculations and ethnic governmentality means that varied populations are subjected to different technologies of disciplining, regulation, and pastoral care, and in the process assigned different social fates” (Ong 2006: 79). However, how do we need to understand the almost self-evident way in which the Roma are directly or indirectly targeted for a different treatment?

GENEALOGICAL TRAJECTORIES OF DIFFERENCE: LEGACIES OF COMMUNISM

To understand the genealogical trajectories toward the differential treatment of different population groups, and how different Roma-related governmentalities intersect, overlap, or contradict in post-1989 Europe, we need to take into account at least three different legacies of communism that affected and continue to affect the situation of the Central and Eastern European Roma. The acknowledgement of these legacies and their effects also helps understand why the Roma’s problematization as inactive has indirectly contributed to tendencies to marginalize or even dehumanize them. The first legacy to be taken into account is that of the late-socialist economic reforms in the region that laid the clear yet hybrid and ambiguous foundation for post-1989 neo-liberal policy reforms. Secondly, following critiques of uniform narratives of modernity and capitalism, we need to pluralize the region’s economic and cultural history beyond what some call ‘capitalocentrist’ views (Smith and Stenning 2006). Thirdly, we have to acknowledge the influential communist histories of how the Roma were marginalized as socially (and even mentally) deviant subjects, who did not belong to the ‘nation’ and who were rendered abject and ‘inadaptable’ by means of various governmental interventions.

Let me begin with the first legacy. Many studies that discuss the post-1989 Central and Eastern European transformations and the impact of neo-liberalism in the region start from a ‘transitologic’ view (Haney 2002: 5). Transitologic views adhere to a bifurcated model of the region’s history into clearly divided periods of pre-1989 state socialism and post-1989 market capitalism or neo-liberalism. These viewpoints often go together with the assumption that neo-liberalism was first developed in the West and, thereafter, imported to Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (Szacki 1995; King 2001). Likewise, the ‘successful’ or ‘shock-therapeutic’ introduction of neo-liberalism to these regions is attributed to international pressure from outside the region and to imitation or the need for legitimacy in Central and Eastern Europe. However, neo-liberalism has hybrid ‘origins’ and its introduction to Central and Eastern Europe was due to an already much longer existing transnational network and dialogue:

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18 We could connect the technologies of pastoral care to the interventions of NGOs and other civil societal associations (chapter 7).
The drafting of post-communist transition blueprints, even with the participation of American economists, should not be analyzed as the diffusion of an innovation from West to East, but as translation meant to align the interests of Western and East European economists and reinforce their transnational ties. Within this transnational network it was impossible to assign the role of active authors to American economists and passive recipients to East European economists. In this case at least, neo-liberalism was not a preexisting theory or ideology that was disseminated from West to East, but was itself synonymous with the network that connected American and East European economists and with the translation strategy that coordinated their interests. (Bockman and Eyal 2002: 345)

In their genealogical analysis of economic practices developed throughout the twentieth century in Central and Eastern Europe, Johanna Bockman and Gil Eyal show how an extensive Cold War dialogue between Western and East European economists, a late-communist struggle among socialist scholars and politicians over the necessity of socioeconomic reforms, and dissident discourses of ‘anti-politics’ laid the foundation of various post-1989 neo-liberal articulations in the region. Bockman and Eyal explain how Central and Eastern European late-communist economists who were going to play a vital role in the post-1989 marketization “felt ‘pushed’ into becoming neo-liberals as a result of their experience with reforms during socialism” (2002: 338). These economists, such as Václav Klaus in the then Czechoslovakia, János Kornai in Hungary, and Leszek Balcerowicz in Poland, “typically depict this experience as a series of failures, which clarified to them that the state socialist economy could not be reformed and needed to be abandoned altogether” (ibid). Both the transnational—including Eastern and Central European—‘roots’ of the post-1989, neo-liberal transformations and the already existing tradition of economic translation and reform strategies in the region help to explain why the region’s articulations of neo-liberalism could have such dramatic consequences for many Roma. However, we need to discuss two other legacies to understand why these changes have particularly hit the Roma.

The second legacy I want to discuss is the one of diverse kinds of economic and cultural practices, and of various survival and livelihood strategies developed under communism to cope with scarcity, to improve living standards, and—particularly in the case of the Roma—to escape social isolation. Various studies of the transitions in Central and Eastern Europe have adopted a ‘capitalocentric’ view. These studies look at the changes primarily from the angle of the emergence of capitalist markets and their socioeconomic, cultural, and political effects. Seen from this perspective, survival strategies that are related to maintaining and developing non-capitalist, informal, and remittance economic and cultural practices are considered as responses to the economic transitions in the region and the related emergence of new forms of poverty. Some of these non-capitalist, informal, shadow, grey, and black markets have undeniably grown after 1989. However, several studies (Smith 2000; 2002a) have shown that we cannot adequately understand the appearance of these markets from a capitalocentric angle, that is, from the post-1989 introduction of capitalism to the region (or even from the constraints of the formal socialist economies during the last phase of communism). Rather, we need to understand these alternative economic and cultural practices as both integral parts of
former socialist societies and as co-constituent of Central and Eastern European socio-economic and cultural realities, including neo-liberal articulations.

An analysis of this legacy of communism is important to understand the current situation of the Roma for two reasons. Firstly, it can clarify that the Roma, despite current trends to marginalize and dehumanize them have also developed new and reshaped older strategies to challenge these trends (see also chapter 7). Secondly, an examination of this legacy and its background can also explain why the Roma, even despite their own past and current ability to develop survival strategies, have been marginalized in double or even multiple ways (Ladányi and Szelényi 2006: 176-82). One of the important conditions of possibility for benefiting from non-formal and non-capitalist market activities is having access to wider social and cultural networks. However, since many Roma faced and continue to face difficulties in getting access to such wider social and cultural networks, for them, it also more difficult to developing these non-formal, non-capitalist, and alternative activities. As I will explain below, this double marginalization also explains, at least partially, why many Roma have recently tried to migrate out of Central and Eastern Europe to look for better futures in Western countries.

As a rich, extensive literature shows, under communism, various unofficial economic and cultural practices were developed that can be regarded as kinds of socialist survival or livelihood strategies. From the perspective of the study of governmentality, we could consider them, at least partly, as practices of counter-conduct (chapter 1). These activities ranged from non-market economic practices, such as domestic food production, self-provisioning, and care work, to grey or black economic practices. One of the dominant fields of this second economy was informal work:

Informal work was practiced in a range of fields including construction and maintenance, agricultural work, repair work, small-scale industry, personal services, and so on. In many cases, this secondary work was founded on resources, skills, client bases, and capital developed in the primary workplace ... In some instances the second economy was condoned or even encouraged by state enterprises, allowing workers to produce goods or services after normal working hours in the primary workplace, contributing to both additional earnings and plan fulfillment ... In less legal scenarios, workers saw the workplace as a source either of additional covert earnings ... or for acquiring socialist property for personal use or reappropriation ... (Smith and Stenning 2006: 194)

These alternative economic practices were not limited to links with the formal infrastructures (workplaces, farms, machines, etc.) of the official communist economies. These practices were also based on economic and cultural activities that were strongly related to inventive and innovative extensions of household economies:

[They involved] a longstanding set of economic practices in which households produce food on urban allotments, in gardens or on rural private plots. In undertaking

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such activities, household members appropriate their own, or other family members’, surplus labor as expressed through the material products of the land. These products, in turn, [became] a part of a wider ‘economy of regard’ (Roger Lee 2000) involving reciprocal circuits of non-monetized exchange and, occasionally, become commodified through sale in markets or on the street … (Smith and Stenning 2006: 196)

This wider ‘economy of regard’ went beyond the mere provision of goods and was basically a socialist form of networking aimed at the arranging of matters such as goods, access, information, and services. As some argue (Wedel 1986; 1992; Ledeneva 1998), these arrangements became a central and more or less necessary element of the shortage economies of late socialism. Since formal supply channels increasingly did not work, several kinds of everyday practices were developed,21 which were usually based on the networks of relatives, friends, and acquaintances:

These kind of relationships operated in daily life as a way of “obtaining goods in short supply, of better quality, or at lower prices by providing access … to foodstuffs and other goods of everyday consumption” (Ledeneva 1998: 28); of maintaining access to health care, education, and other services that were otherwise out of the reach of most citizens; of obtaining employment, job transfers and promotions in the workplace. Though not a part of the formal economy, these [everyday] practices were wholly engaged with it. Very rarely were such goods and services actually provided by non-state entities. The whole process relied on the roles played by one’s family, friends, and acquaintances in the formal economy and the access they had, formally, to goods, services, information, or influence. It rested therefore on the formal, state economy. (Smith and Stenning 2006: 197)

These everyday economic and cultural practices were widespread during communism and need to be seen as integral parts of communist economic and cultural realities, rather than as practices that were developed outside the formal state economy. This genealogy of hybrid cultural-economic practices complicates contemporary, ‘presentist’ views that understand current everyday practices and engagement with informal, alternative, and non-market economies as merely responses to neo-liberal realities. Instead, I perceive of current survival and livelihood practices as rearticulations of these already existent everyday economic and cultural practices. Exploring these rearticulations alongside, rather than in contrast to, current articulations of neo-liberal techniques in Central and Eastern Europe, makes it possible to challenge capitalocentric narratives of its recent history—though, at the same time, we need to be wary of romanticizations of post-1989 informal and non-market-led cultural-economies of life (Stenning et al 2010).

This caution is particularly relevant in connection with the Roma’s situation. The heterogeneity of current cultural-economic practices and their relations to the communist past help to explain why the Roma currently tend to be marginalized in more than one

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21 These everyday life practices also got their own names, such as blizki in Bulgaria (Cellarius 2004), the chata culture in Czechoslovakia (Bren 2002), załatwić sprawy in Poland (Wedel 1986; 1992), and blat and the dacha culture in the Soviet Union (Ledeneva 1998; Lovell 2002).
way (next to the ways in which they maintain and reshape survival strategies). Indeed, already under communism, for the Roma it was much more difficult to get access to the circuits of these alternative economies. For instance, since the Roma were generally not allowed to own land prior to the communist period, they were frequently excluded from joining socialist agricultural cooperatives. Indeed, they had no land to contribute and, due to their exclusion from cooperatives and collectivized farms, it was more difficult for Roma to get access to the informal circuits reliant on these state infrastructures (Barany 2002: 137). Moreover, whatever kind of work the Roma did, in payment practices they were often treated unequally. In the Slovak part of Czechoslovakia, for instance, the Roma were frequently paid in kind, usually food, rather than in cash (Hübschmannová 1998). For Roma, it was also much more difficult to undertake construction work aimed at improving their own living conditions. In her memoirs, the Slovak Romani woman Ilona Lacková, recalling how Romani attempts to improve their houses were dealt with during communism, writes, for instance:

Getting a building permit for a Rom wasn’t a simple matter. According to an edict by the party and the government, the [Romani] settlements were supposed to be liquidated, and so an order went out forbidding construction in the settlements. The Roma didn’t give a damn about that and built illegally—if they had the means. Some of them finished, some of them had to pay a fine of up to fifteen thousand [crowns] and kept building, but there were cases when the officials sent a bulldozer and rolled it right over the structure as a punishment. In some places they got permission to build in town, but for the most part the villagers didn’t want to let any gypsies into the community. (Lacková 1999: 183)

Elaborating on the latter case, Lacková moves on to describe a sad story about how a Rom who finally got permission to build something in the center of a town, found his belongings demolished by non-Romani peasants when he was almost done with his work (ibid 183-84).

Despite difficulties to get access to the social and cultural-economic networks that could compensate for scarcity, the Roma were involved in some of these networks. In most of the Central and Eastern European countries, for example, some of them continued to be involved in entertainment. Local restaurants or non-Romani and better-off Romani families hired them for parties and ceremonies. In some countries, Roma continued to be involved in more traditional professionals, such as in forges in Poland (Mirga 1993), in horse trading in Hungary (Stewart 1997), and in the production of cooper and wooden goods in Romania (Achim 2004). Some Romani groups, such as the Transylvanian Gábor, managed to develop a relatively lucrative trade in consumer goods that were only difficultly accessible for others (Jacobs 2008). Often, these Roma involvements with alternative and informal economies overlapped and intersected with activities in grey and black markets. Moreover, though migration was almost impossible during

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22 See, for instance, Guy (1977), Stewart (2001), and Davidová (2004).

communism, some Roma were able to benefit from seasonable labor transactions or newly established transregional networks. The latter was the case in Czechoslovakia where, after the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans in the aftermath of the war, many Roma were voluntarily or forcibly ‘resettled’ in the depopulated and industrialized Czech border regions. Since the majority of the Czech Roma was murdered during the war (chapter 8), these for the most part sedentary Roma mainly came from the Slovak countryside. They started to develop new Czech-Slovak social and cultural-economic networks. However, the development of these Romani networks was primarily the result of the extreme difficulties these Roma faced in getting access to more formal services and in getting accepted by local authorities and citizens (see below).

After 1989, the alternative socialist social and cultural-economic networks have generally continued to exist, though they have also undergone influential changes. Some have suggested that particularly the very poor and households experiencing extreme hardship in Central and Eastern Europe tend to resort to alternative, informal, and non-market activities. Yet, scholarship on this theme gives a substantially different picture. Partly building on the knowledge that these networks were developed asymmetrically in communist societies, these studies show, for instance, that subsistence food production in countries, such as Bulgaria, Hungary, and Slovakia, is not an activity undertaken by the very poor:

Rather, it is one that predominantly involves relatively affluent households that have enough land and the monetary resources to be able to afford to subsidize an inefficient form of food production … Those with access to better resources in terms of social, human, financial, and knowledge/skills capital, with stronger social networks and with better placed families (Wedel 1986) are more likely to be engaged in a range of diverse economic activities than disenfranchised, marginalized workers and peasants. (Smith and Stenning 2006: 196, 207)

Research on the Roma’s situation in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia confirms the outcomes of these studies. In contrast to what is frequently suggested, majorities in these countries are much better positioned to take advantage of ‘second economy’ opportunities than Romani minorities. János Ladányi and Iván Szelenyi, for instance, have shown that the latter have fewer opportunities “to compensate for the absence of employment by relying on the informal sector” (2006: 175). This is particularly the case when unemployment goes together with spatial segregation. A study on poverty and welfare of Slovak Roma, for instance, concludes:

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24 Yugoslavia was the notable exception, for, after the opening of its borders in 1963, a number of Roma took the opportunity to migrate temporarily or permanently to West European countries (Barany 2002; Acković 2004), where they often experienced great difficulties to get accepted (for the notorious Dutch case, see Willems and Lucassen 1990; 1998; Willems 2003).

25 See also Guy (1975; 2001b), Lacková (1999), and Davidová (2004).

Due to limited formal employment opportunities, many Roma work in the informal sector. Because of the absence of taxes and official and unofficial fees, employment in the informal sector is frequently more attractive than formal jobs for employers and employees alike. Common activities include salvaging and selling scrap metal, petty trade, and part-time work in agriculture and construction ... Roma in geographically isolated and segregated areas have fewer opportunities for involvement in the informal sector, because their communities are closed off from broader society; more-over, they have limited connections outside of the settlement to help them find work. (World Bank et al 2002: 31)

Ladányi and Szelényi show that the only household coping strategy in which the Roma are overrepresented is the rudimentary one of gathering herbs, mushrooms, and wood. Others studies also mention their participation in various kinds of recycling industries. However, as I will explain below, these coping strategies are often criminalized and one-sidedly interpreted as originating from ‘the Romani culture.’

The desperate situation at home in Central and Eastern Europe has encouraged a substantial number of Roma to migrate temporarily or permanently and develop various kinds of remittance economic networks. Some of these networks rely on structures that were developed under communism. The Czech-Slovak Romani connections discussed above are examples of such socialist legacies. Inquiries into the socio-cultural dynamics of impoverished Slovak settlements show how some of their inhabitants maintain close relationships with relatively better-off friends and relatives in the Czech Republic (Jakoubek and Budilová 2006). However, new forms of displacement—such as the Czech citizenship law that, after the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, excluded many Roma who lived in the former Sudeten German areas from Czech citizenship—have contributed to imputation and criminalization of these forms of mobility (Šiklová and Miklušáková 1998; Nedelsky 2003). There is also a clear relation between recent accusations of Czech authorities that Slovak Roma abuse the Czech welfare and asylum system and the imputation of these post-1989 forms of mobility (see below).

Though some of the newly developed remittance cultural-economic networks rely on East-East migration,27 most of them relate to migration to West European countries and beyond.28 As I have shown above, the articulation of neo-liberal techniques in East Central Europe has hitherto neither led to a substantial improvement of the Roma’s socioeconomic position, nor to their inclusion in training or education programs that could change this position. The post-1989 emergence of new forms of Roma migration and the development of several remittance economies are closely related to the multiple forms of exclusion the Roma face at home. Though frequently fragile, criminalized, and leading to new kinds of tensions inside or between different Romani communities, these

27 East-East Roma migration has taken place, for instance, from Romania and Slovakia to the Czech Republic, from Bulgaria to Poland and Turkey, and from Moldova to Ukraine and Russia (Marushiaikova et al 2004; Uherek 2004; OSCE and CoE 2008).

28 A number of Czech, Slovak, and Hungarian Roma have also migrated to Canada (Ronald Lee 2000; Prónai 2004; Uherek 2004; Caparini 2010; Eggenschwiler 2010; Salter and Multy 2010; Tóth 2010). Some Roma from Serbia, Bosnia, and Kosovo managed to escape to the US during and after Yugoslavia’s violent dissolution (OSCE and CoE 2008).
remittance economies are often the only more serious coping strategies that the Roma have been able to develop to improve their socioeconomic position. In some cases, the emergence of these migration and remittance networks has also resulted in new alliances between domestic and migrant Roma (Sordé Martí 2012).

Up until now, I have shown that economic practices in contemporary Central and Eastern Europe cannot be explained from the angle of the articulations of neo-liberal techniques alone. They are also constituted by other, alternative economic and cultural practices. The latter were already developed under communism, have recently been reshaped and rearticulated in conjunction with neo-liberal practices, and can be seen as different kinds of coping or livelihood strategies. The Roma are also involved in these alternative, cultural-economic practices. However, in contrast to what is often believed, the Roma, and in particular the poorest among them, have lesser or even radically lesser means to benefit from such informal and alternative networks than others. I have argued that their limited access to these networks has also been caused by how the Roma were already disadvantaged in getting access to such networks and economies during communism. However, hitherto I have not yet explained why particularly the Roma had and have lesser opportunities to profit from these networks. To explain this relationship, I want to discuss the legacy of communism that relates to the transformation of racism.

*The transformation of everyday and state racist practices against the Roma*

In my discussion of the impact of the recent social reform on the housing situation of Slovak Roma, I have mentioned that the places where many of them have been evicted to are often called ‘sub-standard housing,’ ‘houses for socially inadaptable citizens,’ or even ‘houses of an adjusted standard for non-adaptable groups of citizens’ (GSR 1997b: 80, §C1; 2000: 29, §3). The discourses of inadaptability and non-adjustability, and the related provision of sub-standard services, are quite at home in Czech and Slovak narratives on the Roma and are integral parts of the communist legacy. The idea that the Roma would deserve less advanced services and that they would be inadaptable to whatever a modern life requires has a long and turbulent history. In 2005, a Slovak Romani man told me that he had worked more than twenty years for the same collectivized industrial unit when he was fired in early 1990. When he asked his boss why he had decided to fire the Romani employees first, his boss answered: “You know, it is impossible for us Slovaks to live on 1,000 crowns a month, but you Roma know how to manage that” (interview 2005g). The implicit idea that the Roma are second-class citizens, who easily know how to manage poverty and mobilize clandestine networks to generate income, has often

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30 In contrast to the World Bank’s claim that, for the Roma, “migration only is a short-term coping strategy” (2008: 73), research in Roma migration shows that some of the new networks have been developed since the mid 1990s.

31 During communism, the Roma often received housing with fewer comforts than those allocated to other citizens. In Hungary, these apartments were designated as csökkentett értékű or csökkentett komfortfokozat (housing of ‘reduced value’). In Czechoslovakia they were described as ‘category IV’ types of housing (Barany 2002: 131; Bernáth and Polyák 2002: 23).
been cross-fertilized with the suggestion that the Roma are socially or even mentally inadaptable.

The use of discourses of inadaptability and non-adjustability to frame the Roma as socially or mentally deviant has a notorious history in most of the former communist countries. Official Czechoslovak communist practices of state racism toward its Romani minority, for instance, were usually articulated in a language that was largely stripped of explicit ethnic references and that mobilized categories of social deviance to ethnically stereotype the Roma (Sokolova 2008). From laws adopted to ban ‘nomadism’ and eradicate bad “inheritances from capitalism” (SÚAR 1958b) to measures implemented to ‘reeducate’ Czechoslovakia’s “unfortunate fellow citizens and their children” (Kucharová 1970), and from handbooks for social workers on “care for socially unadjusted citizens” (MPSV 1972) to the notorious Czechoslovak sterilization decree of 1972 introduced to limit threats to the country’s ‘healthy population’ (PRP 1977), official state discourses generally used categories of social deviance to deal with the Roma.32

Various scholars have reflected on the importance of the fact that communist regimes generally regarded the Roma as a ‘social problem’.33 Jean-Pierre Liégeois and Nicolae Gheorghe, for instance, relate their problematization in social terms to the legitimization of dubious state interventions in the lives of the Roma and to the depoliticization of the discrimination linked with these interventions:

Roma/Gypsies are thought to have no linguistic, cultural or ethnic roots. They are instead a ‘social problem’ requiring ‘rehabilitation’ and ‘reintegration,’ who can—and must—be brought back into the fold of ‘society’ … It is this vision, which lies behind the assumed duty—and thus the right—of active intervention, and gives rise to measures of ‘assistance’ opening up the way for full-scale drives aimed at ‘reintegration’ and ‘rehabilitation.’ These flawed analyses encourage a focus on the consequences of a given situation (such as health problems, poverty, illiteracy, etc.), rather than on their root causes (rejection, inappropriate provision, etc.). The next stage is to juggle these parameters, which only modifies the effects without addressing the causes, and risks aggravating the situations supposedly being rectified. Another perverse effect of the development and use of this kind of imagery: since it categorizes Roma/Gypsies in social, rather than ethnic or cultural terms means that neither their authors, nor the law, consider the resulting measures are discriminatory. (Liégeois and Gheorghe 1995: 13, my italics)

Similarly, Véra Sokolova discusses “the omission of the term ‘Gypsy’ from the law” and how communist measures were “fully stripped of the designation ‘Gypsy’ and talked only about ‘travelers,’ ‘wanderers,’ and ‘asocial persons’” (2008: 94, 82). She puts forward that, “by retaining the content of the policy and simply renaming the people in question, the state authorities consciously conflated ethnic categories with categories of social deviance into a collapsed definition of a ‘gypsy’” (ibid 82). Accordingly, she describes

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32 The citations have been taken from Sokolova (2008: 91, 201, 224, 232).
the shift from pre-communism to communism as a shift from framing the Roma in ethnic terms to framing them in social ones:

The discursive shift of replacing the ethnic and cultural content of the term ‘Gypsy’ with ideas from social pathology (for the purpose of assimilation) was accompanied by a redefinition of ‘Gypsy culture’ and Romani collective values with allegations of their filthy lifestyle, incompetent parenthood, unhealthy reproduction, unnatural sexuality, etc. ... The perception of social difference was integral to articulating ethnic difference without using the rhetoric of ethnicity. (Sokolova 2008: 13)

Akin to Sokolova’s approach to the communist Roma problematization, Guy also describes the shift of the official socialist state discourse as one from “ethnic to social group” (Guy 2001c: 8).

Some scholars who have analyzed communist practices toward the Roma have taken the problematization of the Roma in social terms and their stigmatization as deviants in official state policies at face value. The Slovak historian Anna Jurová, for instance, suggests that many Czechoslovak citizens rejected the Roma during communism “not because of racial or ethnic reasons, but for deficits in their basic hygiene and behavior” (Jurová 1993: 113 cited Sokolova 2008: 90). She even states:

[T]he Gypsy question [sic] arose in [socialist] Slovakia with great urgency for solution as an exceptionally serious social problem of the backward population, elevated by the sharp growth of [the] Romani population, but also as a problem of general safety, as the necessity to eliminate their wandering and growing criminality. (ibid 18, English translation cited Sokolova 2008: 76)

We are confronted with a similar problematical neglect of how communist forms of population regulation produced, rather than started from, such alleged social deficits in Viorel Achim’s analysis of Romanian communism. He suggests that “the failure of [communist] integration policies depend[ed] also on the particular characteristics of [the Romani] population” (Achim 2004: 198). He draws this conclusion by reason of what he calls the Roma’s “explosive demographic growth” and their “demographic behavior.” The latter not only “differ[ed] from that of the [majority] population”—which followed “a modern demographic model”—it also caused a “civilization gap between the Gypsies and the majority population” (ibid 199). Both Jurová and Achim mix up the causes and

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34 Those scholars who openly criticized the official communist regimes’ problematization of the Roma in terms of social deviance—such as Eva Davidová and Milena Hübischmannová in Czechoslovakia—were underrepresented and accused of performing subjective, biased forms of research. Due to her critique of the regime’s Roma approach, Hübischmannová was forbidden to publish any explicitly critical study or article until 1989 (Sokolova 2008: 181-82).

35 In chapter 4, I argued that Achim neglects the impact of eighteenth-century bio-political considerations on Habsburg Roma approaches (2004: 69-78). Similarly, he ignores how Romanian communist bio-political preoccupations with the Roma had effectively transformed the prevailing governmental approach toward them from one in cultural or ethnic terms to one in terms of social deviance, anti-social behavior, and a lack of civilization. Therefore, Achim also misses the point when he denies that Nicolae Ceaușescu’s pro-natalist (anti-abortion) policies of the 1970s and 1980s actually (also) functioned as an anti-Romani measure. Achim’s
effects of communism, most notably when they tend to blame the Roma for their ‘bad and deviant demographic behavior’ or even for the failure of communist assimilation policies toward them.

Yet, even those analyses of communist practices toward the Roma which suggest, much more moderately, that the ways in which these practices collapsed into brutal forms of discrimination need to seen as a discrepancy between policy and its implementation miss the crucial point to be addressed (McCagg 1991; Marushiakova and Popov 2001a). As I have argued throughout this study, we need to analyze governmental practices beyond policy-implementation binaries. We need to avoid considering state socialist policies as neutral narratives that only started to become problematic when they were materialized. Starting from such a binary opposition suggests not only that mostly well-meant policies are only wrongly interpreted or badly implemented on the ground, it also assumes that policies are a kind of blue-prints of how things should work, rather than integral parts of how things work, fail, or succeed in practice.

Thus, I do not assume that racism and discrimination toward the Roma were largely the effects of a bad, poor, or biased implementation of basically well-meant communist policies. Rather, I approach these state practices from the angle of how newly invented governmental discourses, techniques, strategies, and forms of expertise produced new forms of state racism. Here, Foucault’s genealogical reflection on the transformations of race discourses in modern European history is helpful. In his lectures of 1975-76, he explains that “socialism has made no critique of the theme of bio-power … It has in fact taken it up, developed, reimplanted, and modified it in certain respects, but it certainly not reexamined its basis or its modes of working” (Foucault 2004: 261, for his notion of bio-power, see chapter 1). When the emergence of socialism is considered as a result of economic transformation and as the articulation of a struggle against capitalist enemies, Foucault argues, socialism inevitably revitalizes the theme of a bio-political kind of state racism. However, this renewed form of state racism—which had its forerunners in historically earlier racist forms of socialism, such as Blanquism and the Paris Commune—differed from the Nazi kind of state racism, which was a clearly ethnic racism responsible for the biological protection of the ‘privileged’ race and for the elimination of ‘inferior’ races (ibid 82, 262). Rather, another kind of racism—a racism of “the evolutionist kind, biological racism—[was] fully operational in the way socialist States (of the Soviet Union type) [dealt] with the mentally ill, criminals, political adversaries, and so on” (ibid 261-62). In the state racisms developed in the Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe, what revolutionary discourses considered the class enemy became a kind of biological threat to be dealt with as if it was a racial enemy: “So, who is the class enemy now? Well, it’s the sick, the deviant, the madman” (ibid 83). This reframing can also explain why the dominant narrative often did not refer to the Roma in ethnic and cultural terms:

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focus on how official state policies were formulated under Romanian communist rule—rather than on how the Roma problematization in social terms enabled new bio-political strategies and practices toward them—leads him to draw the rather naïve conclusion that “in Romania, no measures of racial nature were taken and there were no special laws for the Gypsies” (ibid 200).

36 Foucault also makes the following remark: “As a result, the weapon that was once used in the struggle against the class enemy (the weapon of war, or possibly the dialectic and conviction) is now wielded by a medical police which eliminates class enemies as though they were racial enemies” (2004: 83). It would take
Bio-political state racism can be justified in terms of the goal of the evolution to an ideal society or optimizing the quality of the population as much as the evolution of the race. The practice of state racism upon populations retarding social and political evolution does not necessarily always speak the language of race. (Dean 1999: 148)

The way in which the Roma were differentiated as a part of the population to be dealt with differently becomes clearer when we focus on how policies toward them became integral part of what, throughout the East bloc, was notoriously called ‘the Gypsy Question.’ In the first decades after the Second World War, most socialist countries reframed their ‘Gypsy Question’ as a social one and based it in one way or another on a Leninist-Marxist notion of class. The common way to reframe minority issues in the early postwar period was to rely upon Joseph Stalin’s approach to the ‘national and colonial question.’ He formulated the criteria minorities had to meet to be regarded as national minorities:

A nation is not a racial or tribal, but a historically constituted community of people …
A nation is a historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture … It is only when all these characteristics are present that we have a nation. (Stalin 1935: 5, 8, 9)

Among party officials it was common sense that the Roma did not meet these conditions. Regardless of the eighteenth-century construction of their supposedly common and homogeneous linguistic, cultural, historical, and, thus, national background (chapters 3 and 4), the Roma were now considered as lacking a common history, culture, economy, territory, and, in the end, nation (Stewart 2001; Barany 2002). Thus, the ‘Gypsy Question’ represented no individual ‘National Question,’ but was only part of other ‘National Questions,’ such as the Hungarian or Czechoslovak ones. At the same time, communist regimes rearticulated nineteenth and early-twentieth-century Roma representations as if they constituted a ‘foreign,’ ‘drifting,’ and ‘rootless element.’ By so doing, these regimes legitimated that the Roma first had to be assimilated into the nation to enable in any way

[An entire chapter to analyze the socialist Roma approaches in terms of a combination of non-liberal, authoritarian governmentality, pastoral forms of power, and what Foucault calls here ‘medical police.’ As I explained in chapters 2 and 4, ‘police’ refers to early modern European forms of population regulation. ‘Medical police’ represented an important and influential part of these forms of regulation (Carroll 2002). An illustration of the articulation of what we could call ‘communist medical police’ are the practices of forced bathing in Romani settlements, which took place in socialist Hungary between the 1950s and the mid 1980s. In this period, more than half of the Hungarian Roma had to undergo systematically carried out treatments of cleaning, delousing, and disinfecting. Throughout the country, the Ministry of Health installed so-called Roma sanitary inspectors and developed mobile disinfection units that regularly visited Romani communities to clean their inhabitants. These units were trucks with mobile shower cubicles, which could clean up to 100 persons per hour. During these processes of forced cleaning, which, in some cases, lasted four days long and which forced Romani men, women, and children to be undressed in the same space, the insecticide DDT was used to disinfect the Roma and their clothes. This usage continued even after 1968, when world health organizations banned DDT and decided that, due to its devastating effects on one’s health, it could only be used for agricultural means (Bernáth 2002).

In studies on communism uncritically followed this logic of nationalism, the Roma disappeared entirely from the analytical radar (see, most notably, King 1973).]
a consideration of the ‘Gypsy Question’ as part of the ‘National’ one. A Czechoslovak socialist party ideologue, for instance, suggested that the ‘Gypsy Question’ could only be solved by the Roma’s “social and cultural assimilation [and] a fusion with a more advanced cultural environment” (Sus 1961: 9-11 cited Sokolova 2008: 92). As a result, the ‘Gypsy Question’ had to be solved by “the gradual liberation of Gypsies from the consequences of retardation as a legacy of the capitalist regime” (SÚAR 1952 cited Sokolova 2008: 83). According to party officials, the Roma’s alleged backwardness caused by their ‘capitalist lifestyle’ covered the entire socioeconomic spectrum:

Cultural differences between Czechoslovak and Gypsy populations rest on the deficiencies in their employment, health, education, housing, and hygiene. (ÚVA 1958 cited Sokolova 2008: 93)

To challenge their ‘retardation,’ the central secretary of the Communist Party designed and developed new committees—so-called ‘Committees for the care and reeducation of the Gypsy population’ (ibid)—that had to assist to assimilate the Roma into mainstream Czechoslovak society. This ‘reeducation’ had to ensure that the Roma would “become proper citizens of [the Czechoslovak] homeland, who will understand that only hard work toward the development of socialism will provide them with the security of an increased standard of living and hence a happy future without wrongfulness, poverty, and hunger” (SÚAR 1952 cited Sokolova 2008: 83). Thus, the proposed ‘reeducation’ was an attempt, firstly, to deny Roma the status of a nation and a ‘homeland,’ and, thereafter, to adapt them to ‘the only true nation,’ the Czechoslovak one in this case. Drawing the Roma into the working class, they would turn from an alienated, “mobile section of Czechoslovak society” (SÚAR 1958a) into “citizens with a nomadic origin” or into “citizens with a gypsy origin”—as the official socialist discourse rendered the Roma. In this way, they would become good socialist laborers, who would ultimately be released from the yoke of their ‘capitalist lifestyle.’ In the first years after the Czechoslovak communists came to power, the authorities claimed that their approach was already successful for “work [had] transform[ed] [the] Gypsies in truly miraculous ways” and they had “willingly and quickly adjust[ed] to reliable work” (SÚAR 1950 cited Sokolova 2008: 85).38

Thorough analyses of the practices of socialist state authorities, scientists, social workers, medical doctors, surgeons, pedagogues, and the like also substantiate that the kind of racism that was inscribed in their discourses was not explicitly ethnic, but based on categorizing the Roma in terms of social deviancy (Haney 2002; Sokolova 2008). In the history of Czechoslovak communism to which I will limit myself below, we can distinguish three phases of how official state discourses and popular approaches toward the Roma were articulated to discriminate them. The ‘anti-nomadic’ legislation of the late 1950s, the segregated school system developed in the 1960s, and the 1972 sterilization

38 Please note how this rhetoric is similar to the one of Heinrich Grellmann, in particular when he remarked: “Now, think of the Gypsy, when he has stopped being a Gypsy; think of him with his productiveness and his many descendants, who are all transformed into useful citizens; and one will feel how uneconomical it was to throw them away like trash” (1783: 141-42, my translation, see my reflection upon his work at the end of chapter 4).
decree represent three dominant instruments that characterize successive, overlapping phases of Czechoslovak communist state racism. I will firstly discuss these stages and, thereafter, in the next section, the impact of these histories on the post-1989 transformations.

The largest part of Czechoslovak Roma lived sedentarily for a long time when ‘anti-nomadic’ legislation was introduced in 1958. Many authors who have analyzed this and comparable bans on ‘Gypsy nomadism’ in former communist countries take them at face value and, consequently, examine these measures in terms of the success or failure of the targets formulated in the policies or decrees. However, I do not in the first place understand these measures as aimed at nullifying or substantially limiting the Roma’s movement (see also van Baar 2011b). I consider it as analytically more helpful to look at these bans as ways to regulate Roma movement, to differentiate it from other, regularized forms of mobility, and making it productive. In Czechoslovakia, discourses of nomadism were governmentalized to problematize Romani mobility as excessive, deviant, and backward and, at the same time, to control their movement within the country’s borders. This control included the Roma’s ‘movements’ (trips to relatives, commuting) between Slovakia and the Czech Lands, where many Slovak Roma were forced or encouraged to work as part of the large-scale industrialization projects of the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s in the Sudeten German border areas that were depopulated after the war. However, even these trips back (and forth) to Slovakia were often not voluntary. Many of the Czech local authorities, who employed these Slovak Roma, refused to register them as permanent residents (Guy 1975) and, thus, kept them moving. Rather than understanding these refusals as ‘illegal’ vis-à-vis Czechoslovak socialist law—as, for instance, Guy does (2001b: 315n16)—we can also consider them as ways to make the Roma’s movement both controllable and productive, and to legitimize the correlated sub-standard housing of Roma in basic barracks near their workplaces in Czech industrialized zones. Without suggesting any kind of conspiracy from the side of the officials, we could say that there was simply no need to eliminate Romani mobility. The practices of the socialist system made it possible to differentiate, accommodate, and supervise different kinds of mobility and pathologize the Roma’s as requiring special measures, including sub-standard housing.

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39 In the 1950s and 1960s, ‘anti-nomadism’ measures were also taken by other former communist countries, such as the Soviet Union (Khruschev’s 1956 decree against ‘Gypsy’ nomadism, see Lemon 2001), Bulgaria (decree 258 of 1958, see HW 1991a; Marushiaikova and Popov 2001a), Poland (the Roma settlement project of 1964, see Mróz 2001), and Romania (confiscation of horses and wagons and the dispersion of compact communities in the late 1940s and early 1950s, see HW 1991b; settlement projects of the early 1960s, see Achim 2004).

40 Twenty years later, when the Czechoslovak human rights movement Charta 77 (Charter 77) had become a serious critic of the communist regime, Charta criticized the relationship between the Roma’s situation and their stereotyping as ‘nomads.’ In one of their pamphlets, Charta condemned the use of the 1958 law to regulate the Roma’s movement and develop substandard living conditions as “racist repression” (Charter 77 1979a: 7) The Roma, “while not nomads, [were] forced to migrate on account of living conditions not of their own making” (ibid).

41 As I have explained elsewhere (van Baar 2010a; 2011b), this relation between the Roma’s nomadization and the legitimation of their substandard housing also characterizes recent problematizations of Romani mobility, such as those in France and Italy.
From the mid 1960s onward, this pathologization would get a new dynamics. The supposed “social and moral causes” for the “developmental and medical problems” of Romani children (Meisner 1972: 14 cited Sokolova 2008: 185) were instrumentalized to legitimize the development and dissemination of a far-reaching, segregated special school system, in which Roma were generally overrepresented (ERRC 1999). In 1970, a pedagogical interim report about this system concluded that “Gypsy children achieve better results in remedial schools (zvláštní školy)... because the conditions of [the remedial] school better suit the mentality and preparedness of Gypsy children” (Machácková 1970: 46 cited Sokolova 2008: 204). Such fallacies are typical of how discriminatory measures toward the Roma were legitimized. Sokolova, in her analysis of Czechoslovak Roma discourses, shows how, in the 1960s and 1970s, scientific studies appeared that tried to explain ‘Gypsy characteristics’ in terms of physical anthropology. One of these studies provides an analysis of “seven anthropomotorical features: body height, cranial length and width, facial width, nose height and width, and mouth width” in order to interrogate the levels of “Gypsy social and biological integration” (Beneš 1975: 75-78 cited Sokolova 2008: 183). However, these studies generally concluded that we could not explain ‘Gypsy behavior’ in anthropomotorical or genetic terms and, thus, needed to explore other directions for explaining it. A particularly striking conclusion was drawn in a study on Romani children:

It is generally impossible to characterize the population of Gypsy children as medically or developmentally pathological, because the majority of individuals are healthy. Rather than a product of some hereditary inferiority, most developmental and medical problems [of Gypsy children] are consequences of social and moral causes. (Meisner 1972: 14 cited Sokolova 2008: 185)

Claims, such as those that the “developmental and medical problems” of Romani children had social and moral backgrounds, were closely related to a far-reaching pathologization of Romani children, parents, women, and families more generally (see also Haney 2002). In the end, it were the Romani parents, and particularly the mothers, who were neglecting their children and unable to carry out good childcare; it was the family environment—the milieu—in which Romani children had to grow up that spoil them, and it was the general Romani ‘mentality’ that reduced their chances in society. A document of the Ministry of Health, for instance, states that the Roma’s “tendency toward romanticism, amusement, temperament expressed in music and dance, their fondness of bright colors, and their modest needs and [absence of] ambition” reduces the possibilities of their successful integration into society (FMPSV 1980 cited Sokolova 2008: 188). This problematization of Romani families as deviant and incompetent was inherently connected to the development of a series of state interventions in their private and public lives, most notably to the emergence of the special school system, of social work

42 Between 1970 and 1975, for instance, three per cent of non-Romani Czechoslovak children went to these ‘remedial schools’, while 80 per cent of all Romani children attended them (Hübschmannová 1993: 119).
43 Legislation had also made it easier for social workers to separate Romani children—who lived in “inappropriate conditions” and whose parents “neglected to take care of them”—from their families (see Sokolova 2008: 192).
aimed at assessing the ‘quality’ of Romani parenting, of welfare offices who had to decide on whether or not a family should get its monthly child support, and of orphanages and children’s homes where Romani children had to be educated who lived in what was called ‘bad Gypsy environment’ or ‘endangered families.’

A methodological handbook for social workers developed in the 1970s shows how far the official discourses had moved into the direction of the Roma’s total pathologization and criminalization. This four hundred pages long handbook, entitled Care for the Socially Unadjusted Citizens (Pěče o społeczeństwo nieprzystosowanej obcangi), includes articles that psychologists, sociologists, lawyers, sexologists, criminologists, and physicians wrote to define, explain, and solve the problems of “socially abnormal, pathological, and deviant persons.” In the authors’ attempts to elucidate the phenomenon of inadaptability they produced various circular arguments. First, they firmly related the behavior of non-adaptable persons to social phenomena, such as criminality, alcoholism, parasitism, and prostitution. Then, they consider all these interrelated residues “of the previous capitalist regime” and the ways in which they constitute “deviant, socially not-adapted persons, problem families, and conflict groups” as a problem of “social inheritance” that was hard, if not impossible, to eradicate:

If a child is raised in a pathological subculture, which is in contradiction with the prevailing culture, he or she will become delinquent in a similar process, in which an Eskimo becomes an Eskimo … Most carriers of socially pathological phenomena come from seriously deficient families. Many criminals, recidivists, alcoholics, prostitutes, citizens avoiding work, and other non-adjusted citizens grew up in conditions of broken families, families of alcoholics, and otherwise non-adjusted persons, as well as from families with substandard cultural levels. (MPSV 1972: 9, 26 cited Sokolova 2008: 225-26)

As Sokolova remarks, not a single time did the book use the term ‘Gypsies.’ Yet, the book and the general information on “fundamental problems of socialization and non-adaptability” that it contained was used by social workers who, according to their official work description, often had to deal with ‘citizens of Gypsy origin.’ While this does not yet indicate that the handbook was only used to deal with the Roma, it nonetheless implies that the term ‘citizens of gypsy origin’ and the concepts that were used to define phenomena of inadaptability and deviance had actually become interchangeable (Sokolova 2008: 226).

The influential pathologization of the Roma and the governmental interventions that were developed in post-war Czechoslovakia to deal with them led to such a radical revival of the belief that the ‘ideal’ society could not only be designed but also fully materialized, that some claimed that the ‘hard work’ of assimilating the Roma began to bear fruit. A demographic study of the late 1960s, which stated to have discovered a significant decrease of the Roma population’s natural growth, claimed that many Roma were “released” and that a “satisfactory speed of Gypsy integration with the rest of the population” was achieved (Srb and Vomáčková 1969: 221 cited Sokolova 2008: 189). Resembling some of Heinrich Grellmann’s darkest eighteenth-century thoughts (chapter 4), one scholar claimed:
In some cases it was also [scientifically] proven that when proper hygiene and skin care is applied [to the Roma], it is possible achieve normal skin color. As evidence I cite an example: in Rokyca there are two Gypsy women who have beautiful white skin, achieved by proper attention to personal hygiene. (Bučič 1973: 14 cited Sokolova 2008: 186).

However, the most dramatic way in which normalcy, whiteness, proper hygiene, and beauty were ‘naturally’ combined to legitimate the Roma’s discrimination was undoubtedly related to a final stage of Czechoslovak Roma approaches that I want to discuss.

In 1972 a sterilization decree was introduced “to prevent the involuntary and ill-informed sterilization of all Czechoslovak citizens by outlining strict requirements an applicant had to fulfill in order to be granted permission to undergo the procedure” (Sokolova 2008: 10). Recently, the Czech Public Defender of Rights and ombudsman Otakar Motějl has estimated that as many as 90,000 women—mostly Romani—may have been sterilized in the former Czechoslovakia since the early 1970s (Tačman 2009). Sokolova argues that, by the time that the Czechoslovak authorities introduced the notorious sterilization law, the term ‘Gypsy’ had almost become an equivalent of the term ‘unhealthy’ in social, medial, educational, and scientific narratives. This becomes particularly clear when we see how the practices of sterilization, school segregation, demographic research, and racial discrimination against the Roma came together on the ground. In the 1970s, the Slovak government promoted a “more adequate” demographic monitoring of the “unhealthy population of Gypsy children” and the development of “health indications, which could be used as justification for sterilization” and as a means “to suppress further unhealthy populations in these [Gypsy] families” (PRP 1977: 5). At the same time, a municipal secretary suggested that the Gypsies’ “obvious retardation [did] not have to be measured by any special tests.” According to her, this retardation is “readily apparent to anybody who sees the ways the Gypsies live,” and obvious since their “children are unable to succeed in the regular elementary school” (cited Sokolova 2008: 229). In the town in question, the Eastern Slovak village of Jarovnice, many Romani women were actually sterilized between 1971 and 1989, as was the case in many other towns throughout Czechoslovakia.

44 Probably it is also this kind of reasoning that had ultimately made it possible, as late as the early 1990s, that washing powder producer Ariel could show an advertisement on Czech television in which a Romani child was literally whitewashed.

45 In general, Romani women were sterilized when they needed medical assistance in a hospital or clinic (during a delivery or an abortion). They had to sign an official form before undergoing the medical procedure. In most of the cases, the women were not informed that, by signing this form, they were at the same time agreeing with their sterilization. Only after the operation they were told that they were also sterilized or, in yet other cases, they only found out when they did not succeed in getting another child. In other cases, women were offered relatively high amounts of money if they agreed upon being sterilized. Though opportunities to sterilize men were taken into account, the officials considered it ‘easier’ to start with women due to the fact that they had to visit hospitals and clinics much more often regarding child-related inspections than men.

46 Though widely documented, the sterilization of Romani women in socialist Czechoslovakia, but also in the post-communist Czech Republic and Slovakia, remains a highly delicate issue that has thus far only
and of the problematization of the Roma in social, rather than ethnic or cultural terms more generally, Sokolova concludes that:

Many local offices translated ethnicity-neutral instructions as a mandate to sterilize Romani women in a belief they were acting in the interest of both the nation and the Roma women themselves. Such a high level of agreement on an ordinary level demonstrates that, contrary to the official rhetoric, racism was a pervasive and vital phenomenon manifesting itself in the everyday life of the society. ‘Gypsy’ was almost universally translated into a ‘Czechoslovak’ social speech as ‘unhealthy,’ complying with the officially marketed image of a ‘Gypsy’ not as an ethnic/cultural subject, but as a socially/mentally/sexually deviant object. (Sokolova 2008: 230, her emphasis)

In the final decades of Czechoslovak communism, the representation of the Roma as socially, mentally, and sexually deviant came close to claiming that they were not simply ‘backward’ or ‘retarded’ and, thus, ‘only some serious steps behind’ and basically ‘improvable’ but, rather, immobile and, therefore, incorrigible. Seen from this angle, it is telling that the Slovak socialist government’s so-called Bureau for the Questions of the Gypsy Population (Sekretariát Komisie vlády SSR pre otázky cigánských obyvatelov) called for a stricter implementation of the sterilization decree to guarantee ‘more adequately’ the protection of the ‘healthy population’:

In practice, Gypsy citizens are still being encouraged too little to use the possibility of sterilization … In many cases, especially when the parents are mentally retarded, they are not able to realize that for their own health, as well as for the child that would be born psychologically defective, sterilization is necessary. But even such parents cannot be sterilized without their consent. The only legal way to circumvent this problem right now … is to constitute such a citizen legally incapacitated and assign her a social guardian. (PRP 1977: 6 cited Sokolova 2008: 232, my italics)

The possibility to circumvent the consent of the involved ‘mentally retarded Gypsy citizen’ by mobilizing a guard to ‘protect’ her against herself represented a crucial step in turning de jure citizens into de facto denizens and dehumanized beings. Only if the Roma would be entirely assimilated into the Czechoslovak nation, they could be considered as

marginally been recognized by the involved authorities. One of the important reasons for the poor recognition of these past sterilization practices is certainly related to how the so-called ‘Gypsy question,’ and official documents and laws that promoted sterilization in particular were largely de-ethnicized. In this respect, Sokolova’s study on Czechoslovakia’s cultural politics of ethnicity substantially contributes to understanding the contexts of the sterilization practices, as well as the current difficulties to get them adequately recognized (for critical views and overviews, see HW 1992; CRR and Foradňa 2003; ERRC 2004c; Cahn 2006; Kopalová 2006). However, in 2009, at the instigation of the Czech Minister of Human Rights and Minorities Michael Kocáb, the Government of the Czech Republic officially expressed regret over the sterilization of Romani women (ERRC 2009; Romea 2009a). Kocáb has also suggested that this is only the first phase of the apologies; in a second phase the Czech government would need to negotiation about a form of compensation for the victims: “In this first phase we wanted to express commiseration. The second phase could not be on the table given the economic crisis and the fact that next year’s budget has already been set” (Kocáb cited Tajčman 2009).
equal, healthy, autonomous, and human members of this society. As yet, however, that was supposedly not the case. This way of reasoning, and particularly its collapse into the Czechoslovak sterilization practices, represented one of the most devastating circles of all circular arguments produced, defended, and put into practice during the communist era.

SHAKING HANDS: THE INADAPTABLE MEETS THE INACTIVE

Four years after the collapse of communism, Vladimír Mečiar, Slovakia’s first post-Czechoslovak Prime Minister, gave an informal address to his party members. A secret recording of his speech revealed that he dubiously reflected on the growth of the Romani population. Their birthrate, he stated, is much higher than that of the other Slovaks:

So, the prospect is that this ratio will be changing to the benefit ofroma. That is why if we do not deal with them now, then they would deal with us in time ... We ought to take into consideration ... the extended reproduction of the socially inadaptable population. Already children are giving birth to children, or grandmothers are giving birth to children—poorly adaptable mentally, badly adaptable socially, with serious health problems, who are simply a great burden on this society. (Mečiar cited Kohn 1995: 178-79) 47

Mečiar’s speech shows that discourses on the Roma’s alleged inadaptability did not disappear after the fall of communism. As statements of politicians and policy documents show (Zoon 2001b), these discourses did even not disappear after the years of Mečiar’s neo-authoritarian rule (1993-97). In 2000, Róbert Fico—the leader of the political party Smer and Slovakia’s Prime Minister between 2006 and 2010—claimed that “the population growth of the Roma threatens to ruin Slovakia’s social system.” He described the Roma issue as “a time bomb that will cause trouble if not kept under control” (Fico cited Angelovič 2000).48 Such statements have not been reserved to populist politicians, such as Mečiar and Fico, but centered on the Slovak political arena. In 1999, the then Slovak president Rudolf Schuster remarked that the Roma “lack the will to integrate ... and ... profit from state help, but are neither willing nor capable of assuming responsibility for the improvement of their own situation” (Schuster cited RFE/RL 1999c). He also linked the Roma’s survival strategies with their ’backward culture’ and alleged abuse of the social security system:

47 Mečiar suggested solving ‘the Romani problem’ by cutting the social benefits of parents with many children. When he had left the center of the Slovak political scene, ‘his’ proposal to implement this measure was actually adopted by the Slovak parliament (GSR 2003a).

48 To solve ‘the Romani issue’ Fico followed in Mečiar’s footsteps (see the previous note) by suggesting to substantially cut the social benefits for Romani families with more than three children (Togneri 2000). Fico has continuously used anti-Romani rhetoric to increase his popularity. In the spring of 2001, the outcomes of Slovak polls suggested that he was considered the most trustworthy public representative of the country (Nicholsonová 2001). In the course of the years, the popularity of his party Smer has steadily grown. In 2006, Smer won the parliamentary elections and Fico was elected Prime Minister.
[Their] lifestyle is oriented towards consumption, and they live from hand to mouth. Because of their lower educational level, the philosophy of some is to simply survive from one day to the next. If we add their increased propensity for alcohol abuse, absence of at least a minimum degree of planning, and low concern for developing normal habits including a sense of responsibility, hygienic habits and ethics, this philosophy of survival is becoming one of living ‘from one benefit to the next.’ (GSR 1999c)

Even those who are officially appointed to deal with the situation of the Roma have often made comparable statements. In 2001, the Slovak-Hungarian politician Pál Csáky, then Slovakia’s Minister for Human Rights, Minorities, and Regional Development, was responsible for dealing with Romani minority issues. When he was asked whether the solution to the ‘Roma problem’ was a question of money, he answered:

The Roma problem arises from the absence of a model for mutual coexistence between completely different cultures. If you had an unimaginable amount of money, could you change India into a modern European country in four years? No. Roma mentality, culture, thinking, reactions do not stem from the classic Slovak culture. (Csáky cited Reynolds and Habšudová 2001)

Considering ‘the Romani culture’ a backward one that is hard, if not impossible to ‘modernize’ also motivated some to suggest ‘learning’ from the past experiences with sterilization. In 2000, the director of a Slovak hospital, reflecting upon what he considered a worrisome growth of the Roma’s birthrate, put forward:

Twenty years ago . . . mothers of three or four children were offered 5,000 to 30,000 crowns to undertake a sterilization . . . Now, those who are interested in sterilization have to pay a minimum of 8,000 crowns, which is not possible for Romani women. They don’t have even 3,600 crowns to pay for an abortion . . . I have been arguing for years that policymakers should visit us and live in the town for at least two months and then consider the seriousness of the problems, make decisions, and propose solutions. (Ivan Voloin cited VN 2000)

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49 In some cases, even those who have analyzed the current development of ‘Roma policy’ and the majority’s attitudes toward Roma in the light of communist approaches to them have reproduced the narratives of modern vs. traditional communities as well as the developmental logic that is usually integral to such discourses. Imrich and Michal Vašečka, for instance, suggest that for many Roma the Czechoslovak communist regime’s attempt to make the Roma “part of the ‘people of the Socialist country’ . . . meant liberation from their original society and from traditional ties” (Vašecka and Vašecka 2003: 33, my emphasis). Here, the authors reinforce a reified and homogeneous understanding of what ‘Romani culture’ would be. This understanding is even intensified by their suggestion that “the majority of the Roma,” due to “their historical marginalization, lifestyle and a consciousness that is ill-suited to a post-industrial way of life,” “are literally ‘out of time’” (ibid 36-37). Despite their reflections on the historical specificity of policies toward the Roma, Vašečka and Vašečka follow a minor, yet persistent tendency in scholarship on the Roma to examine their ‘culture,’ ‘communities,’ and ‘lifestyles’ as relics of a traditional society or in (relative) isolation from wider socio-economic, cultural, and political contexts and patterns (for another examples of this tendency, see Jakoubek 2004; for another critique of this tendency, see Hegburg 2006).
The discourses on the Roma’s supposed inadaptability and lack of responsibility regarding issues such as work and family planning went together with new or reshaped strategies to problematize their mobility. When, at the turn of the century, some Slovak Roma tried to look for better futures elsewhere, their attempts to migrate, ask for asylum, and develop new remittance economies were persistently criminalized and stripped from their socioeconomic, historical, and political contexts. Prime Minister Dzurinda stated that the Roma have apparently “learned how to misuse the social system not only in Slovakia, but also in EU-member countries” (cited TASR 2000a). The chairman of Slovakia’s parliamentary committee for EU integration blamed the Roma for being “‘false’ asylum seekers who were going to Belgium and other countries to seek ‘economic advantages’” (František Sebej cited RFE/RL 1999a). The situation for the Roma worsened when Western countries, afraid that Roma were coming to their countries, were imposing visa requirements on Central and Eastern European countries and taking unorthodox measures, such as collectively deporting the Roma back to their countries of origin (Cahn and Vermeersch 2000) and secretly and preemptively screening Roma at airports in Central Europe in order to avoid that they could even start asylum procedures in the West (Fawn 2001).

In Slovakia, the return of the Roma led politicians to propose radical sanctions against unsuccessful asylum seekers. The Roma were blamed for the reintroduction of visa requirements for all Slovaks and for contributing to negative attention paid to Slovakia abroad. Fico proposed that anyone who returned to Slovakia after “speculative requests for political asylum” elsewhere should not get access to social benefits for the duration of a year (ČTK 2000b; 2000a). Members of the extreme-right Slovak National Party (SNS) were even more radical. One proposed revoking the passports of asylum seekers for five years after their return to the country (Togneri 2000). Yet another, reacting to Finland’s introduction of visa requirements, blamed the Roma for “drawing barbed wire around Slovakia” and proposed that “the whites [sic] will not feed them” anymore (Jaroslav Paska cited TASR 2000b). Thinking along these lines, a variety of images of mobility come together: the Roma are blamed for being socio-economically immobile, while being, at the same time, both excessively mobile regarding their migratory movements and held responsible for limiting the mobility of other, non-Romani citizens.

In the neighboring Czech Republic, similar criminalizations of Romani mobilities and identities would emerge in a post-Czechoslovak dispute between Czech and Slovak officials. In December 2003, the Czech weekly newspaper Respekt published a cartoon on its cover in which we see various dark-skinned figures, who are approaching over water in tiny boats (figure 6.2). They carry a violin, a guitar, a pan, an axe, and a television with them. A swimming dog desperately tries to climb on board. These figures, including their children, are portrayed with red eyes and Dracula teeth. The title “Slovak Roma in front of our gate” (Slovenští Romové před branami) and a homonymous article in this newspaper issue accompany the cartoon (Čápová 2003; Reisenauer 2003). The cartoon represents the Roma, right from childhood, as bloodthirsty robbers. Being without solid ground—they come over water—they are resolved on looking for new destinations where they can maintain or extend their supposedly illegal and criminal practices. The cartoon was meant as a critical reflection on a then emergent idea—mostly expressed by some Czech politicians and media—that numerous Slovak Roma were coming to the
Czech Republic and purposely placing a heavy load on its asylum system. In actual fact, we dealt with a new episode in the discussed Czech-Slovak history of the Roma, in which they were repressed as ‘nomads’ during the Interbellum period, murdered and displaced in the Second World War, ‘resettled’ during the 1950s and 60s, problematized as deviants to control their movement and population growth during communism, and denied Czech citizenship after Czechoslovakia’s dissolution. From the Roma’s point of view, these forms of mobility largely expressed a continuation and renewal of strategies to cope with the new, post-communist and post-Czechoslovak circumstances. Among those who were and are currently still ‘traveling’ back and forth between the Czech Republic and Slovakia are many Roma who have a history related to the ‘resettlement’ policies of the first two decades of Czechoslovak communism.

FIGURE 6.2 Pavel Reisenauer’s cartoon at the cover of the Czech weekly newspaper Respekt (December 2003), with the headline “Slovak Roma in front of our gate”
Let me now connect my analysis of the legacies of communism with my examination of activation policies made at the beginning of this chapter. The spectral life of racist discourses of Roma inadaptability that has continued to threaten the Roma after the fall of communism can be put in the context of currently transforming governmentalities toward the Roma.\(^{50}\) The, in many respects, devastating combination of communist authoritarian governmentality and medical policing has transformed into forms of Romani minority governing that are basically liberal. One of the features of liberal and neoliberal governmentalities is the possibility for critiquing bio-political preoccupations with minorities and, thus, the effects of processes of minoritization (chapters 2 and 4). However, governing at the liberal nexus of freedom and security does not necessarily mean that illiberal forms of government do no longer exist. Within the context and scope of liberal government, interventions to assist those who are considered as not yet able to exercise their own autonomy or act in their own best interest can still be legitimized in liberalism’s name. As Mitchell Dean puts forward:

The liberal norm of the autonomous individual is a figure carved out of the substantive forms of life that are known only through [this figure’s] exceptions, e.g. insufficient education, poor character, welfare dependency, statelessness, underdeveloped human capital, absence of spirit of improvement, lack of social capital, etc. (Dean 2002: 49)

In current discourses on the Roma, we have been able to notice a crucial, yet ambivalent shift from problematizing them as socially deviant objects to framing them as ethnic, cultural subjects, who now—as we have seen in the first half of this chapter—need to be and become ‘responsible,’ ‘empowered,’ and ‘active’ citizens. On the one hand, they conform to the liberal norm of the autonomous individual, while, on the other, they still need to be ‘autonomized’ and ‘responsibilized’ with the assistance of various kinds of experts and mediators. Once persistent ideas of state-led planning, social engineering, and the wide-ranging management of the Roma’s socioeconomic, cultural, and political realities have slowly but surely made place for notions of Romani communities prepared to invest in themselves and assumed to regulate the behavior of their members according to their own values.

A range of post-1989 Slovak policy documents on the Roma articulate this change. Only their titles tell the ambivalent story of this transformation. In the mid 1990s, these documents still aimed at the solving of “the problems of citizens in need of special care”.\(^{51}\) At the end of the 1990s, these ‘problems’ where renamed those of the “Romani minority”.\(^{52}\) Since about 2002, the reference to ‘problems’ has disappeared and the Roma are discussed in terms of ‘integration’ or ‘inclusion’.\(^{53}\) Their framing in terms of inte-

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\(^{50}\) Recently, the discourse on the Roma’s alleged inadaptability has also and radically been reintroduced in the Czech Republic. In February 2011, a group of 48 Czech mayors even signed a so-called “Declaration of Mayors” in which they call for adequate measures regarding “the issue of the socially inadaptable” (Romea 2011e).


\(^{52}\) See GSR (1999a; 1999b; 2000).

\(^{53}\) See GSR (2003b; 2004b; 2005).
igration and inclusion certainly relates to the Europe-wide trend to increasingly discuss the Roma in terms of European integration and social inclusion. Yet, these Slovak policy discourses on the Roma are clear manifestations of numerous encounters between the revitalized narrative of inadaptability and the emergent discourse of activation. On the one hand, youth “employment centers” need to be established and “proper motivation” used “to encourage the [Romani] youth to work.” On the other hand, however, “preventive” and “disciplining” educational programs need to be designed “for children from dysfunctional, non-supportive, and socially pathological families” (GSR 1997b: 78, §5, 7, 9, 11). Roma need to be encouraged to participate in “life-long education,” while models need to be worked out “on how to solve the housing problems of socially inadaptable citizens” (ibid 80-81). “Active voluntary organizations and citizens’ associations directed toward developing the social, economic, and cultural level of the [Romani] community” need to be supported, whereas “pregnant [Romani] women” are characterized by their “bad way-of-life” (ibid 82-83).

The same ambivalent merging of discourses of inadaptability and activation appears in the much more extensive policy documents of a few years later. On the one hand, “the ‘Behave Normally’ pilot project” and the “Model Projects for Houses of an Adjusted Standard for non-adaptable Groups of Citizens” need to be updated. On the other hand, however, “re-qualification courses for unemployed Roma” need to be organized to improve their access to the labor market (GSR 2000: 13, 25, 29). “Rational use [need to be made] of the network of special schools,” while, at the same time, “educational and advisory events for adults [need to be organized] in co-operation with Romani non-governmental organizations and self-government bodies” (ibid 14, 36). “Regular meetings with police, doctors, psychologists, psychiatrists, etc, [need to be organized] with the aim of improving the [Romani] population’s education level,” while “projects in the area of small businesses and self-employment of Roma” need to be developed to encourage their empowerment (ibid 16, 26). And so forth.\footnote{Even in those cases where dubious terms to deal with the Roma have recently been abandoned, the traces and effects of the communist Roma approaches, as well as how they have been reshaped, often remain highly ambiguous. Partly under the pressure of European court cases against the Czech Republic (ECtHR 2007; ERRC 2008), the Czech government, for instance, has recently decided to formally remove the category of ‘special schools’ from its national educational system and replace it by ‘practical elementary schools’ (GCR 2004a; Komarek 2009). Nevertheless, the subcategory ‘children with social disadvantage’ the educational system currently uses is vaguely defined to include children from “family environment with a low social and cultural status” (GCR 2004a cited ERRC 2007c: 43; see also Gall and Kushen 2010). While the involved law does not clarify how this category needs to be applied, yet another formal Czech government document (GCR 2005) explicitly associates this category with the Roma. This indicates that their cultural background is considered to be a disadvantage (ERRC 2007c; see also AI 2010a).}
munism, these Roma were used to chopping wood in the forest and using the logs for heating their small houses. In 1988, the forest was officially declared a National Park. However, particularly since timber thieves have increasingly tormented Slovak forests, the Letanovce Roma have frequently been represented as criminals and accused of endangering security in the national park, which, since the early 1990s, has been developed as an important tourist site (ČTK 2006j). The Slovak government also aims at getting the park recognized as one of UNESCO’s World Cultural Heritage Sites.

To try to change the situation in Letanovce, various plans have been developed in the course of time. According to one of these plans, the entire settlement had to be removed and rebuilt somewhere else, at the remote site of a former collective farm (Smolka 2002). However, due to various kinds of opposition, most of all from the municipality responsible for that site, but also from the Roma themselves, this plan was not realized (but see ČTK 2006b; 2007c). The Slovak regional and local authorities have also looked for other solutions and, for instance, introduced various public works programs for the Roma in Letanovce.\(^{55}\) In these community work projects, Roma have been deputized to guard the park as part of a community policing program (SITA 2002). Following the government’s proposal to “support positively and use the natural authority of leaders in Romani settlements ... with the aim of progressive decriminalization of these communities” (GSR 1997b: 84), the Letanovce Roma are encouraged to collaborate with a local NGO, the police, municipal authorities, and National Park officials to contribute to their own and the National Park’s security. Following a “partnership-based problem-solving approach” to community policing (OSCE 2010: 77), such initiatives need to encourage the Roma to actively discipline, police, and ‘responsibilize’ their own communities (chapter 5). Articulating a similar philosophy, a Roma community center has been built in the village of Letanovce. The center is located in the middle of the town and needs to support the Roma to connect with the world of the modern media—computer equipment has been made available—and with their fellow citizens in town. However, Letanovce is a community with weak governance structures and poor policing capacities, most of all because basic infrastructure, the radical effects of education in special schools, discrimination by their fellow citizens, and long-term unemployment dominate. When neo-liberal community policing projects are introduced to such communities, they are doomed to failure and risk leading to reactions that blame the Roma for the failure, rather than the conditions in which they need to live. This is also the case in Letanovce. Despite various attempts to get the Roma involved in the National Park guarding project and to encourage them to make the community center their own, most of the Roma have dropped out of the guarding project and do not use the center. Milan Krosцен, a Rom who lives in the Letanovce settlement, has commented on the situation:

> What good is the community center to us? What we want is jobs. Under communism we were working, but Slovaks hate us and won’t give us jobs. Now there is 100 per cent unemployment here. They say we are lazy, but we’d all take any job going. They say we steal. Yes, we steal wood from the forest just to stay alive, I admit it. (Kroscen cited Nurden 2004)

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I have discussed the ways in which neo-liberal technologies of governing have been introduced to challenge large-scale unemployment among the Roma in post-1989 East Central Europe. I have paid particular attention to how such neo-liberal tools have been cross-fertilized with domestic socio-cultural and economic practices. These practices can be related, at least partly, to the legacies of communism. I have shown how the assembling of neo-liberal governmental technologies with such practices have resulted in an ambivalent situation for the Roma, leading to their eviction, exploitation, dehumanization, and the limitation to effectively enact their legal citizenship rights.

Activation programs have sometimes been heralded as forms of ‘workfare with a human face.’ Activation policies, seen as endeavors to combine labor market integration and social and human capital formation with an individualized approach to the marginalized, would be ‘tailor made’ to an individual’s circumstances. In this chapter, I have shown how the articulation of activation schemes in Slovakia, officially initiated to enhance the Roma’s (and other citizens’) ‘employability,’ actually function as a form of ethnicity-based governmentality that tends to naturalize the ethnic differences between Romani and other parts of the population. Yet, I have also clarified that we can see these ambiguous effects neither as the direct outcome of neo-liberalism, nor as primarily the ‘inadequate’ implementation of neo-liberal measures.

An interrogation of neo-liberal programs from the angle of how they are assembled with various other elements, tools, practices, and historically inherited patterns of governance and prejudice can also help to redirect the focus of inquiries into such programs and into the variety of actors involved. The hybridity and, thus, ‘impurity’ of the neo-liberal forms of governance, as well as the ways in which they affect the situation of the Roma urge us to analyze, for instance, how and under what conditions notions and practices of welfare have changed. Why and how are neo-liberal programs actually mutated in the daily reality of welfare delivery? Why, for instance, does the Slovak implementation of activation schemes frequently go without offering the involved ‘clients’ the intended training programs? How are European funds (ESF) used to pay ‘activation allowances’ in Slovakia? Have the Roma or advocacy groups and NGOs related to them become involved in new partnerships with state institutions? How exactly do the involved Roma—alongside and in reply to neo-liberal programs—develop alternative livelihood strategies and citizenship practices? To answer these and similar kinds of questions requires, for instance, research into the everyday practices of municipal or privatized ‘reintegration’ offices, as well as into the ways in which frontline or social workers who work there negotiate with their Romani clients. How do these local circumstances and the ways in which municipalities or NGOs have recently got access to European funds, influence their daily practices and Roma approaches? One other important and related domain that needs to be further investigated to answer such questions is how the current Romani social and civil movement has impacted on the situation of the Roma. Indeed, alongside the trend to problematize Romani identities and mobilities as irregular or even disruptive, we have seen a clear, heterogeneous movement in which Roma and activist and advocacy organizations try to challenge the Roma’s current situ-
ation. This movement, including its chances, promises, and ambivalences, is the central theme of the next chapter.
Chapter 7
Traveling Activism in/against the Spirit of Neo-Liberalism

INTRODUCTION: THE ROMANI MOVEMENT AFTER THE FALL OF COMMUNISM

During one of the large November 1989 demonstrations against the communist leadership in Czechoslovakia, Václav Havel appeared on the stage together with Emil Ščuka, Jan Rusenko, and Vojtěch Ziga. They were three of the Czechoslovak Romani leaders who were already active in the 1980s and pioneers in the Czech and Slovak Romani movement (Pečinka 2003). During the non-violent protests that would lead to the resignation of the communist leadership, these Roma founded the Romani Civic Initiative (ROI or Romská občanská initiative) and joined Havel and other dissidents who had founded the Civic Forum (Občanské forum) a few days earlier. On 22 November, the ROI leadership formulated a proclamation in which they stated:

Brothers and sisters, Roma! Arise! Let us awaken! Our day has come, the day we have awaited for so many years. The day is here. The Roma living in this country have, for the first time, taken their destiny in their own hands. Now it is up to us, if we show ourselves capable of uniting and of doing something for the sake of our children ...

The [Civic] Forum and the ROI will defend all the Roma in the country. Let our romanipen ['Romani soul'] lead us to a better life. Let us not forget the truth of our fathers: who gives respect receives respect! (English translation cited Liégeois 2007: 212)

Three days later, Ščuka and Rusenko gave a speech in the presence of about a million of people who had gathered at Prague’s Letná plain. While some Roma in the audience were waving a Romani flag, these Romani activists were calling for a democratic society with equal citizenship rights for the Roma, including the right to maintain and develop their own cultural and ethnic identity. The appearance of Havel and other dissidents together with the Romani leaders was more than a symbolic gesture. Since the late 1970s, an explicit critique of the communist approach to the Roma was part of dissident attempts to challenge the dictatorship, including its violation of human and civil rights. Ten years before the fall of communism, the civil movement Charter 77 warned that a modernization of the Czechoslovak economy would have radical consequences for the Roma:
The demand for unskilled labor will then fall, threatening the Roma with massive unemployment which will expose this ruthlessly urbanized minority to extreme pressure, and fuse their social ostracism and material oppression with a new ethnic consciousness, all the stronger the more cruelly it is today suppressed. (Charter 77 1979b: 7)

In a nutshell, this warning accurately expresses what happened in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, even though the developments differed from country to country (Guy 2001a; Barany 2002). Large-scale unemployment among the Roma, radical forms of institutional and citizen violence against them, and their budding ethnic mobilization were three important characteristics of their situation in the early 1990s. Romani activists established political parties that ran or are currently still running for local and national elections, while others joined newly established political parties. Yet others founded new Romani cultural or media centers or reshaped cultural organizations that had their roots in late communism. These developments led to the launch of numerous Romani journals, newspapers, magazines, and radio and television programs. This has also revitalized the Romani language, for many of these media started to use Romanes or publish and broadcast bilingually (Matras 2005). Yet other Roma started to collaborate with the first NGOs that entered or were established in Central and Eastern Europe to launch community development and other empowerment and aid initiatives for the Roma, primarily at local levels. These forms of Romani ethnic mobilization, together with the domestic civil movements and the transnational social and human rights movements were the main sources of the current, heterogeneous Romani movement in Europe.

We can distinguish two different types of analysis of the Romani movement. Firstly, some scholars (Vermeersch 2006; McGarry 2010; Ram 2010a) have primarily focused on the Romani movement from the viewpoint of social movement theory, transnational advocacy, and ethnic mobilization. They focus, for instance, on the ways in which the dynamic relation between international governing institutions and transnational pro-Roma activism and advocacy has contributed to getting the Roma on the policy agendas of European institutional bodies and national governments. They discuss what has been

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1 In most Central and Eastern European countries the demand for unskilled labor was already substantially falling since the beginning of the economic crisis in the 1970s (Szelényi 1983; Stark and Nee 1988). This, and the social-economic inequalities, radically worsened the situation of the Roma in the region (Kovats 1997; Mróz 2001; Fosztó and Anástasioe 2001).

2 The pre-1989 international Romani movement—mainly initiated by the International Romani Union (IRU) that was developed in the 1960s and 70s—has also influenced the post-1989 developments. Yet, since the 1990s the impact of the IRU on the movement has rapidly decreased, most of all because it did not succeed in modernizing its decision-making structures and forms of leadership (Acton and Klimová 2001; Klimová-Alexander 2005). It remains to be seen which role the IRU can play in future developments of the current Romani movement, in particular now state and supra-state bodies have increasingly ignored the IRU and prefer to negotiate with NGOs formed and led by a younger generation of Romani activists (Nirenberg 2009). Particularly in the field of Romani memory, the Central Council of German Sinti and Roma (Zentralrat Deutscher Sinti und Roma), established in the early 1970s in Heidelberg, has increasingly played an international role in debates about the recognition of the nazi genocide of the Sinti and Roma (chapter 8, Matras 1998).
achieved in terms of political mobilization and transnational structures of representation and concentrate on, among other things, the position of those who (claim to) represent the Roma or suggest defending their interest. These scholars focus on those forms of advocacy and activism that form what Peter Vermeersch calls “the formal side of the movement” (2006: 9, his italics). They concentrate on governmental and non-governmental bodies and organizations that “attempt to represent Romani interests or are supportive organizations that aim to assist, protect, or to mobilize the Roma” (ibid). These scholars have pointed to various ambiguities that have gone together with attempts to legitimize and frame different forms of activism and advocacy. Nevertheless, their analyses have generally led to a relatively positive evaluation of civil society actors and their impact on European and domestic Roma policy changes—even though this has not yet led to a substantial improvement of the Roma’s living conditions. This first group of scholars has extensively examined the emergence of new Roma-related sites of participatory governance and, accordingly, looked at the various new and reshaped bodies and NGOs that have been established at and beyond the state level (chapter 5). Yet, these scholars do not really explain how the emergence of these sites of participatory governance relates to the ways in which state/civil society relations have significantly changed since 1989. This topic relates to how ‘the strengthening of civil society’ in post-communist countries has become a huge project in itself, in which both transforming states and IGOs have tried to mobilize civil societies to reinforce state and supra-state power and sovereignty (chapters 5, 6, see also below).

These post-1989 socioeconomic and political shifts are among the starting points of a second group of scholars who have analyzed the Romani movement. Many scholars have described how the optimism of Romani leaders and activists in the immediate aftermath of ‘1989’ soon made place for pessimism or even cynicism. Some of these scholars, who belong to the second group I distinguish, have drawn equally pessimistic conclusions about the movement’s chances to become really effective and democratic. Their assessment is primarily based on factors such as the (re)emergence of institutional and citizen violence against the Roma; the ways in which this violence is embedded in institutional structures and related to communist legacies; the difficulty to mobilize civil societal forces to change this; the lack of grassroots support for the Romani movement, and the displacement of ‘the grassroots’ in Romani-related activism. Some scholars relate the limitations of the Romani movement and the difficulties in challenging the Roma’s marginalization above all to the emergence of neo-liberal states, markets, and societies in Europe, and in Central and Eastern Europe in particular. These scholars are both critical of where the Romani movement has hitherto led to and usually not very hopeful about its short-term prospects. Nando Sigona and Nidhi Trehan, for instance, suggest that neoliberalism has become hegemonic in the region, if not throughout Europe, and led to seriously undermining viable possibilities for civil societal actors to further the Romani

living conditions. They do reflect on the changing state/civil society relationships, but, at the same time, tend to present the Roma primarily as victims of ‘neo-liberalism.’ Insofar as they see a way out of the suffocating, hegemonic logic of neo-liberalism, it is through mobilizing and supporting forms of local Romani grassroots community resistance and giving voice to Romani subaltern voices.

I shall re-examine the chances and limits of the Romani movement, relate them to my analysis of neo-liberal governmentality (chapters 5, 6), and question the ways in which the chances and barriers of this movement have thus far been analyzed. I will argue that little or only one-sided attention has been paid to how the blurring of the boundaries between state, market, and civil society has profoundly influenced the development of the Romani movement. We have been able to observe in post-1989 Central and Eastern Europe what Mitchell Dean calls an unfolding of the formally political sphere into civil society, which has led to the building of several private-public partnerships. At the same time, the parallel governmentalization of the region’s civil societies has entailed an unfolding of civil society regulations into the political sphere and led to attempts to incorporate some of civil society’s core values—agency, participation, voice, etc.—into formal political institutions at and beyond the state level (Dean 2007: 116-17). I will show that the simultaneity of these two processes makes it difficult to consider civil society as merely a “supplement to the development of political institutions” (Matveeva 2008: 12). We need to reflect on the effects of their boundary blurring and on the possibilities of their boundary crossings for developing new forms of Romani agency. An analysis of these effects and possibilities, I will show, has two major implications for how the Romani movement has hitherto been investigated. Firstly, we will get a different picture of changed state/civil society relations and the opportunities and limits that are going with them. Secondly, we will get another idea of the Romani movement’s politics of representation and its relation to both the Roma’s Europeanization and the involved use of knowledge and expertise. Taken together, these two aspects will allow me to reveal some novel dimensions, prospects, and ambivalences of the contemporary Romani movement.

To make an alternative reading of the Romani movement possible, I propose that at least two steps will be made. Firstly, we need to assess its politics of representation beyond the ‘global hegemonic neoliberal power’ versus ‘local grassroots community resistance’ binary. Going beyond this artificial opposition, which tends to essentialize resistance as residing in discrete localized places or actors, will shed light on how neoliberal power is constituted, but also contested through diverse social relations and everyday practices in and outside institutional contexts. Secondly and correlatively, alongside an ‘activist’ notion of Romani politics, we also need to adopt a less dramatic notion of politics. Some scholars tend to assess the movement primarily in terms of mass mobilization. Yet, a less ‘revolutionary’ conception of politics is required to reveal how everyday practices in which Roma are involved do not necessarily preserve ambivalent status quos, but also try to contribute to transformative participation and new constel-

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6 See, most notably, Sigona and Trehan (2009a; 2009b) and Trehan (2009a; 2009b).
7 See also Kóczé (2009) and Trehan and Kóczé (2009).
8 See, for instance, Vermeersch (2006: 212, 228), Sigona and Trehan (2009a: 297), and Marušák and Singer (2009: 201-02).
lations of citizenship. Seen from this angle, the daily struggles of, for instance, activists to get ‘the Roma’ on domestic and European policy agenda, but also those of ‘ordinary’ Roma can be interpreted as difficult yet important attempts to re-politicize inequality and poverty affecting the Roma. Combining both notions of politics reveals not only that such struggles contest neo-liberal concepts of participation and existing citizenship frames at and beyond the national level. It also illuminates how diverse actors involved in the Romani social and civil movement strategically mobilize the Roma’s Europeanization across space and difference to challenge the frameworks in which the Roma are often framed.

I will show that the extension of a conceptualization of politics along these lines can be considered as a politics of citizenship of participation. I will illustrate how various kinds of Romani actors have developed practices of citizenship in which they try to renegotiate the meaning of participation beyond its limited, neo-liberal meaning of individualistic, market participation (chapter 6). The notion ‘citizenship as participation’ that I use in this chapter refers to citizenship struggles for the deepening of democracy and for challenging old and new practices and mechanisms that (tend to) reproduce inequality and exclusion. I will show how the politics of citizenship of participation partly relies on strategies that I call traveling activism. With this notion, I draw attention to the significance of how various discourses, strategies, and techniques of activism are translated across space and difference. My examination of traveling activism will clarify how activists travel through disjunctive circuits and how the diverse forms of coalition building that arise from these activities can serve as a productive source for Roma to claim the right to participate as equal and full citizens. These citizenship practices also reveal that the governmentalization of civil society has had diverse effects. While it has gone together with practices that persistently de-politicize subjects and programs of development by rendering them natural, private, or technical (chapter 6), it has also provoked processes of re-politicization that challenge these mechanisms of reification and reveal their ‘dilemmatic’ character (Honig 1996). These processes of re-politicization have contributed to the production of new forms of agency.

This chapter proceeds as follows. I will first explain why we cannot discuss the Romani movement along the lines of easy, straightforward strategies of empowerment and emancipation. I will clarify how the post-1989 Romani movement has emerged from a peculiar mixture of participatory democratic and neo-liberal elements, and how their confluence has confronted pro-Roma advocates and Romani activists with dilemmas that radically traverse their activities. Thereafter, I will explain how practices of traveling activism represent attempts at articulating a politics of citizenship as participation. I will illuminate that traveling activism does not depart from or reject neo-liberal development as such, but, rather, tries to mobilize and articulate neo-liberal technologies of governing for different ends. I will look at several activities that have been developed by the European Roma Grassroots Organizations network (ERGO) to illustrate how I read traveling activism and the related citizenship practices. I will show that practices of traveling

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9 For a compelling case study on how current Romani practices of mobility contest EU citizenship regimes, see Aradau et al (2010). In this case study, insights from citizenship studies (Isin and Nielsen 2008) have been mobilized to develop an original approach to mobility and citizenship.
activism are relying on a specific, strategic redeployment of expertise and knowledge and how this mobilization has gone together with new kinds of knowledge formation and Romani agency.

BEYOND THE PERVERSE CONFLUENCE OF PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY AND NEO-LIBERALISM

The Romani movement has been confronted by a dilemma that has largely emanated from a ‘perverse confluence’ (Dagnino 2008) of two different processes, related to two different political projects: a participatory democratic and a neo-liberal project. The Romani movement has profoundly been influenced by post-communist processes of democratization, which have gone together with the development of new public spaces, new forms, subjects, and sites of citizenship, de-centered forms of governance, and the increased participation of civil societal actors in decision-making linked to public and policy issues. Dissident movements with roots in opposition against the communist regimes, human rights and social movements that appeared in the West since the 1970s, and the momentum of ‘1989’ have all contributed to the emergence of this participatory process aimed at developing and deepening democracy, including the building of a viable civil society. At the same time, the Romani movement has been influenced by the neo-liberal project. Post-communist state and civil society building and the transition from plan to market economies in Central and Eastern Europe have gone together with the profound articulations of neo-liberal governmental technologies (chapters 5, 6). The participatory democratic and the neo-liberal projects have ambiguously flown together:

The perversity lies in the fact that, even if these projects point in opposite and even antagonistic directions, each of them not only requires an active and proactive civil society, but also uses a number of common concepts and points of reference. In particular, notions such as citizenship, participation, and civil society are central elements in both projects, even if they are being used with very different meanings. (Dagnino 2008: 55)

I will show how the uncomfortable merging of these two political projects in the case of the Romani movement has led to ambiguities that complicate a reading of the Romani movement along straightforward lines of empowerment and emancipation.

There is an important difference between the Romani movement, as well as other social movements in Central and Eastern Europe on the one hand, and social movements in parts of the world where participatory democracy had been established longer ago, on the other. The way in which civil societies have been revived and woven in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe has roughly taken place at the same time of the global ‘NGO boom.’ This boom took place in the context of influential transformations of the structures of capitalism, including new approaches to poverty and development (chapters 2, 5). Moreover, contrary to what is often suggested, neo-liberal concepts and practices have transnational ‘roots,’ including some in pre-1989 Central and Eastern Europe (chapter 6). In some countries, most notably in Hungary, the impact of neo-liberalization has already become tangible since the early 1980s (Haney 2002). For these
reasons, the simultaneity of the post-1989 NGO boom with emergent neo-liberalization in Central and Eastern Europe makes it more difficult to distinguish or phase the participatory democratic and neo-liberal projects, in particular when it comes to the Roma’s situation. The fact that some studies and reports that have discussed the Romani movement identify ‘civil society’ with private foundations and NGOs, for instance, could itself be considered as a symptom of the post-1989 confluence of the two political projects. Indeed, limiting the meaning of civil society to NGOs or what has been called the ‘third sector’ (next to the state and the market) is itself expression of the trend “to implement a ‘minimalist’ conception of politics and to nullify the extension of public spaces for political deliberation that had been achieved by the democratizing struggles” (Dagnino 2008: 59).

Until late into the 1990s, and partly as a consequence of Cold War East-West relations and the related Western distrust of state authorities in Eastern Europe, the direct Western support for Romani minorities in Central and Eastern Europe mainly consisted of establishing small-scale NGOs. In the course of the years, the steadily growing number of Roma-related civil societal organizations, mainly funded by Western donors, became a major channel for the initial development of and support for the Romani movement. At the same time, the restructuring of Central and Eastern European states and their institutional infrastructures led to the influential change of state-civil society relations. The ‘strengthening of civil society’ and the post-1989 restructuring of the state were parallel, largely interconnected processes. Partially and incoherently, these processes contributed to the decentralization of formerly authoritarian communist governmental structures, to the privatization of formerly state-owned sectors, to the reform of welfare regimes, and to the development of various kinds of private-public partnerships. Thus, the support for Romani or pro-Roma NGOs on the one hand, and for democratic state and market reform on the other, went together with an unprecedented transformation of state-civil society relationships and with a partial transfer of state responsibilities to existing, but most of all newly developed civil society actors.

These complex changes in the structures, patterns, tools, and forms of governance do not involve a de-regulation, but, rather, a re-regulation of government in the Foucaultian sense (chapter 1). They have been accompanied by a blurring of the boundaries between state, market, and civil society (chapter 5). This has certainly not only been an outwardly driven process governed by western actors or IGOs, but a complex process supported by various kinds of governmental actors, including local and national ones in the region. As part of these processes of state-civil society transformations, IGOs, foreign donors, and state authorities in Central and Eastern Europe have been looking for reliable Romani civil society partners with whom they could build up formal and informal partnerships. In some cases, these emerging dialogues between state and pro-Roma or Romani civil society actors have had their roots in late communist economic crises and the need for restructuring the socialist economy and reducing the costs of the then existing Roma assimilation programs (Kovats 1997). In 1984, for instance, the Hungarian authorities argued that “the integration [of the Gypsies] is restricted by our difficult economic situation ... a consequence of which is that we must now consider the Gypsy population as playing an important role in the construction of a new consensus” (cited Kovats 1997: 57). Martin Kovats clarifies that allowing the Roma to play a role in
COMMUNIST ROMA POLICIES WAS LARGELY MOTIVATED BY SOCIO-ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES, RATHER THAN BY A DESIRE TO ESTABLISH ROMANI MINORITY SELF-GOVERNANCE AND TO ALLOW ROMA TO IMPACT ON POLITICAL AND POLICY DEVELOPMENTS. HE SUGGESTS THAT THIS AMBIGUITY HAS NOT DISAPPEARED WITH THE FALL OF COMMUNISM AND WITH THE POST-1989 DEVELOPMENT OF IMPORTANT NEW REPRESENTATIONAL STRUCTURES, SUCH AS, FOR INSTANCE, THE MINORITY SELF-GOVERNMENT SYSTEM IN HUNGARY. HE STATES THAT THE INTRODUCTION AND BUILDING OF POLICY DIALOGUES WITH TACTICALLY CHosen MEMBERS OF THE ROMANI MINORITY REPRESENT AMBIGUOUS STATE STRATEGIES TO POSTPONE THE DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SOCIOECONOMIC POLICIES THAT WERE AND ARE STILL NEEDED TO IMPROVE THE SITUATION OF THE ROMA.

KOVATS’ OBSERVATIONS ON THE AMBIvalent EFFECTS OF THESE POLICY DIALOGUES COULD BE PUT INTO THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE PERVERSE CONFLUENCE OF THE TWO POLITICAL PROJECTS. STATE ACTORS THAT HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN THE (PARTIAL) TRANSFER OF THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES TO CIVIL SOCIETY ACTORS POTENTIALLY CONSIDER ROMANI OR ROMA ADVOCACY NGOs AS THE RELATIVELY IDEAL AND TRUSTWORTHY PARTNERS FOR (ASSISTING WITH) THE IMPLEMENTATION OF POLICIES. THESE NGOs ARE SEEN AS AGENTS WHO ARE OPERATING IN THE PROXIMITY OF ROMANI COMMUNITIES AND WHO HAVE DEVELOPED KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERTISE ABOUT THE LOCAL SITUATION. FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF NATIONAL OR INTERNaTIONAL GOVERNING ORGANIZATIONS, THESE FEATURES MAKE SUCH NGOs IDEAL INTERMEDIARIES BETWEEN GOVERNMENTS AND STATE OR SUPRA-STATE INSTITUTIONS ON THE ONE HAND, AND ROMANI MINORITIES AND ‘GRASSROOTS COMMUNITIES,’ ON THE OTHER. SINCE THE EARLY 1990s, MUCH HAS BEEN EXPECTED OF THE ‘STRENGTHENING OF CIVIL SOCIETY’ THROUGH SUPPORTING AND ESTABLISHING NGOs AND MOBILIZING OR IMPROVING THEIR ‘LOCAL’ CONNECTIONS AND FORMS OF EXPERTISE. FOR THOSE ROMANI OR PRO-ROMA NGOs THAT HAVE BEEN APPROACHED BY GOVERNMENTAL OFFICES, FOREIGN DONORS OR IGOs (AND VICE VERSA), TAKING UP SUCH ROLES IN POLICY DELIVERY IS MOST OFTEN NOT A QUESTION OF CHOICE AND, MORE OFTEN THAN NOT, REPRESENTS A CHALLENGE. HOWEVER, THESE INVOLVEMENTS HAVE ALSO HAD MORE AMBIvalENT EFFECTS.

THE GOVERNMENTALIZATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS BY STATE AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENTAL ACTORS EMBODIES A COMPLEX ATTEMPT TO LOOSELY BUT EFFECTIVELY ATTACH SUCH NGOs TO THE STATE AND SUPRA-STATE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS OF GOVERNANCE. IN MANY CASES, THESE PROCESSES OF GOVERNMENTALIZATION HAVE LED TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF SO-CALLED QUANGOS OR QUASI-AUTONOMOUS NGOs. A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF NEW CIVIL SOCIETAL STRUCTURES, AND PRIVATE-PUBLIC PARTNERSHIPS IN PARTICULAR, ARE THE RESULT OF HOW STATES THEMSELVES, WHILE MOBILIZING NEO-LIBERAL TECHNIQUES OF GOVERNMENT, HAVE ESTABLISHED NGOs AND OTHER QUASI-AUTONOMOUS BODIES (AUTONOMOUS FROM THE STATE OR OTHER DONORS) TO CARRY OUT TASKS THAT WERE FORMERLY DIRECTLY ORGANIZED BY STATE AUTHORITIES.

latest amendments requires that ‘representative’ Romani NGOs back the formation and election of Romani minority self-governments.

The system, and particularly its effects on the situation of the Roma have been much criticized, most of all for its limited focus on cultural autonomy and its effect, MSG’s financial and logistic dependency on other official governmental bodies, and its problematic approach to the self-definition of minority members. At an even more fundamental level, the system has been criticized for how it would have de-politicized the socio-economic reasons for Roma marginalization and displaced critiques of how these newly established structures themselves are partly responsible for the reproduction of inequality.\textsuperscript{10} Nidhi Trehan, for instance, puts forward:

Progressive representatives of the Romani communities perceived [the MSG] system as a clever mechanism of political control on the part of the state to co-opt Romani leadership in Hungary, effectively neutralizing radical critiques of the situation … Nevertheless … large numbers of Romani leaders … have tacitly accepted the importance of the MSG system, which they view as a type of ‘training ground’ for a career in professional politics as community representatives. (Trehan 2009a: 113)

We have been able to notice the emergence of similar state-civil society structures and partnerships, resulting in similarly ambiguous situations for the Roma, in other countries in Central and Eastern Europe. For instance, the national agencies for the Romani minorities that have been established in the Czech Republic and Romania represent equivalent attempts to attach NGOs to state institutional bodies. Even though these Czech and Romanian agencies are structurally different from the Hungarian MSG system and, to some extent, more centralized than the latter, they could also be considered from the angle of the governmentalization of Romani and pro-Roma civil societal actors.

Roma-related scholarship has, however, not stressed how the governmentalization of civil society has also taken place at the international level, in IGOS such as the European Union, the Council of Europe, and the World Bank. The World Bank’s ‘good governance’ and the EU governance agendas are also dedicated to how the mobilization of civil societal actors needs to contribute to new participative and deliberative forms of global and European governance and to democratizing decision-making (chapter 5). The European Commission, for instance, puts forward that NGOs “can become ‘centers of expertise’ and capitalize on their knowledge of communities by becoming trainers and advisors for mainstream providers or governmental authorities” (EC 2007: 26). Within the EU, the governmentalization of civil society relates to a longer tradition to try to bring ‘Europe’ closer to its citizens. Particularly since the early 1990s, the Union has launched various kinds of ‘proximity policies’ to improve participatory democracy and limit the EU’s much discussed democratic deficit. The desire to bring the EU closer to its citizens was one of the reasons for initiating the influential subsidiarity principle in the early 1990s:\textsuperscript{11}


\textsuperscript{11} According to the principle of subsidiarity, which was enshrined in EU law by the Treaty of Maastricht (1992), “the EU may only act … where member states agree that action of individual countries is insufficient. The principle serves the functions of, on the one hand, setting up a division of competence between
We affirm that decisions must be taken as closely as possible to the citizen. Greater unity can be achieved without excessive centralization ... Bringing to life this principle—‘subsidiarity’ or ‘nearness’—is essential if the [European] Community is to develop with the support of its citizens. (CEU 1992: 5)

In the context of its new governance agenda, the EU has introduced numerous new discourses, mechanisms, and tools that need to bring decision-making closer to the EU’s citizens. Lifelong learning (EC 1995), activation, and the ‘open method of coordination’ (OMC) are examples of what can be conceptualized as neo-liberal governmental technologies of proximity:

Technologies of proximity refer to all those discourses and practices which imagine democracy in terms of positive experiences of local engagement, participation, and connection. Proximity is affirmed at the level of the citizen body: democratic life is seen to benefit from a certain closeness and connection between citizens. It is also affirmed between citizens and the formal institutions of political authority: people should feel ‘closer’ to government. (Walters and Haahr 2005: 76)

The tools that have been developed at local, national, and supranational levels to increase the role of Romani and pro-Roma civil societal actors in decision-making can be considered from the perspective of the articulation of such neo-liberal technologies of proximity.\(^\text{12}\) Several Romani activists have moved into closer collaborations with national or supranational political institutions or even into their official bodies to help foster Roma-related development programs. However, these commitments have often been considered as co-options, rather than successes.\(^\text{13}\) Whether co-option or a limited form of successful participation in decision-making, the governmentalization of civil society has undoubtedly led to an ambiguous situation:

[T]he increasing political autonomy of NGOs creates a peculiar situation in which these NGOs are responsible to the international agencies which finance them and the state which contracts them as service providers, but not to civil society, whose representatives they claim to be, nor to the social sectors whose interests they bear, nor to any other organ of a truly public character. (Dagnino 2008: 59-60)

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\(^{12}\) Seen from the angle of this transnational development of technologies of proximity, QUANGOs are, thus, not only GONGOs or government-organized NGOs; they are also what could be called EURONGOs or European Union-organized NGOs (or NGOs organized and supported by other IGOs, such as the Council of Europe and the World Bank). Yet, it is important to realize that EU funds for the development of civil society in Central and Eastern Europe have usually been distributed through state structures in the region. The number of national Romani NGOs that get direct funding from Brussels is still limited. Nevertheless, the Council of Europe has funded several new international Romani NGOs, such as the International Roma Women Network (IRWN), the Federation of European Romani Young People (FERYP), and the European Roma and Travellers Forum (ERTF) (Nirenberg 2009).

\(^{13}\) See, for instance Nirenberg (2009: 113), and Trehan (2009a: 113).
This situation has important consequences for issues of minority participation and representation. Propagators of newly developed technologies of proximity—such as the Hungarian MSG system and Roma-related private-public partnerships more generally—claim that these technologies represent mechanisms that take decisions ‘as closely as possible’ to the citizen or the involved community of identity. However, often “the use of new technologies does not mean that publics can speak to governments in ways that are unmediated” (Newman and Clarke 2009: 136). Frequently, participative governance implies that civil society actors can help implement policies, while having no direct say in how these policies are actually developed. The ways in which participative technologies of proximity have been articulated on the ground “highlight the continued significance of questions about who sets agendas, who claims to represent whom, and how different experiences, identities, and interests can be given voice in the public domain” (ibid).

The ways in which the Roma have increasingly been involved in participative and deliberative forms of governance reflect a more general and widespread idea that democracy needs to be based on forms of governing that are better attuned to individual preferences and questions of difference than the classic welfare state and more classic forms of representative governance. Deliberative forms of democracy “are viewed as more responsive to subtle differences of interest and identity than the aggregative electoral processes of representative democracy” (Newman 2005: 131). However, one of the outcomes of dealing with questions of difference in this way is, Janet Newman suggests, that the public or citizenry needs to be constructed as “a differentiated entity so that citizens or service users can be included from appropriate categories” (ibid). These processes of categorization tend to naturalize group identities and to divide people in relatively clearly distinguished population groups, based on categories of age, gender, ethnicity, profession, and the like. Similarly, participative and deliberative practices of governance often tend to assume a clearly defined, more or less homogeneous Romani community. This identification often goes with an ambivalent problematization:

[T]he process of categorization tends to construct problems as the property of the group concerned rather than of the wider social or political system. ‘Hard to reach’ groups are constituted through a double taxonomy of assumed deficits (lack of skills or confidence, unwillingness to participate) and potential assets (in the form of social capital). As such, their participation is linked to a social inclusion agenda rather than a democratic one. (Newman 2005: 132, my italics)

Consequently, national, but also supranational political institutions tend to reduce their redistributive role to the capacity building of Romani communities. I have clarified how the tendency to isolate the situation of the Roma from the larger political, historical, and socioeconomic context has moralizing and de-politicizing effects (chapter 6). Politically complex issues of marginalization tend to be reduced to problems of morality, decency, and individual responsibility, which primarily need to be solved by the marginalized themselves. One of the consequences of this governing through community is that structural problems affecting the Roma tend to be territorialized. These problems and how they are supposed to be solved are one-sidedly related to the inhabitants and
infrastructures of specific localities, such as separated or segregated Romani settlements, sites, and ghettos (see also Timmer 2010). In such cases of governing through relatively fixed Romani communities, we have been able to notice the simultaneity of three overlapping phenomena: the reduction of a democratic agenda to a social inclusion one; the territorialization of complex structural problems, and the limitation of their solution to the context of the target groups and their living places. The combination of these phenomena often goes together with the suggestion that ‘the Romani culture’ is the ‘key problem’ to be addressed. Hence, “a cultural gloss is overlaid on structural problems” (Newman 2005: 132). In his evaluation of the Romani movement, Valeriu Nicolae (2008) puts forward that, despite all the rhetoric on the equal participation of the Roma as citizens, the dominant public discourse on the Roma is that they need to change their culture and lifestyle, that they need to send their children to school, that they need to obey the law, and that they need to integrate into mainstream society. The problems the Roma face tend to be ‘privatized’ and their solutions considered as their own private, ‘community’ matter and, thus, not as a collective, public responsibility (chapter 6).

Let me link this issue to the suggestion of scholars of the second group (discussed in the introduction to this chapter) that those who have started to represent the Roma—including Roma themselves—and speak in their name have become involved in an ambivalent or even dirty politics of representation. Some of these scholars, for instance, have discussed the appearance of so-called ‘NGOization’ at the center of the Romani movement. This phenomenon relates to how particularly Roma advocacy NGOs, gradually departing from a movement agenda of solidarity and participatory democracy, have become a kind of service deliverers that contribute to, rather than challenge, the success of the new neo-liberal orthodoxies of state and supra-state actors. NGOization leads, it is argued, to an ambiguous situation in which, at new sites of participation, the competences of some representatives—well-educated Roma and, particularly, pro-Roma advocates—tend to be preferred above their capacity to democratically or authoritatively represent the interests of Romani grassroots communities. NGOization, so the argument goes, has resulted in a troublesome divide within the movement, according to which some bureaucratic, professionalized NGOs run the show and limit “the dynamics and flexibility of civil society” (Rostas 2009: 170). Advocacy NGOs, mostly staffed by non-Romani human rights activists, would currently dominate the NGOization trend and the setting of the movement’s agenda. Therefore, NGOization has caused a displacement of Romani NGOs and subaltern, grassroots voices. Nidhi Trehan, most notably, critiques what she considers the “marketization of ‘Romani rights’”, which would have taken “a logic of its own, which in many cases is disconnected from the diverse needs of Romani

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14 This territorialization often goes together with criminalizing the Roma. Such strategies of criminalization and making the marginalized responsible for (solving) their problems are evidently not limited to the Roma. Such strategies are applied to the poor more generally (Wacquant 2009; Ilcan and Lacey 2011). However, problematizing Romani identities and mobilities as irregular intensifies the applicability of strategies of stigmatization and ‘responsibilization’ to the situation of the Roma (chapter 6, van Baar 2011b).

15 See, most notably, Trehan (2001; 2009a; 2009b), Barany (2002), Kóczé (2009), Nirenberg (2009), Rostas (2009), and Sigona and Trehan (2009a; 2009b).

16 See Kóczé (2009), Trehan (2009b), and Trehan and Kóczé (2009).
communities” (2009b: 65). In short, NGOization would have radically displaced Romani grassroots communities and subjects and their voices, interests, and needs.

Nando Sigona and Nidhi Trehan argue that NGOization is generally the effect of how neo-liberalism has impacted on the Romani movement. They consider neo-liberalism as an ideological policy framework, mainly imposed on Central and Eastern Europe from outside and which would instrumentalize “the NGO vehicle” to achieve its aims (2009a: 297). For instance, they claim that the former World Bank President Wolfensohn and the billionaire Soros are elite figures who played a crucial role in “the ‘Americanization’ of Eastern Europe” (2009b: 3). Referring to David Harvey’s (2005) view of neo-liberalism, they link the region’s marketization mainly to the dissemination of discourses of “American and Euro-Atlantic liberal and neo-liberal political elites” (2009b: 8). They primarily follow a reading of hegemonic neo-liberalism as policy-cum-ideology (chapter 5). In such a view, I argued in chapters 5 and 6, is neither much space for a consideration of uneven articulations of neo-liberalism, nor for an acknowledgement of the possibly constitutive role of critique in producing ambivalences within articulations of neo-liberal governance. As a result, they tend to understand it as a rampant hegemonic mechanism that rules everything and everybody, at least when it comes to the daily realities of Europe’s Romani minorities. This view of neo-liberalism also impacts on the alternative they propose and the way in which they perceive Romani agency.

Sigona and Trehan present their alternative mainly by contrasting it to what they consider as counterproductive. They oppose, for instance, urban pro-Roma and Romani elites to rural Romani grassroots communities, top-down to bottom-up approaches, external expertise to local knowledge, technocratic professionalism to social justice, and NGOization to grassroots empowerment. While they value positively and want to mobilize the latter sides of these binaries, they consider the former as intrusive manifestations of a neo-imperial neo-liberal order. Ultimately, alternatives need to be looked for at the local, grassroots level. For instance, Trehan proposes, that “[w]hat is needed … is … an analysis that accounts for Romani diversity in Europe through an emphasis on privileging local level knowledge …” (2009b: 65). Yet, while Sigona and Trehan pay ample attention to the latter sides of the aforementioned binaries, in their analysis the ‘grassroots’ remain an almost empty signifier. This issue relates to their specific understanding of the Romani movement’s politics of representation. In their view, the needs, interests, and problems of the Romani grassroots tend to be naturalize as given, transparent, and incontrovertible. However, this view disregards how these needs, interests, and problems are constituted “within the process of political representation itself, and not somehow apart from or prior to it” (Saward 2005: 181, his italics). Such a view sug-

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17 For instance, Trehan puts forward: “Inherent to the neo-liberal, technocratic policy approach towards NGO development, the ‘NGOization’ of human rights has curtailed, if not stunted, the development of an autonomous, democratic voice which would effectively intervene or mediate on behalf of European Romani communities and their most critical needs … [T]he advocacy culture and methods of neo-liberal human rights entrepreneurship continues to have a profound impact on younger generations of Romani activists, who have been exposed to a ‘technocratic, professional’ model … rather than the self-help, bottom-up model of community development” (2009a: 225).
gests that the Roma’s representatives are, but the represented Romani grassroots communities are not involved in the politics of representation (or less problematically).\textsuperscript{18} I call into question the binary oppositions between the Roma’s representatives and the represented Roma, elites and grassroots, or formal and informal sides of the movement. Such a ‘binary’ approach to the Romani movement, and to the (im)possibilities of NGO development in particular, embodies several ontological and epistemological problems. These binary constructions and the way in which they oppose expert to local knowledge privilege a problematic view of ‘local needs’ and ‘grassroots communities’ (chapter 2, Mohan and Stokke 2000). The Romani grassroots communities and local Romani NGOs are set against a non-Romani and Romani elite, including the professionalized international NGOs with whom they are affiliated. Critically, this all adds up to the valorization of ‘local’ or ‘insider’ knowledge and to the idea that the local Romani NGOs are ‘closest’ to the Roma most in need. This form of localism tends to “essentialize the local as discrete places that host relatively homogeneous communities or, alternatively, constitute sites of grassroots mobilization and resistance” (Mohan and Stokke 2000: 264). The glorification of local community as the site where Romani activism needs to start and to be mobilized privileges a notion of politics in which the main aim seems to be to carve “out spaces of empowerment where ordinary people can define their lives outside the imprisoning architecture of developmentalism” (Corbridge 2007: 185). I have critiqued the view of those who consider the ‘development industry’ itself as one of the core problems of how development is organized (chapter 2). Those who have called for rejecting this entire ‘industry,’ including the experts who have ‘flown into’ indigenous movements and contexts, tend to assume that the ‘local’ and ‘non-local’ are a kind of discrete entities that can be easily separated in space. The same rhetoric and problematic appear when some scholars are discussing the limits of the Romani movement in terms of the emergence of an ‘ethno-business,’ ‘Roma industry,’ or ‘human rights industry’.\textsuperscript{19} These scholars tend to present the Roma as either victims of the development and empowerment programs or active contributors to their own ideological deception. However, contrary to what seems to be these scholars’ academic aspiration, the ultimate theoretical consequence of this representation is that the space for Romani agency vanishes into thin air. Indeed, if the Roma are only victims of the development programs, they are denied agency. And when some, more organized and elite Roma are, through NGO-ization, merely contributing to an ambivalent politics of representation, they would simply not have the right kind of agency, “because they have bought in the development myth” (Sharma 2008: 119). Indeed, they have started to defend positions that neglect the ‘real’ needs of Romani ‘grassroots communities.’ In other words, the view of ‘global

\textsuperscript{18} Even scholars such as Vermeersch and McGarry, who have carefully analyzed the role of interest and identity formation and the processes in which interests and identities are framed and legitimized, tend to follow Pitkin’s (1968) seminal, yet unidirectional theory of representation. Focusing on “the formal side of the movement” (Vermeersch 2006: 9), they concentrate on the flow of interests from the represented to the representatives and on the role of the latter in the movement’s politics of representation (see also van Baar 2012b).

\textsuperscript{19} See Trehan (2001; 2009a), Trehan and Kóczé (2009), and Barany (2002).
hegemonic neo-liberal power’ versus ‘local grassroots community resistance’ makes it methodologically hard to specify the requisite agency to realize any alternative.20

Rather than romanticizing the role of local Romani grassroots communities outside neo-liberal articulations of technologies of government, I propose to interrogate the political uses of ‘the grassroots’ by various actors, including those who are considered as local Romani NGOs and grassroots organizations (see also van Baar 2005b; 2008a). Such an interrogation reveals that the governmentalization of civil society has also led to the formation of new forms of Romani agency. Moreover, it leads us beyond an analysis of the Romani movement in terms of merely a perverse confluence of the neo-liberal and participatory democratic projects. The confluence of both political projects in itself does not tell us much about whether and to what extent the confluence has transformed practices of participation. Though the perverse confluence approach helps to understand how solidarity movements tend to be displaced by the individualistic approach of the neo-liberal project, it tells us little about how these displacements are negotiated on the ground. To some extent, the ‘perverse confluence’ approach still tends to formulate the conflicts between the participatory democratic and the neo-liberal project at the level of how participation is theorized and conceptualized, rather than at the level of its actual practice. The latter approach, however, can provide insight into how and under what conditions participatory spaces and forms of governance have engendered new citizenship practices. This leads me to ask: How do Romani activists and others involved in the movement actually negotiate the meaning of participation in their daily practices? Do they mobilize, for instance, the contested boundaries between the public sector and the third sector to try to develop their own agendas? What is the impact of the activists’ involvement in networking on attempts at creating both a more engaged civil society and more responsive and effective official institutions? Is it possible for Romani activists or subaltern subjects to appropriate and re-embed neo-liberal tools in locally situated practices, rather than merely replicate these tools at the expense of their opportunities to redirect the movement?

20 Paloma Gay y Blasco has adopted an even more radical view of Romani activism, in which it would be a form of an almost total assimilation of the involved Roma to the patterns and models of the world of outsiders. Without seeing a possibility for a productive contestation of the boundaries between the ‘Gypsy’ and the ‘non-Gypsy’ worlds, she presents the following caricature of American and Euro-centric theories and ideas of identity and personhood:

[Romani] activism is premised on non-Gypsy models of personhood, by which all persons become entitled to the same human rights, effectively working as equally valuable units of humanity … Roma activists begin to move away from a performative model of identity to the same emphasis on historical and biological continuity that lies at the core of Euro-American ethno-theories … Roma activism both mimics the way international politics are organized and models itself upon non-Gypsy paradigms of identity and personhood. (Gay y Blasco 2002: 181, 184, 185, my italics and abridgement)

The Czech anthropologists Marek Jakoubek and Lenka Budilová have proposed a similarly negative approach to everything that relates to pro-Roma human rights activism, Romani political mobilization, and the kinds of identity formations that they would provoke (Jakoubek 2004; 2008; Budilová and Jakoubek 2007; for a critique of their view of Romani ethno-politics and pro-Roma activism, see Cahn 2009).
A networked theory of power (chapter 1) and an understanding of neo-liberalism as governmentality (chapter 5) lead us beyond totalizing, global views of neo-liberal power and enable us to see how activists have mobilized and incorporated neo-liberal elements in the Romani movement for different than neo-liberal ends. I call the forms of activism that are based on this understanding of power and governmentality traveling activism.

With this term, I want to underscore the significance of how various, transnationally circulating discourses, strategies, and techniques of activism are translated across space and difference. Traveling activism points to how activists, by crossing the boundaries between different political terrains and both institutional and non-institutional settings, articulate a politics of citizenship as participation and contribute to shaping new forms of agency and transformative spaces. Even though these citizenship practices are often frustrated and usually achieve neither the desired aims nor match the written project results, they exceed “the search for simple technical fixes” (Hickey and Mohan 2004: 168) and address participation in terms of broader social transformation.

In the case studies that I will analyze in the remainder of this chapter, I will show that the involved notion of participation refers to various kinds of claim making, including claiming the right to have rights, claiming access to public services, claims to be heard and represented, and strategies to make public and visible what has hitherto often remained invisible and been rendered the Roma’s ‘private matter.’ Using these claims as entry-points to challenge contemporary development and other policy practices may be a useful strategy in promoting a basically hybrid notion of empowerment. According to this view of empowerment, various elements, among which neo-liberal ones, are recombined to reveal the limits of existing policy frameworks and, possibly, renew them. Even if these activist strategies always need to be articulated at local levels, the local does not bound these strategies. They try to achieve “relative levels of empowerment within networks, rather than producing bounded, localized spaces of liberation” (Williams 2004: 102). Thus, traveling activism does not represent an even geography of activism. Rather, I will show that the spaces that these forms of activism produce are essentially multi-scalar, entail complex, overlapping and traversing geographies, mobilize diverse forms of knowledge and expertise, and include various kinds of alliance building.

Traveling activism can be seen as a form of counter-conduct (chapter 1). In his search for an adequate term to specify challenges to prevailing governmentalities and existing power relationships, Foucault calls such resistances ‘counter-conducts.’ He tellingly rejects the terms ‘revolt,’ ‘dissidence,’ and ‘disobedience.’ He rejects the first “because the word ‘revolt’ is both too precise and too strong to designate much more diffuse and subdued forms of resistance” (Foucault 2007b: 200). He discards ‘dissidence’ for the noun ‘dissident’ implies the ‘substantification’ and ‘sanctification’ of resistance, which would limit resistance to particular persons or groups, and excessively glorify their individual status in the process of contestation (ibid 202). He considers ‘disobedience’ as too weak a term, though “the problem of obedience is in fact at the center” (ibid 200) of what he wants to demarcate. For these reasons, he introduces the term ‘counter-conduct’ to analyze the components of everyday life struggles that could contribute to reshaping “the very general field of politics” and “power relations” (ibid 202).
In a first set of case studies, which are all related to the European Roma Grassroots Organizations Network (ERGO), I will analyze how traveling activism contributes to reshaping “the very general field of politics” through mobilizing different kinds of technologies, including neo-liberal ones, for some commonly set goals. In what follows, I will first examine the way in which ERGO presents its strategies and, thereafter, look at these case studies. However, I do not look at ERGO because it describes itself as a ‘grassroots-based’ network. Rather, I want to interrogate how ERGO ‘goes local’ and both constructs and mobilizes the ‘grassroots’ it supposedly empowers. I will argue that some of ERGO’s strategies offer us an example of how the confluence of the participatory democratic and neo-liberal projects can be mobilized in favor of transformative participation and the repoliticization of development programs. These abilities are not somehow intrinsically implied by ERGO’s strategies, but are the effects of conflicts and contestations on the ground.

Officially established in 2003, ERGO has been developed out of several Romani community development and capacity building initiatives, and out of earlier attempts at regional collaboration and networking.21 Throughout the years, ERGO has become a fluctuating, transnational network of Romani ‘grassroots’ organizations in the east of Europe, with members in Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, and Turkey.22 Recently, ERGO has also established an office in Brussels and collaborated with several other advocacy and activist organizations. In a programmatic pamphlet, ERGO presents ‘active citizenship’ as its main strategy and empowerment and grassroots mobilization as the two main ways in which it wants to realize this strategy. The way in which the two central dimensions of this strategy are described helps to unravel ERGO’s own political use of ‘the grassroots’:

*Empowerment* is a process that enables people, individually and collectively, to take control of their own lives and act together to produce change in their societies. Our concept of empowerment is based on a *process-oriented approach*, which focuses on the mechanisms of change that provide Roma the possibility of overcoming stigma and better negotiating their interests in society ... The work carried out by our partner organizations is long-term and oriented towards sustainability. ERGO believes the main priority is the process of change rather than short-term solutions. (Cited verbatim ERGO 2009: 2, their italics)

ERGO approaches ‘grassroots mobilization’ as follows:

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22 Usually, one or two stronger partner organizations in these individual countries support several smaller Romani organizations or activists who try to build (trans)local coalitions. Spolu International Foundation, a Dutch NGO, has logistically and financially supported these diverse activities. For a long time, Spolu provided the administration for the network, but without official voting rights in ERGO. Early 2011, Spolu officially merged into ERGO. Throughout the years, Spolu has been funded by various donors, such as the EU CARDS program, the Council of Europe Development Bank, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ICCO, Cordaid, Co-operating Netherlands Foundation for Central and Eastern Europe, the One Europe Foundation, and several individual and corporate donors.
Grassroots mobilization is a process which brings people together and enables them to fight for a common cause. Our main concern is to mobilize Roma in different countries in order to help them to organize themselves, to identify priorities and to introduce them on the political agenda of responsible institutions at local, regional, national, and European level. Since most Roma policies are created at the highest national level, we promote a bottom-up approach, taking into account grassroots priorities. (Cited verbatim ERGO 2009: 2, their italics)

To some extent, the way in which ERGO defines its central strategy is a clear example of a neo-liberal approach to community governance. Ideas of top-down social engineering have made place for a range of ‘natural grassroots communities’ assumed to regulate the behavior of their members according to their own values: “in the name of community, ... groups and forces stand up for their rights and enact their resistances” (N Rose 1999b: 136). In the approach of ERGO, the emphasis is also on ‘responsibilization’ and auto-nomization. The activities of the new community experts are characterized less by the imposition of externally developed principles and duties on communities, and more by the identification and formation of groups of individuals that can hold formal or informal meetings and prepare plans to change the situation in their communities. In this way, groups can be made visible, created, or improved where they already exist, crafted where they are absent, and resuscitates where they are disappearing (see Li 2007b: 235). While the identified grassroots groups are imagined as ‘naturally’ belonging or attached to the involved communities, the experts and empowerment and grassroots mobilization techniques are considered as crucial to guide and supervise the processes of community empowerment, participation, and movement building (see also Schuringa and Spolu 2005; van Baar 2008a).

The ‘community’ of community development or grassroots empowerment—whether withering or passive or already active—tends to be understood as preceding the development processes and interventions. Even though their interests, needs, and priorities still need to be defined, the underlying idea is that they and new community identities will crystallize during guided processes of mobilization. Those involved in grassroots empowerment will become aware of their commonality in the process of community (re)building. Thus, in this respect, there is a similarity with how the discussed de-politicized forms of participation assume a coherent, given community ‘behind’ those who (claim to) have the competences to represent them. Discussions with the supposed ‘grassroots’ may characterize the ways in which bottom-up approaches have been negotiated. Nevertheless, many of these approaches constitute the collective Romani subject as people who potentially possess human and social capital, but do not (yet) know how to mobilize it effectively. Empowerment programs are seen as the necessary interventions to turn the tide, while “empowerment is typically treated as a simple quantitative increase in the amount of power possessed by an individual” or group of individuals (Cruikshank 1999: 71). The programs “seek to mobilize and maximize the subjectivities of those perceived to lack the power, hope, consciousness, and initiative to act on behalf of their own interests” (ibid). However, “understood as a means of combating exclusion and powerlessness, relations of empowerment are, in fact, akin to relations of government that both constitute and fundamentally transform the subject’s
capacity to act.” Thus, “rather than merely increasing that capacity, empowerment alters and shapes it” (ibid). Put differently, such empowerment programs do not merely turn ‘powerless’ persons into more ‘powerful’ ones, but change the relations of power in which the subjects of these programs are embedded. This issue relates to the kind of critique a governmentality approach involves. It does not follow the path of ideology critique, which, in the case of neo-liberal empowerment programs and strategies, aims at unmasking neo-liberal ideological representations in order to reveal ‘real’ relations:

Rather, it makes clear the immanent disjunction and dissonance between how practices of empowerment are viewed by their advocates and the intelligibility or logic of such practices … [T]he relations between the poor and the activist, the poor and the bureaucrat, and indeed the poor and themselves … are constituted within a distinctive rationality, technology, and strategy of power. The agency of the poor does not anticipate ‘emancipatory visions of society’ outside power relations but is an element in a particular set of power relations. (Dean 1999: 69-70)

Similarly, the communities of community building and grassroots mobilization are not given, “but are constantly remade through modern governmental practices, such as development, census, voting, which provoke multiple, shifting, and antagonistic identifications” (Sharma 2008: 154). Thus, rather than focusing on ‘good’ local Romani NGO versus problematic, professionalized INGO involvements, we need to look at how development interventions by diverse actors shape contentious communities within the processes of development themselves.

The technologies of government that ERGO mobilizes and the way in which they aim at ‘responsibilization’ and autonomization can be identified as ‘neo-liberal.’ But can they also be mobilized for different uses than the largely negative ones with which neoliberalism is frequently associated? Governmental techniques and those who articulate, translate, reshape, negotiate, and develop them can travel (Lewis 2008; Larner and Laurie 2010). Hence, we might also ask whether these techniques can “migrate’ across strategic camps” (Ferguson 2009: 174). Indeed, as James Ferguson puts forward, “devices of government that were invented to serve one purpose have often enough ended up, though history’s irony, being harnessed to another” (ibid). The strategy that ERGO has developed on paper undeniably intends to break with the strictly neo-liberal version of active citizenship in terms of activation (chapter 6) and to reinforce alternative visions of participation:

*Active citizenship* refers to the shared ownership of society, the principle of self-determination and its associated values … Through active citizenship, people develop a sense of identity and belonging to society. Active citizens are aware of their rights and responsibilities and act accordingly; they are able to exercise and defend these rights while assuming their responsibilities and duties. Currently, most Roma projects or policies perceive Roma as socially problematic and passive beneficiaries, placing the focus on poverty and dependency. Strong emphasis is placed on the responsibilities of Roma towards non-Roma, in the form of indisputable requirements … ERGO advocates changing this paternalistic attitude. We believe Roma should participate as
active fellow citizens in their own societies, by taking up the responsibility to alter their own situation and to contribute to the shaping of society. (Cited verbatim ERGO 2009: 2, their italics)

ERGO relates this approach to a dynamics between citizenship as legal status (official, formal rights) and citizenship practices that aim at reshaping and contesting relatively well established rights frameworks:

Citizenship is often reduced to a set of formal rights and downplays the participatory dimension. However, ERGO promotes a more dynamic concept of active citizenship, starting with fundamental citizens rights and moving towards more abstract rights, such as own identity and universal respect. In putting this into practice, our member organizations assess the dynamics among all actors; Roma as well as national, regional, and local authorities and NGOs. (ERGO 2009: 2)

But how are these paper realities connected with practices on the ground? What do we make of the evolutionary logic inherent to the way in which ERGO presents its own strategies? Can those who have lastingly lived at the receiving end of prejudice and who have often internalized narratives of inferiority and discrimination be turned into self-confident actors aware of their rights as smoothly and steadily as ERGO suggests? Even if we assume that they have become more active citizens, are they then able to “act accordingly,” to develop “a sense of identity and belonging to society,” and to “fight for a common cause” (ibid 2)? It would be wishful thinking to consider development interventions as unilinearly and cumulatively leading to a better capacity to act and to better, more sustainable, stable, and independent living conditions for the involved Roma. In many cases, Roma development and empowerment programs have led to more capricious movements, in which a temporal improvement of some circumstances is followed by a partial or even total relapse. Such up-and-down movements do also not contribute to the desired increase of the Roma’s self-esteem. Rather, they often lead to the increase of distrust in projects meant for them. This fluctuating process of upward and downward movements has not only been reserved to practices that are related to ERGO. This process is typical of how many post-1989 development and empowerment programs have been enacted.

Yet, the fact that empowerment programs and processes are more often than not disturbed on the ground should not necessarily be interpreted as their failure or as the mere inappropriateness of the strategy to bring Roma together to fight for a common cause. This issue relates to how a governmentality approach moves beyond assessments in terms of discrepancies between programmatic design and implementation. Indeed, “if read simply in comparison to their intended outcomes, the failure of these programs on the ground—through routinization, the capture and co-option of schemes, the reproduction of the power of village elites—is both familiar and unsurprising” (Williams 2004: 98). Assessing the results of pro-Roma projects one-sidedly in terms of failure is, at least to some extent, dependent on the ambitious political points of reference of those who perform these critical evaluations:
In part, the idealism of a naïve understanding of participatory development writes ‘failure’ into such projects from the outset. In so far as the poor are supposed to become ‘empowered’ by dint of their engagement in participatory events alone, this view of participation does not merely raise the standard for developmental ‘success,’ it sets it impossibly high … [J]udgments of projects that see their problems merely as ‘failures’ *within the act of participation itself* are tilting at windmills. (Williams 2004: 98, his italics)

My point is not that ‘failing programs’ do not exist, but that we need to be careful with attaching ‘failure’ too easily to the empowerment logics of human and minority rights or community development approaches (see also van Baar 2012b). Identifying the failures one-sidedly with such programs and those who carry them out risks neglecting what these programs make possible. Similarly, “to blame development professionals for not truly taking on board participatory values, or locally powerful figures for acting in self-interested ways, may protect the purity of a mythic participatory ideal” (Williams 2004: 98). However, “it fails to elucidate participation’s potential and limitations in changing development practice” (ibid, my italics). Let me now turn to a couple of case studies to elucidate some of these potentials and limitations.

*Inside the nebula of complaints: development programs on trial*

In the summer of 2005, I visited a project of one of ERGO’s (observing) members in Serbia, based in Novi Sad. Three of its staff members brought me to the village where the project was carried out. When we entered the living room of one of the local Roma that was turned into a kind of community center, almost all Roma of the town, including many of their children, had come together and were waiting for our visit. Initially, two women and a man enthusiastically started to tell everything about the local project. Soon, however, some of the others who were present began to disagree with what the three had presented till then. Those who intervened started to discuss a couple of more problematic details about the project and even to question its impact. After a while, the central theme of the discussion had entirely changed. Many who were present were now involved in a heated debate about how the interim results of the project had to be evaluated regarding the other difficulties they were facing in the village and the county more generally. Some of the participants in the discussion began to criticize the municipality and suggested that real progress could only be made if the local government would do more for them. They suggested that local officials had used the fact that they were involved in the NGO’s activities as an excuse to continue to neglect the needs of the Roma. Some of these participants agreed that the project was good, but just a drop in the ocean. The activists with whom I went to this village also started to be involved in the discussion and tried to defend some of the project’s original intentions and discuss how it could be redirected and used to put the mayor under pressure. They also began to clarify some of the original principles of their organization and to explain that real mobilization would imply thinking beyond concrete projects. Some of local Roma agreed and suggested to mobilize a local councilor to organize a meeting with the mayor (interview 2005i).

Later that day, together with the activists from Novi Sad, I visited a project in Serbia’s Croatian-Hungarian border region. One of the main activists in town, who was running
a relatively successful local Romani center, explained to us that the project initiatives were nice, but extremely limited regarding the real problems they were facing in the border region. At the same time, in the course of our talk, he introduced to me what he was professionally doing for the county’s government, where he had become an advisor on Roma-related issues. He tried to convince some mayors in the district that the infrastructures of some Romani neighborhoods had to be improved—something many Roma he knew considered as a pressing issue. When I asked him what his relationship with ERGO meant to him and whether it helped him, he said he did not know the exact answer. Yet, he hoped that the fact that he had attracted a foreign donor and got assistance from the Romani NGO from Novi Sad had improved his position at the county’s negotiation table. In his turn, he wanted to know from me, the scholar from Amsterdam, how I perceived their local situation (interview 2005e).

In these two cases, and in several others I became involved with, I bumped into situations in which the Roma involved in the local projects and processes of ‘grassroots mobilization’ were critical about their results. They did not present themselves as obedient ‘consumers’ of the projects, but seized the opportunity to discuss the project’s relevance vis-à-vis what they considered as important issues to address in order to change the situation in town and beyond. During these meetings it became clear that some tried to defend the project, that others suggested how the project had to be changed, while yet others, stressing the project’s inadequacy, took the opportunity to discuss what they considered as the most urgent needs of their community. Even though, in both towns, some of the local Roma had intensively been involved in developing the content and structure of the projects, their consultation had not guaranteed that the projects could be smoothly implemented and realized without difficulties. Not only were those who were not directly involved in the carrying out of the project critical about its potential or results, also those who had initially supported the project had started to question its adequacy. Yet, the more general ways in which the empowerment and development programs were put ‘on trial’ clarified that they questioned the overall structure in which their work had to be carried out. The Roma in these villages considered it as unjust that they were left to their own devices and the goodwill and whimsicality of the non-governmental sector. Though some saw it as helpful that the local and regional Romani NGOs were involved in their affairs, they primarily addressed the state’s and county’s inefficiency and unwillingness to take care of them.

To put it slightly differently, they mobilized their relationship with these NGOs and the networks in which they were involved to address these affairs, to try to make them public at all, and to hold state agents and offices accountable for delivering the relevant public services. During these discussions and the ones I had at other places during my research trips, the involved Roma referred to basic services, such as housing, education, employment, health care, and infrastructure, in terms of facilities that were simply not organized for them in the same way as they were for others. Directly or indirectly, issues of justice and inequality were among the central frames of reference of their doubts, complaints, and requests. Seyla Benhabib has put forward that “all struggles against oppression in the modern world begin by redefining what had previously been considered ‘private,’ non-public, and non-political issues as matters of public concern, as issues of justice, as sites of power which need discursive legitimation” (1992: 100, my italics).
Accordingly, these Roma problematized their situation in terms of citizenship as participation. At a very basic level, their participation in society was addressed in terms of citizenship and articulated as a right, yet not simply the right to be invited to join a state, IGO, or NGO organized empowerment or development program. Rather, their citizenship as participation was at stake. This can be considered as “representing an expression of human agency in the political arena, broadly defined, [and] enables people to act as agents” (Lister 1998: 228, my italics). The way in which the Roma questioned how they had ambivalently become committed to, complicit in, and/or excluded from community development and empowerment programs clarified that they were involved in a politics of citizenship in which they tried to claim the right to such basic forms of participation and recognition. They claimed to be acknowledged as agents, as “makers and shapers,” rather than merely as passive “users and choosers,” of the development programs that were, in the eyes of some, designed behind their backs and at their expenses (Cornwall and Gaventa 2000). If the discussions in which I became involved clarified anything in particular, it was that the development programs were not at all a question of something technical or neutral and that the participants re-politicized them as inadequate to address more structural issues of poverty and inequality. In other words, the way in which the various kinds of interventions (whether initiated by NGO, IGO, or state actors) were put on the stage during the meetings expressed that they were the central issue to be addressed.

This theme is also important regarding the way in which we assess rights-based approaches to the Roma. Ultimately, the ways in which these citizenship practices aim at broadening relatively well-established discourses and definitions of citizenship address the right to participate in the very definition of societies as political systems. The politics of citizenship, in which this participation in society is at stake, closely connects with rights-based discourses and those who are propagating them. These tools can help to establish participation as a right, not only in terms of existing political, social, or civil rights, but also in those of new rights and frameworks to address them—such as housing or reproductive rights and frameworks of spatial justice. In other words, the Romani citizenship practices of participation not only strategically mobilize rights-based frameworks to tackle questions of discrimination and inequality. They also, and more generally, question cultural and socio-political mechanisms that tend to render the Roma abject and place them outside political communities. This issue is clearly at stake in cases where the Roma are collectively disconnected from utilities, such as running water or electricity. For instance, a group of Albanian Romani women affiliated with the ERGO network through the Romani NGO Roma Active Albania (RAA) has recently protested in public against the fact that they have no access to running water (ERGO 2010). Through such citizenship practices they not only make the issue public, they also try to establish the involved Roma as ‘a public’ and, thus, part of the political community at large.

Though these Albanian Roma have hitherto not been successful in getting access to running water, elsewhere similar citizenship practices have led to attributing rights to

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Roma. A case study from Kriva Palanka, a town in North Macedonia, can illustrate this (see also van Baar 2008a; 2009). Most of the inhabitants of Kriva Palanka’s Romani neighborhood live in bad socioeconomic and environmental circumstances. Late in 2002, when some Roma could not pay their bills, the electricity company ended the power supply to the entire quarter. Before the company was privatized at the end of the 1990s, electricity had been supplied in exchange for votes. Because most of the members of the Romani community were unemployed, they could not pay their debts. The cut-off mobilized some of Kriva Palanka’s Roma. They agreed to form a delegation, who went to negotiate with the company manager. After several unsuccessful attempts, they consulted Fundatia Avundipe, a small-scale regionally operating Romani NGO, known for its collaboration with local and national authorities. Avundipe organized a meeting with the mayor and representatives of the company and the Romani neighborhood. This roundtable discussion was successful. Electricity was reconnected in exchange for labor offered by members of the community to the company; electricity meters were installed to see who was able to pay and who was not—thus making the Roma accountable individually, rather than collectively (interview 2004d).

Reconnecting the houses of the Roma to the electricity network can easily and cynically be read in the context of the spirit of neo-liberalism and its emphasis on individual, rather than collective responsibilities. Yet, the appeal to equal treatment and the politics of citizenship as participation that have motivated these actions need to be put in a broader framework. As Arjun Appadurai (2002) has shown in another context, forms of self-organization by marginalized groups and techniques to convince potential social and civil partners of their local projects and encourage them to invest in these projects may lead to policy changes. In the case of Kriva Palanka, the NGO Fundatia Avundipe collaborated with numerous social actors—the involved Roma, the electricity company, the municipality, a local school, and, last but not least, the then emerging ERGO network—to try to achieve more than just the reconnection. The ERGO network combines such local initiatives and activism with experiences and knowledge shared on the basis of horizontal exchanges between Romani communities in different districts and regions and across national borders. Regularly, the members of the network organize meetings where they discuss their strategies. The very structure of the network enables actors to vary strategically their position in the network in coordination with other more or less autonomous actors or to transform temporarily its structure to achieve particular aims more effectively. As part of its transnational strategy, “ERGO has started to work toward different, more open network structures ... This way, the entire network or some of its members can enter into temporary alliances with organizations and people that do not have a formal relation with the ERGO member, but face the same problem” (Spolu 2005: 12).

The various forms of networking involved in current Romani activism touch upon important ways in which it tries to strategically ‘de-territorialize’ the problems Roma face and, in so doing, to link them (again) to more complex and structural issues. Let me mention two examples. The first is the ludic way in which, in February and March 2010, ERGO organized “the most Roma-friendly mayor” competition in five South Eastern European countries (ERGO 2010). This competition was part of ERGO’s international campaign to respect the citizenship of all in society and to encourage a dialogue between
local authorities and representatives of Romani minorities. Questionnaires with questions about the local Roma approaches and strategies and about the inter-ethnic relationships were sent to municipalities in the five countries. The participating Romani NGOs announced the campaign in the national media—on radio and television and through the internet—and established independent selection committees, in which minority experts and journalists were given a seat. The campaign offered the winning mayors the opportunity to talk about their Roma approach in the media. The five winning mayors were invited to present their approach at the second EU Roma Summit, held in April 2010 in Córdoba in Spain. In this way, mayors with progressive views about how to improve the situation of the Roma were turned into a kind of ambassadors of their own countries and indirectly mobilized against those who present the Roma themselves as the main problem. At the same time, by publishing the final scores of the participating municipalities, ERGO has produced its own tools to show in which places Roma tend to be excluded and their problems ‘territorialized’ and in which towns ERGO has observed progress toward de-segregation and ‘de-territorialization.’ I will return to the importance of these alternative forms of data collection when I will discuss the role of knowledge and expertise formation in the Romani movement.

A second example of strategic ‘de-territorialization’ is precedent setting. Indeed, once one group or organization has set a precedent, with the help of external partners other groups could also mobilize to try achieving something similar elsewhere. This happened successfully as a result of mediating work done by Integro Association from Razgrad, a Bulgarian member of the ERGO network and itself the center of a large domestic network of Romani NGOs and activists.24 By legally registering the land on which some Roma lived in the land registers, Integro set a precedent for other villages where Roma faced problems due to the fact that they were not officially registered. In this particular case, and perhaps more generally, I want to suggest:

[The strategy of precedent setting can turn] the survival tactics and experiments of the poor into sites for policy innovations by the state, the city, donor agencies, and other activist organizations. It is a strategy that moves the poor into the horizon of legality on their own terms. Most important, it invites risk-taking activities by bureaucrats within a discourse of legality, allowing the boundaries of the status quo to be pushed and stretched—it creates a border zone of trial and error, a sort of research and development space within which poor communities, activists, and bureaucrats can explore new designs for partnership. (Appadurai 2002: 34, my italics)

In no way, I want to idealize these research and development spaces as progressively and cumulatively leading to situations where the involved Roma can adequately and

24 Some authors (Rostas 2009; McGarry 2010) have discussed a few of the more successful members in the ERGO network, such as Împreună in Romania (actually a former member). Yet, they tend to discuss them in isolation from both the transnational networks in which these NGOs operate and the national networks that these ERGO members have developed themselves. More research needs to be done to analyze how the large domestic networks of ERGO members such as Roma Active Albania and Integro Bulgaria have gradually developed and to examine how their transnational tries have also contributed to the emergence of new (parts of) networks elsewhere.
without difficulty enact their citizenship. These border zones of trial and error are often nebulous zones in which the choices between survival practices and informal activities on the one hand, and inclusion into the formal structures of the state and civil society, on the other, are based on strategies in which marginalized Roma weigh the pros and cons of this inclusion against each other. Consequently, the involved forms of risk-taking are not limited to bureaucrats and other ‘frontline’ workers, but are an integral part of how networks such as ERGO operate. In their partnerships, they always run the risk that some of their local partners do not share the activist or moral aims with them. ERGO, for instance, is strongly in favor of process-driven long-term change, rather than of the short-term project models on which many externally funded initiatives for Roma are based. Yet, the bias against the project model cannot avoid that some of the partners with whom the ERGO network collaborate, reinterpret the work they do in project-terms that also need to guarantee an income for those who are involved. Within this uncertain political terrain, the discourse of many development and activist interventions often turns out to be based on a fetishization of the notions of participation and civil society. There, the “sanitized worlds of civil society and good governance” (Corbridge 2007: 194) anticipated by mainstream social movement and development policy literatures have simply no easy, if any starting point (Chatterjee 2004). Approached from the point of view of grassroots mobilization, it is crucial to recognize that the participatory spaces that such programs want to establish are part of broader historical, social, political, cultural, and spatial processes. These influence and saturate participative arenas and often make it impossible to dissolve even a few of the power relations in which potential project participants are involved, including patriarchy, alternative employment, systems of patronage, usury practices, and other informal networks (see chapter 6). The Roma’s inclusion in such power relations can also explain why it is often ambivalent for them to decide upon the added value of their contribution to development programs:

People rarely limit their perceptions to ‘the program’ … and their willingness to draw on the helpful powers of participation will be affected by their imminent return to the power-soaked everyday spaces that surround them. Moreover, the public nature of participatory technology links the right to speak with the consequences of doing so and … exposes the marginalized to the risk of inadvertently revealing their survival strategies. (Kesby 2005: 2056)

When Romani community development and empowerment interventions happen under these circumstances, and they often do, the outcomes are highly ambiguous.

Yet, even in such cases, I propose to bend the one-dimensional narrative of failure into another, less dark direction. During several of my fieldtrips, the visits to local sites where Roma lived were an experience of entering into nebulas of complaints. Some were really proud of what they had established or achieved and others resolved on their intentions to make a change. Several of them had also made a change. However, the majority of people I met complained about the local or regional situation, about discrimination, about the unequal or corrupt distribution of resources, about segregation in housing or education, about some other Roma in town, about the local NGO and those who were involved, etc. How do we need to assess these different kinds of complaints? Are they
straightforward, clear manifestations of failure or the Roma’s aversion against others or some of their fellows and the organizations they run? I don’t think so. To value these complaints more productively, it may help to develop something like an ethnography of complaining (Corbridge 2007), in which ‘failures’ are not seen as points of closure, but as entry points into the ambivalent realities of development scenes (Sharma 2008). When it comes to the situation of the Roma, civil society is still fragile in most Central and Eastern European countries. Yet, through these diverse forms and kinds of complaints, the involved Roma, as well as non-Roma, are giving voice to their dissatisfaction with the different ways in which development and empowerment have hitherto been organized. They blame the EU, the state, and civil society organizations for not being able to improve the situation. While civil society is thin, these complaints, and above all the emerging fragile yet solidifying participatory channels developed to express them, clarify that civil society is deepening—even though frequently not in the way in which we usually think about civil society. My examples may suggest that, in the case of the Roma involved in development programs, these do nothing more than reconfirming the status quo and, thus, indirectly legitimizing the existing power relationships. Yet, as I have already touched upon, reading their practices along these lines too easily reduces the strategic value of the Roma’s involvement in development and empowerment programs. For them, leaving the door open to those who are in much more powerful positions than they are, can play a strategic role in attempts to enact their citizenship more effectively, if not now than maybe in the future.

Moreover, there is another, more substantial dimension to the ways in which the complaints have been addressed. They relate to the participatory channels developed to express the complaints. Ethnographically, they relate to questions such as “Who gets to complain to whom and when? For what reasons? What motivates the complaint? How are complaints dealt with?” (Corbridge 2007: 197) I have illustrated that the complaints have become a central part of the daily development and empowerment scenes and have been expressed at moments of gathering and federating with members of the networks or with local, regional, or even international officials and experts. Sometimes complaints or requests are expressed in meetings with frontline workers, councilors, or mayors and are leading to formalizing relationships that were either informal or non-existing prior to such meetings. Complaining, thus, has gradually become a somewhat awkward part of more formal governmental infrastructures and has started to interfere with technologies of rule. Through the developing network structures of initiatives such as those of ERGO, it has become possible to ‘scale up’ the complaints and reach those who are involved in Roma-related policy building at and beyond local levels. In this way, complaints can productively solidify and turn into mundane or even institutionalized forms of critique. At the same time, through incorporating constructive projects, such as ERGO’s “most Roma-friendly mayor” competition, into the network structures “chains of information” (ERGO 2010: 14) are built. These chains can help to de-territorialize the problems Roma face and link them to their socioeconomic, political, historical reasons, backgrounds, and contexts.

These processes are not occurring outside the governmentalization of civil society discussed in this chapter’s first half. Rather, these processes of re-politicization are an integral part of it. I do not present these processes as the easy solutions to the problems
that many Roma face. Traveling activism strategically contributes to the enactment of citizenship as participation. At a basic level, this politics of citizenship turns problem spaces—in which the Roma are considered as either ‘problems’ or de-politicized subjects of development—into what can be called ‘dilemmatic spaces’ (Honig 1996). Such dilemmatic spaces do not offer ready-made or easy solutions. Rather, they make the dilemmas of empowerment and development “visible and available for being acted upon, rather than compressing and displacing them into the difficult choices of individual actors” (Newman and Clarke 2009: 184). These dilemmatic spaces make “contestation, conflict, and contradiction visible and debatable” (ibid). To turn problem spaces into dilemmatic ones, de-territorializing strategies need to go beyond localized spaces. Mike Kesby, for instance, puts forward that “if empowerment through participation is to become endemic in a host community, its discourses and practices must escape from the project laboratory” (2005: 2058-59). If this does not happen, “participatory projects will simply produce temporary carnavalesque arenas that allow yet contain a ‘ritual of rebellion’ against prevailing frameworks” (ibid). Kesby puts forward that, “as with power, repeated performance is necessary to stabilize empowerment’s effects” (ibid 2055). Making these effects more stable and sustainable “will involve their becoming embedded in (and therefore transforming) everyday spaces” (ibid 2058). In the final section of this chapter, I will discuss some ways in which these effects can be made more stable and sustainable. I will explain that phenomena such as NGOization have produced more diffuse effects than has hitherto been suggested in scholarship on the Roma. I will also clarify that the possible stabilization of empowerment’s effect are not to be based “on privileging local level knowledge” (Trehan 2009b: 65), but, rather, on how traveling activism opens up opportunities for mobilizing hybrid forms of expertise and knowledge across space and difference.

TRANSMATIONAL NETWORKING AND KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION

The governmentalization of civil society and the parallel development of new spaces of participatory governance have not exclusively led to the de-politicization of poverty and inequality. On the contrary, these developments and spaces themselves have, at the same time, created room for maneuver to re-politicize poverty and inequality. New public spaces have been developed where representation itself has become a site of negotiation and contestation. This is true even in situations where programs for the Roma have supposedly ‘failed.’ We need to acknowledge that these developments have also led the Romani movement into new directions, notably deviating from neo-liberal doctrines. One of these directions is the production of new forms of agency:

While participative governance constitutes the public as active agents, it also constitutes the possibilities of their agency. It does so by controlling the places, norms, and rules of participation—for example, by setting agendas, defining membership, and delimiting the interests and identities that can be legitimately expressed. However, while such strategies shape identity, they do not determine agency. While the proliferation of initiatives that seek to draw citizens and communities into
participative governance subjects them to new regulatory strategies, it also creates the possibility of new subject positions and forms of identification which may not be ‘tidy’ or ‘stable.’ And the active citizen may not act in the way envisaged by government; the empowered service user may not use their power in an approved manner. (Newman 2005: 133-34)

We cannot one-sidedly view civil society’s governmentalization, and the NGOization of human rights and community development in particular, in terms of strategies in which new public spaces are largely being “co-opted into partnership arrangements that enrolled them into formations of governmental power” (Newman and Clarke 2009: 143). Indeed, “public participation initiatives create new kinds of dilemmatic space, producing discomfort for both facilitators and publics, as well as opening up tensions between them” (ibid). Conversely, co-option suggests clear and singular reasons for state or supra-state governmental institutions. It also tends to assume coherent and smooth policy transfer, uniformity of the acts of involved experts, and an unequivocal nature of expertise. Let me challenge these assumptions to clarify how new participatory structures have gone together with the production of new forms of agency and the transformation of everyday spaces. First, I will address the issue of policy transfer. Policies cannot be considered as easily transferable from the one place to the other, even within domestic contexts. Rather than discussing policy in terms of transfer, we better speak of processes of articulation (chapter 5). By means of a brief analysis of some practices related to the Hungarian MSG system, I will illustrate what this reorientation implies in terms of, often unforeseen, transformative participation. Second, I will discuss the question of knowledge and expertise and show how various Romani activists and NGOs, while practicing traveling activism, have developed new forms and practices of knowledge formation that are basically of a hybrid kind. These actors have increasingly become involved in different kinds of networking, in which such new forms of knowledge formation are strategically mobilized.

At the beginning of this chapter, I have presented the Hungarian MSG system as an example of a quasi-autonomous civil societal structure, and as part of the trend to governmentalize civil society. I discussed how the system has been criticized for increasing, rather than decreasing, ethnic boundaries and conflicts. Its limited focus on cultural autonomy and recognition, it has been argued, also tends to displace issues of inequality, justice, and redistribution. Last but not least, the MSG system would have turned the local Romani self-governments into a kind of service deliverers (or even less than that) doomed to be inadequate. Yet, much of this critical literature has “ocluded the political agency of Roma communities” (Schafft and Brown 2000: 214). Few scholars have analyzed the circumstances under which, despite the system’s apparent inability to address the Roma’s privation, Romani minority self-governments “find themselves able to mobilize resources which can substantially affect their overall standard of living” (ibid). One of the interesting outcomes of these examinations is that about three-quarter of the local self-governments have tried to mobilize the recognition structure of the MSG system for redistributive aims (Molnár and Schafft 2003a; 2003b). Thus, while the system has been developed for reasons of cultural autonomy and recognition, in practice the overwhelming majority of the Romani minority self-governments articulate this system
differently. This different use of the system does not necessarily conflict with the negative effects of civil society’s governmentalization. Indeed, “signing the municipal government off of its legal obligation to provide for the social welfare of its residents” (Pallai 2003: 81-82) led local self-governments to take over tasks from the municipal government for which they are officially not responsible. Consequently, they have become the kinds of service deliverers that easily but uncomfortably fit with the neo-liberal project. Júlia Szalai (2000) has argued that the combination of MSG’s recognition structure, its local articulation to address issues of redistribution, and the ‘outsourcing’ of social welfare provision to the Romani self-government has more often than not led to the increased ethnicization of group boundaries and conflicts. Yet, in particular where these local Romani self-governments have refused or stopped to be held responsible for redistributive policies, we have seen the possibility of “individual political actors to manipulate recognition and redistribution within the system” to their advantage (Pallai 2003: 80, my italics). In her analysis of the Romani MSG in the South-West Hungarian city Nagykanizsa, Nicole Pallai shows that the self-government’s representatives succeeded “in demonstrably improving the chances of upward social mobility among their constituents by maintaining a powerful consensus with the municipal authorities, by under-emphasizing their redistributive efforts, and by seeking financial support from outside” (ibid 81). Pallai’s findings correspond to the results of a research among more than 200 local Romani MSGs, conducted by Kai Schafft and David Brown. Their research reveals a wide range and depth of developmental activity by these Roma local MSGs:

[A number of them] have helped to establish new political elites within minority communities who have, in many cases, forged substantial linkages with local and extra-local institutions, both governmental and non-governmental. They have developed and initiated a wide variety of programs, from social and agricultural support, to educational and local media programs directed toward the Roma minority. There is evidence that these projects in many cases benefit, not only Roma, but ethnic Hungarians as well, strengthening intra-community social ties and networks as they improve local socio-economic conditions. (Schafft and Brown 2000: 214)

Schafft’s and Brown’s conclusions contradict neither the critiques of the MSG system, nor value the activities of some of the relatively successful MSGs at the expense of identifying widespread structural problems. Though they show that many local MSGs do not and cannot function well due to structural problems, they also show that these do not necessarily hinder that MSGs articulate policies at the local level to their advantage. Both Pallai and Schafft and Brown argue that the Romani self-governments’ abilities to attract financial means, from NGOs or other private and public donors, have often helped them substantially to benefit from the MSG structure.25 Pallai (2003: 81n253) also suggests that the involvement of the MSG representatives in international training

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25 Romani MSGs in Hungary have been supported by a variety of more professional NGOs, such as Partners for Democratic Change, the Democracy Network, OSI, and USAID. In the context of the local MSGs, it is important to mention OSI’s Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative (LGI), an initiative that is specialized in improving governance practices and the provision of public services, particularly at the local level (see Gál 2002: viii).
programs has helped them to confer legitimacy on their MSG in the eyes of those with whom they collaborated at the local level.

Let me analyze, before I move on to the importance of these training programs, the MSG system at a more theoretical level. As said, since its launch in 1993, scholars and Romani activists have criticized the system as an inadequate or even non-functional governmental instrument to address Romani issues. Yet, two important ways in which the system has been mobilized during the years are often overlooked. Firstly, I have explained that the system has unforeseeably been used for other than its ‘original’ uses and intentions, and not always without being successful. Romani actors have developed strategies to address a variety of social issues and manipulate the system in ways that allowed them to benefit from it. Secondly, the system itself has paradoxically become an instrument for critiquing the construction of new ethnic-racial boundaries between majorities and Romani minorities. Indeed, the system has contributed to the formation of dilemmatic spaces in which delicate issues have become public. Among them are the organization of local voting, issues of representation, access to and reform of public services, processes of Romani minoritization, and the limits or drawbacks of the current recognition structures. This unforeseen yet prominent functioning of the system can be interpreted, alternatively, as an important way to address and challenge the bio-political mechanisms that render the Roma problematic.

Let me now move on to the issue of expertise and knowledge involved in the Romani movement. Just as policy only crystallizes at the moment and site of its articulation, knowledge and expertise change according to specific circumstances. Romani NGO staff and activists have often been trained by other, more professional and influential NGOs, as well as by initiatives of the EU, the OSCE, and the Council of Europe. One of the interesting developments of the past two decades is that several Romani NGOs and activists have mobilized these education and training tools in their own ways. Moreover, new networks, such as ERGO, have emerged in which Roma increasingly also train other Roma, thereby making strategic use of temporal or more stable links with other partners in and outside these networks. I do not want to ignore the risks and limits of what some have called ‘ethnopolitics’ (Barany 2002; Brubaker 2004) and others ‘ethnodevelopment’ (Laurie et al 2005). Yet, Romani activists are not simply passive receivers of expertise developed elsewhere. They are also active and increasingly professional developers and disseminators of knowledge and expertise. Let me illustrate this by discussing one of the activities of the Prague-based Romani NGO Romea.

Romea is led by a group of young activists who focus on news production through articles, press releases, a magazine, and their bilingual website, which informs its audience on domestic and foreign developments of the Romani movement. Yet, since its establishment Romea has also facilitated many other processes and projects, such as organizing trainings for Romani journalists, offering computer courses and internet facilities to Roma, organizing debates, maintaining relationships with governmental agencies, and offering Roma the opportunity to look for jobs through using Romea’s website. Here, I want to highlight one initiative. Early in 2004, Romea introduced an

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26 These trainings have been organized by, for instance, OSI, PER, Partners for Democratic Change, Spolu, and, to a lesser degree, the ERRC.
educational project that deployed the internet to try to fulfill its aim of challenging the dominant, often stereotypical representations of the Roma in the Czech public opinion (interview 2005c). By so doing, Romea hoped to contribute to a better social and historical understanding of the situation of Romani minorities in the Czech Republic. One section of Romea’s website provided information on Romani history, culture, and language. Furthermore, Romea featured interactive discussions about the social issues and problems that the Roma are currently facing in the Czech Republic, such as the relatively large number of Romani youngsters who are addicted to drugs. The website also offered information that was included in the curricula of a significant number of Czech schools. In the spring of 2004, Romea contacted more than eleven hundred schools throughout the country, including elementary and secondary schools in both the regular and the special school system. By the beginning of the 2004-2005 school year, almost seventy schools had registered at Romea’s school website. Teachers at these schools have begun using the materials provided by Romea, which have hitherto not been available in Czech history or language books.

This example brings to light some important issues. It shows, for instance, that the identities of those who are considered as ‘experts’ are changing with the emergence of new forms and sites of participatory governance. Trehan claims that the “younger generations of Romani activists” are in particular need to conform to the “technocratic models” of contemporary NGO entrepreneurship. According to her, more critical activists “tend to become sidelined or co-opted to a large degree” (Trehan 2009a: 225). She discusses this trend alongside “the creation of a parallel system of expertise on Roma” that would have “placed epistemic capital firmly in the hands of non-Roma” (ibid 165). My own fieldwork points, at least partly, to another direction. Professional and critical Romani experts, who have usually also been involved in trainings elsewhere, are increasingly emerging from the ranks of the movement. This is the case with Romea, which operates mainly in the field of media and representation, but also with the ERGO network and networks, such as the Roma diplomacy network (Nicolaie and Slavik 2007) and the International Romani Women Network (Izsák 2009). For instance, Roma who, in the 1990s, were involved in ‘pre-ERGO’ community development initiatives are now also training other Roma at the local level. What is more, Romani press and media centers, such as Dženo and Romea in Prague and the Slovak Roma Press Agency (RPA) in Košice, started as agencies that criticized mainstream Czech and Slovak media for their biased reporting. Currently, these relationships are increasingly reversing: they have become sources for domestic and foreign mainstream media, but also for organizations, such as the ERRC (2011). These examples challenge geographies of knowledge and expertise production that separate know-how and knowledge developed at the local level from externally developed knowledge systems. These examples, including the example of the Hungarian MSG system, reveal that heterogeneous actors and experts are currently involved in policy translation. Indisputably, those who are involved in the articulation of Roma policy include more and different kinds of actors than those who are traditionally considered as the official policy makers.

I also want to draw attention to the increased significance of scholarship in (building) these new kinds of alliances. A large number of scholars who analyze and publish on Roma-related topics have directly or indirectly been involved—as experts, advisors,
monitors, consultants, mediators, activists, etc.—in the Romani movement. As a result, scholarship has increasingly become one of the vital knots in the transnational Roma advocacy and Romani activist networks. Moreover, scientific input plays a role not only through incorporating scholars in the transnational activist networks; it also plays a role via the strategic use of social scientific methods or the mimicking of such methods in the ways in which pro-Roma activism is developing. ERGO’s “most Roma-friendly mayor” competition, for instance, can be considered as an alternative way of benchmarking, as a kind of audit from below. This competition was based on sending questionnaires to municipalities in which ERGO members produced their own criteria for what counts as valuable local Roma policy and as viable and constructive local approaches to the Roma. We can understand these ludic, inventive practices of measurement a manifestation of the emergence of an active, calculating Romani citizen, who produces its own statistical means and tools for showing what kinds of environments are ‘Roma friendly’ and which municipalities tend to neglect their Romani population. In this way, the involved Romani NGOs are actively participating in the politics of knowledge and gaining entry in decision-making, policy processes, and public debates about the performance of local governments and bureaucracies.

The deployment of these alternative forms of knowledge and expertise production within pro-Roma advocacy and Romani activist organizations needs to be interpreted beyond cooptation and one-dimensional forms of NGOization. Though these forms of knowledge production replicate processes of neoliberalization, they rework and redirect tools, such as benchmarks and indicators, to produce their own ‘chains of information’ and to create and render visible specific ‘Romani grassroots realities.’ Like all social scientific tools, these statistical instruments aimed at measuring ‘Roma friendly’ places are both productive and performative (Osborne and Rose 1999; Law and Urry 2004). Indeed, “measurements do not merely inform—they make demands on those who should be informed [and they have] performative and regulative consequences” (Barry 2002: 277). Romani activists involved in networks such as ERGO use social scientific tools to bring Roma friendly or unfriendly places into existence and make them visible as quantifiable ‘facts.’ ERGO has established a local policy monitoring program in which it has also mobilized these forms of knowledge and expertise to contribute to improving employment, education, health or housing policies. We need to see these kinds of activities in light of a much wider development in which pro-Roma advocacy and Romani activist networks are producing their own surveys and their own indicators to show how particular policies affect the situation and perception of the Roma. Various pro-Roma advocacy NGOs have developed their own monitor systems, such as the OSI’s EU Monitoring and Advocacy Program (EUMAP), a large monitor mechanism that has produced a series of reports on issues such as minority protection and education (eg, OSI 2001; 2007). In the course of the years, these advocacy and activist actors’ involvement in the politics of knowledge formation has also gradually shifted from ‘shaming and blaming’ strategies, in which entire countries were blamed for discriminating against the Roma, to more diverse and heterogeneous strategies. The latter kinds of strategies offer Romani activists tools that help not only to show that their government or educational system does not perform well. Increasingly, these strategies also make it possible for them to inform their local government where exactly they can improve their policies.
The example of how knowledge and expertise travel across space and difference can also be extended to the ‘movability’ of the pro-Roma and Romani actors involved in the movement. Hitherto, I have discussed how old and new and established and alternative actors articulate expertise within the public or the third sectors. In addition, we need to consider the effects of the boundary-crossings between these sectors. Some scholars have discussed how human rights and Romani activists have crossed the boundaries between the public and the third sector and started to work for governmental institutions or vice versa. Trehan, for instance, describes these boundary-crossings as “a ‘revolving door’ phenomenon, whereby the state and the NGO sector serve as alternative and/or parallel spaces of activity and employment for non-Romani and Romani intellectuals” (2009a: 132-33). Vermeersch discusses how, in the latter half of the 1990s, newly established ministerial bodies dedicated to Roma policy in the Czech Republic and Slovakia began to employ people with a background in advocacy organizations, such as Helsinki committees and OSI-funded alliances.27

These scholars have adopted a relatively fixed concept of these boundaries and the identities of those who cross them. While it could be analytically helpful to separate these sectors, my interrogation of the blurring boundaries between state, market, and civil society suggests that we need to reflect on the correlated transformations of the spaces of participatory governance. This implies that we also need to examine “the types of relationships and forms of power that link structures and processes across the sectors. How are these constructed, both by individual agency and by broader contextual aspects of politics, history, or culture?” (Lewis 2008: 564) The relatively new, interdisciplinary study of boundary-crossings “aims to learn from the career trajectories and experiences of individuals who travel between the third sector and the public sector” (ibid; cf Billis 2010). Boundary crossing studies examine “the motivations and experiences of those who have crossed over,” and seek to explore “the broader meanings and implications of these movements” (ibid). An entire study could be dedicated to tracing various individual career trajectories and their effects on the Romani movement. A boundary-crossing perspective on the development of the Romani movement trains the analytical lens on how everyday policy and activist practices and the agency of the involved actors have influenced the development of the movement. A study of boundary-crossings vis-à-vis new forms and sites of participative governance could also further complicate the idea that Roma working for ‘the government’ or professional human-rights NGOs are more or less automatically becoming agents of neo-liberal rule (Sigona and Trehan 2009b; Trehan 2009a). Structural issues and persistent processes of Roma categorization often hamper these Roma to perform in the way they would like. Yet, due to their boundary-crossings, their identities are changing in complex ways. Often, they try to find ways to steer middle courses and to bring in their own ideas into decision-making processes:

Much can be learned from these boundary-crossers, whose ‘hybrid’ or ‘hyphenated’ professional identities are constructed from within … ‘in-between spaces’ in which plural identities reveal new perspectives on history and change. (Lewis 2008: 574)

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Many Romani and pro-Roma activists are involved in boundary-crossings. During the travels and boundary-crossings, activists usually build (on) strategic alliances, which are engagements within and across various publics.

All these different examples underscore the importance of networking in the Romani movement. Through federating, the ERGO network, for instance, has expanded various directions across ethnic or gender difference, ranging from temporal or more stable associations with local partners (mayors, municipalities, volunteers, teachers, etc.) to professional advocacy organizations, politicians, and scholars at national and international levels. In 2008, for instance, ERGO co-established the EU Roma Policy Coalition (ERPC), a loose network of various strong partners, such as OSI, ERRC, Amnesty International, the European Roma Information Office, the European Network Against Racism, Minority Rights Group International, and the Roma Education Fund. Though the members of the ERPC network do not always have the same agendas, they have strategically mobilized what binds them. One of their aims has been to put pressure on governments and the European Commission to develop more coherent, effective, and just Roma-related policies. In so doing, they have contributed to the development of the EU Framework on National Roma Strategies on Roma Inclusion, adopted by the European Commission in June 2011 (EC 2011).

We can put these achievements in the perspective of the long-term contributions of these forms of alliance building. One of the remarkable developments of Europe’s post-1989 history is how Roma advocacy and Romani activist networks have tried to challenge European governmentalities toward the Roma. These networks have actively contributed to the development of Europe’s minority policy and to the discussion of the Roma’s situation in all Europe and, thus, beyond the initial focus on Eastern and Central Europe. When the EU launched its new enlargement policies in 1993 and suggested to guarantee the ‘protection of minorities,’ it had almost no minority policy. Due to continued pressure by Romani actors, pro-Roma groups, and other advocacy groups, the EU has gradually shaped its current minority and anti-discrimination policy, including its race equality directive (Ram 2010a; 2010b). Similarly, the extension of the debate about the Roma’s situation to all Europe has much been the work of Romani activist and pro-Roma advocacy organizations that have persistently targeted the hypocrisy in West-European criticism of the Roma situation in Eastern Europe. Last but not least, as I will discuss in the next chapter, Romani cultural and memorial practices have increasingly challenged the exclusion of Romani histories and memories from national and European ones. The involved multi-scalar networks, and the way in which they mobilize the Roma’s Europeanization, have contributed to the repoliticization of the socioeconomic, political, and historical reasons of the Roma’s marginalization. These practices do not represent clearly progressive and unambiguous achievements. Though expressions of ‘horizontal solidarity’ across space and difference have unquestionably emerged, they often remain ephemeral phenomena. Therefore, Romani politics in Europe compares with feminist politics in India:

[It] must be a politics of ephemerality, where solidarity functions as a vanishing and reappearing horizon but which, nonetheless, remains a vital mobilizing factor and vision that indeed makes political struggle possible. (Sharma 2008: 182)
CONCLUSION

At the beginning of chapter 5, I discussed the rapid post-1989 emergence of new Romarelated centers of expertise and knowledge formation throughout Europe. I explained that some of these are entirely new institutions and organizations, while others have been developed within the boundaries of existing or transforming state bureaucracies or international governing organizations. In this chapter, I have discussed these newly emerged forms of expertise and knowledge in light of the development of the post-1989 Romani social and civic movement. In chapter 6, I clarified that neo-liberal technologies of inclusion have contributed to the de-politicization of issues of poverty and inequality by rendering them into politically neutral and technically governable problems. In this chapter, I have shown that solidarity-based, participatory democratic attempts at re-politicizing such issues by dint of human rights or community development discourses and tools have also and ambivalently been traversed by neo-liberal logics. I have argued that, therefore, empowerment cannot be understood as an unproblematic, progressive strategy of emancipation for the mobilization of the Roma and for the improvement of their situation. However, I have also shown that the governmentalization of civil society has not just de-politicizing effects. At the same time, this governmentalization has inaugurated new forms and spaces of participatory governance that have contributed to the contestation of the traditional boundaries between state, market, and civil society. A politics of citizenship as participation has emerged in which Roma claim the right to participate as equal citizens in contemporary European societies. Though this politics of citizenship has often been articulated at the local level, it is not based on a reified approach to ‘the local’ or to those who are frequently and uncritically understood as ‘Romani grassroots communities.’ Rather, through multi-scalar strategies in which knowledge and expertise tools and discourses are appropriated and mobilized, this politics of citizenship tries to articulate practices of transformative participation. I have illuminated how the continuous traffic in translation and mimicry beyond simple replication contests territorialized notions of Romani culture or ethnicity and facilitates what I call traveling activism. With this notion, I underscore the significance of how various discourses, strategies, and techniques of activism are translated across both space and difference. My examination of traveling activism has clarified how activists travel through disjunctive circuits and how the diverse forms of coalition building that arise from these activities can serve as productive sources of transformative participation.

If there was any specific keyword to this chapter, then it was ‘ambivalence’ and its possible and not easily achievable productivity. Departing from either-or-isms and, thus, also from an analysis of the Romani movement in either pessimistic or optimistic terms, calls for a less radical notion of politics than some scholars and activists will feel contented with (Corbridge 2007; Chhotray 2008). I have suggested thinking about the current, heterogeneous Romani movement in terms of a less dramatic, less ‘revolutionary’ concept of politics. In normative endeavors to trace transformative elements and prospects in the Romani movement, scholarship has hitherto adopted ambitious notions of politics or the political. For instance, some tend to assess the movement’s chances and prospective in terms of ‘mass mobilization’ (Vermeersch 2006: 157, 211; Trehan 2009a: 188; Marušák and Singer 2009). These are welcome and important analyses. Yet, concep-
tualizing politics in terms of radical change and transformation may overlook important issues. Indeed, if radical change and transformation do not take place or cannot be perceived, some tend to conclude that pro-Roma and Romani activism tends to preserve a dubious status quo, rather than contribute to making a change. This is the case when professional human rights organizations are one-sidedly seen as agents of neo-liberal rule (Sigona and Trehan 2009b; Trehan 2009a), rather than as knots in larger, hybrid transnational activist networks that try to articulate rights as an issue of public and equal participation. Being attentive to the productivity of ambiguous encounters between neo-liberalism and participatory democracy enables us to see new forms of agency and how these can contribute to transformative participation.
Chapter 8
The European Memory Problem Revisited: Romani Memory beyond Amnesia

INTRODUCTION

*Ma Bisteren!* Let’s not forget! ¹

We have been taught that it is our duty to remember. That is certainly a positive development. Yet the doctrine that urges us not to forget the crimes against mankind is accompanied by the hope that this memory will prevent us from repeating the atrocities of the past. But without the duty to think, the duty to remember will be meaningless. (Claude Lefort cited Probst 2003: 58)

In her best-selling travel story *Bury me Standing: The Gypsies and their Journey* (1995) Isabel Fonseca suggests that the Roma do not collectively remember and that they forget to survive as a people. In contrast, Katie Trumpener (1992) states that Romani minorities, their cultures, histories, and memories have persistently been denied a place in modern Europe and, thus, that their memorial cultures tend to be displaced. She argues that this displacement is inherently related to the denial of ‘the time of the Gypsies.’ According to her, the immobilizing of their time and their relegation to the domain of pre-modern, traditional, and ‘history-less’ cultures have been among the necessary conditions of possibility to develop modern European histories, characterized by their supposed ability to be productive, innovative, and progressive at the same time. Trumpener considers this phenomenon, according to which European history and historicity can only be constructed and articulated as productive by reducing peoples such as ‘the Gypsies’ to those without history, as the main characteristic of what she calls the European memory problem.

Fonseca’s and Trumpener’s claims are at odds with the recent proliferation of Romani memorial practices. Particularly since the fall of communism, we have seen a rapid increase of such practices throughout Europe, as well as the increased Romani involvement in developing artistic and intellectual movements, including the formation of

¹ In Romanes, ‘ma bisteren’ means ‘let’s not forget!’ *Ma Bisteren!* was also the name of a Slovak project which aimed to remind the public of the suffering of the Roma during the Second World War. In 2005-06, the Romani NGO In Minorita and the Slovak National Museum organized this project (interview 2005p; RNL 2005; Hušová 2006).
Diverse historiographies. Particularly regarding Holocaust remembrance, Romani memorial practices have increased. Roma have developed new memorials at various sites of memories that are related to their war histories. Since the mid 1980s, such memorials have been built at the sites of former Nazi concentration camps in but also outside Germany, in countries such as Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland, and Slovakia. In some towns, such as in Tarnów in Poland and in Brno in the Czech Republic, Romani museums have been established, at which new memorial practices and historiographies have also been developed. Elsewhere, such as in the Auschwitz museum in Poland and the new Holocaust museum in Budapest, Roma have developed exhibitions in which they address the Nazi genocide of Sinti and Roma.

In this chapter, I will engage in debates about the role of Romani histories and memories in contemporary Europe. How are we to assess the current proliferation of Romani memorial practices vis-à-vis claims, such as those of Fonseca and Trumpener? In the first part of this chapter, I will argue that we can maintain neither the thesis that the Roma collectively neglect their past in order to survive, nor the thesis that Romani histories and memories are persistently denied a place in European societies and cultures. Diverse Romani groups are mobilizing memory as a strategy to inscribe Romani histories in the European memorial landscapes and to claim a place in national and European histories and memories.

In this chapter’s second part, I will explain why we can nevertheless maintain Trumpener’s idea that we, in contemporary Europe, are facing a European memory problem. Yet, this problem is no longer the one that she addressed. To show how this problem has transformed, I will reflect on how, in EU cultural policy, we have seen a tendency to what I call the governmentalization of Holocaust remembrance. This governmentalization has engendered novel narratives of European belonging that tend to include, rather than exclude, the histories and memories of minority groups such as the Romani. At the same time, however, the trend to governmentalize Holocaust remembrance also risks to turn it into a questionable Holocaust pedagogy.

This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I will discuss the way in which Trumpener introduced the notion of a European memory problem in the early 1990s. After that, I will confront the way in which she conceived this problem with my first case study, in which I discuss the heated, still ongoing debate about two former Nazi concentration camps for the Roma in the Czech Republic. I will show that, even though Romani memory tends to be displaced in these cases, the involved Romani activists and their advocates have developed strategies to politicize these exclusion practices and render them public. I will explain how these strategies relate to traveling activism at the European level and to the current trend to governmentalize Holocaust remembrance. The trend to governmentalize Holocaust remembrance at the EU level for aims, such as social inclusion, citizen participation, human rights education, and European identity formation has also changed the place of Romani memories in the new narratives on

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3 See Lážničková (1999), Bartos (2003). See also some of my interviews (2002a; 2003c; 2003b; 2003f; 2008b).

4 See R Rose (2003; see also my interviews 2003d; 2004a; 2006c).
Europe’s past instigated by the EU. In my second case study, in which I focus on Romani memory strategies that have been developed in postwar Germany, I will further examine what novel Holocaust discourses tend to make possible in terms of Romani memory. Yet, I also explain that the European memory problem risks reappearing in the form of a Holocaust pedagogy that does not sufficiently reflect on how Europe’s dark past still affects the EU’s current functioning. In the concluding section, I show how Romani memorial strategies contest this EU politics of ‘re-membering.’

TEMPORALITY AND THE EUROPEAN MEMORY PROBLEM

In his reflection upon the increased attention paid to memory and its various instances since the 1980s, the American scholar Andreas Huyssen suggests that the recent ‘obsession’ with memory could be considered as “a sign of the crisis of that structure of temporality that marked the age of modernity with its celebration of the new as utopian, as radically and irreducibly other” (Huyssen 1995: 6, my italics). In the light of this crisis we have also been able to observe a shift in scholarly analyses of how the past has been articulated in the present. This shift could be described as one from history to memory. According to Huyssen, this change represents “a welcome critique of compromised teleological notions of history rather than being simply anti-historical, relativistic, or subjective” (ibid, my italics). This change goes together with acknowledging the crucial importance of the articulation of memory in conjunction with other ways in which we can articulate the past in the present. Huyssen’s observation is relevant to how Romani memorial practices can be considered as critiques of established historiographies of nation states and Europe, and the Holocaust in particular. To explain the background of this argument, I will engage in a debate about the role of Romani memories in narratives of European identity, temporality, and modernity.

Beyond the art of forgetting
The way in which the Roma would or would not remember and how they have or have not been involved in the writing of their own histories has repeatedly been discussed among scholars. Some have suggested that Romani cultures could be characterized by an ‘art of forgetting.’ In the 1970s, for instance, it was argued that the Roma’s alleged lack of interest in their past was the result of their temperament as a people (Quintana and Floyd 1972). More recently, Isabel Fonseca, in her Bury me Standing: the Gypsies and their Journey, has suggested something similar when, in a chapter on the Holocaust, she remarks that “the Jews have responded to persecution and dispersal with a monumental industry of remembrance. The Gypsies—with their peculiar mixture of fatalism and the spirit, or wit, to seize the day—have made an art of forgetting” (1995: 276). Fonseca’s theory of the Roma’s ‘art of forgetting’ has been reworked more formally by Inge Clendinnen, who, in her study Reading the Holocaust, claims that the European Roma are an example of a people who have chosen “not to bother with history at all” and who “seek no meanings beyond those relevant to immediate survival” (1999: 8).

A similar, though subtler point of view returns in the works of the anthropologists Michael Stewart and Paloma Gay y Blasco. The latter, for instance, claims that “all Gyp-
ties ... elaborate on the contrast between themselves and the non-Gypsies and also share ... a lack of an elaborate social memory” (Gay y Blasco 1999: 4). In her research on Spanish Gitanos, she suggests that, “unlike many other minorities, the Gitanos do not look to a historical or mythical past for explanations of their way of life or of their difference from the dominant majority” (ibid 14). Both Stewart and Gay y Blasco relate this lack of an elaborate social memory to a preoccupation with temporality that would be characteristic of the Roma. The former, for instance, concludes his study The Time of the Gypsies with the remark that “they live with their gaze fixed on a permanent present that is always becoming, a timeless now in which their continued existence as Roma is all that counts” (Stewart 1997: 246). Similarly, Gay y Blasco claims that the Gitanos “lack an elaborate social memory and have no myths of origin in which their common identity could find its roots: they are intent on separating the past from the present, and on denying that the ‘before’ ... may hold the blueprint for the ‘now’” (1999: 174). The way in which the Gitanos would deal with temporality leads Gay y Blasco to conclude that they “seem to be permanently engaged in the ‘celebration of impermanence’” (ibid 173). This implies that “the identity of the group is not objectified outside the group itself” (ibid 174, my emphasis), for instance, in the form of memorials. A similar point returns in one of Stewart’s articles, in which he states that the vast majority of the European Roma does remember, but is not involved, for instance, in the commemoration of the Nazi genocide. Their Holocaust memories would usually remain ‘implicit,’ but not get objectified in the form of commemorations, monuments, or memorials more generally (Stewart 2004; for a similar view, see also Gay y Blasco 2001).

Though most of the mentioned authors implicitly or explicitly suggest that the Roma’s endurance as a people relates to how others have treated them throughout European history, they nevertheless tend to reify Romani cultures and their external boundaries. Their cultures are represented as having ‘timeless’ characteristics, even though the Roma’s relationships with others and among themselves may change in due course. This reification manifests itself most clearly in the case of Stewart’s and Gay y Blasco’s representation of the Gypsies as those who live in a ‘permanent present’ or ‘timeless now.’ These kinds of reifications tend to obscure how these Roma representations relate to the dynamic interrelationships between Roma and others, to internal variations across (ethnic) difference and space, and to how particular socio-cultural mechanisms ‘majoritize’ some groups while they ‘minoritize’ others (chapter 3).

More recently, the American anthropologist James Scott has also attributed ‘an art of forgetting’ to the Roma. He presents the lack of a written history in the context of strategies of what he calls, more generally, “the art of not being governed” (2009). Relatively powerless peoples, he argues, “may well find it to their advantage to avoid written traditions and fixed texts, or even to abandon them altogether, in order to maximize their room for cultural maneuver” (ibid 235). Similar to how Stewart and Gay y Blasco present such strategies, Scott attributes agential potential to such peoples: “the shorter their genealogies and histories the less they have to explain and the more they can invent on the spot” (ibid). This observation also leads him to briefly discuss the Romani case:

In Europe, the case of the Gypsies may be instructive. Widely persecuted, they have no fixed written language but a rich oral tradition in which storytellers are highly
revered. They have no fixed history. They have no story they tell about their origins or about a promised land toward which they are headed. They have no shrines, no anthems, no ruins, no monuments. If there were ever a people who needed to be cagey about who they are and where they came from, it is the Gypsies. Shutting between many countries and scourged in most, the Gypsies have constantly had to adjust their histories and identities to the interest of survival. They are the ultimate bobbing and weaving people. (Scott 2009: 235)

In line with Stewart’s and Gay y Blasco’s views, Scott also suggests that the Roma do remember, but do generally not objectify their remembrance in the form of shrines, anthems, ruins, written stories about their origins, or monuments. Yet, unlike Stewart and Gay y Blasco, Scott highlights the importance of the distinction between written and oral traditions regarding how cultures are represented. He argues that the privileging of written traditions in western or majoritarian cultures, and the related attribution of historicity to ‘civilized cultures’ have historically resulted in the stigmatization of stateless peoples and peoples characterized by oral cultures as “peoples without history” (ibid 237). Scott combines this insight with his emphasis on these peoples’ agency to conclude that “how much history a people have … is always an active choice, one that positions them vis-à-vis their powerful text-based neighbors” (ibid). Scott’s view, thus, takes into account how correlated processes of majoritization and minoritization are involved in representations of peoples or minorities as those who have no history and live in a timeless here and now. He adds a crucial element to the readings of the hitherto discussed authors. Unlike them, he does not represent these peoples’ attitudes toward temporality as a somewhat a-historic feature, but, rather, as a governmental survival strategy. Consequently, his view makes it possible to understand majority-minority relations as in constant flux and to historicize minoritarian strategies as historically situated attempts by minorities to (avoid) being governed in particular ways, by others or even by themselves.

Scott’s reflection is primarily based on the distinction between oral and written forms of history, the majority’s attitude to privilege the latter, and the strategic and ‘active choice’ of ‘peoples without history’ to have no written one. If we follow Scott’s analysis, the stigmatized representation of these peoples is primarily the result of the majoritarian privileging of historicity. Yet, he takes the construction of the distinction and the boundaries between orality and textuality largely for granted. By so doing, he indirectly contributes to the construction of a more or less homogeneous Gypsy people with a common culture, oral tradition, and a common strategy to endure as a people. Even though Scott acknowledges that this strategy may change over time and that oral traditions may move toward literacy and writing to adapt to new circumstances, their homogeneity remains in place. This view leads back to the discussion of chapters 3 and 4, where I argued that the issue of historicity itself needed to be embedded in an analysis of historically changing governmentality toward minorities such as the Romani.5 As a result, the way

5 At another theoretical level, Stewart’s, Gay y Blasco’s, and Scott’s discussion of memory in terms of a distinction between elites who would commemorate and ordinary people who would remember without
in which the time of peoples ‘without history’ and the time of those ‘with history’ are relationally constructed and, possibly, contested is left aside. In order to analyze how structures of temporality are constructed, it is not yet enough to juxtapose, as Stewart, Gay y Blasco, and Scott do, the impermanence of oral traditions to the permanence of monuments and written texts (Gay y Blasco 1999: 173; 2001: 642; Stewart 2004: 566; Scott 2009: 227). We also need to interrogate how the stability and permanence of memorials and written texts have been made possible by how they ‘absorb’ the time of those regarded as history-less people. Precisely this relationship is central to Trumpener’s analysis.

Between time-bandits and the silenced producers of modern temporality
In her essay “The time of the Gypsies: a ‘people without history’ in the narratives of the West,” Trumpener argues that in the past—and in the ages of Enlightenment, Romanticism, and literary modernism in particular—chroniclers, scholars, and various kinds of artists primarily considered ‘the Gypsies’ as a people or group of wandering clans who were at odds with the modern structures of temporality, and with the paradigms of modernity more generally. They were often seen as a people that stood outside modern life, and the formation of the nation (state) in particular. This people was consequently relegated to the domain of pre-modern, traditional, natural, and history-less societies. Particularly since the end of the eighteenth century, Trumpener argues, the Gypsies also started to function as a trope of various kinds of escape routes, which led away from the modern socio-economic, political, and cultural order toward a mythical or mystical realm of freedom and dissipation. From Johann Wolfgang Goethe’s Götz von Berlichingen (1773) to Heinrich von Kleist’s Michael Kohlhaas (1808), from Alexander Pushkin’s The Gypsies (1824) to Charlotte Brontë’s Jane Eyre (1847) and Emily Brontë’s Wuthering Heights (1847), from Prosper Mérimée’s and Georges Bizet’s Carmen (1845/75) to Franz Liszt’s The Gypsies and Their Music in Hungary (1859), from Ezra Pound’s “The Gipsy” (1912) to Leoš Janáček’s The Diary of the One who Disappeared (1926), and from Virginia Woolf’s Orlando (1928) to her story “Gypsy, the Mongrel” (1939)—to mention but a few examples of a long history of Gypsy-related narratives—Gypsies were generally portrayed as representing either an escape from the order of modernity and its troubles or a serious threat to its maintenance and further development. In Von Kleist’s Michael Kohlhaas, for instance, a Gypsy fortune-teller appears as a figure that lives outside of history to introduce “magical timelessness” (ibid 869) into the main narrative. And in Woolf’s being involved in commemorations also leads back to my critique of the elite/grassroots binary in the politics of representation discussed in chapter 7.

6 Space precludes extensively discussing the central problem with how Scott takes up the Romani case. He models his analysis of this case on his more general examination of the difference between hill and valley peoples in Southeast Asia. Yet, apparently he does not adequately take into account how his somewhat reified relationship between hill and valley peoples (Scott 2009) reproduces some of the problems with how he has earlier introduced the relationship between legibility and local knowledge or métis (Scott 1998). For an important critique of these relationships, see Li (2001; 2005).

7 Stewart and Gay y Blasco also discuss Roma/non-Roma relationships in terms of their relationality. Yet, they tend to rely on rather static approaches to Romani identity (see also Tremlett 2000; Kapralski 2011).

8 Various authors have reflected on how the Gypsies were represented in artworks during the nineteenth and early twentieth century processes of nation-state formation in East Central Europe (Solms and Strauss 1995; Frigyesi 1998; Trumpener 2000; Cooper 2001; Lajosi 2008; Sokolova 2008).
novel *Orlando* Gypsy men and women appear as indistinguishable, ‘genderless’ people during Orlando’s gender transition from man into woman and liberation from a patriarchal world (Bardi 2006). In both these narratives, as well as in many other ones, Trumpener argues, “the Gypsies are … reduced to a textual effect” (1992: 869). Everywhere they appear in these narratives, they seemingly “begin to hold up ordinary life, inducing local amnesias or retrievals of cultural memory, and causing blackouts or flashbacks in textual, historical, and genre memory as well” (ibid). Trumpener suggests that the Gypsies appear not only along a kind of timeless escape routes from the order of modernity, but also as magical figures who ambivalently disrupt the structure of temporality of this modern order itself, as those whose main discursive job seems to be what she calls “time-banditry” (ibid).\(^9\)

The reduction of the Gypsies to textual effects is not limited to pre-Second World War narratives, as the selected list of works above may suggest. As various authors have analyzed, in many ways the Gypsies have continued to play this role in various postwar and contemporary works, including film, exhibitions, and popular culture.\(^10\) In postwar policy documents, the Gypsies and those who are usually associated with them also pop up as a people that has another sense of time and place and that apparently belongs to another social order than that of the European majorities. A 1984 document of the European Parliament on ‘education for children with parents who have no fixed abode,’ for instance, represents caravan dwellers as follows:

[They] have a relatively casual attitude towards space and time. They live in the present and give little or no thought to the future. They do not live according to a fixed scheme of hours, days and weeks, etc. Work is integrated into the normal rhythm of the day so that there is no difference between work and leisure as such. (EP 1984 cited Simhandl 2006: 106)

Back in 1984, the European Parliament suggested that the fact that the Gypsies live “in the present and give little or no thought to the future” resulted in their suffering from “educational backwardness” (cited Danbakli 2001: 30). Living in an eternal here and now and making no difference between work and leisure had apparently led to a situation in which their children were not “integrated in normal education” (ibid).

The ways in which timelessness has been repeatedly projected onto the Gypsies has led Trumpener to a general contemplation on the relationship between the continuous Western fascination with the Gypsies and the formative moments of cultural traditions themselves:

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\(^9\) Other scholars, who have taken up Trumpener’s arguments and critically developed them further, suggest that Gypsies have often and vitally functioned as tropes in Western cultural traditions and that, wherever they appear in narratives, they tend to be represented as threats to existing power relationships, such as those related to the nation, gender, race, and the institution of the family (see Bardi 2006; Dearing 2010; Matthews 2010).

If in the course of the nineteenth century the Gypsies became increasingly stylized, exoticized, ‘generic’ figures of mystery, adventure, and romance, they also became intimately identified, on several different levels, with the formation of literary tradition itself, acting as figurative keys to an array of literary genres and to the relations between them … If at the end of the nineteenth century, apparently disparate branches of literary production are thus peculiarly connected by their common fascination with Gypsies’ ‘primitive magic,’ the longer list of authors and literary forms preoccupied with Gypsy life is … virtually synonymous with the modern European literary canon—and is synonymous as well, if the many thousands of popular novels, poems, songs, operettas, paintings, and films featuring Gypsies are added to it, with European and American cultural literacy more generally. Over the last two hundred years, European literary and cultural mythology has repeatedly posed the Gypsy question as the key to the origin, the nature, the strength of cultural tradition itself. It could be argued, indeed, that as the Gypsies become bearers, par excellence, of the European memory problem in its many manifestations, they simultaneously become a major epistemological testing ground for the European imaginary, black box, or limit case for successive literary styles, genres, and intellectual movements. (Trumpener 1992: 873-74, my emphasis)

Thus, Trumpener argues that the very formation and celebration of successive Western artistic traditions and intellectual movements as innovative, progressive, and radically and irreducibly other have been made possible by the construction of the Gypsies as the ultimate and universal representatives of a pre-modern, traditional, natural, and timeless order. Thus, the teleological time of modern, ‘civilized’ history could only have been set in motion by immobilizing and bringing to a stop ‘the time of the Gypsies’ and by continually instrumentalizing related stereotypical representations.11 According to Trumpener, the cultural uses of such Gypsy/Roma representations can be considered as a crucial condition of possibility of the temporal structures of modernity. She follows this argument and the tendency in Western thought to orientalize Romani minorities and deprive them of a time and place in modernity (Willems 1997; see, more generally, Said 1978; Fabian 1983). This leads her to inherently relate the European memory problem to the silent erasure of Romani memory from western canons and the impossibility for the Roma to effectively claim a representative space for their own memories and histories. Finally, this led her to pessimistically conclude that “those peoples who do not claim a history, are relegated to nature, without a voice in any political process, represented only in the glass case of the diorama, the dehumanizing legend of the photograph, the tableaux of the open-air museum” (Trumpener 1992: 884).

Trumpener’s analysis prominently contributes to a better understanding of the crucial relationality of the structures of temporality that have historically been attributed to alleged peoples with and without histories. Her most important achievement is to have illuminated what these relational histories and temporalities tend to make impossible in terms of Romani agency and memory. She has shown how Roma orientalization and the

11 Here, we see another fundamental example of how Romani or Gypsy identities and mobilities—in this case ‘their time’—are represented as irregular, rather than regular (see my discussion of such strategies of ‘irregularization’ in chapter 6, see also Squire 2010).
displacement of their histories and memories relate to the parallel development of modern narratives that rely on teleological, progressive notions of time. Yet, Trumpener wrote her article in the early 1990s, at the moment when communism fell and when Romani groups all over Europe began to increasingly challenge their neglect and invisibility in local, national, and European histories and memories. Twenty years later, it is high time to see whether we should maintain Trumpener’s thesis and her bleak image of the Roma’s position in European history, culture, and thought. I want to pose the question of how exactly we need to revise her view of the European memory problem in respect of newly emerged Romani memorial practices.\textsuperscript{12} What happens now that at least some Roma “claim a history” (Trumpener 1992: 884)? Have the emergence of these practices and the making of such claims led to the fading away of what she considers the European memory problem or, instead, to its rearticulation and reinforcement under new conditions? Could we understand these claims in light of the politics of citizenship as participation (chapter 7)? Could we, akin to Scott’s line of reasoning, understand the development of these new memorial practices as active and strategic Romani adaptations to new circumstances in contemporary Europe and as a move toward inscription into currently prevailing discourses, such as those of the Holocaust and its remembrance? What possibly novel kind of memory problem accompanies these inscriptions? How do they relate to the way in which the EU has tried to develop new founding narratives to unite the European continent transnationally? I will address these issues by analyzing diverse ways in which several Romani groups and organizations have recently developed Romani Holocaust memorial practices and strategies to claim a place in national and European histories.

THE WAY OUT OF AMNESIA

Lety near Písek and Hodonín near Kunštát are two villages in the Czech Republic. Since the mid 1990s, an industrial pig farm in Lety and a holiday resort in Hodonín have increasingly become tangible symbols of the poor recognition of the Romani Holocaust in the Czech Republic and, by extension, in Europe. Hodonín and Lety are the neglected sites of two former Nazi concentration camps on Czech territory that were used for the imprisonment and persecution of Roma. The Nazis murdered about 6,000 Czech Roma, that is, 90% of the Romani population. A substantial number of them were deported to Auschwitz and other extermination sites via the camps in Lety and Hodonín, which were entirely administered by Czech gendarmes (Pape 1997; Nečas 1999b). As in several other concentration camps established during the Second World War, many Roma, who were imprisoned in these camps, including a lot of children, died due to harassment, exhaustion, malnutrition, forced labor, and the outbreak of various illnesses.\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{12} Elsewhere (van Baar 2010b), I have argued that there is also an important methodological problem with how Trumpener interprets modern European literary and intellectual histories and claims a persistent, diachronic displacement of Romani memory and history throughout European modernity.

Since the 1970s, the site of the former camp in Lety has been occupied by a pig farm, privatized and modernized in the early 1990s (see figure 8.1). The site of the former camp in Hodonín is taken up by a privately owned holiday resort, which has become a popular holiday destination since 1989 (see figures 8.2, 8.3, 8.4). For many years now, the sites of these two former concentration camps have been at the center of a series of heated debates within and, increasingly, outside the Czech Republic. Czech and other Romani groups, as well as their advocates, want to remove both businesses to build decent memorials for what they consider as an adequate recognition of the Romani Holocaust. However, at the same time as they are struggling for recognition and the removal of those businesses, other actors, ranging from nationalists and extremists to mainstream politicians, have disturbed their attempts. Due to these oppositions, for a long time the involved Romani activists were unsuccessful at removing the businesses. Yet, in the course of the years of my research, this situation has gradually changed, most notably in Hodonín. In 2009, the Czech government bought the holiday resort with the intention to build a Romani Holocaust educational and documentation center, including a new memorial, at the site of the former camp (ČTK 2009a; Romea 2009e; 2011d). In what follows, I will analyze the Romani struggles and how we could understand this change. I will describe several strategies that Romani activists and their advocates have developed to practice forms of Romani memory, to protest against exclusion practices, and to initiate public debates about these issues. I will clarify how transnational strategies of traveling activism have increasingly played a crucial role to get and keep the situation in Lety and Hodonín on the political agenda in and beyond the Czech Republic.

FIGURE 8.1 The industrial pig farm, owned by AGPI, in Lety near Písek on the site of the former Nazi concentration camp for Roma. Photo: Huub van Baar, 2003
FIGURE 8.2 Postcard for sale at the holiday resort Žalov on the site of the former Nazi concentration camp for Roma in Hodonín near Kunštát

FIGURES 8.3 – 8.4 The Zigeunerlager (‘Gypsy Camp’) in Hodonín in 1942 (left) and the last remaining barrack (right), used as a depository, in the holiday resort Žalov. Photo (left): archive of the Museum of Romani Culture, Brno, Czech Republic. Photo (right): Huub van Baar, 2003

FIGURES 8.5 – 8.6 The monument established by the Havel government in Lety in 1995 (left) and the memorial plaque made in 1998 by the Romani artist Božena Vavreková-Přikrylová at the cemetery in Černovice near Hodonín (right). Photos: Huub van Baar, 2003
FIGURES 8.7 – 8.8 Symbolic references to the Romani nation that are included in the Romani monuments at the cemetery by Lety in Mirovice (left) and in Hodonín (right)
Photos: Huub van Baar, 2003

FIGURE 8.9 The 10th official commemoration ceremony in Lety (13 May 2005)
Photo: Huub van Baar, 2005
Inscribing Romani memory

The demand for memorials in places such as Lety and Hodonín can be considered as an attempt by Romani activists to resist exclusion from society and history. They have used the memory of persecution and extermination to challenge exclusionary practices toward the Roma, but also and even as importantly to develop their own memorial cultures and practices. I consider the inscription of Romani memories into public space a first strategy that Roma have mobilized to render these memories public and claim a place for Romani histories and memories in public culture. Throughout the years, different groups of Czech Roma have contributed to a diversification of the domestic and, by extension, European memorial landscapes. In the early 1990s, a group of Roma, who were already active during communism, established the Museum of Romani Culture (Muzeum romské kultury) in an abandoned and damaged building in the Czech city of Brno. With the help of various donors, the involved Roma have entirely rebuilt it and, in the course of the years, established a permanent exhibition, a research center, and various educational and social activities. Currently, the museum’s permanent exhibition also includes a Romani Holocaust memorial.\footnote{A sculpture, which is included in this memorial, has been made by Ivan Berky-Dušík, a Romani artist from the Slovakian town of Zvolenská Slatina (interview 2005).} Since the mid 1990s, the Roma associated with the museum have dedicated a significant part of their work to the situation of the former Nazi concentration camps in Lety and Hodonín. Supported by the then Czech President Václav Havel, on the initiative of the museum a monument was built in the vicinity of the pig farm (figure 8.5).\footnote{See Havel (1995) and Frištenská et al (1995).} The unveiling of the memorial in 1995 would also become the beginning of a long and difficult struggle for the removal of the businesses. For the Roma, the establishment of this monument is not enough. They want to get rid of the pig farm and the holiday park. They consider their presence socio-historically unjust. Though they have faced various kinds of opposition against their endeavors (van Baar 2008b, see also below), at the same time, they have succeeded in extending the Romani memoryscape. In the mid 1990s, Čeněk Růžička, whose relatives were deported to Lety and Auschwitz, founded the Committee for the Compensation of the Romani Holocaust (VPORH). Since then, VPORH and the museum in Brno have established a number of memorials, such as those in the vicinity of the holiday park in Hodonín and those at cemeteries near Lety and Hodonín (figures 8.6, 8.7, 8.8).\footnote{In 1997, in the vicinity of the holiday park in Hodonín, the museum built a monument, made by the Romani artist Eduard Olah. There are also Romani memorials in the Czech towns of Brno, Bohusouduv, Černovice, and Uherčice. In Brno, the Museum of Romani Culture has put a memorial plaque at the place in Masáš Street from where the first Moravian Roma were deported to Auschwitz in March 1943 (Nečas 1999b: 97-98, 170; 2005: 295). In 1985, a Romani family built a monument in Bohusouduv (in the Jižná district), from where the Roma were deported in 1943 (Nečas 2005: 262). Yet another Romani monument has been built in Uherčice in the Břeclav district, from where the Roma were deported in the same year (ibid 158). At the cemetery of Černovice near Hodonín and at the cemetery of Mirovice near Lety—graveyards where many of the Roma who died in the two camps were buried—there are also some memorial plaques, most of them established in the 1990s, but one originates from 1960 (Pape 1997: 190-91; 2008: 88; Nečas 1999b: 97-98; 2005: 281-85).} The Czech Roma and their advocates have used the annual commemorations in Lety (May) and Hodonín (August) to commemorate the Nazi genocide of the Sinti and Roma, but also to protest against the presence of the businesses
at these sites (figure 8.9). Both VPORH and the museum in Brno have also developed detailed plans of the memorials that need to be created at the sites of the former camps once the businesses are removed (interview 2003a; 2008b).

Despite the displacement of the current memorials—they are all located at a relatively large distance for the former camps—the visual language of these memorials clearly appeals to the European Romani social and civil movement (chapter 7). The monuments at the cemeteries near Lety and Hodonin include unambiguous references to the symbolism of the Romani movement. One of the monuments integrates a broken wheel and another a wheel in the form of a horse halter fastened to the top of a cross (figures 8.7, 8.8). International Romani organizations and some of their national representatives have chosen the caravan wheel as the symbol uniting disparate Romani groups globally by reference to a common history of traveling, migration, and socioeconomic and cultural displacement. The development of Romani memorial cultures would not remain limited to the establishment of the museum, VPORH, and the memorials. With the support of some of their advocates, the memories of some of the Romani survivors of the Lety and Hodonin camps have been recorded and written down (Pape 1997; Polansky 1998b; Danielová et al 2001). The way in which the Romani survivors have been given a voice also relates to a second strategy that the Roma and their advocates have developed to initiate a public debate about past and contemporary exclusion mechanisms that have affected the situation of the Roma.

Re-narrating and contesting the nation

The gradual development of the Czech Romani memorial cultures took place at the same time as two books were published in which the memories of Romani survivors of the Lety camp were mobilized to unleash a public debate about the situation at the sites of the former camps and about the role of Czech collaboration during the Second World War. Though this debate took primarily place at the national level, I will show how it would finally also get a European dimension.

In 1994, the Czech government was embarrassed by the way in which Paul Polansky, an American activist and poet, drew the Czech government’s attention to the existence of the former camp in Lety (Pape 2008). He had started an individual inquiry into what happened at Lety. He researched some local Czech state archives and spoke with several Romani survivors of Lety. He published a book in Czech in which he brought his findings together and in which he suggested that Lety had been an extermination camp, which was entirely run by Czechs. In his book, Polansky also strongly linked the wartime treatment of the Roma with their post-communist situation in the Czech Republic (Polansky 1998b). In the same period of time, the Czech-German journalist Markus Pape prepared yet another book on Lety in which he, like Polansky, drew attention to the ambivalent role of the Czech police in the management of the Lety camp, and in the genocide of Czech Roma more generally (Pape 1997; interview 2003e; 2008a).

In their books, Polansky and Pape follow a similar strategy, which can be related to the way in which Huyssen discusses emergent memorial practices in terms of a ‘shift’ from history to memory (see above). Both authors follow the trend in Holocaust and genocide studies to bring historical analyses and individual testimonies analytically and
methodologically together. Polansky and Pape combine historical research with Romani memories and testimonies to question how, in Czech debates about the Second World War, the genocide of the Czech Roma tends to be externalized as solely a Nazi-German issue, with important consequences regarding issues such as responsibility and justice. Polansky and Pape suggest that this externalization impedes an open, fair debate about the role that Czechs themselves played in the wartime persecution of the Roma. They follow this line of reasoning to link what happened during the war to the issue of social-historical justice that, they argue, still needs to be done vis-à-vis the Czech Romani Holocaust victims and their children. Since the mid 1990s, particularly Pape has closely collaborated with Růžička’s VPROH. Pape and VPROH have jointly organized annual commemorations in Lety and struggled for a more adequate recognition of the Romani Holocaust in the Czech Republic, particularly by disputing the presence of the pig farm and organizing other events that could help to further their issue. At the same time, the books by Polansky and Pape unleashed a heated, yet initially largely academic debate about the status of the former Lety camp.

The publication of their books was followed by that of a book (HÚ 1999) in which the Czech historians Ctibor Nečas and Jaroslav Valenta discuss the Lety case and the status of the camp. They wanted to reveal “objective truths” and “verify the historical facts” about Lety (Valenta 1999: 9). A number of original historical documents on the Lety camp were added to the book to support their arguments. In this book, Nečas and Valenta question how Polansky and Pape would have used historical documents and Romani testimonies to make political claims. Yet, they themselves cling to historical documents to do something ambivalent. In order to argue that the genocide of Roma did not take place on Czech territory and that Czechs were not to blame for what happened with the Roma during the war, these historians ambiguously mobilize original Nazi documents and rhetoric. Nečas, for instance, claims that the original Nazi purpose for imprisoning the Roma and “setting them to work” was merely “to reeducate” them (převýchova vězňů k práci) (Nečas 1999a: 28). He also remarks:
The genocide of the Czech Roma took place in the context of forced camp concentration: though it was initiated in the Gypsy camps of the Protectorate, it was in actual fact realized in the B-II-e camp of the Auschwitz camp complex. (Nečas 1999a: 18, my translation)

Valenta’s uses this argument to externalize the genocide of the Roma. He states that, because the Czech Lands were occupied by Nazi Germany, it does not make sense to accuse Czechs of their collaboration in the genocide of the Czech Roma. These Czechs would only have obeyed Nazi instructions meant for what the Nazis called the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. Suggesting that the terms ‘Czech’ and ‘Protectorate’ contradict each other, he concludes that “every author who wants to be historically objective, needs to consequently speak and write about a Protectorate camp in Lety” (Valenta 1999: 12, his emphasis, my translation).

The interventions of Polansky and Pape, as well as of the Czech historians Nečas and Valenta, clarify that the debate about Romani memory is about much more than the recognition of the Romani Holocaust. The debate is also about Czech collaboration, about social-historical justice vis-à-vis the Czech Roma, about the current position of Roma in Czech society, and about the position of the Czech Republic in its own and European history. The way in which the two historians in the debate have mobilized periodizations of Czech history, including references to original Nazi documents, to distinguish the ‘before and after’ of occupation, concentration, deportation, and genocide, illustrates the role that the framing of historical time plays in the debate. Whereas Polansky and Pape try to extend the debate by including Romani memories and testimonies, the two historians limit the discussion to the historical time of the nation, and to past policy documents and the “objective truths” they would reveal in particular. In the course of the years, these claims of objectivity and the particular way in which these historians narrate the (time of the) nation have begun to interfere with other politicizations of the Lety case in the Czech public debate. This will become clear when we look at the ways in which this debate would get a European dimension and would partially be hijacked by Czech nationalists and populists.

Going European
The debates on the removal of the businesses in Lety and Hodonín have also led to outbursts of anti-Roma sentiments and even Romani Holocaust denial. In the late 1990s, for instance, a representative of the far-right Czech Republican Party (SPR-RSČ) declared that building monuments to the Roma would be “simply rudeness and an insult to all white citizens of this state” (Josef Kresja cited Fawn 2001: 1201). This statement was part of the Republicans’ national election campaign, which was extremely dismissive of the Roma and initiatives to improve their socio-economic situation. They put up huge bill-

21 The Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia was the name the Nazis gave to the occupied Czech Lands.
22 The debate about the status of the former concentration camps continued on the ground, when disputes arose about how the camp in Lety had to be qualified on an explanatory sign installed in the vicinity of the memorial (see Kundra 2000; Malota 2000).
boards throughout the country, which read: “The Republicans reject a privileged treatment of the gypsies” (Republikáni odmítají zvýhodnování cikáňů) (Raichová 2001: 260).

At about the same time, the involved Czech Romani activists and their advocates have started to develop yet another strategy to get paid attention to the situation in Lety and Hodonin, and the poor recognition of the Romani Holocaust more generally. Since the late 1990s, they have increasingly mobilized connections abroad to put pressure on the Czech government.\textsuperscript{23} They have got support from various organizations and politicians, including Members of European Parliament. In 2005, they succeeded in getting the entire European Parliament involved. The Czech Romani activists have started to collaborate with a number of other partner Romani organizations, such as the Central Council of German Sinti and Roma in Heidelberg, one of the strong Western European Romani self-organizations to which I will pay attention in the last part of this chapter. In April 2005, VPROH and Pape (2005; 2008) organized an exhibition on the former camp in Lety in one of the main halls of the European Parliament in Brussels. They invited members of the Parliament to visit the exhibition’s opening. With the help of several parliament members who were already backing them, they built a strong coalition to get attention paid to the Lety case in a parliament’s resolution that was in preparation that spring.\textsuperscript{24} Finally, these efforts and those of several others resulted in the adoption of the resolution by the European Parliament, which was the first Parliament’s resolution that addressed the situation of the Roma in the European Union and also called for the recognition of the Romani Holocaust throughout the Union. In this resolution, the Parliament calls on the EU member states to fully recognize the Romani Holocaust. The Czech Republic in particular is urged “to take all necessary steps to remove the pig farm from the site of the former concentration camp at Lety … and to create a suitable memorial” (EP 2005b: §G, my italics).

The ‘European’ success of the Romani activists and their advocates would unleash an extremely polarized debate in the Czech Republic, in which various echoes of the debate between the historians and Pape and Polansky also became audible. Immediately after the resolution’s adoption, the Czech President Václav Klaus strongly condemned the call as an interference in Czech domestic affairs. He declared that the Czech Republic, not the EU, decides on what will eventually happen to the farm in Lety (ČTK 2005b). Miloslav Ransdorf, a Czech Member of the European Parliament claimed that “there has never been any genuine concentration camp there” (cited ČTK 2005b, my italics). There was also strong opposition against the views of politicians, such as Klaus and Ransdorf. Petr Uhl, a former Czech ombudsman for human rights, accused the latter of contributing to “the

\textsuperscript{23} In 1998, for instance, Czech Romani activists presented an open letter to the Czech government asking for the removal of the pig farm. The letter was signed by a number of internationally well-known figures, such as Günter Grass and Simon Wiesenthal (Trojan 1999). In 1999, the Roma National Congress (RNC), one of the international Romani associations, tried to put pressure on the Czech government to remove the farm by calling for a boycott of Czech products (RNC 1999).

\textsuperscript{24} Milan Horaček, a Member of the European Parliament for the Greens, actively helped to organize the exhibition and supported the call for a more adequate recognition of the Romani Holocaust. On the same day the exhibition opened, a European Parliament hearing on the Lety case was organized, at which Romani Rose, the chairman of the Central Council of German Sinti and Roma, in no uncertain terms rejected the presence of the pig farm. He called its presence “scandalous” (interview 2005a).
so-called ‘Auschwitz Lie’” (Uhl cited Balážová 2005). Uhl put forward that Ransdorf had “used his position to deny facts about fascism and the Romani Holocaust … Our predecessors allowed this camp to be erected, worked here as guards; it’s up to us to try to make amends! Not even Auschwitz was originally denoted as a concentration camp, and we know what happened there … We can’t allow anyone to deny the genocide of a nation or group of people” (ibid). However, in an interview with one of the main Czech daily newspapers, President Klaus also joined those who had questioned whether Lety was really a concentration camp. He declared:

[Lety] was originally a labor camp for those who refused to work, and not only for Romani people. It is really not a concentration camp in the sense in which we all subconsciously understand the words ‘concentration camp’ and envision Auschwitz, Buchenwald and all that went with them. Of course many tragic things happened [in Lety]. But we understand that the victims of this camp primarily succumbed to an epidemic of spotted typhus, not due to what is traditionally understood as the fate of a concentration camp victim—at least according to what every child learns in school. (Klaus cited Kolář 2005: 11; see also Drchal and Kolář 2005)

On the eve of the national elections of 2006, Czech Prime Minister Jiří Paroubek further politicized the Roma case. Traditionally, his Social Democratic Party (ČSSD) often competes with Klaus’s Civic Democratic Party (ODS). Contrary to Klaus, Paroubek repeatedly declared that he was willing to think about the removal of the pig farm (ČTK 2005e; 2005d). He even wanted to “solve the issue” before the 2006 elections by purchasing the farm from the owner and removing it afterwards (ČTK 2005a; 2006h). Despite a number of Roma-friendly actions, however, Paroubek gradually postponed and finally cancelled his promise (ČTK 2005f; 2005c).

Both the President’s and the Premier’s statements on Lety have partly facilitated less moderate and mainstream political parties and extremist groups to radicalize the debate. The former Czech President Václav Havel condemned the way in which Klaus had given space to extremists to radically politicize the Lety case: “Václav Klaus has opened the door to the current events around Lety as he said that it was not a concentration camp in the proper sense of the word” (Havel cited ČTK 2006a). The ‘current events’ in the quote refer to what happened in 2006, eight months after Klaus’s statement on Lety. Then, the Czech extreme-right National Party (NS) organized an aggressive election campaign against the Romani call for adequate recognition of the Romani Holocaust (Alda 2006; ČTK 2006e). As part of their campaign, NS unveiled a so-called ‘counter-monument’ close to the pig farm (ČTK 2006d). This counter-monument would have reclassified Lety as only a ‘labor camp,’ not a concentration camp. Though the monument was removed soon after its turbulent unveiling—partly due to immediate Romani protests and opposition by several politicians—the discussion about Romani memory was omnipresent in the Czech media for a few weeks (ČTK 2006g; 2006c; Romea 2006). The Romani victims did not fight for the Czech liberation, the NS’s chairwoman Petra

25 Svatopluk Karasek, then a Czech government human rights commissioner, made some similar statements (ČTK 2006g).
Edelmannová said. “They were deported to the camp, because they were unwilling to work.” She told the Czech press that the Nazis had “also” interned “antisocial elements” in the camp. She added that the Roma themselves were to blame for their deaths “since they did not observe sanitary rules.” She stated that, “if one is not accustomed to observe hygiene and spreads infectious diseases, it is him or her who is more or less at fault.” She claimed that “such people are not worthy of monuments; we build memorials to those who managed to achieve something” (Edelmannová cited ČTK 2006f; 2006i). The claims made by the two historians also turned out to be cheap fuel for the extremist propaganda machine against the Roma. In the heat of the debate about the NS’s attempt to establish its counter-monument, Edelmannová claimed: “We know from historical sources that the camp was just a labor camp” (Alda 2006). When the counter-monument was removed, she added: “It’s a sad day when the word of Gypsy provocateurs has more weight than the words of historians” (ibid).26

Retrospectively, we can say that the way in which the Romani activists and their advocates have ‘Europeanized’ the Lety case has had two ambivalent, largely unforeseen effects. Firstly, this Europeanization resulted into a kind of “backdoor nationalism” (Fox and Vermeersch 2010) in which various kinds of Czech political actors, ranging from mainstream politicians, such as Klaus, to extremist splinter groups, have mobilized the Roma’s supposed Europeanness to reinforce populist or nationalistic rhetoric and propagate Romaphobia. Yet, despite the extremists’ attempts at disputing the struggles for Romani Holocaust recognition, they have not succeeded in hijacking the entire debate. Partly, this relates to the second effect of the Europeanization of the Lety case. For the first time since the 1990s, the official governmental discourse on the two former camps has started to change. Despite the fact that the pig farm is still there, since 2005, a series of Czech politicians, including representatives of the ruling governments, have suggest-

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26 The attempt to establish a counter-monument was no incident, but the beginning of a series of endeavors to disturb the Romani calls for a more adequate Holocaust recognition. In 2007, several NS members disturbed the annual commemoration at Lety and showed banners with slogans, such as “German labor facility – German responsibility,” “Czech policemen – victims of typhoid epidemic in the labor camp,” and “300,000 Czech victims on Nazism often without single memorial” (cited ČTK 2007b). In 2008, NS tried something else. In front of the House of Ethnic Minorities in Prague and on the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, they wanted to hold “a commemorative meeting against positive discrimination.” At its website, NS said that it wanted to recall “discrimination against the white majority by pseudo-humanist associations and activists” (cited Romea 2008e). In 2009, NS focused on the Roma and the Lety case again. NS organized a meeting where party member Jiří Gaudin presented his book The Final Solution of the Gypsy Question in the Czech Lands. In one of his chapters, he focuses on what he calls, in the chapter’s title, “the influence of the gypsies on the state budget and economy of the Czech Republic.” His last chapter focuses on what he called, in his book title, “the final solution of the Gypsy Question.” In an interview, Gaudin said that “our short-term solution is to cut down on welfare to discourage people from avoiding work and living off welfare. If you don’t work, you don’t eat” (Gaudin cited Borufka 2009). The money saved by the reduction of welfare payments, he suggested, could then be used for ‘repatriation’ to India. The book presentation was also used to take up the Lety case. Some members of the National Party installed a number of provocative signs. One was a makeshift road sign pointing to ‘Gypsies’ in one direction and ‘pigs’ in another, a clear allusion to the pig farm in Lety and to the Nazi separation of ‘fit’ and ‘unfit’ people. Gaudin explained that the signs were installed due to Romani complaints that their memorials were difficult to find. He added: “they asked … for 10 million Czech crowns for the signs, which is the gypsy mentality, to always ask for help, so we decided to help out” (Gaudin cited Borufka 2009).
ed that the pig farm should indeed be removed. When Klaus and other mainstream politicians disputed the status of Lety, some other Czech politicians also immediately opposed against this narrative. What is more, the situation in Hodonín has changed. In 2009, the Czech government bought out the owners of the holiday resort (Romea 2008b; 2008d). The government intends to build a new memorial at the site of the former camp (Romea 2009e; 2011b). These changes have also gone hand in hand with ambivalent governmental moves. In the Lety case, the government has proposed to improve the memorial, but still maintain the pig farm. Moreover, strategies to marginalize the Romani actors have been developed. For instance, the Czech government has recently transferred the administration of the Romani memorial sites to state-owned institutions. The Romani actors who have interminably struggled for the development of these memorial sites, and have actually extensive plans to do so, have been passed over by the Czech authorities (Romea 2011c).

Despite these developments, we can nevertheless interpret the gradually changing parameters of the Czech debate as part of the “memorial-making process” (Young 1993: 12-13), ambivalent as it still is. If debates about memorials are not just about “the relations between people and their monuments, but [also about] the consequences of these relations in historical time” (ibid 13), we can also say that the debate is increasingly more about questioning the way in the Czech Roma have been excluded from Czech national history and collective memory. The way in which the Romani activists and their advocates have developed various strategies to open up the public debate and cross-fertilize history and memory “moves away from a state supported (and state supporting) national history” (Levy 2004: 182). Their acts for recognition question the teleological temporal sequence that periodizes Czech national history in order to maintain national victimhood and externalize complicity. Of course, as the debate shows, the Czech state continues to play a crucial role in how its history is remembered. However, the state now needs to share the field of meaning making with a range of other actors, such as the European Parliament, scholars, nationalists, journalists, and, most notably, the Romani activists and their advocates (cf Levy 2004). If “the real monument is not the stone object but the debate itself” (Carrier 2005: 228) and if we take into account that the debate is increasingly more about Czech-Roma relationships, Romani memories, their place in European history, and issues of socio-historical justice, we can also say that the space for representing Romani histories and memories is gradually widening.

The Czech case illustrates that Romani activists and their advocates have developed their own strategies to mobilize the Roma’s Europeanization to claim a place in national and European histories and memories. We need to interpret these strategies, which can large been considered in the context of traveling activism and the politics of citizenship as participation (chapter 7), beyond the EU-member state binary. Indeed, as I have

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27 See, for instance, various statements made by Czech politicians on the removal of the pig farm in the Czech media (ČTK 2005a; 2006b; 2006k; 2007a; 2009b; Romea 2008b; 2008a; 2009c; 2009d; 2009b; 2011a).

28 The administration of the in Lety memorial has been transferred to the Lidice Memorial (ČTK 2009b), while the Czech government has decided to make the Komenský Pedagogical Museum in Prague responsible for the development of a new memorial at the site in Hodonín (Romea 2011d).

29 In the Lety case, VPROH has developed such plans (interview 2003a), whereas, in the Hodonín case, the Museum for Romani Culture in Brno has done something similar (interview 2008b).
shown, Romani activist and advocacy networks have developed their own politics of scaling (chapter 5) to challenge exclusion mechanisms that affect the Roma. Attempts by political analysts to explain the relationship between Romani memorial practices and Czech attitudes against the Roma have sometimes focused on domestic affairs and EU pressures on successive Czech governments. While such analyses help to gain a better insight in the situation, they can also lead to the ambiguous suggestion that (some) Czechs are Romaphobic and that the EU mostly represents liberal and human ideals. On the basis of this representation of the EU, the Union is understood as a uniform and unison socio-political agent that could morally and logistically resolve the amnesia concerning the Roma in EU member states, such as the Czech Republic. However, different EU policy practices regarding Lety easily contest the uniformity of EU policies. For instance, while the European Parliament has called for the removal of the pig farm, at the same time, one of the EU’s social funds has financially supported the company that owns the farm (figure 8.10). Instead of starting by juxtaposing Czech and EU interests and scaling the EU level morally or otherwise above the Czech national or local one, we need to extend the scope of the analysis to the wider context of the Europeanization of Roma representation (chapter 5), the politics of European integration, the globalization of Holocaust discourses, and post-1989 EU attempts to reconsider its own Cold War ‘founding narratives.’ As I will argue below, the founding narratives of the EU have altered and the Union has recently changed its cultural policies, which has also impacted on how Holocaust remembrance is taken into account. Above, I have shown that we cannot maintain Trumpener’s thesis, for the Roma have increasingly and actively entered current ‘memorial-making processes’ in Europe. Below, I will explain how newly emerged EU narratives about Europe’s past nevertheless tend to confront us with a new kind of European memory problem.

FIGURE 8.10 Sign at the fence of the pig farm in Lety with the inscription: ‘This project was co-funded by the European Union - European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF)’  Photo: Huub van Baar, 2008
In post-war Western Europe, anti-Nazism and anti-communism were central discursive and strategic frames for the European Community’s search for peace and stability. At the same time, in socialist Central and Eastern Europe, the discourse of anti-fascism profoundly shaped the anti-Western and anti-capitalist attitude. The memorial landscapes of the Holocaust were forcefully Sovietized and inscribed within the rhetoric of anti-fascism and communist martyrdom. In most socialist war memorials the representation of the war histories of the Jews and the Roma was downplayed or purposely neglected. Instead, most of the memorials celebrated de-ethnicized, ‘communist’ resistance groups and soldiers of the Red Army as those who had beaten the ‘fascist tyranny’ and finally brought peace and stability to the socialist states. Communism was consequently understood as the true force behind the collapse of Nazism and as the sole source of postwar peace. Simultaneously, the communists tried to universalize and externalize fascism as something that was always latent in the capitalist world order of the West, not only before and during the Second World War, but also afterward. The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (1948-89) was no exception to this rule. After the war, speaking publicly of the Romani Holocaust became taboo and the sites of the former camps in Lety and Hodonín were ignored.

However, when the European Community reached relative stability at the end of the 1980s and communism fell, neither the symbolism of East European anti-fascism nor that of West-European anti-communism could function as a founding transnational narrative of European integration. It has been argued that new founding narratives were and are still needed to foster, revitalize, and continue the project of European integration (Probst 2003). Since these narratives have an important function in creating unity and stability in the expanding EU, now the symbolic scope of those narratives also needs to encompass Central and Eastern European audiences, histories, and memories:

The commemoration of the Holocaust is increasingly becoming the core of a unifying European memory, thus giving constitution building in Europe the necessary symbolic foundation ... The commemoration of the Holocaust ... is not only a source of symbolic legitimacy but also of political action and values, such as the rejection of racism, anti-Semitism, and xenophobia. (Diner 2000 cited Probst 2003: 53, the quote is reproduced verbatim from Probst)

The commemoration of the Holocaust, Diner argues, has become the symbolic center of a “unifying European memory” and a kind of “negative” founding act of the current European Union (Diner 2003b: 43-44). In particular, the issue of how Holocaust remembrance could be a source of political action has recently become relevant in the EU’s approach toward culture and cultural policy. Over the last decade, we have been able to observe a

30 Though the narratives of anti-Nazism and anti-fascism had also some features in common, these discourses were actively mobilized against each other after the Second World War (Koshtar 2000; Müller 2000).
31 Only in 1969, at the times of the Prague spring, some historians for the first time wrote a moderate history of the camps. Since the early 1970s and primarily through Nečas’s works, more scholarly attention had been paid to Lety and Hodonín (Nečas 1981; 1987; see also Růžička 2004; Pape 2008).
gradual shift in the EU’s dealing with cultural affairs from conceptualizing culture primarily in symbolic terms to instrumentalizing it in governmental terms (Barnett 2001). This governmental approach is based on “the belief that ways of life can be acted on through the governmental deployment of artistic and cultural resources” (Bennett 2000: 1420). Cultural practices are considered as instruments to achieving specific aims and targets, such as European integration and the increase of the EU’s global competitiveness. In particular, EU institutions try to mobilize and utilize various cultural practices and programs to help individuals to transform into actively participating European citizens. The mobilization of culture in the EU implies a deployment of such practices for the more effective management and integration of (parts of) the European population, including Europe’s minorities. This tendency is well illustrated in the EU’s ‘cultural’ approach to employment:

To participate more fully in society and the world of work, people are required to develop professional qualities based on more specific individual skills, such as creativity, initiative, flexibility and human relations skills. Increasingly employees are seeking the potential for personal development and growth which cultural practices (exhibitions, performing arts, fine arts, etc.) may help to shape … Training and participation in a variety of cultural activities are increasingly emerging as a significant tool of social integration whereby people can acquire new or improved skills and qualifications. (EC 1998 cited Barnett 2001: 419, my italics)

Initially, in the mid 1990s, EU programs and policies on European integration primarily linked issues of employment and competitiveness to the importance of training, education, and what was increasingly called ‘lifelong learning’ (EC 1995, see also chapter 5). Already in these early programs of the mid 1990s, and in the EU’s White Paper on Education and Training in particular, these relationship were clearly framed in terms of the vital importance of Europe’s cultural heritage and the remembrance of its dark past:

The essential aim of education and training has always been personal development and the successful integration of Europeans into society through the sharing of common values, the passing on of cultural heritage and the teaching of self-reliance … Recalling and understanding the past is essential in order to judge the present. Knowledge of history … has a dual function as a guide in time and space which is essential to everyone if they are to come to terms with their roots, develop a sense of belonging and to understand others. It is small wonder that the hallmark of authoritarian regimes and dictatorships has been the undermining and falsifying of the teaching of history. The penalty society pays for forgetting the past is to lose a common heritage of bearings and reference points. (EC 1995: 3, 12, emphasis in original)

Since about the turn of the millennium, we have been able to observe a clear governmentalization of cultural practices in EU cultural policy, particularly vis-à-vis issues of socio-economic integration and the EU’s global competitiveness, and particularly through dealing with cultural practices in terms of their inclusion in programs of what has been called ‘active European citizenship.’ Since a few years, the trend to govern-
mentalize culture has been extended to “governmentalizing the past” (Bennett 1998) at the EU level. The EU has envisioned its future in the long-term Europe for Citizens Programme 2007-2013, which is centrally based on “the concept of Active European Citizenship” (EC 2009: 6). Apart from clear initiatives at the EU level to governmentalize civil society through articulating, developing, and logistically and financially supporting projects that aim at active citizenship, the EU has now explicitly included a governmental action called “active European remembrance” (EC 2009: 89-93), which it delineates as follows:

The European Union is built on fundamental values such as freedom, democracy, and respect for human rights. In order to fully appreciate their meaning, it is necessary to remember the breaches of those principles caused by Nazism and Stalinism in Europe. By commemorating the victims, by preserving the sites and archives associated with deportations, Europeans will preserve the memory of the past, including its dark sides ... [C]itizens will engage in a reflection on the origins of the European Union, fifty years ago, on the history of European integration, which preserved peace among its members, and finally on today’s Europe, thereby moving beyond the past and building the future. This action therefore will play an important role in nourishing the broad reflection on the future of Europe and in promoting active European citizenship. (EC 2009: 89, my italics)

The central aims of this particular initiative on active European remembrance, the call for projects states, correspond to the general objectives of the Europe for Citizens Programme. This initiative is “fostering action, debate, and reflection related to European citizenship and democracy, shared values, common history, and culture” and “bringing Europe closer to its citizens by promoting Europe’s values and achievements, while preserving the memory of its past” (EC 2009: 89).32

This trend also relates to the issue of Romani memorial practices and Holocaust remembrance. The 2005 European Parliament (EP) resolution on the Roma in the EU, which calls for the removal of the farm in Lety, refers to another European Parliament resolution, adopted earlier the same year:

[The EP] pays homage to all the victims of the Nazis and is convinced that lasting peace in Europe must be based on remembrance of its history; rejects and condemns revisionist views and denial of the Holocaust as shameful and contrary to historical truth ... [The EP] urges the Council and the Commission, as well as the various levels of local, regional, and national government in the Member States, to coordinate their measures to combat ... attacks on minority groups including Roma ... in order to uphold the principles of tolerance and non-discrimination and to promote social, economic and political integration. (EP 2005a: §1, §3, italics added)

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32 Similar to how I interpret the governmentalization of civil society, the governmentalization of the past at the EU level can be seen in the context of the promotion and articulation of technologies of proximity (chapter 7).
This resolution links the remembrance of the Holocaust to the promotion of social, economic, and political integration of the Roma in the EU. In other words, the Union governmentalizes the remembrance of the Holocaust in order to achieve its aim of European integration. The EU considers remembrance, Holocaust education, and promoting dialogue among diverse communities as vital instruments to “make intolerance, discrimination, and racism a thing of the past” (EP 2005a: §5). The Union also encourages its members to create a “European Holocaust Memorial Day,” to use Holocaust memorial institutions, such as the Auschwitz museum, to reinforce Holocaust education and to make Holocaust and human rights education and “European citizenship” standard elements in school curricula throughout the EU (ibid, see also OSCE 2006a; FRA 2010a; 2010b). The means of remembrance, education, and intercultural dialogue, which are assembled in the EP resolutions, need to be introduced into the curricula of schools, museums, cultural venues, commemorations and the like. The memorial practices are understood here as “embodied mediums for changing the conduct of individuals and social groups, and thereby as means of addressing problems of discrimination and social exclusion” (Barnett 2001: 419-20).

The EU’s governmentalization of Holocaust remembrance in Europe brings the Holocaust, and Nazism and Stalinism, in alignment with the ‘negative’ founding moment of European unification and integration. This linkage is clearly expressed when the Europe for Citizens Programme states, for instance, that active European remembrance will enable European citizens to “engage in a reflection on the origins of the European Union [and] on the history of European integration” (EC 2009: 89, my italics). Here, the program suggests that the lessons learned from the Holocaust have not only given European integration a crucial start. They also legitimate political actions aimed at the strengthening of European integration programs and their extension to other policy domains, such as the ones of social and cultural policy. The discursive representation of the EU as “built on fundamental values such as freedom, democracy, and respect for human rights” (ibid) and, at the same time, as itself a significant defender of such universalized norms is mobilized to ‘normalize’ European integration programs across several policy domains, including those of education, employment, and culture. The norm of this normalization process does not just refer to legal norms set by juridical standards or to ethical norms set by historical knowledge of the Holocaust. Rather, this norm refers to the Foucauldian notion of a normalizing power—now at the European level. This norm is related “to a positive technique of intervention and transformation” (Foucault 2003: 50) and to the legitimatization of its development and exercise (chapter 1). This narrative enables EU authorities to set out pedagogies of participation in which European citizens need to “come to terms with their roots” and “develop a sense of belonging” (EC 1995: 12). The link between awareness raising of the impact of the Holocaust and the way in which the EU presents itself as a protector of human rights has increasingly become central to this narrative and the pedagogies it has inaugurated. Recent reports by the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), for instance, discuss the

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33 The inclusion of Stalinism in the call for Active European Remembrance is apparently yet another attempt to enable the ‘founding narrative’ to include the entire EU, including its new Central and Eastern European members.
link between Holocaust and human rights education in terms of “discovering the past for the future” (FRA 2010a) and perceive of these novel pedagogies as “teaching for the future” (FRA 2010b). What are the implications of these pedagogies in which active European remembrance and active European citizenship are loosely linked to promote “Europe’s values and achievements, while preserving the memory of its past” (EC 2009: 89)? How could we relate these new developments to the endeavors of various Romani actors to challenge the ways in which Romani histories and memories are excluded from European ones? This question brings me back to Trumpener’s thesis.

The EU narrative about remembrance can be seen from the angle of the trend to Europeanize the representation of the Roma. This narrative fits, for instance, with the calls of European institutions for recognizing the Roma as a European minority (chapter 5). This EU narrative also allows Romani histories and memories to be part of European ones. In contrast to how Trumpener analyzes European modernity as conditional upon representing the Roma as without histories, the current EU discourse importantly departs from this exclusion model. As I have argued above, Trumpener focuses on the question of what the relationality of the modern structures of temporality tends to make impossible. Now that the newly emerged EU narrative presents Europe’s structure of temporality as primarily based on including, rather than excluding, Romani histories and memories, the question to pose changes into what this relationality makes possible. In order to see what this relationality enables and whether and how the European memory problem has subsequently changed, in this chapter’s final part I will analyze two different, closely related Romani memorial strategies. I will argue that, taken together, these strategies have critical significance vis-à-vis the way in which the EU is currently governmentalizing Holocaust remembrance.

ROMANI MEMORIAL STRATEGIES AND THE MEMORY DEFICIT OF EU POLITICAL ACTION

The first memorial strategy that I will analyze relates to the museal representation of Romani histories in the permanent exhibition on the Nazi genocide of the Sinti and Roma in the Polish State Museum of Auschwitz-Birkenau. At the end of the 1990s, the Central Council of German Sinti and Roma (Zentralrat Deutscher Sinti und Roma) in Heidelberg initiated this exhibition (interview 2003d; 2006c). Particularly regarding the struggle for the recognition of the Romani Holocaust in Germany and—increasingly—beyond, the Central Council can be seen as one of the most influential Romani organizations in Europe. Together with the establishment of the Memorial to the Murdered Sinti and Roma of Europe in Germany’s post-1989 capital Berlin, the new exhibition in Oświęcim belongs to the most recent achievements of the endeavors of the German

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34 Hereafter, I will refer to this organization as the Central Council.
35 The building of the Memorial to the Murdered Sinti and Roma of Europe in front of the Reichstag in Berlin has not yet finished (fall 2011), due to several disputes. The development and building of this memorial have formed part of a long and heated debate about the building of a memorial to the victims of the Nazis that started in the early 1980s (Rose 1989a; R Rose 2000; Young 1993; Wiedmer 1999; Jäckel 2000; Carrier 2005; Leggewie and Meyer 2005; Till 2005) and continued after the building of the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe (Zimmermann 2007a).
Council to get recognized the Romani Holocaust and to articulate Romani Holocaust memory in public space and debate.\textsuperscript{36} The Romani exhibition in Oświęcim was co-financed by the EU. It has become an integral part of the Auschwitz museum, its educational programs, its guides, and international tourism to the site. In many ways, the exhibition could be seen as expressing the pedagogic aims as they are reflected in the EU’s recent focus on Holocaust remembrance and education. This congruency does not imply that the governmentalization of Holocaust remembrance is reflected in the exhibition. There is no easy one-to-one relationship between the two, but, nevertheless, they share, I will show, a clear focus on the pedagogical importance of the Holocaust for the present and future.

The second Romani memorial strategy that I will investigate is the cinematic one expressed in one of the documentaries made by the German-Sinti filmmaker Melanie Spitta and her German colleague Katrin Seybold. This documentary has not played the profound role that many of the activities initiated by the Central Council have in the postwar debate. Nevertheless, a reflection on what I interpret as its main strategy will shed light on the current reemergence of a European memory problem, though in a different form than introduced by Trumpener. I will show how Spitta and Seybold’s memorial strategy brings to the fore a fundamental problem that goes with newly emerged Holocaust-related pedagogies. At the same time, I will not discuss both memorial strategies to merely contrast them—even in spite of their obvious dissimilarities. These strategies carve out two routes in a newly emerged diverse Romani memorial landscape that increasingly overlaps and interacts with other memoryscapes. Taken together, rather than in isolation, these strategies encourage us to rethink how past but also present European governmentalities have impacted not only on the situation of Romani minorities, but also on influential deficiencies in current EU narratives on Europe’s past.

\textit{The long, bumpy road toward the recognition of the Romani Holocaust}

Since the mid 1950s, the Central Council and several of its forerunners have played a prominent and in many respects crucial role in the development of the German Romani and Sinti civil rights movement (Rose 1987; Matras 1998).\textsuperscript{37} Since the founding of the first post-war Sinti organization in 1956, attempts at getting the Nazi genocide of Sinti and Roma recognized at various levels in and later also beyond Germany have been essential to the German Sinti and Romani identity and memory politics (Margalit 2002; Margalit and Matras 2007). The postwar ‘recognition’ history can roughly be divided into two

\textsuperscript{36} Oświęcim is the Polish name of the town where the Polish State Museum Auschwitz-Birkenau was established in 1947. As part of the Nazi mythology of the thousand-years old German Empire, and integral to the Nazi German population policies of the 1930s, the Nazis changed the Polish name into Auschwitz, the name that Silesian knights would have given to the town when they founded it ‘as a German city’ in the thirteenth century (van Pelt and Dwork 1996: chapter 1; Aly and Heim 2003: 101-12).

\textsuperscript{37} The Central Council’s forerunners were (Rose 1987): the Association and Interests Community of Racially Persecuted German Citizens of Non-Jewish Faith (\textit{Verband und Interessengemeinschaft rassisch Verfolgter nichtjüdischen Glaubens deutscher Staatsbürger e.V.}), established in 1956; the Central Committee of the Sinti of West Germany (\textit{Zentralkomitee der Sinti Westdeutschlands}) established in 1971; the Association of Sinti of Germany (\textit{Verband der Sinti Deutschlands}), established in 1972; and the Association of German Sinti (\textit{Verband Deutscher Sinti}) established in 1979. In 1982, this organization changed its name into the Central Council of German Sinti and Roma (\textit{Zentralrat Deutscher Sinti und Roma}).
overlapping periods. During the first period (1945-1985) the efforts to get officially recognized the Nazi genocide of the Sinti and Roma in Germany would increasingly be central to the activists’ endeavors.\textsuperscript{38} Since the early 1980s, their struggles would increasingly get a more European dimension, which marks the start of the second period.

During the first four postwar decades, the Central Council and its forerunners, in close collaboration with other Romani organizations,\textsuperscript{29} were involved in a long and heavy battle for getting recognized the Sinti and Roma as victims of the Nazis and as central targets of Nazi genocidal policies.\textsuperscript{40} At least until the early 1960s, the first postwar activists had to fight against the complete denial of the Nazi genocide by the official authorities and even against the continuation of their persecution. In the early 1950s, for instance, so-called Central Police Registers of Vagrants (\textit{Landfahrerzentralen}), which had their prewar antecedents, were reinstated in a number of German towns to deal with ‘antisocial’ and ‘criminal’ elements in Germany society. The trend to continue to criminalize Sinti and Roma was also reflected in court cases about war reparation. In the mid 1950s, for instance, a German Federal Court characterized the Nazi persecution of the Sinti and Roma as “measures aimed at the prevention of criminality” (Bundesgerichtshof Koblenz cited Matras 1998: 52). The denial of genocide and the actual postwar continuation of persecution led to the categorical rejection of several reparation claims and to the impossibility to bring the perpetrators to court (Spitta 1989; Matras 1998). After the war, many of the perpetrators could continue their ‘scientific’ work and locate their \textit{Zigeunerforschung} (research on the Gypsies) in the field of criminology and social pathology and pedagogy. Some of them even contributed to decisions that denied compensation to German Sinti and Romani victims. Both German and Austrian courts and governmental departments made use of the ‘expertise’ of scholars, police officers, doctors, and bureaucratic officials, who had been involved in the Nazi persecution of Sinti and Roma to deny war reparations and pensions to them.\textsuperscript{41} Since the 1960s, this politics of denial slowly but difficultly changed into a recognition that the Sinti and Roma had been victims of the Nazis. Particularly due to the efforts of the ‘1968 generation’ of Sinti and Romani activists, and to the endeavors of some other involved advocacy groups, the struggle for recognition would gain momentum.

\textsuperscript{38} This period can be divided into various other stages (see, for instance, Rose 1987; Matras 1998).

\textsuperscript{29} Throughout these decades, the German Sinti collaborated with several Romani organizations in Germany, such as the Central Committee of the Gypsies (\textit{Zentral Komitee der Zigeuner}), founded by Walter Strauss and Wilhelm Weiss in 1960, and the Romani and Sinti Union (\textit{Rom und Cinti Union}), established by Rudko Kawczynski in Hamburg in 1980. Until the emergence of several disputes between and among the Sinti and Romani organizations about the main direction of the movement in the mid and late 1980s, they collaborated relatively smoothly (Seybold 1989; Seybold and Spitta 1989; Rose 1989b; Zimmermann 1989; Matras 1998; Margalit and Matras 2007).

\textsuperscript{40} Though the Nazi persecution of the Roma was generally neglected during the Nuremberg trials, it is not true, as has often been claimed, that they were \textit{entirely} neglected. Some Romani testimonies were effectively included in some of the trials, such as the Medical Trial. What is more, as Marcia Rooker argues, “the prosecutors did not doubt the genocide attempt on Romany people.” Yet, “the judgment referred to it only implicitly … Proof of this genocide was not necessary to convict the defendants” (Rooker 2002: 50, chapter 2).

German sites of memory played a crucial role in the recognition struggle. There, the Sinti and Romani activists organized several protests. In 1979, for instance, they organized a protest rally at the site of the former concentration camp in Bergen-Belsen and, a year later, some Sinti held a hunger strike in the former Dachau concentration camp (Rose 1987; Margalit 2002). Another important protest act was the occupation of the university archive of the University of Tübingen in 1981. More than twenty thousand Nazi files—mostly documents of individual German Sinti and Roma, including their photographs, genealogies, fingerprints, information on their medical treatments and persecution trajectories—were archived in Tübingen, but made inaccessible for Sinti and Roma. These documents could have been used to prove their Nazi persecution. The activists were suspicious that they were kept back to hamper legal action against the perpetrators. The Sinti and Romani identity politics of these years mobilized the history and memory of the Nazi genocide of the Sinti and Roma to address the permanence of discrimination against them, the continuity of the denial of their persecution by the Nazis, the failure of the government to prosecute those who were responsible, and, consequently, to challenge “the self-image of the Federal Republic as a state and society which claimed to have broken with its Nazi past” (Matras 1998: 55). In the end, these protests would pay rewards. Finally, in 1985, the efforts of the Romani and Sinti activists culminated in the official recognition of the Romani Holocaust by the political establishments of both the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, expressed during a commemorative event held at the site of the former Nazi concentration camp for Sinti and Roma in Berlin-Marzahn, where the Federal Republic had erected the first official Romani and Sinti memorial in Germany in the same year (Margalit 2002: 202-05).

Whereas the official recognition of the Nazi genocide of the Sinti and Roma was undeniably a major achievement of the Central Council and others who had been involved in the postwar recognition struggle, after 1985 it would actually enter a new and again difficult phase of the struggle. Since then, it has been turned into a struggle for what I want to call the public recognition of the genocide. As Gilad Margalit remarks, “placing Gypsies on the list of victims left a lot to be desired” (Margalit 2002: 205). Indeed, “placing Gypsies with the homosexuals [in the category of the ‘other victims’] left them

42 The protests resulted in heated debates between Western Germany’s main politicians about how the past and current situation of the Sinti and Roma had to be addressed. A governmental workgroup on Sinti and Roma was established. An important outcome of the protests in Tübingen was that the files were transferred to the Federal archives in Koblenz, where they would become accessible for the persecuted Sinti and Roma. Moreover, German newspapers publicly introduced the terms Sinti and Roma and mostly stopped using the term Zigeuner. In 1982, both Germany’s Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and the opposition leader of the Christian democrats, Helmut Kohl, met with the Central Council’s chairman Romani Rose to express sympathy with his work and, in Schmidt’s case, express the wish to correct the wrong done to the Sinti and Roma by the Nazis, who, he explicitly recognized, had persecuted them on racial grounds. Since 1983, the Central Council has got financial support from the German federal government. In 1990, the documentation and cultural center of the Central Council was built in Heidelberg (Rose 1987; 2003; Margalit 2002).

43 Reparation related to the Nazi genocide of Sinti and Roma started extremely late in Europe. Austria, for instance, began to compensate Sinti and Roma who were still alive in 1988 (Rieger 2003; Thurner 2007), while the Netherlands followed as late as 2000 (Öfner and Rooker 2001). In Central and Eastern Europe, the compensation debate has only started at the turn of the millennium. With the help of German authorities, the Czech Republic, for instance, started to compensate in 2001 (interview 2003a; Hübischmannová 2006), while Slovakia compensated a Romani war victim for the first time in 2002 (Pišárová 2002).
in the same category they occupied in the 1950s, victims whom wide circles of Germans perceived as not entirely innocent, if not questioned their very victimization [44] (ibid.). For various different reasons, of which the analysis reaches beyond the scope of this study, the early 1980s also mark a kind of turning point in how the war is remembered. This had to do—as, for instance, Margalit emphasizes—with the changes inside Germany that would finally also lead to Germany’s reunification and a renewed, intensified debate about Germany’s shared past—a debate that would, among other things, lead to a heated debate about the building of a memorial to the victims of the Nazis, including the Sinti and Roma, in the center of Berlin (Young 1993; Carrier 2005; Leggewie and Meyer 2005).

Even more importantly, the shifting focus of practices of remembrance has had to do with what Huyssen calls “the globalization of Holocaust discourse” and with what he considers as the increased tendency to use the Holocaust as “a universal trope for historical trauma” (Huyssen 2000: 23). Since the early 1980s, we have been able to observe the increased emergence of a combined universalization and de-territorialization of Holocaust discourses (Levy and Sznaider 2001; 2002; Diner 2003b). Increasingly, these discourses have been untied from their strict link with the Nazi genocide of the Jews, as well as from their particular reference to genocidal events in the historical time of the Second World War and in the territorial context of Europe. Both earlier and later genocidal events in and outside Europe—such as the mass murder of the Herero by the Germans in Namibia in 1905, the one of the Armenians by the Turks in 1915-16, and recent ethnic cleansings in ex-Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and the Sudanese province of Darfur—are now referred to as holocausts as well. Though in many respects the Nazi genocide of the Jews has remained a key reference point of Holocaust discourses, the globalization of Holocaust discourses has resulted into profound changes within contemporary Holocaust memorial cultures and regarding the identity strategies of the groups involved. This shift has gone together with the necessity for victim and activist groups to develop new memorial strategies to effectively achieve public attention and recognition. [46] In the case of the Roma, there is a somewhat paradoxical situation. While their sufferings during the war were largely spatio-temporally conflated with those of the Jews, though radically neglected for decades, both the spread of knowledge about the Nazi genocide of the Roma and the public identity derived from it have now become

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[44] The ‘other victims’ narrative also still appears, for instance, in the recent FRA reports: “Holocaust education is understood as education that takes the discrimination, persecution, and extermination of the Jews by the National Socialist regime as its focus, but also includes Nazi crimes against other victim groups, both for the purpose of deeper understanding and contextualization of the Holocaust and out of a desire to acknowledge and commemorate the suffering of numerous non-Jewish victims of the Nazi era” (FRA 2010b: 18).

[45] Yet another important development that indirectly contributed to the transformation of memorial practices and the debate on the victim status of the Roma and Sinti was the increased migration of Central and Eastern Europeans to Germany. The arrival of Romani migrants also caused a dispute between the Central Council and Romani organizations in Germany, such as Rudko Kawczynski’s Roma National Congress (Matras 1998; Margalit and Matras 2007).

[46] Among these strategies are those that claim or argue that the Jewish Holocaust or Shoah is unique and cannot be compared to any other genocidal event in modern history (for a debate about these strategies, see, for instance, Linenthal 1995; Rosenbaum 1996; Finkelstein 2000).
dependent on a globalized discourse in which disjunctive holocausts are presented as ‘of the same kind.’ This situation has gone together with diverse attempts, developed by different kinds of Romani actors, to articulate Romani memories and represent their pasts.47

The Central Council and other Romani actors in Europe have actively become involved in articulating and rearticulating Romani memories and memorial strategies vis-à-vis the phenomenon of the globalization of Holocaust discourses. As I discussed in chapter 3, since the mid 1980s, for instance, Ian Hancock has been one of the prominent Romani intellectuals who has left his mark on a specific national and essentialist articulation of the history of the Roma, tracing their persecution, militancy, and nation back to eleventh-century India. In the particular context of the Romani Holocaust, he has played a vital role in developing strategies to emphasize its specificity and to try to get ‘the Roma’ out of the category of the other victims.48 His attempts at creating an own historiography of the Romani Holocaust has led him to develop a specific Romani term for the suffering of the Roma during the Nazi times. Similar to how some, since the mid 1980s, started to refer to the Shoah as a particular Hebrew translation and Jewish articulation of the term Holocaust, Hancock (1989; 1996; 2002) introduced the term Porajmos or “great devouring” to recently emerged Holocaust narratives. Other Romani actors have introduction different Roma-specific translations of Holocaust, such as Murdaripen (Horváthová 2003) and Pharrajinos (Bársony and Daróczí 2008). Some scholars take these concepts at face value and do not reflect on how and why they have only recently become integral part of Romani memorial strategies and identity and memory politics.49 Yet, in these cases we deal neither with the disclosure of original meanings of how Romani victims and survivors referred to the suffering during the war, nor with merely linguistic translations of the term Holocaust or some of its equivalents into Romanes. Rather, these initiatives can be regarded as political translations in which Romani identities, memories, and contestable Roma/non-Roma relationships are strategically rearticulated (see also Fischer von Weikersthal et al 2008).50 They represent a politics of citizenship as participation (chapter 7) that addresses particular aims, such as socio-historical justice, recognition, reparation, or reconciliation. The two memorial strategies that I will discuss below can also be seen in light of such contemporary attempts at articulating Romani memories and histories.

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47 Elsewhere, I have extensively discussed the stages of what could be called the globalization of Holocaust discourses and reflected on how we need to interpret various contemporary Holocaust references from the angle of this globalization (van Baar 2010d).

48 Hancock has placed an important role in addressing the lack of attention paid to the Roma and challenging the memory politics that tended to exclude them in the development and establishment of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington (Linenthal 1995).


50 Similar processes of Romani political translations have recently been discussed in the fields of literature, film, opera, music, and popular culture (see, for instance, Toninato 2004; 2012; Imre 2008; von Hagen 2009; Kovalcsik 2010; Blandfort and Hertrampf 2011).
Periodizing history and cultivating victimhood
A visitor to the Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum in Poland who follows the official route suggested in the museum’s guidebook will end her or his tour with a visit to the permanent exhibition on the extermination of the European Roma.\(^{51}\) Established in 2001, the exhibition on the Nazi genocide of the Sinti and Roma constitutes a unique part of the museum’s multiple exhibitions. For the first time in its history, an exhibition has been dedicated to the suffering of the Roma. Since it was realized by a number of Sinti and Romani organizations,\(^{52}\) the exhibition can be considered as one of the first opportunities for Romani self-representation at such an internationally important site of memories (Peritore and Reuter 2006; van Baar 2010d).\(^{53}\) The exhibition has been made with great care and conveys the suffering of the European Roma in an impressive manner. Yet, some aspects of the exhibition invite us to rethink its representation of the Romani Holocaust. I will discuss these aspects by focusing on the exhibition’s selective use of materials and its periodization of history, and its technical design.\(^{54}\)

The content of the exhibition covers the Roma’s immediate prewar histories in individual European countries, their wartime persecution, and their deportation from various places to concentration and extermination camps. A substantial part of the exhibition is dedicated to the history of the Roma’s persecution, resistance, and extermination in Auschwitz. The exhibition is roughly divided into two parts, a design that the exhibition’s catalogue explains as follows:

The central room, which stands for the persecuted people, does not blend in well with the existing architecture and also stands in contradiction to the original room in every respect: the axes of both rooms are not identical, here pleasant, safe forms, there hard and severe forms, here warm, earthy colors, there cold blue-white, here faces of people, laughter and family life, there typewritten documents of the captors. The

\(^{51}\) This exhibition is located in one of the barracks of the former Auschwitz I extermination camp, the so-called Stammllager, that, together with the former Auschwitz II camp in Birkenau, makes up the contemporary museum. The barracks is the last one on the recommended route along the fifteen camp barracks that together make up the museum’s exhibition (Smolenski 2003: 1). Apart from the Romani exhibition and the exhibition Struggle and Martyrdom of the Jews, the museum exhibitions are organized along the lines of the nation state. Elsewhere, I have reflected on the way in which the new Romani exhibition relates to the general structure and communist and post-1947 transformations of the Auschwitz museum (van Baar 2005a; 2010d; 2010c).

\(^{52}\) The Central Council collaborated with Romani and Sinti organizations from Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Serbia, Ukraine, and the Netherlands (Rose 2003: 323).

\(^{53}\) The monument established in 1974 in the former ‘Gypsy camp’ (Zigeunerlager) in Birkenau can actually be considered as the first opportunity for Romani self-representation in the museum. This monument was an initiative of the Association of Sinti in Germany (Verband der Sinti Deutschlands), one of the forerunners of the current Central Council of German Sinti and Roma and was established at the site of the former 28th barrack in the Bille section of the former Birkenau camp (Rose 1987: 89-90). Yet, never before an entire permanent exhibition has been dedicated to the Nazi genocide of the Sinti and Roma in Europe. Currently, various national exhibitions that were renewed or established after 1989 also pay attention to the fate of their national Romani populations during the Second World War (most notably in the exhibitions of Austria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and the Netherlands).

\(^{54}\) The exhibition was designed by Wieland Schmid’s Atelier für Gestaltung in Mannheim, which also designed the exhibition on the Nazi genocide of the Sinti and Roma in the Central Council’s Documentation and Cultural Center in Heidelberg (R Rose 1999; Rose 2003).
wedge-shaped steel elements as symbols of persecution and violence dissect the central room, gliding more or less on the invisible axes of the original room and finally break it up completely (Rose 2003: 317, see also figure 8.11).

The prewar past displayed in the exhibition’s central room is almost exclusively represented by portraits and group photographs, for example, of families, school classes, sports clubs, bands, and small orchestras. Few images show working Roma, and only very few shots are from Romani villages or caravan dwellers. Since the displayed photographs are mainly snapshots of members of Romani elites on their feast days, the exhibition shows peacefully living individuals and groups all over the European countries most of the time (figures 8.12). Hence, the visitor passes by images from the prewar period in which poverty, hard times, regional differences, and national forms of marginalization and persecution (apart from those instigated by Nazism) are practically excluded.55 The lack of these national forms of prewar marginalization and persecution creates a radical contrast between the prewar and the wartime period. Moreover, the exhibition does not show how these prewar measures and their local and national backgrounds, as well as the varying wartime collaborations with Nazi Germany throughout Europe, resulted in differently articulated forms of Roma persecution.56

55 This representation of the Roma as a socially and culturally well integrated and peacefully living group is in line with the Central Council’s attempt at representing Sinti and Roma as an integral and integrated part of German or even European cultures and societies (Margalit and Matras 2007). From the interviews that I conducted with representatives of some of the Central Council’s partner Romani organizations that contributed to the exhibition, I have got the strong impression that this Roma representation is not accidental. Representatives of Romani organizations in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and the Netherlands (interview 2003; 2004b; 2004c) told me that they, on the request of the Central Council, did some research on the fate of the Roma in their countries and, as part of this activity, they also collected pictures of Roma and Sinti in the prewar period. However, when they met with the representatives of the Central Council again, the latter did not want to make use of pictures on which Roma and Sinti were not dressed well or where they clearly suffered from poverty. When, a few years later, I interviewed Romani Rose, the Central Council’s chairman, and asked him whether he could tell me something about the processes of selecting materials for the Auschwitz exhibition, he told me that there were no discussions among the collaborating Romani organizations about how the Sinti and Roma should be represented in the exhibition or about the selection of researched materials (interview 2006c).

56 Various studies have addressed the different ways in which the persecution of Romani groups was (systematically or haphazardly) articulated in countries that were occupied by the Nazis or that collaborated with them. Many of these studies clarify that we cannot assume that the practices of Roma persecution outside Nazi Germany were directly informed by the Nazi persecution practices and their definitions of the Gypsies. In many cases, diverse histories of marginalization and different local, regional, and national conceptions of the Gypsies were influential on how the Nazi occupation or collaboration with the Nazis led to forms of Roma maltreatment that partly or even substantially differed from those in Nazi Germany (for the Austrian case, see Thurner 1983; Baumgartner and Freund 2007; for the Dutch case, see Lucassen 1990; 2007; for the French case, see Hubert 1999; Peschanski 2007; for the Italian case, see Boursier 1999; for the Swiss case, see Ludi 2006; Meier 2007; for the case of the former Soviet Union including the Baltic States, see Zimmermann 1999a; 1999b; Weiss-Wendt 2003; for the case of Serbia and Croatia, see Trubeta 2003; Dulić 2006; Zimmermann 2008; for the Romanian case, see Mihok 2001; Achim 2004; 2007; for the Bulgarian case, see Marushiakova and Popov 1999; 2007; for the Czech case, see Nečas 1999b; for the Slovak case, see Hübshmanová 2005; 2006; for the Hungarian case, see Bernáth 2001; Katz 2006; 2007; Bársy and Daróczi 2008).
FIGURE 8.11 Overview of the central room of the permanent exhibition on the Nazi genocide of the Sinti and Roma in the Auschwitz Museum. Photo: Huub van Baar, 2003

FIGURE 8.12 Images of pre-wartime Roma in the former Czechoslovakia. Photo: Huub van Baar, 2003
In fact, many European countries took restrictive measures with regard to their Romani populations, in particular in the interwar period. A Czechoslovakian law from 1927, for instance, “condemned the Roma as asocial citizens, limited their personal liberty, introduced Gypsy identity cards, and decreed that Romani children under 18 be placed in special institutions” (Barany 2002: 99). A Hungarian law from 1928 “ordained semi-annual Gypsy police raids in order to weed out the criminal and parasitic elements from the Romani communities” (ibid 100). As in the Czechoslovak case, “special regulations required the fingerprinting and registration of all Roma” (ibid). From the 1920s onward, Ante Pavelić's Croatian Ustaše movement increasingly endangered the position of Roma and Jews in the former Yugoslavia. During the Second World War, the pro-Nazi Ustaše regime was responsible for the extermination of about 25,000 Roma (Acković 1995; Dulić 2006; Reinhartz 2006). Many Western European countries already took restrictive measures against Roma during the migration waves at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century (Lucassen 1990; Gotovitch 1998; Hubert 1999). The under-representation of these and other national differences and of local anti-Roma measures in the exhibition creates the impression of a homogeneous European Romani people, which began to suffer as soon as, but not earlier than, the Nazi terror penetrated the occupied countries. This impression is intensified by the wedge-shaped steel elements that spear the central room as if the aggression against the Roma came merely from the outside (figure 8.11). In this conception of victimhood, possible aggressive elements against the Roma are excluded from the non-German national territory and history, and projected abroad. The good and peaceful nations on the one hand, and the evil and foreign aggressor on the other are largely polarized. A moral logic that mobilizes a good vs. evil binary appears.

The chances and limits of relational strategies of representation
What do such a moral logic and periodization make possible? Disappointed by the scarce attention paid to the Roma in the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, Hancock once expressed the hope that the Roma “will eventually be moved out of the category of ‘other victims’ and fully recognized as the only population, together with the Jews, that was slated for eradication from the face of the earth” (1996: 59). The Romani exhibition in the Auschwitz museum seems to contribute to getting the Roma out of this category. Moreover, the moral logic that results from the specific periodization and victimization seems to make it possible to linking the past atrocities with contemporary violations of human rights regarding the Roma. Hancock has been one of the Roma who has strongly suggested such as link. Referring to anti-Roma violence that emerged in the early 1990s, he remarked:

Today, the Romani population faces its severest crisis since the Holocaust; neo-Nazi race crimes against Gypsies have seen rapes, beatings, and murders in Germany, Hungary, and Slovakia; anti-Gypsy pogroms in Romania and Bulgaria, including lynchings and home burnings, are increasing. For my people, the Holocaust is not yet over. (Hancock 1996: 55)

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57 This museum was opened in 1993 (Linenthal 1995).
By making a direct link with the Holocaust and by using words such as ‘pogroms,’ Hancock also mobilizes the good vs. evil logic which is often central to globalizing Holocaust discourses and to using the Holocaust as “a universal trope for historical trauma” (Huyssen 2000: 23). Daniel Levy and Nathan Sznaider suggest that, now that Holocaust discourses have been globalized, victim and activist strategies are often bringing victimhood and morality strategically together:

[In contemporary Holocaust references] the oppressed have to be ‘guiltless,’ and those who violate human rights, have to be ‘evil.’ Nazis and Jews form the constituents of this new global religion. Consequently, those who claim that their human rights are violated, have to relate their suffering to the one of the Jews, and have to bring the perpetrators symbolically at the level of the Nazis ... The Holocaust has become a universal ‘container’ of memories of indistinguishable victims. It has resulted in ‘the globalization of evil.’ (Levy and Sznaider 2001: 222-23, my translation)

In the Central Council’s approach to memory, the Sinti and Romani communities and their histories are strategically represented as strongly related to the Jewish communities and their Holocaust histories (van Baar 2010d). Since the early 1980s, relational strategies of Roma representation—in relation to the Jewish situation as well as to other Germans—have been integral to the Central Council’s identity politics. Its chairman Romani Rose usually presents the Sinti as important carriers of the German cultural heritage:

Sinti are among the foremost people to ensure that old cultural possessions (Kulturgut) would remain preserved. They went to the villages and bought or secured their antique things, things that other people would just have tossed into the garbage ... Some German citizens who today possess a Baroque chest of drawers do not know that they owe it to the Sinti. (Rose 1982: 89, English translation cited Margalit and Matras 2007: 113)

During the recognition struggle of the early 1980s, the Central Council used large banners with the heading “Sinti and Roma – For 600 years in Germany!” (Sinti und Roma – Seit 600 Jahren in Deutschland!) to stress the Roma’s and Sinti’s belonging to German society and culture (Rose 1987: 108, 110, 172). Similarly, one of the Central Council’s publications on the Nazi genocide states:

Sinti and Roma have been living as citizens of German-speaking countries, as in other parts of Europe, for more than 600 years. Contrary to the propagandistic clichés of the Nazis, Sinti and Roma were, until the ‘seizure of power,’ integrated as German citizens to the same extent as the Jews. They lived in their hometowns as workers, clerks, civil servants, craftsmen, artists, or shopkeepers, in many cases for generations. Many of them had fought for Germany in the First World War as convinced patriots and, like the German Jews, been highly decorated. The discrimination and deprivation of rights began with Nazi rule put an end to the previously unremarked existence of Sinti and Roma as German citizens. (Rose 1995: 9, my italics)
The strategy of representing Romani histories and their memories relationally is also a central element of how the Auschwitz exhibition has been designed. When a visitor enters the former camp barrack and goes through the corridor that leads to the exhibition, for instance, the very first panel she sees displays a statement of the former Federal President of Germany, Roman Herzog:

The genocide of the Sinti and Roma was carried out from the same motive of racial mania, with the same premeditation, with the same wish for the systematic and total extermination as the genocide of the Jews. Complete families from the very young to the very old were systematically murdered within the entire sphere of influence of the National Socialists. (Roman Herzog cited Rose 2003: 4, my italics) 58

The exclusion of prewar photos displaying poverty (see note 55) or other forms of marginalization from the exhibition could also be interpreted along the lines of this relational strategy of representation. As I have suggested, such a strategy can help to gain both official and public recognition:

[R]elational strategies of representation can ... open the way for marginalized communities to engage in collective articulations and assertions of identity across space and time ... Such collective articulations may be more readily intelligible, carry more weight, and thus be more effective in furthering the aim of representation, namely to gain recognition for one’s community and history. (Hoffmann and Peeren 2010: 19)

Throughout the years, the Central Council has made an enormous effort to develop a narrative of Sinti and Romani minority belonging and socio-cultural membership, thereby making strategic use of writing Romani histories relationally. On the one hand, the Central Council has mobilized a justifiable singularization of the Sinti’s and Roma’s genocidal persecution as a unique historical event. On the other hand, however, the way in which the Central Council, in the Auschwitz exhibition, periodizes modern history and mobilizes a good vs. evil moral logic to sustain its pedagogical aim of corroborating Sinti and Romani minority belonging ultimately seems to play tricks on the Roma’s and Sinti’s case. This representation and moral logic risk eliding significant differences between the Romani and the Jewish cases and, thus, leading to a non-articulation of the specificity of the Nazi genocide of the Sinti and Roma, including, most notably, its prewar and postwar histories. These differences are related to the significantly different prewar and wartime trajectories that led to these genocidal events and to their crucially different postwar settlements (Zimmermann 2006; 2007b; Stewart 2010). It is here, in the context of the postwar politics of denial typical of not only Germany’s postwar history vis-à-vis the Sinti and Roma, but also of European postwar histories more generally,

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58 This statement made by Herzog during the opening of the exhibition on the Nazi genocide of the Sinti and Roma in the Central Council’s documentation and cultural center in Heidelberg in 1997 has become a central tool in the Council’s memory politics. The Council also wanted to inscribe this statement in the Memorial to the Murdered Sinti and Roma of Europe in the center of Berlin, a proposal that became part of the dispute about this Memorial’s establishment (Zimmermann 2007a).
where I want to relate to the governmentality of Holocaust remembrance in Europe again.

I have shown how the EU narrative of active European remembrance takes the breaches of fundamental values caused by Nazism and Stalinism as its starting points. The narrative also suggests that the EU itself is built on fundamental values, such as freedom, democracy, and respect for human rights. Governmentalizing Holocaust remembrance and considering the Holocaust as central to a unifying European memory are “part of the increasing efforts to create a new overarching and significant founding myth, which can fill the gap of political identity in the process of European integration and constitution building” (Probst 2003: 56). Yet, the way in which “this founding [myth] is connected with pedagogy and political functionalization makes the whole venture problematic” (Jeismann 2001, English translation cited Probst 2003: 56). But what exactly is the problematic character of this venture? Lothar Probst gives the following answer:

To enforce and to legitimize political action with reference to a historical event that for political reasons has been given suprahistorical meaning, seems to be problematic because it heavily burdens the political space in moral terms. The subordination of politics to such moral judgment could, at very least, give rise to a questionable political instrumentalization … The fact that the Holocaust happened gives evidence to the fact that in politics we are never acting on stable grounds and that democracy and the values of human civilization are always threatened by unforeseeable historical developments. To the contrary, totalitarianism is to a certain extent inherent in the structures of modernity, and each attempt to ban the totalitarian temptation by moral imperatives or verdicts will probably fail. (Probst 2003: 56, 57)

I agree with Probst, but, at the same time, consider his answer somewhat general and less specific when it comes to clarifying where exactly we can observe the risks to which he is pointing. According to me, the main issue is that the EU discourse on Holocaust remembrance claims that the EU guarantees inclusion and membership for all its citizens, no matter what their background is. Seen from this angle, the EU as the alleged protector of fundamental values and rights indeed guarantees the inclusion of its Romani minorities. But this EU narrative seems to be much less able to reflect on whether some of its own governance mechanisms could directly or indirectly endanger the forms of membership it promises to guarantee. Though the EU discourse on European remembrance includes reflection on the causes and consequences of Nazism, this narrative does not adequately include the possibility that the EU as a community of fundamental values still needs to come to terms with a past that endangers its foundation. An adequate reflection on how this past still affects the EU’s present functioning, however, is particularly important when Holocaust remembrance starts to be mobilized for political reason of participation, inclusion, competitiveness, and greater cohesion and unity within and throughout the EU. This issue is all the more urgent now that Romani minorities throughout Europe are generally approached in terms of activation, social inclusion, and active citizenship without sufficiently reflecting on the historical conditions under which their marginalization could have occurred at all (chapters 6, 7). In its turn, the Central Council’s memory politics and relational strategy of representation
seem to be able to comply with the EU’s all-inclusive narrative of active European citizenship and its desire to encourage its citizens to become actively involved in cross-European remembrance. Yet, the Central Council’s memorial strategy seems to be much less able to reflect on the memory deficit of the EU’s own active European remembrance discourse and its consequences for how Romani memorial contexts can be taken into account. In order to present a possible way in which reflection on this new, transformed European memory problem could take place, I will finally discuss the memorial strategy of the filmmakers Seybold and Spitta.

IN LIEU OF A CONCLUSION: THE LIMITS OF THE POLITICS OF RE-MEMBERING

For my people, the Holocaust is not yet over. (Ian Hancock 1996: 55)
That’s a ridiculous remark. (Romani Rose during an interview [2006c])

In the 1980s, the German filmmaker Katrin Seybold and her Sinti colleague Melanie Spitta (1946-2005) made four documentaries. They focused on how the denial of the Romani Holocaust had dramatically and up till then affected the lives of German Sinti and Romani communities and their position in German society (Spitta and Seybold 1980; 1981; 1982; 1987). In the 1980s, some of these documentaries were broadcasted on German public television. Though Spitta and Seybold’s joint works belong to the intellectual and cinematic archives that are related to the struggles of the 1980s, their documentaries do not belong to a distant past. Their works can be regarded audiovisual sites of Romani memory, included in the diverse and heterogeneous contemporary memoryscapes related to the Romani Holocaust. For instance, their documentaries have been included in the archives of several important Holocaust memorials. Their works have also been screened at important international film festivals and discussed at academic conferences.59

Spitta and Seybold’s works contest the idea that there were strict, unambiguous borders between the Roma representations of the wartime and the postwar period. The central aim of their joint work bear strong resemblance to that of the Central Council, for instance, to get the Romani Holocaust recognized more adequately and to get more publicity for how it has strongly affected postwar Sinti and Romani lives. Nevertheless, Spitta and Seybold’s central strategy differs in an important way from that of the Central Council. I will illustrate this difference by a brief discussion of their most powerful film “The Lie: ‘Compensation’ for Gypsies (Sinti) in Germany?” (Das falsche Wort: Die ‘Wieder-gutmachung’ an Zigeunern (Sinte) in Deutschland?).

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59 Their documentaries are archived, for instance, in the Auschwitz Museum, the Yad Vashem Memorial in Jerusalem, the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, and in a number of important German memorials (eg, KZ Dachau, KZ Ravensbrück, KZ Bergen-Belsen, KZ Neuengamme, the Wannsee Conference House, and the Topography of Terror in Berlin). Their works have been shown at various festivals, such as the international film festivals in Rotterdam (2004) and London (2006). They have been discussed at scholarly conferences, such as Representation and Effect: the Roma in Politics, the Art and the Academy, held at the University of St. Andrews in Scotland in 2007.
Das falsche Wort was released in 1987, shortly after the Central Council had reached its main milestones. Largely due to the Council’s efforts, the federal authorities had officially recognized the Roma and Sinti as victims of the Nazi genocide, the word Zigeuner (Gypsy) had been banned from most German media, and, since 1983, the German government had financially supported their association in Heidelberg. Yet, while, since the mid 1980s, the Central Council began to build on its achievements and to strengthen its relational memorial strategy of representation, Spitta and Seybold made a kind of opposite move. In Das falsche Wort they give an extremely sinister image of the postwar realities of the German Sinti that survived the war. Their documentary builds on many of the elements that I have brought up while discussing the first four postwar decades. Their film shows that none of the researchers, who were involved in the Racial Hygiene and Demographic Biology Research Unit of the Nazi Ministry of Health—the institute that was largely responsible for marking the ‘unfitness’ of many Roma and Sinti and the decision to deport them—were ever persecuted for their crimes. As I have mentioned, after 1945 these researchers were even contracted by juridical and governmental teams to ‘scientifically’ decide upon whether the surviving Romani victims—many of whom had been forcibly sterilized—could be restituted. In a powerful visual language, Das falsche Wort shows that those, who had decided upon the destruction of many Romani lives during the war, continued to decide upon the direction of most of the survivors’ lives after 1945.

Das falsche Wort brings together various narratives, such as the life stories that German Sinti women and men tell about their persecution and the lack of postwar reparations to them, and the visual language of numerous filmed Nazi documents and portraits of Sinti and their families. These different narratives are cinematically woven together by Spitta’s own personal story and her search for what had exactly happened to the 60 members of her own family, of whom her mother was one of the few survivors. One of the main political issues that the film tries to address is to clarify why Wiedergutmachung is the false word and why it wrongly suggests that Roma/non-Roma relationships have been substantially normalized by the postwar reparation politics. In the documentary, Spitta’s story often functions as a voiceover and has a moral undertone. She mobilizes an us-and-them narrative to underline the blatant inconsistencies of the politics of Wiedergutmachung—literally “making good again”—aimed at coming to terms with Germany’s Nazi past. She explicitly uses the word Gypsies (Zigeuner) when she makes a distinction between “we Gypsies” (wir Zigeuner) and “you Germans” (ihr Deutsche). This narrative strategically connects Spitta’s and other Sinti family life stories to the unwillingness of ordinary Germans to really recognize the wrong done to the Sinti and Roma and the crucial role of the collaborators and perpetrators who could hide themselves behind the postwar politics of compensation. Somewhere in the documentary, Spitta says:

To save her life, my mother and her family fled to Belgium. Vain hope, because only few have survived Auschwitz. My brother and all of our family’s children were brutally murdered. You Germans had the courage to do so. But most of you did not have the heart to ask how these murders could take place and why they were allowed … Whereas, in your case, so many wearers of swastika’s [Hakenkreuzer] have been left over who knew how to obstruct war reparation to us, our struggle has been in vain …
You have beheaded us and speak of ‘compensation.’ ‘Compensation’ is the false word, because you have forgotten your feeling of regret and sin. (Das falsche Wort cited Seybold 2005: 200-01, my translation)

Central part of this strategy is to emphasize, as Spitta also says in the film, that “they believed them, not us” or, put differently, that those governmental and judicial officials who had to decide on the war reparations relied on the statements and findings of the non-persecuted perpetrators, rather than on the testimonies of the victims and on the Nazi documents that could have clearly pleaded against the perpetrators.60

The difference between Spitta and Seybold’s memorial strategy and the Central Council’s has to do with how both parties approach the issue of compensation and, most of all, ‘coming to terms with the past.’ To be sure, Das falsche Wort does not suggest that financial compensation for what happened to the Sinti and Roma during the Second World War would or did not imply a welcome necessary and gesture. But Seybold and Spitta’s approach does not in the first place deal with the achieved compensation and official recognition. Rather, they address the politics of German war reparation and how it radically hampered both moral compensation and the persecution of the perpetrators. Das falsche Wort deals with the moral question of whether and how something like ‘coming to terms’ with the Nazi genocide of Sinti and Roma is possible at all. The timing of Das falsche Wort was crucial: it was released a few years after the official recognition of the Nazi genocide of the Sinti and Roma. Spitta and Seybold challenge the politics of compensation at the same time as was suggested that Wiedergutmachung had taken place. Das falsche Wort contests ‘coming to terms with the past’ at the moment this political gesture becomes part of a narrative in which notions such as recognition, equality, and citizenship are turned into a kind of pedagogy. Seybold and Spitta contest the self-image of Germany that had long prevailed in the postwar era, and, when it comes to the situation of Sinti and Roma, still prevails in many ways. Their joint work reflects on the post-1945 acceptance and recognition of Sinti and Roma as equal citizens and challenges the promises of the enacted policy of reparation. Contesting the politics of Wiedergut-

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60 The Central Council’s chairman Rose strongly protested against Seybold and Spitta’s Das falsche Wort. He considered the release of their work as a concrete danger to many of the Central Council’s achievements. In his protests against the screening of Das falsche Wort on German public television in the spring of 1989, Rose took Seybold and Spitta’s film at face value. In a telexed letter to the responsible program director, he brings up several arguments against the broadcasting (Rose 1989b). He considers Das falsche Wort a historically inadequate representation for the documentary would incorrectly suggest, for instance, that the genocide of the Sinti and Roma was not planned at the level of the Nazi government and the SS direction, but only at the level of local police authorities. Seybold and Spitta would also incorrectly suggest that Sinti and Roma had lived a nomadic life before the war and that ‘only’ the Nazis had forced them to settle. More generally, Rose accuses Seybold and Spitta of under-representing the concept of genocide (Völkermord) in their work and neglecting the parallel with the fate of the Jews. However, Rose objects most severely to the use of the us-and-them narrative, which would create the counterproductive image of a German collective guilt (unsinnige Kollektivschuld), and the portrayal of compensation for the Sinti without any kind of future perspective (Perspektivlosigkeit bezüglich der Entschädigung). Rose also suggested that the screening would hamper some of the Central Council’s planned activities for the spring of 1989. In the end, this argument turned out to be the only one that the ZDF program director took seriously. The ZDF broadcasted Seybold and Spitta’s documentary, but postponed the broadcast until after these Central Council’s activities (Hauschild 1989; Seybold 1989).
machtung, Spitta and Seybold show that the attempts at compensation have not at all been based on considering the Sinti and Roma as equal members of the German state and society. Das falsche Wort clarifies why compensation will never be possible for some Sinti and Roma and why it had never really taken place for others. “We are finished with the world” (Wir sind fertig mit der Welt) says one of the Sinti survivors in the documentary. She expresses why compensation has been the false word. The radical denial of the Romani Holocaust and the anti-Romani attitudes that motivated this neglect have resulted in a feeling, shared by many Sinti victims, that Wiedergutmachung has come “too late for all of them” (Ein für allemal zu spät)(FAZ 1989). Das falsche Wort powerfully illustrates that it did not in the first place come too late because many of those who had the right to get compensated had already died or were in the last phase of their lives. Rather, it has come too late, Spitta and Seybold show, because it has been based neither on equality nor has it led to treating Sinti and Roma on equal grounds. The contestation of the politics of Wiedergutmachung has revealed its failure to really remember the Sinti and Roma in the double meaning of both coming to terms with the Nazi past and guaranteeing societal participation on equal grounds.

How could Das falsche Wort be related to the governmentalization of Holocaust remembrance in the EU narrative? Transposed to the European level, the impact of this documentary reveals the contours of the current European memory problem. Das falsche Wort confronts us with the consequences of turning the remembrance of a past that still radically intersects with the present and current forms of minority governance too easily into pedagogical discourses and the justification of determining political action. As I have emphasized, the narrative in which the EU presents itself as the protector of fundamental values seems to be much less able to reflect on whether some of its own governance mechanisms could endanger the forms of membership it promises to guarantee. Throughout this study, I have shown how European governmentalities and the possibly negative way in which they impact on the lives of Romani minorities are largely dependent on how governmental rationalities and technologies are articulated on the ground. I have shown that the ambiguities that go hand in hand with these articulations cannot be understood as discrepancies between ‘sound’ policies or discourses developed at the European level and ‘bad’ or ‘inadequate’ implementations at the local level. Rather, I have argued that it is the complex dynamic between them, between disparate elements to be assembled, and between this interplay and legacies of the past that, often unforeseen, results in ambiguous settlements. If contemporary political action and active European remembrance policies are to be based on developing structures of temporality in which Nazism and Stalinism are represented as the negative founding myth of Europe and the EU as the protector of the values that totalitarian regimes violate, the EU risks to overlook the exclusion mechanisms inherent to its own daily functioning. The structures of temporality that the EU’s active European remembrance narrative tends to create could nominally be focused on the inclusion of minorities such as the Romani. Yet, these structures tend to assume a post-totalitarian, European time, refrained from illiberal forms of governance. Replacing structures of temporality based on narratives of people with or without history by structures of temporality that rely on reordering time itself through periodizing Europe’s history in a before and after the emergence of the EU risks
to forget how EU political time is saturated by its own moments of denial and illiberal rule.

Spitta and Seybold’s *Das falsche Wort* illustrates that, in order to keep memory alive, we need to include in our memorial acts a reflection on how the denial, neglect, and forgetting of some pasts tend to continue to ambiguously affect present political action. The main issue is that the EU discourse on Holocaust remembrance claims that the EU guarantees inclusion and membership for all its citizens, no matter what their background is. Seen from this angle, the EU as the alleged protector of fundamental values and rights indeed guarantees the inclusion of its Romani minorities. But this EU narrative seems to be much less able to reflect on whether some of its own governance mechanisms could directly or indirectly endanger the forms of membership it promises to guarantee. Though the EU discourse on European remembrance includes reflection on the causes and consequences of Nazism, this narrative does not adequately include the possibility that the EU as a community of fundamental values still needs to come to terms with a past that endangers its foundation. An adequate reflection on how this past still affects the EU’s present functioning, however, is particularly important when Holocaust remembrance starts to be mobilized for political reason of participation, inclusion, competitiveness, and greater cohesion and unity within and throughout the EU. This issue is all the more urgent now that Romani minorities throughout Europe are generally approached in terms of activation, social inclusion, and active citizenship without sufficiently reflecting on the historical conditions under which their marginalization could have occurred at all.
A CRISIS OF GOVERNING

Since the fall of Wall Street and the burst of the credit bubble in 2008, increasingly more scholars have suggested that “the current crisis threatens, perhaps fatally, to undermine the political legitimacy of neo-liberalism” (Peck et al 2009: 95). The fall of Wall Street has inspired some to mobilize ‘the falling wall’ metaphor to announce an epochal change. Austria’s former Federal Chancellor, for instance, claimed that “the fall of Wall Street is to neo-liberalism what the fall of the Berlin Wall was to communism” (Alfred Gusenbauer cited Peck et al 2009: 99). Now that we are witnessing the failure of entire economies, such as those of Iceland and Greece, but also of cities such as Detroit in the United States and Wuppertal in Germany, some have started to reflect on what they call ‘post-neoliberalism’ and on how we need to interpret it.1 Do these developments imply that a new kind of governmentality is starting to manifest itself? And does this go together with new forms of problematizing the Roma? The financial crisis has gone hand in hand with much turmoil and economic reform and, in the case of Europe’s Roma, with the alarming reemergence of violence against them. As several authors have remarked though, these manifestations of anti-Roma violence are neither new nor primarily caused by the financial crisis.2

In this afterthought, I will reflect on governing at the time of crisis and reemerged violence against the Roma in Europe. I will develop a future research agenda and build on some of my findings to map out this agenda. I will concentrate on two interrelated research foci that I have already developed in the context of this study, but that need further exploration to understand the current situation of the Roma in Europe: firstly, analyses of the nexus of security and development, and, secondly, further inquiries into the politics of citizenship as participation. I will suggest that the current crisis and the accompanying anti-Roma violence can be related to a crisis of neo-liberal governing in Europe and, at a more fundamental level, to a crisis of governmentality. Thus, to a considerable extent, we deal with a crisis of governing, rather than with an inadequate

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1 See, for instance, Brand and Sekler (2009), Macdonald and Ruckert (2009), and Peck et al (2009).
2 See, for instance, Albert (2009), Mirga (2009), Rorke (2009), and Sigona and Trehan (2009b).
governing of the crisis. However, I do not consider this crisis of governing as the symptom or announcement of the end of neo-liberal governmentality per se.

In this study, I have discussed a notion of neo-liberalism that clarifies why it does not make sense to speak of a post-neoliberal order if by that is meant the end or serious breakdown of neo-liberal modes of governmentality. Just like in the case of forms of governmentality that emerged in a more distant past—such as pastoral, police, or liberal ones—neo-liberal governmentality will also continue to play a role in future contexts of state, European, and global governance (chapters 1, 2, 5). Neo-liberalism, understood as a form of governmentality, refers to particular, highly mobile and flexible technologies of governing that travel and are articulated and assembled with other forms of governing and with ‘local’ cultures, politics, and circumstances. These and similar techniques will remain in place, though the ways in which they will be articulated and assembled will change. Undoubtedly, new neo-liberal governmental technologies will also be invented or, still better, are already in the making. For these reasons, some refer to the currently emerging ‘version’ of neo-liberalism as “neo-liberalism 3.0” (Hendrikse and Sidaway 2010), while others suggest that, though neo-liberalism as intellectual project would be dead, we are now entering its “zombie stage” (Peck 2010). Dead or alive and kicking, face-lifted or haunting, to speak of neo-liberalism ‘in crisis’ does not really make sense, for it implicitly adopts a rather static, unified concept of neo-liberalism and cannot sufficiently address its ability to flexibly adapt to moments of crisis. At the same time, such moments of crisis “reveal a great deal about the nature of neo-liberalization as an adaptive regime of socioeconomic governance” (Peck et al 2009: 95). Rather than interpreting the current crisis as simply grim, depressive, and negative, I think, we need to look for its ambivalences and the ways in which it reveals conflicts and tensions within current power relations and the governance tissue with which they are connected.

In his reflection on the emergence of neo-liberalism, Foucault discusses it in the context of a series of crises of governmentality that implied both the renewal of more classically liberal and the appearance of neo-liberal forms of governmentality (2008a: 68-70). Crisis, as a “phenomenon of sudden, circular bolting” (Foucault 2007b: 61) of social processes can be understood as co-constitutive with processes of neo-liberalization and their renewal. Since it first theoretical manifestation in the 1930s and particularly since its clear empirical manifestation in the 1970s, neo-liberal governmental rationales and techniques have significantly renewed themselves at the time of crises (Foucault 2008a; Peck 2008). The structural adjustments of state economies in the global south were introduced not only at a time of the crisis of the 1970s, these neo-liberal adjustments themselves had to be renewed, reshaped, and replaced by other neo-liberal techniques when they turned out to be ineffective or counterproductive in the 1980s in a next crisis of governing. Social capital and other formulae that capitalized on ‘the social’ entered the scene (chapter 5, Fine 2001; Harriss 2002).

Human and social capital formation, activation schemes, participation-based or community-based development: these techniques and their variants have all traveled to and through Europe and cross-fertilized, in various different constellations, with programs meant to improve the situation of the Roma. A mixture of decentralization measures and strategies to make the Roma (partly) responsible for solving their own problems has resulted in an ambivalent situation. IGOs often pass the responsibility for improving the
situation of the Roma on to national governments and NGOs. In their turn, national authorities devolve these responsibilities onto ‘lower’ local governments, NGOs, and Romani ‘communities’ (chapters 6, 7). The current crisis will probably not bring an end to these measures and strategies and will almost certainly lead to an intensification of the ongoing trend to make the Roma responsible for solving their own issues without substantially improving the conditions under which they could do so. New neo-liberal techniques of governing, developed elsewhere or in other contexts, will probably also travel to or emerge in Central and Eastern Europe in an attempt to invent something new.3

However, I have clarified that de-politicizing moves have taken place alongside opportunities to renegotiate participation and to politicize issues of poverty, inequality, and memory (chapters 7, 8). Even or, still better, in particular in this time of crisis, I propose, we need to search for new ways to open up debates about the political contexts in which violence against the Roma takes place. To delineate the announced future research agenda, I start with a brief discussion of various recent developments at the margins of Europe; developments that are increasingly less marginal phenomena.

**BETWEEN STARVATION AND DEADLY VIOLENCE**

During several of the research trips I made through Central and Eastern Europe, I was confronted with the extreme poverty of many members of Europe’s Romani minorities, but also impressed by their hospitality and inventiveness. In 2005, I visited a number of urban ghettos in the Serbian cities Novi Sad and Belgrade. One of these ghettos, inhabited by hundreds of Roma, was located under the bridge that connects Old with New Belgrade through the E70 highway from Zagreb to Sofia. In the EU narrative of trans-European corridors of mobility, the bridge and the highway are part of Corridor X. This corridor connects Salzburg with Thessaloniki through what, in the former Yugoslavia, was known as Tito’s “Highway of Brotherhood and Unity” (Verstraete 2009: 165). What happened under the bridge was only ambiguously linked with brotherhood, unity, the EU’s rhetoric of free movement, and the idea behind the corridors to improve mobility, connectivity, accessibility, and integration across Europe. During my visit, bulldozers were imperturbably smoothing the ground very close to the hundreds of little shacks that the Roma had built there. “To repair the bridge,” city officials told the Roma. “To prepare our eviction,” the Roma told me. “Some say that they want to put some of us in container houses, somewhere out of town. But there won’t be place for all of us, that’s for sure” (interview 2005). Rivalry and mutual fear between primarily two groups who inhabited the ghetto—marginalized Roma from the Belgrade region and Romani IDPs from Kosovo—resulted in a tense atmosphere. The Roma from the Belgrade region

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3 I do not preclude, for instance, that tourism will be mobilized as a means of poverty alleviation. For some time this has already be done in African countries with the support of the United Nations World Tourism Organization (UNWTO). In actual fact and to the indignation of some NGOs, a Slovak major has recently put forward that he plans to turn poor Romani ‘settlements’ in the Slovak Tatra region into tourist destinations. He wants “to get people to realize what kinds of conditions Romani people live in here. On the other hand, it could motivate the Romani people to improve their living conditions on their own” (cited Romea 2011).
feared that, due to international attention paid to Kosovo, only the situation of the IDPs would be taken into account. In their turn, these IDPs were afraid that the Belgrade Roma, due to their inclusion in the city registration, would be helped first with alternative housing. To avoid that their children would constantly starve, a number of Roma had established a kind of mobile recycling industry, one of the ‘specialties’ of marginalized, yet inventive Roma in Belgrade (Mitić 2003). During my visit, Roma on improvised and self-made bikes and little cars came and went with empty bottles, waste paper, and other recyclable materials. I was invited in one of the shacks under the bridge to drink coffee and discuss their situation. Some showed me their ID cards to substantiate that they were originally coming from Kosovo. These Romani stories could have easily been added to Angela Melitopoulos’ (2005) fascinating road movie Corridor X. In her video installation, she travels the corridor, all the way from Germany to Turkey, and meets with numerous people who tell stories about past and current life, death, change, humor, day-to-day worries, and suffering along the route. Imaginatively, Melitopoulos confronts “the EU’s capitalist multimodal network of integrated roads, rails, waterways, energy and communication lines in the south-east of Europe with an uncertain topology of multiple lines of vision and narration that greatly complicates what it means to be ‘mobile’ in the region” (Verstraete 2009: 165). The Roma from Belgrade could have added the stories of their mobilities and how they were made immobile or forced to move.

The Roma under the bridge were still waiting for the arrival of a program that would change their situation: education for their children, food supply, repatriation to Kosovo, a housing project, or yet something else. Nothing, no program or project, was organized for them. There were only speculations about their future resettlement. The Roma were making calculations of how they would deal with it. Just in case. Not only in the global south, but also in Europe, “the deployment of bio-political programs to secure life is uneven” (Li 2009: 79). The Roma under the bridge were speculating about the announced ‘resettlement’ and how they were going to deal with it if their current living place would be made ready to support the kind of mobility of which the upper part of the bridge and the highway were the obvious expressions. They knew that they were living on economically profitable ground. They only had to look around. They formed the margins that radically traversed Belgrade’s newly emerging business center. On the horizon of their ghetto, hotels and expensive apartments had been built for tourists, business people, and Belgrade’s nouveau rich. New formal and informal economic networks have been developed between and among both contested strata of this city world and beyond. The Romani IDPs from Kosovo, of whom tens of thousands live in segregated, often largely neglected areas in Serbia, are the reminders of the last violent conflict that divided the European continent. In the meantime, reports and statistics of the EU, the World Bank, and the UNDP tell us that the Roma are the poorest people of Europe. Large parts of the Romanian and Bulgarian Romani populations are constantly starving and in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, and Serbia more than 80 per cent of the Roma are living below the nationally defined poverty threshold. Infant mortality among the Roma is much higher than the European average, while their life expectancy is much lower (UNDP 2002; 2006; World Bank 2005b; FRA 2009). To address these issues, since the mid 1990s, and since the turn of the millennium in particular, we have witnessed the
rapid increase of the development programs and interventions that I have tried to put into perspective in this study.

Yet, some fractions of European societies have come up with other, macabre solutions to deal with the Roma. Elsewhere in Belgrade, on the city’s central old town square Trg Studentski, I saw the graffiti Smrt ciganima!—“Dead to the Gypsies!” The graffiti reminded me of the anti-Roma violence of the 1990s. Throughout Central and Eastern Europe, we could find graffiti to that effect, such as Stop černým tyrantím—“Stop the black tyranny”—and Cikáni Raus!—“Gypsies out!” Violence against the Roma did not remain limited to verbal manifestations. A notorious case was the attack on Roma in Hädäreni in Romania. In 1993, villagers of Hädäreni, assisted by some police officers, took revenge on the local Romani community after a violent conflict between the local Roma and non-Roma. Three Romani men were killed, about twenty houses destroyed by fire and demolition, the inhabitants chased away, and their properties stolen (AI 1995; ERRC 1996b; 2001b). Throughout the region, the Roma were attacked. Often, they were injured or even killed. Frequently, the police were ambivalently involved. And, if taken at all, the road to justice was long or frustrated (ERRC 2001a; 2010a). Extreme violence did not remain limited to Central and Eastern Europe. Another notorious attack took place in Oberwart in Austria in 1995. When four Romani men found a sign with the inscription Roma zurück nach Indien (“Roma back to India”) on the way leading up to their houses and tried to remove it, it exploded. All of them died on the spot (ERRC 1996a).

At about the same time of these Oberwart killings, Tony Judt reflected on the rise of Jörg Haider’s Freedom Party (FPÖ) in Austria. Judt protested against interpreting its emergence as a renascent fascist or para-Nazist phenomenon and, thus, as “an echo of the ghosts of Europe’s past.” Instead, he regarded these movements as “the ghosts of Europes yet to come” (Judt 1996 cited Rorke 2009: 14). The graffiti Smrt ciganima! that I saw in Belgrade was a reminder of the violence against the Roma of the 1990s, as much as it was a manifestation of what was already going on and would get a new shape since then—largely mixed up with the Europe-wide populist and extreme-right movements that Judt announced. Since about 2004, we have seen the reemergence of violence against Romani minorities throughout Europe. Like in the 1990s, Roma and their houses have been attacked by incendiary bombs. Since 2008, for instance, Roma have been attacked more than 25 times in Hungary. During these attacks nine Roma were killed. In 2007, the Oberwart formula was imitated in the Czech Republic. A Romani man tried to remove a sign that called his house that of a thief. He lost both arms and legs (Albert 2009). Unlike in the 1990s, the Roma have now become victims of heavy weapons, such as grenades. War and terrorism rhetoric, and more than just rhetoric, have entered the scene. In 2004, for the first time since the fall of communism, the Slovak government mobilized its army. “Gypsy unrest” had to be combated (chapter 6, van Baar 2012a). In 2008, Tetőrekész—the newsletter of the trade union of Hungarian police officers, edited by a prominent politician of the far-right political party Jobbik—described Hungary as a “crumbling country, torn apart by Hungarian-Gypsy civil war” (cited Rorke 2009: 11). In Italy and

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4 These are two examples of Czech graffiti of the 1990s, archived by the Museum of Romani Culture in Brno (Raichová 2001: 263).
Lithuania, terrorism has become one of the frames to deal with the Roma and to legitimize special interventions (ERRC et al 2008; Kavaliauskaitė 2008). In 2007, the authorities of several big Italian cities signed so-called ‘security pacts’ in order to deal with what has been referred to as the ‘nomad’ or Roma ‘public emergency.’ According to these pacts, the mere presence of Roma in Italian public space is considered a security risk and allows authorities to take special measures against them, including eviction and their and their children’s ethnic profiling through fingerprinting (Picker 2010). The French government also considers the Roma as a threat to public or social security. This has particularly become clear during controversies over the expulsions of Romanian and Bulgarian Romani migrants from France in the summer of 2010. A member of Sarkozy’s ruling party the UMP, for instance, stated that the key issue of the current “European Roma problem” is the way in which the Roma interpret and practice the right to travel freely in the EU. He said that their “excessive mobility” and “related medieval lifestyle” cause serious security problems and, he suggested, should lead us to reconsider the EU free movement directive (Jacques Myard, interviewed by Kahn 2010). Like in the 1990s, the Roma have become targets of mob violence, most prominently in Italy where so-called campi nomadi have been destroyed several times. When a group of youngest tried to attack and burn down such a camp in Naples in 2005, they stated that this was just “weekend mayhem” (ERRC et al 2008: 20). More recently, Umberto Bossi, the leader of the far-right Italian political party Lega Nord (Northern League), claimed that assaulting campi nomadi is well comprehensible, saying, with approval: “People are going to do what the political class cannot” (cited Rorke and Nicolae 2009). In the meantime, the Serbian graffiti “Death to the Gypsies” has also become, but now in Italian, the name of a group active at Italy’s social network Facebook (Scicluna 2008).

In a reflection on the difference between now and then, the Romani intellectual Andrzej Mirga, who has become senior policy advisor on Sinti and Romani issues at the OSCE, remarks that, whereas, “in the early 1990s, there was mainly impromptu community violence against Roma and Sinti in Europe … what we are witnessing today is the deliberate and organized use of hate speech and incitement of violence” (2009: 6). Social media, political parties — Ataka in Bulgaria, Delnička strana in the Czech Republic, Jobbik in Hungary, Lega Nord in Italy, etc. — and extra-parliamentary splinter groups have gone to play a vital role in organized violence against the Roma. One of the most recent phenomena, which started in Hungary and the Czech Republic around 2007, is the organization of provocative marches of extreme-right parties and related ‘patrol’ or ‘security’ groups through neighborhoods where many Roma live. According to Jobbik’s 2010 electoral platform, the party “will establish a Gendarmerie: along the lines of both our own appropriate historical traditions, and the functional example of comparable organizations operating in other countries, it shall work alongside the existing police force” (Jobbik 2010: 18). In actual fact, under the name Magyar Gárda (Hungarian Guards) such a ‘gendarmerie’ was already established in 2007, dedicating itself to what Jobbik’s party program calls “the fight against our ever-swelling crime wave” (ibid). Elsewhere, the party pamphlet clarifies that one of the most pressing social issues to be addressed

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5 Actually, these expulsions began shortly after the EU entry of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007 (ERRC 2007a).
“is undeniably the halting of gypsy crime, for which the strengthening of the established police, and the foundation of a dedicated rural police service, or Gendarmerie, is required” (ibid 11). Since its establishment, the uniformed Magyar Gárda has patrolled through Hungarian neighborhoods with large Romani populations, suggesting that they are “re-establishing law and order and charged with maintaining public safety” (ibid 18). Similarly, Czech extreme political parties have also established such ‘security’ units meant to “oversee the behavior of inadaptable minorities and immigrants” (cited Albert 2009: 27). In most of the cases, however, violent conflicts have emerged or intensified only after the confrontational marches.6

THE EUROPEAN ROMA AT THE NEXUS OF SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT

If we bring together the discourses and instruments that have recently been developed to address what has increasingly more been called ‘Europe’s Roma problem’ or even ‘Roma question,’ we can produce a long list: ‘security units,’ ‘Gendarmerie,’ ‘national guards,’ ‘security emergency,’ ‘public emergency,’ ‘public order,’ ‘security pacts,’ fingerprinting, ‘excessive forms of mobility,’ etc. The common denominator of all these tools, discourses, and mechanisms is undoubtedly security, even though the term security has different kinds of associations in these contexts. The associations range from racist claims that the Roma are the source of diverse social problems, and crime in particular, to suggestions that their ‘lifestyles’ at home or abroad cause troubles to their ‘decent neighbors.’ Whether the one or the other association, they usually intersect with processes of illegalization, criminalization, and making the Roma responsible for their own problems. As the examples clarify, those who discuss the Roma in security terms range from far-right, extra-parliamentary groups to members of center political parties. As the Italian case shows, security framing has also been intermingled with juridical-administrative infrastructures. Of course, security framing and violence are not the same; we need to carefully reflect on how they are related and intermingled. Increasingly, the Roma’s problematization in terms of a ‘European minority’ is taking place alongside their problematization in terms of a ‘European problem.’ Securitization—framing them in security terms—has become an important element of this trend. How do we need to interrogate this trend or shift?

In this study, I have not in the first place dealt with processes of securitization and how they could be challenged or ‘de-securitized’.7 Nevertheless, my main findings open up ways to combine my inquiries into European governmentalties with recent insights from critical security studies to analyze the contemporary situation of Romani minorities in Europe. Analyses of the role of problematizing the Roma in terms of security, particularly in the European transnational rather than primarily national context, are largely lacking in current scholarship on the Roma but sorely needed. Future research on

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6 In two of the most notorious Hungarian cases of 2009, in which three Roma, including a five-year old boy were killed, the Magyar Gárda organized meetings and marches before the deadly attacks (Rorke 2009).
7 De-securitization is the term used in critical security studies to describe and analyze processes that challenge security framings (eg, Waever 1995; Roe 2004; Huysmans 2006; Balzacq 2011).
the relationship between violence and security framing regarding the Roma can benefit from combining insights from governmentality and critical security studies. Let me indicate along which lines such a research agenda could take shape and how they could build on some of the insights developed in this study.

I have shown that some of the usual ways in which conflicting problematizations of the Roma are explained cannot adequately address what is at stake. Firstly, these problematizations cannot simply be discussed in terms of discrepancies between ‘good’ European or supranational liberal ideals and values of inclusion, emancipation, and human rights on the one hand, and ‘dubious’ local or national articulations of nationalism or even racism, on the other (part three). Though ambiguous phenomena such as ‘backdoor nationalism’ (Fox and Vermeersch 2010) have appeared in countries such as Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic, they cannot solely be explained in terms of their local or national manifestations. Rather, to a large extent these phenomena have appeared alongside the emergence and articulation of the politics of EU integration and enlargement (chapter 8, van Baar 2011b). Therefore, we need to critically examine the manifestations of nationalism, Romaphobia, and anti-Gypsyism alongside analyses of the indirectly, often unforeseen effects of these politics of integration and enlargement.

Secondly and correlatively, any suggestion that anti-Roma sentiments and policies can be straightforwardly challenged by various kinds of ‘pro-Roma’ policies is equally problematic. By way of a genealogical analysis of how socioeconomic mobility of the Roma has recently been dealt with in East Central Europe, I have clarified that the articulation of pro-Roma policies has highly ambiguously impacted on the situation of the Roma, even leading to their dehumanization (chapter 6, van Baar 2012a). My analysis of how neo-liberal activation measures have been introduced to deal with large-scale unemployment among the Roma has clarified that the ambiguous effects on them are not simply the result of discursively framing them as socio-economically ‘inactive.’ I have shown how the complex assembling of various kinds of expertise on the Roma, old and new welfare regimes, informal and formal social, cultural, and economic networks, and the legacy of communist racializing and bio-political schemes have had problematic effects on the situation of the Roma. Also, the introduction of activation schemes in Slovakia and the protests against the welfare reforms took place in a political environment where the Slovak Minister of the Interior suggested a “state of emergency” and legitimized the mobilization of police officers and soldiers because “Romani communities” had to be “monitored” and “public order restored” (chapter 6). The revision of social security mechanisms and the problematization of the Roma in terms of public security were two sides of the same coin. Currently, “improving employment chances of the Roma,” as the World Bank (2008) calls it, is going hand in hand with their framing in terms of social, human, and/or public security.

The way in which the devising of various bio-political programs for the Roma has gone together with their securitization is related to a third and more fundamental difficulty within the prevailing attempts to challenge the Roma’s discrimination or marginalization. The freedoms of liberalism and its attempts at guaranteeing ‘free,’ ‘more,’ and ‘better’ circulation are going together with controlling the conditions of ‘good circulation,’ with calculating the costs and risks of creating and opening up new spaces of circulation, and, thus, with identifying possible spheres and categories that endanger the
interests of individuals and collectives (chapter 2). For Foucault “freedom in the regime of liberalism is not a given, it is not a ready-made region which has to be respected” (2008a: 65). Rather, it “is something which is constantly produced.” According to this concept of liberalism, it continuously proposes to manufacture freedom, “to arouse it and produce it, with, of course, the system of constraints and the problems of cost raised by this production” (ibid). The political economies of power related to liberalism and neo-liberalism are consequently internally related to the nexus of freedom and security and to how their interplay has to guarantee that individuals and communities are minimally exposed to danger.

We should further analyze what this intrinsic relation between freedom and security implies for contemporary processes of securitization in Europe and their impact on the situation of the Roma. Since ‘security’ is not opposed to ‘freedom,’ but inherently related to it, defending civil liberties or something like free movement in the EU instead cannot automatically challenge problematizations in terms of security. A Foucauldian approach to security makes “the relation between supporters of security policy and those who criticize securitization by arguing for a more balanced approach to the trade-off between security and civil liberties or between free movement and the protection of the public order more ambivalent” (Huysmans 2006: 149). Put differently, those who criticize the framing of migration, asylum, trafficking, or minorities such as the Muslims or Roma in and beyond Europe in terms of security, but, at the same time, prioritize a relation between freedom and security; still “sustain a political field in which freedom is heavily politicized as a question of controlling its dangerous excesses” (ibid). Maintaining and developing rationales and governmental instruments that look for balancing security and freedom in this way, thus, cannot avoid that the supposed dangers to ‘good’ governance will be ethnicized, territorialized, and culturalized in ways that tend to render the Roma abject (chapters 6, 7).

A closely related research question concerns the transnational mobility of security technologies and the ways in which they are articulated with local or national politics, cultures, and infrastructures. Indeed, the case of security framing not only relates to how, for instance, French, Italian, or Slovak authorities have started to discuss the Roma in terms of public order and a threat to their social security systems. It also relates to a range of knowledge and expertise formations and disseminations and to diverse policy and control instruments that have recently or historically been developed and deployed to deal with issues of migration, asylum, employment, crime, and the like. Already existing social and cultural infrastructures, such as the Italian campi nomadi or the Slovak Romské osady (‘Romani settlements’) have been assembled with new, transnationally mobile kinds of security knowledge and technology. This multidimensional process, in which diverse policy questions are interwoven through security technologies, expertise, and narratives, has also got relevance at the EU level (Bigo 1994; Huysmans 2006; de Goede 2008). The insights of those critical security studies scholars, who have analyzed such processes, can help to relocate the focal point of interrogation. Examples, such as the Italian security measures against the Roma and the French expulsions of Romani migrants, have recently been discussed in terms of the violation of EU rules (eg, Merlino 2009). However, such interrogations tend to adhere to a debatable politics of scaling in which binaries between supranational and national entities or between anti-policies and
pro-policies are reproduced (Walters 2008; van Baar 2010e). A combination of governmentality and critical security studies, however, could give better insight in how the freedom/security interplay and the articulation of security rationalities and technologies in the EU are co-constituted. Jef Huymans eloquently remarks:

[The EU’s] internal security field and the codification of the Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice have integrated a range of policy issues—including migration, border control, terrorism, border-crossing crime—as dangers to the functional integrity of the Internal Market and the member states of the Union. (Huysmans 2006: 148)

If we read recent phenomena, such as the French expulsions or the Italian introduction of security pacts to deal with the Roma along the lines of problematic articulations of the freedom/security nexus in the EU, we are able to reveal both the power and limits of current European governmentality. Such an analysis shows, for instance, that illiberal practices can be introduced, maintained, or even strengthened in the name of liberalism (chapters 2, 6).

Moreover, we should try to link this debate and the reemergence of violence against the Roma with the ambivalences that have gone together with how development programs have been articulated on the ground. I think we can see the reemergence of violence partially as an effect of a gradually intensified crisis of European governmentality that did not start recently, but much earlier, at the beginning of the 1990s. I have explained that, in the early 1990s, the Roma appeared at Europe’s institutional horizon, to a considerable extent, through a complex and manifold reshaping of the security approaches of international governing organizations, such as the OSCE, the EU, the World Bank, and the UNDP (chapter 5). I have suggested that this rearticulation was not in the first place a question of considering the Roma increasingly more “as representing a security issue” (Kovats 2001a: 95). Rather, the Roma have primarily been included in the policy agendas of IGOs through a confluence of several newly emerged development and security networks, rationales, and technologies and through the internalization and codification of EU development policies in Europe. The post-1989 processes of increased merging of security and development issues in Europe have also played a significant role in focusing on the Roma as a target group of bio-political development programs and interethnic conflict resolution. At the same time, since the late 1980s, some events in and beyond Europe have considerably contributed to the gradual intensification of securitization processes. These events were, most notably, the fall of communism, the violent dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, the manifestations of global terrorism, and, last but not least, the emergence of the current financial crisis. A case in point is that the securitization of Roma migration and asylum prior to the entry of Central and Eastern European countries to the EU was not incidental, but, increasingly, central to how the ‘old’ EU member states dealt with the Roma since the start of Yugoslavia’s dissolution.8 I have argued that this approach was also not necessarily at odds with the human and minority rights agenda that the EU started to articulate at more or less the same time (chapter 5). The way in which, in the EU’s new approach to European governance, human rights

have been reinterpreted “as the empirical outcome of ... concrete instances of good government” (Guilhot 2008: 512) has led the Union to focus primarily on the (candidate) member states’ compliance with the newly introduced benchmarks of ‘good governance,’ rather than on (the maintenance of) the violations of the rights of the Roma. At least the former, rather than the latter, played a decisive role in the entry of new states into the EU and also in the EU’s abandoning of infringement procedures against France regarding the expulsion of EU citizens with a Romani background (chapter 5).

The freedom/security and the development/security nexus, thus, have hitherto played a critical and in many ways ambivalent role in how the Roma are approached in Europe. Similar to how calls for a more balanced approach to the trade-off between security policy and civil liberties are problematic, those who promote, for instance, human development approaches without seriously interrogating its confluences with security mechanisms are also in trouble. I do not in the first place suggest that human security or human development concepts are intrinsically problematic, but that the way in which they have started to interconnect and intersect with Europe’s “internal security field” (Bigo 1994) has led to problematic articulations on the ground. Further research needs to be done to analyze whether, how, where, and under what circumstances such articulations are taking place. At the same time, combining a critical security with a governmentality perspective could help to reveal the contradictions and tensions within current power relations and structures and to challenge and politicize them. This brings me to the second future research agenda that I have proposed: to undertake further inquiries into the politics of citizenship as participation.

INQUIRIES INTO THE POLITICS OF CITIZENSHIP

In order to discuss how we could extend research on the politics of citizenship, let me first make an explicit link to the issues of security and violence—even though this politics is not limited to these domains. When we acknowledge that, in contemporary European liberal democracies, initiatives taken to further the Roma’s situation are situated within the interplay between freedom and security and between security and development, we also need to work both sides of these relationships at the same time. Since security mechanisms are central to liberal and neo-liberal governmentalities, security issues cannot simply be transformed or ‘talked’ into non-security issues, such as those of human rights, development, or free movement. At the same time, there is not necessarily something wrong with security policy. The critical and ambivalent change in security framing takes place once security policy turns into something like ‘emergency politics.’ This happens when forms of politics are mobilized in which security issues are rendered exceptionally important to deal with diverse kinds of socio-economic, political, and cultural changes, circumstances, and events, ranging from the environment to health, from markets to neighborhoods, from poverty to food, from migration to asylum, etc. Huysmans (2006: 143) puts the crucial point succinctly when he explains that ‘emergency politics’ represents a political strategy that tends to inscribe illiberal concepts of the political in liberal-democratic communities. According to him, such politics creates a notion of the political community in which its insecurities are primarily related to
essentialized binaries between insiders and outsiders, friends and enemies, ‘us’ and ‘them’—following a logic of exceptionality, rather than ‘normality.’ If such social changes take place, they do usually not affect everybody in the same way and they are often going together with the production and reproduction of difference along ethnic, racial, class, or gender lines. To de-dramatize bifurcated renditions of the political community, therefore, we need to explicitly politicize them. Then, the focus shifts from security per se to the dubious, reified notions of the political and the political community that go with exceptional, extended security framings.

Several insights from this study help to discuss these questions of the political and political community. The politics of citizenship as participation and the practices and strategies of traveling activism and memory politicize the ways in which prevailing practices of citizenship and development are often based on ethnicized, culturalized, and territorialized notions of communities that render the Roma abject (chapters 7, 8). Rendering the Roma abject inherently goes with practices that tend to displace and de-humanize them and to make them particularly vulnerable to violence, humiliation, and disgrace (chapters 6, 8). The politics of citizenship as participation works at different fronts at the same time to call these practices and correlated notions of the political community into question. Firstly, this politics tries to challenge the exclusionary mechanisms inherent to currently prevailing development (chapter 7) or memorial (chapter 8) practices—even in those cases that others would maybe describe as ‘failures.’ Romani narratives of failure and complaint—the failure of bio-political programs to achieve ‘something’ (chapter 7) or of war reparations to really ‘re-member’ (chapter 8)—are able to address or even challenge the mechanisms that tend to reproduce inequality and exclusion.

Secondly, though there is no single or miraculous formula to enact the politics of citizenship as participation, I have shown that traveling activism plays a central role in strategies toward politicizing contentious issues. Traveling activism—by mobilizing, reshaping, and redirecting transnationally circulating discourses, techniques, and tactics of activism and by federating across space and difference—contributes to struggles over how development tools and knowledge are deployed and articulated. Romani activists and their advocates have developed their own forms, mechanisms, and tools of expertise to render socioeconomic and cultural mechanisms of exclusion (or inclusion) visible and used them to open up political debate. By so doing, traveling activism has become a way to renegotiate and critically redirect bio-political programs meant for the Roma. By showing, for instance, how the focus on the Roma’s human and social capital formation tends to neglect the socioeconomic, political, and historical reasons that have led to marginalization, traveling activism can contribute to reformulating the debate in terms of citizenship and participatory democracy. I do not want to suggest that such strategies are easy, let alone that they easily succeed in what they want to achieve. Sometimes, the most they can do is trying to reveal the democratic and memory deficits implicit in prevailing notions of politics (chapters 7, 8).

Moreover, various groups of Roma are producing their own narratives about Europe, and are increasingly making different kinds of Romani histories and memories visible and audible in public spaces throughout Europe, including important memorial sites, such as Auschwitz and other former Nazi concentration camps (chapter 8). In this way,
the Roma are inscribing their memories in Europe’s heterogeneous ‘memoryscapes’ and creating new and diverse maps, images, and stories of and about Europe. These narratives are not uniform; I have shown how different Romani actors themselves are involved in disputes about how their histories and memories should be represented or mobilized in political debates and cultural institutions. Even in cases where conflict has arisen, such as in the controversies over the former concentration camps in Lety and Hodonín in the Czech Republic, the involved Roma have been able to politicize issues of citizenship and to instigate public debate about the politics of historicism.

At a more theoretical level, my inquiries into the politics of citizenship have tried to contribute to a diversification of where we could ethnographically analyze and locate processes of re-politicization. In the practice of academic writing, and scholarship on migrants, minorities, and the marginalized in particular, analyses of politicizing processes and acts have often led to a strong focus on clear, visible acts of protest and demonstration or on the conditions of possibility of mass mobilization. In endeavors to trace transformative elements in the contemporary Romani movement in Europe, we have seen something similar. While some tend to assess the movement’s chances and prospects in terms of mass mobilization,9 others have looked into Romani protests and demonstrations to delineate the conditions under which political contestation may take place.10 These are welcome and important analyses. The benefit of this focus is that it emphasizes how diverse kinds of political struggles are made visible at social, political, and cultural levels.

However, I am not convinced that we can unravel the complexity and diversity of practices of politicization by this ethnographic privilege only. Therefore, in this study, I have tried to widen the ethnographic scope to less ‘revolutionary’ and also to memorial acts. Though my concept of traveling activism maybe suggests that only ‘activists’ can apply it, I have clarified that the politics of citizenship as participation covers a wider spectrum than just that of activists. I have shown, for instance, how Roma who are expressing their dissatisfaction with the programs in which they are (not) involved can also get involved in the politics of citizenship as participation (chapter 7). Along these lines, and across space and difference, I also propose a second new research agenda. I have suggested that we can analyze practices of de-politicization and re-politicization along the entire spectrum from Romani everyday life struggles in remote villages to the very heart of, for instance, the European policy machinery (chapter 7). In particular since Roma-related issues are now being discussed and disputed at such a huge variety of different offices, agencies, and NGOs at various institutional levels, future research should focus more explicitly on the daily politicizing and de-politicizing practices within these ‘bureaus’ and the diverse actors allied with them. This research could include analyses of how negotiations between front-line workers in municipal offices and their Romani ‘clients’ are taking place. Building on insights from governmentality and citizenship studies, these practices and the ways in which they relate to the transformation of public services and spaces could be interrogated.11 This research agenda could also in-

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9 See, for instance, Vermeersch (2006) and Trehan (2009a).
10 See, for instance, Üstündag (2008), Caglar and Mehling (2009), and Marušák and Singer (2009).
clude the role of various forms of diplomacy in which Roma activists and their advocates are increasingly involved (Nicolae and Slavik 2007). I have found it intriguing, for instance, that, when I discussed the protests against the welfare reforms in Slovakia (chapter 6) with a couple of Slovak Romani activists, they were highly critical about the activities of some of their fellow Romani citizens. The activists I spoke suggested that the Roma who had immediately and openly politicized the protests had acted rashly and seriously endangered the often invisible, but constructive results of careful diplomatic negotiations at local levels (interview 2005). These Roma stated that open and visible politicizing strategies, particularly when the political or media climate is tense and not very Roma-friendly, could easily be counterproductive. Further research into the politics of citizenship could deal with such and similar questions about the tactics and strategies involved in diplomacy as ‘silent’ forms of politicization.

At a time of crisis—such as at the moment when the French expulsions of Romani migrants became a media spectacle in the summer of 2010—open, visible and silent, less visible forms of politicization often come together. At various place in Europe, people started to protest against the French Roma policy. At the same time, we saw an increased activity in various Romani activist and diplomacy networks throughout Europe, and at the internet in particular. Many of these networks capitalized on ‘the French momentum’ to try to make a change and build new coalitions. In November 2010, for instance, a group of Bulgarian Romani activists wrote a letter to the European Commission in which they put forward: “We demand putting an end to the discriminatory practice of treating all Roma as a socially vulnerable or disadvantaged group. The stigmatization of Roma as ‘vulnerable’ in EU documents contributes to their forced marginalization” (Tahir et al 2010). In this line of reasoning they also encouraged the EU to invest more in existing Romani social capital, and, thus, they contested the idea that the Roma are not able to empower themselves. Future research on the politics of citizenship needs to pay attention to the dynamics of politicization that is involved in such strategies of traveling activism.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AI</td>
<td>Amnesty International</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASPEN</td>
<td>Active Social Policy European Network</td>
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<td>CEE</td>
<td>Central and Eastern Europe</td>
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<td>CEU</td>
<td>Council of the European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CoE</td>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>COHRE</td>
<td>Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPRSI</td>
<td>Contact Point for Roma and Sinti Issues (OSCE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (until 1995)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ČTK</td>
<td>Česká tisková kancelář (Czech News Agency)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAP</td>
<td>Decade Action Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>DS</td>
<td>Dělnická strana (Workers’ Party) (in the Czech Republic)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAGGF</td>
<td>European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAPN</td>
<td>European Anti-Poverty Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECMI</td>
<td>European Centre for Minority Issues</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECRIC</td>
<td>European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECtHR</td>
<td>European Court of Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>EFRE</td>
<td>European Fund for Regional Development</td>
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<td>ERGO</td>
<td>European Roma Grassroots Organizations Network</td>
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<td>ERI</td>
<td>European Roma Information Office</td>
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<td>ERPC</td>
<td>European Union Roma Policy Coalition</td>
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<td>ERRC</td>
<td>European Roma Rights Centre</td>
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<td>ERTF</td>
<td>European Roma and Travellers Forum</td>
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<td>ESF</td>
<td>European Social Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUMC</td>
<td>European Union Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia</td>
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<tr>
<td>EURONGO</td>
<td>European Union-Organized Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>EP</td>
<td>European Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>FPÖ</td>
<td>Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (Freedom Party of Austria)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRA</td>
<td>European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>GCR</td>
<td>Government of the Czech Republic</td>
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<td>GSR</td>
<td>Government of the Slovak Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>HCNM</td>
<td>High Commissioner on National Minorities (OSCE)</td>
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<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index (UNDP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIV/AIDS</td>
<td>Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGO</td>
<td>International Governing Organization</td>
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<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<td>IPA</td>
<td>Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance</td>
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<td>IRU</td>
<td>International Romani Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRWN</td>
<td>International Roma Women Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo Force (UNMIK and NATO-led international security forces)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MG-S-ROM</td>
<td>Specialist Group on Roma, Gypsies, and Travellers (CoE)</td>
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<td>MRG</td>
<td>Minority Rights Group International</td>
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<td>MSG</td>
<td>Minority Self-Government (in Hungary)</td>
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<td>NAP</td>
<td>National Action Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NS</td>
<td>Národní strana (National Party) (in the Czech Republic)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODIHR</td>
<td>Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>OMC</td>
<td>Method of Open Coordination</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (since 1995)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSI</td>
<td>Open Society Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>PER</td>
<td>Project on Ethnic Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>PFDC</td>
<td>Partners for Democratic Change</td>
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<tr>
<td>PHARE</td>
<td>Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies</td>
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<tr>
<td>QUANGO</td>
<td>Quasi-Autonomous Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>RNC</td>
<td>Roma National Congress</td>
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<td>ROI</td>
<td>Romská občanská iniciativa (Romani Civic Initiative)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RPA</td>
<td>Roma Press Agency (in Košice, Slovakia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RPC</td>
<td>Roma Medijako Centro – Roma Sajtóközpont – Roma Press Center (in Budapest, Hungary)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SITA</td>
<td>Slovak Press Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNS</td>
<td>Slovenská národná strana (Slovak National Party)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TASR</td>
<td>Tlačová agentúra slovenskej republiky (News Agency of the Slovak Republic)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAIDS</td>
<td>United Nations Joint Program on HIV/AIDS</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>United Nations Population Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations International Children’s Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Kosovo</td>
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<tr>
<td>VPORH</td>
<td>Výbor pro odškodnění romského holocaustu (in the Czech Republic) (Committee for the Compensation of the Romani Holocaust)</td>
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<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>0.1</td>
<td>Billboard with the names of agencies and countries that support a new housing project (2007) in a Romani neighborhood in Mitrovica (Kosovo), where the houses of Roma were burnt down during the Kosovo war in 1999. Photo: Tara Bedard, European Roma Rights Centre, 2007.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>The entrance door of a Romani NGO in Eastern Slovakia, including the badge of the European Social Fund. This community center is called an “activation center” (aktivna centrum). Photo: Yolande Jansen, 2005.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>Pavel Reisenauer’s cartoon at the cover of the Czech weekly newspaper Respekt (No XIV, December 2003), with the headline “Slovak Roma in front of our gate.” © Pavel Reisenauer and Respekt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>The industrial pig farm, owned by AGPI, in Lety near Písek (Czech Republic) on the site of the former Nazi concentration camp for Roma. Photo: Huub van Baar, 2003.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>Postcard for sale at the holiday resort Žalov on the site of the former Nazi concentration camp for Roma in Hodonín near Kunštát (Czech Republic).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>Overview of the Zigeunerlager (‘Gypsy Camp’) in Hodonín near Kunštát in 1942. Photo: Archive of the Museum of Romani Culture, Brno, Czech Republic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>The last remaining barrack, used as a depository, in the holiday resort Žalov on the site of the former Nazi concentration camp for Roma in Hodonín near Kunštát (Czech Republic). Photo: Huub van Baar, 2003.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>The monument established by the Havel government in Lety near Písek (Czech Republic) in 1995. Photo: Huub van Baar, 2003.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>The memorial plaque made in 1998 by the Romani artist Božena Vavreková-Přikrylová at the cemetery in Černovice near Hodonín (Czech Republic). Photo: Huub van Baar, 2003.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


8.10. Sign at the fence of the pig farm in Lety near Písek (Czech Republic), with the inscription “This project was co-funded by the European Union – European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF)“ Photo: Huub van Baar, 2008.


8.12. Images of Roma during the pre-wartime period in the former Czechoslovakia, included in the permanent exhibition on the Nazi genocide of the Sinti and Roma in the State Museum of Auschwitz-Birkenau in Oświęcim (Poland). Photo: Huub van Baar, 2003.
Interviews

2002

2002a Interview with Adam Bartosz, director of Muzeum Okręgowego w Tarnowie (Regional Museum of Tarnów). Tarnów, Poland, 31 July
2002b Conversations with shopkeepers in the center of Košice. Košice, Slovakia, 2-6 August
2002c Interview with the Slovak play writer František Držík. Spišská Nová Ves, Slovakia, 5 August
2002d A series of interviews with Kristína Magdolenová and Ivan Hriczko, directors of the Roma Press Agency (RPA) in Košice. Košice, Slovakia, 2-6 August
2002e Interview with Petr Pollák, regional officer of the Slovak government responsible for the distribution of EU and government funds to Romani communities in the Spiš region. Levoča, Slovakia, 5 August
2002f Interview with various Roma in Bardejov. Bardejov, Slovakia, 4 August
2002g Interview with Deborah Harding, vice president of the Open Society Institute (OSI). New York, USA, 29 March
2002h Interview with Ivan Veselý, director of the Romani NGO Sdružení Dženo (Association Dženo) in Prague. Prague, Czech Republic, 23 July
2002i Interview with Andrzej Mirga, Chairman, Project on Ethnic Relations Romani Advisory Council and co-chair of the Council of Europe Specialist Group on Roma/Gypsies. Kraków, Poland, 2 August
2002j Conversations with various Romani families in Luník IX. Košice, Slovakia, 3 August
2002k Interview with Josef Mižigár, Romani mayor of Žehra. Žehra, Slovakia, 5 August
2002l Conversations with various Roma in Žehra. Žehra, Slovakia, 5 August
2002m Interview with Vladimír Smolej, head of the regional police office of the Košice region. Košice, Slovakia, 6 August
2002n Interview with Ondrej Sokolovič of the International Organization for Migration (IOM). Košice, Slovakia, 6 August
2002o Interview with Gloria Jean Garland, legal director of the European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) in Budapest. Budapest, Hungary, 8 August
2002p Interview with Claude Cahin, programs director of the European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC). Budapest, Hungary, 8 August
2002q Interview with Miklós Gábor of Roma Medijako Centro - Roma Sajtóközpont (Roma Press Center) in Budapest. Budapest, Hungary, 9 August
2002s  Personal communication with the Romani journalist and activist Jarmila Vaňová. Ďurkov, Slovakia, 3 August
2002t  Personal communication with Monika Sinuová. Bidovce, Slovakia, 3 August

2003

2003a  A daylong interview with Čeněk Růžičká, the chair of Výbor pro odškodnění romského holocaustu (Committee for the Compensation of the Romani Holocaust). Prague, Czech Republic, 8 November
2003b  Interview with Ilona Lázničková, ethnologist, and with Lenka Kravičková at the Muzeum romské kultury (Museum of Romani Culture). Brno, Czech Republic, 24 November
2003c  Interview with Jana Horváthová, director of Muzeum romské kultury (Museum of Romani Culture). Brno, Czech Republic, 25 November
2003d  Interview with Krystyna Oleksy, Teresa Świebocka, and Teresa Zbrzeska of the Polish State Museum of Auschwitz-Birkenau in Oświęcim. Oświęcim, Poland, 20 November.
2003e  Personal communication with Markus Pape. Prague, Czech Republic, 4 August
2003f  Interview with Petr Lhotka, historian at the Muzeum romské kultury (Museum of Romani Culture) in Brno. Brno, Czech Republic, 26 November
2003g  Interview with Petr Višek of Socioklub: Sdružení pro podporu rozvoje teorie a praxe sociální politiky and with Hana Zelenková of the Minority of Labor and Social Affairs of the Czech Republic. Prague, Czech Republic, 31 July
2003h  Conversations with Roma in Nymburk. Nymburk, Czech Republic, 1 August
2003i  Conversations with Roma in Jablonec nad Nisou. Jablonec nad Nisou, Czech Republic, 1 August
2003j  Conversations with Romani activists from the Kraków region. Tárnow and Kraków, Poland, 19, 21 November

2004

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In this study, I analyze the current situation of Romani minorities in Europe from the angle of changing forms and tools of minority representation and governance. Particularly since the fall of communism, we have observed what can be called the Europeanization of Roma representation. In political and policy debates, in media and scholarly discourses, and in various forms of activism and advocacy, the Roma have increasingly been represented as a European minority. This development has gone hand in hand with the devising and organizing of large-scale, Europe-wide projects and programs that aim at the Roma’s empowerment and the development and improvement of their situation throughout Europe. No other population group in Europe has recently become the central focus of so many different inclusion, empowerment, and development programs than the Romani. At the same time, the Roma’s Europeanization has inaugurated a new phase in the history of their representation and self-representation. Indeed, during the Enlightenment, the Romantic Movement, nineteenth and early twentieth century processes of nation state formation, and under Nazism and communism, the Roma and their cultures were often considered as non-European, alien, and barriers to ‘progress’ and ‘civilization’ in Europe.

In this study, I put the following questions at the center: How are we to understand the recent shift from the representation of the Roma as a non-European minority to their representation as a European minority? How are we to assess this shift and the parallel development of transnational forms of minority governance from a cultural historical, policy theoretical, and political philosophical point of view? I examine this and other shifts of Roma representation and self-representation, as well as their consequences, in light of changing forms, processes, concepts, and tools of governance and self-governance in Europe. In my attempts to answer these questions, I do not in the first place focus on how minority governance is or needs to be organized from a practical point of view. At a more fundamental level, I concentrate on the ways in which diverse ideas and practices of governing have historically and up to now influenced and changed the relationship and interaction between ‘Europe’ and ‘the Roma.’ What kinds of practices, knowledge, and expertise, for instance, enable us to constitute and perceive Romani minority governance differently than before the end of the Cold War? How could the existence of heterogeneous Romani groups in various countries in Europe actually develop into a question and transform into a specific European ‘problem’ or set of ‘prob-
lems’ to which various programs, interventions, and projects need to give an answer? How do the simultaneous Europeanization of Roma representation and the emergence of a European integration agenda relate to the change of Roma representation in terms of assimilation and nomadism to their more recent representation in terms of human and minority rights, minority integration and participation, and human security and development? In what ways do recently developed governmental techniques and rationales contribute to new or changing forms of Roma representation and self-representation, and to new forms of activism, history writing, and advocacy? How do these transformations relate to new ways of thinking ‘Europe’?

To shed light on these questions and issues, I examine practices of Romani minority governance, as well as their modern European history, from the angle of an analytics of governmentality. At the end of the 1970s, the French philosopher Michel Foucault introduced this somewhat awkward neologism ‘governmentality’ in order to be able to reflect on practices of governing beyond the context of governments, organizations, and institutions. The concept of governmentality can be explained in two, closely related ways. In a general way, this notion indicates the relationship between practices of ‘governing’ and the diverse ways in which we think about governing. This meaning does not refer to how certain ideas about governing are first developed and then brought into practice, but, rather, to how the technical and rational dimensions of governing constantly interact. This general meaning emphasizes the interaction of acts of ‘governing’ with particular ‘mentali-ties,’ hence ‘govern-mentalities.’ In Foucault’s work this general meaning relates to a huge variety of activities, ranging from ideas about and practices and techniques of how we govern ourselves and others to the ways in which a city or state has been or should be governed. According to its more narrow meaning, though, governmentality primarily refers to a consolidation of the activity of ‘governing’ and, thus, to ‘governmental-ity.’ This meaning points to relatively stable, institutionalized forms of governing, such as those expressed in the governing or self-governing at the level of governments and organizations, but also in everyday life practices related to health care, education, sexuality, imprisoning, exhibiting, activism, the keeping of households, and the like. The narrow meaning of governmentality is related to how the consolidation of a particular way of governing or self-governing involves both the ability to govern and the power to govern and identify what needs to be governed. The general and more narrow meaning of governmentality are closely related: processes of governmentalization—making particular objects, subjects, or processes governable—contribute to the consolidation of practices of governing and self-governing, and give them a more explicit institutional form. Seen from this viewpoint, it becomes possible, for instance, to understand the state as a historically institutionalized, yet non-universal, variable form of governing, which exists because of its continuous and constantly changing governmentalization. A governmentality approach also allows for analyzing the formation and representation of certain groups in terms of a minority from the more general angle of the governing and regulating of population groups.

In this study, I extend the conceptual framework of governmentality to an analysis of current forms of minority governance in Europe, and those of Romani in particular. I interpret European forms of minority governance in terms of Europe’s governmentalization. By so doing, I shed new light on the history of minority formation and represen-
tation in Europe and on the correlated demarcation of population groups in terms of their alleged ‘Europeanness.’ I clarify that the formation, representation, and governance of Romani minorities closely relates to our representation of Europe and to how governance at the European level has historically been conceived and practiced. Hence, the title of this book—*The European Roma*—does not describe a neutral, objective condition or minority status. Rather, the book’s title needs to be read in relation to the notion of historically changing and changeable Roma representations and self-representations, including processes of minoritization and minority self-articulation.

This study contributes to insights into processes of minority formation in the modern and recent history of Europe. I also contribute to the current debate in governmentality studies on the relationship between politics and governmental power. I challenge those studies that understand governmentality primarily in terms of depoliticized mechanisms of security, which more or less effectively succeed in controlling particular population groups or processes. This book deals not only with governmentality as a relatively stable form of power, but also with so-called practices of counter-conduct that (try to) challenge this exercise of power. I argue that an analytics of governmentality entails an examination of both the consolidation of governmental forms of power and the limits of their exercise. Such an analytics explicitly interrogates the dynamics between processes and mechanisms of de-politicization and re-politicization. I clarify how my interpretation of governmentality impacts on both uniform readings of European modernity and the way in which we assess the current situation of Romani minorities in Europe.

In this book, I bring two dominant, yet often largely separated kinds of research on the situation and representation of Romani minorities together. On the one hand, current scholarship on the Roma has been largely dominated by analyses that discuss Romani minority representation and its history in terms of policy or governance processes, structures of political representation, and social inclusion and exclusion mechanisms. On the other hand, particularly since the early 1990s, much research has been dedicated to cultural and cultural-historical practices and concepts of representation and self-representation in art, science, the media, museums, and popular culture. I bring these two branches of scholarship together. I am not so much doing so by discussing them next to each other, but by clarifying the intrinsic relationship between processes of governing, representation, and knowledge formation. In this way, I discuss the conditions under which forms of representation and self-representation change without isolating one of these processes from the other.

The chapters of this study are grouped into three parts. In part one, I introduce the theoretical framework of governmentality and how we can extend it to an analysis of transnational, European forms of population regulation. Chapter 1 introduces the methodological and conceptual parameters of this study. I critically build on Foucault’s work and post-structuralist analyses of his intellectual legacy to explain how a governmentality approach helps to overcome some of the drawbacks of a governance approach. I discuss the concept of governmentality in the context of Foucault’s work and how it relates to contemporary debates about the state, sovereignty, power, and agency in an age of glo-
balization. Building on a so-called ‘topological’ reading of power, I illuminate how an analytics of governmentality helps to analyze issues of power, agency, and resistance beyond functionalism and the periodization of European history. I explain how such an analytics involves an examination of the dynamic interplay between governmentalities understood as relatively stable forms of power, on the one hand, and practices of counter-conduct that challenge the former, on the other.

In chapter 2, I extend the analysis of governmentality to Europe and discuss how intra-state and inter-state forms of governmentality have appeared in conjunction with each other in Europe’s history. I discuss Foucault’s reading of two distinct forms of governmentality—so-called ‘police’ and liberalism—to examine transnational forms of population regulation and processes of minority formation in Europe. I explain how the emergence of liberal forms of governmentality has gone together with processes of majority and minority formation. I will move beyond Foucault’s Eurocentric analysis of inter-state governmentalities to propose how we could examine contemporary transnational forms of population regulation in Europe. I discuss postcolonial critiques of development regimes to call for analyzing transnational population regulation, such as those regarding Romani minorities, beyond tradition vs. modernity, and global hegemonic power vs. local grassroots resistance binaries. In a transit to part two, I propose to re-narrate European modernity to shed another light on how Romani groups have been minoritized in modern European history.

In part two, I discuss how the development of liberal governmentality has historically gone hand in hand with both the emergence of ‘Gypsy studies’ and Romani minority formation. I investigate this nexus of emerging liberalism, Romani minoritization, and ‘Gypsy studies’ in the eighteenth-century Habsburg Empire, and analyze two currently prevailing scholarly readings of this history and its legacy. Chapter 3 engages in a debate about how the Gypsy problematization during Habsburg rule has been received in scholarship on the Roma. I discuss the position of the historians Leo Lucassen and Wim Willems and that of the linguist Yaron Matras and call for bringing the two largely opposite historiographies that their works represent in dialogue. I combine philosophical and postcolonial critiques of homogeneous, uniform narratives of the Enlightenment, and modernity more generally, to question the way in which these historiographies have hitherto been read in relative isolation. None of these two historiographic paradigms, I argue, can be maintained separately and only their combination sheds new light on the ambivalence of Romani minority formation in European history.

Chapter 4 advances and deepens the debate on Romani minority formation in European history. I interrogate eighteenth-century modes of governmentality by means of a close reading of both Habsburg assimilationist Gypsy policies and scholarship on the ‘Gypsies’ in the Prussian academy. I discuss the ambivalent impact of the scientific and administrative tradition of so-called ‘Cameralism’ (Kameralistik) and ‘police sciences’ (Polizeiwissenschaften) on practices of population regulation in the Habsburg Empire. I explain how we can understand shifting Habsburg Gypsy policies and emergent Romarelated knowledge formation in light of changing governmentalities. I clarify how the emergence of comparative forms of science—such as those in then appearing disciplines of linguistics, biology, and economics—has gone together not only with new forms of
Roma population regulation, but also with new opportunities of Romani minority self-articulation.

In part three, I mobilize the threefold nexus between representation, government, and knowledge formation that I theoretically explain in part one and historically articulate in part two to move on to the present-day situation of Romani minorities in Europe. In part three, I examine the nexus between the Roma representation as a European minority, neo-liberal forms of governmentality, and heterogeneous, hybrid knowledge formation at the transnational European level. Chapter 5 discusses the current Europeanization of the Romani identity and minority status alongside the emergence of neo-liberal forms of governmentality. I explain how we can consider neo-liberalism as a specific form of governmentality and how this reading differs from more conventional readings of neo-liberalism along the lines of policy or ideology. I combine my reading of neo-liberalism as governmentality with an analysis of shifting security, development, and human rights agendas in Europe to explain how we are to assess the representation of the Romas as a European minority beyond fixed institutional boundaries. I clarify that we can regard the emergence of numerous new centers of Roma-related expertise at the level of IGOs and NGOs in light of how neo-liberal governmental technologies have been articulated with the policy, political, and administrative cultures of these actors. Whereas chapter 5 introduces neo-liberalism at a theoretical level, chapters 6, 7, and 8 explore case studies of how neo-liberalism, the Roma’s Europeanization, the fall of communism, and the resurgence of nationalism have influenced the situation of Romani minorities on the ground.

Chapter 6 is dedicated to how neo-liberal technologies have recently been articulated in East Central Europe with various different political and socio-economic cultures and institutional settings. I clarify that it is the way in which these technologies have been assembled with these cultures and settings, rather than a kind of neo-liberalism imposed on the region from outside, which has ambiguously impacted on the Roma’s situation. I examine how EU and World Bank supported neo-liberal activation programs have been introduced to East Central European welfare regimes to improve their employment chances. I demonstrate how the assemblage of these programs with ‘local’ cultures and politics has highly ambivalently impacted on the Roma’s situation, leading to their eviction and to practices of exploitation and dehumanization. I discuss three influential legacies of communism to put these grim effects in the perspective of the region’s recent transformations. I undertake an inquiry into communist socio-economic reform politics, past alternative socio-cultural and economic networks, and communist practices of racism vis-à-vis the Roma. I show how, in interrelationship with neo-liberalism, the legacies of these three formerly communist practices have dramatically impacted on the current situation of Romani minorities.

Chapter 6 needs to be read next to chapters 7 and 8, for these three chapters deal with developments that are simultaneously occurring in contemporary Europe. Chapter 6 focuses on the impact of processes of de-politicization, and particularly on how basically political issues and problems are translated into the quasi-neutral, non-political terms of policy and expertise. Chapters 7 and 8 analyze how processes of de-politicization are actually taking place alongside attempts to politicize development and empowerment programs meant for the Roma and alongside endeavors to challenge issues of poverty and inequality that affect their current situation. Thus, while chapter 6 particularly dis-
cusses the consequences of de-politicization, chapters 7 and 8 concentrate primarily on how delicate political and social issues have recently been re-politicized.

In chapter 7, I discuss the Romani social and civil movement and how, since the fall of communism, transnational Romani activist and pro-Roma advocacy networks have increasingly entered the political scene. I argue that the post-1989 Romani movement can be characterized by a ‘perverse confluence’ of participatory democratic and neo-liberal projects, in which notions such as citizenship, participation, and civil society play a key, yet often opposite role. I introduce the notions of traveling activism and the politics of citizenship as participation to highlight the ways in which issues of participation, inequality, and poverty are explicitly politicized in the current Romani movement. I show how Romani activist networks have strategically mobilized neo-liberal tools and activist knowledge and expertise to articulate these processes of politicization.

In chapter 8, I examine the significance of various Romani memorial practices that have been increasingly developed in post-1989 Europe. The chapter starts from an analysis of what, in 1992, Katie Trumpener called ‘the European memory problem.’ With this problem she pointed to how, throughout modern European history, dominant cultural and intellectual movements have displaced Romani memory by representing the Roma as ‘a people without history.’ I examine how we are to assess the current boost of particularly Holocaust-related Romani memorial cultures in Europe vis-à-vis Trumpener’s thesis. I argue that the European memory problem that she discussed does no longer exist, but that we are presently facing the appearance of another kind of European memory problem. Current Romani cultural and memorial practices radically contest the politics of historicism that tends to relegate ‘the Roma’ and their cultures to the domain of pre-modern, ‘history-less’ societies. These practices critically question the exclusion of Romani histories and memories from national and European ones and contribute to new, diverse images and stories about Europe and, thus, to new narratives about the complex relationship between ‘Europe’ and ‘the Roma.’ I show that these practices are currently taking place in the context of a trend to governmentalize Holocaust remembrance in the EU, which, at least in theory, enables the inclusion of Romani minorities in European memorial cultures. At the same time, though, this governmentalization tends to turn Holocaust remembrance into a pedagogy that does not sufficiently reflect on how current forms of European governmentality ambivalently go together with exclusionary practices. Finally, I argue that current Romani memorial practices invite us to rethink the structures of temporality and the politics of historicism integral to both past and contemporary forms of European governmentality.

This study ends with an afterthought, in which I reflect on the links between neo-liberal forms of governmentality, governing at a time of financial and political crisis, and the current reemergence of institutional and citizen violence against Romani minorities and migrants throughout Europe. Building on the findings of this study, I develop two future research agendas. The first combines insights of governmentality studies, such as those developed in this book, with those of critical security studies to analyze processes in which the Roma are one-sidedly problematized in terms of ‘security’ and ‘public order.’ The second agenda that I propose builds on what I call a politics of citizenship as participation and suggests to widen and deepen ethnographic analyses of practices of politicization related to the heterogeneous Romani movement in Europe.

Kadi studia thovel kadala pučimata ando maškar: sar amen te hačaras o paruvipe kadala reprezentaciakoro e Romen sikavenas sar na-Europaki minoriteta thai akana kerelpe reprezentacija/vaj sajekh sikaven e Romen sar Europaki minoriteta? Sar te kera, sar šaj te anas i kris pe kado paruvipe thai pararelo barjaripe e zorako e transnacionalo formengo katar kulturnalo historikano, politikano teoriako, thai politikano filozofikano dikhipe? Kadi miri studia kerel jekh egzameno thai dikharel aver paruvimata sar e Romen sikaven/reprezentinen thai sar von sikaven korkore-pest, sajekh thai lenge konsekvence, pe kadala paruvimaske forme, procese, koncepte thai sar sit e phiravelpe o instrumente vaš korkori-governanca ande Europa. Ando angluno šajipe te del angle, kadi studia na thovel ando jekheto fokuoso, ando angluno than o pučipe sar si e minoritetnegi governanca vaj sar manglepe te ovel organizirimi katar jekh praktikakono dikhipe. Ande jekh fundamental nivel, kadi studia kerel koncentracia pe droma save sikaven verver idée thai e governancaki praktika savi resla pe historikano dikhipe te dzanelpo save paruvimata agorinen pe umal e amalipaski thai interakcia maškar ‘Europa’ thao ‘o Rroma.’
Savi praktika, dzandipe, thai ekspertiza, mekhel amen te dzana e Romengi minoritetengi governanca, angleder no so sas agorimo o Sudro Maripe? Sar, kana dziven verver Rroma ando verver Europake thema, sas kerd kado puçiipe, thai kadi buti sas transformirimi sar specifikano Europako ‘problemo,’ kodoleske kerdile save na programe, intervencie, thai projekte, thai po agor ŋaj varekon te del angle te dzanas sostar si kado paruvipe?

Sar jehvarestar e Europanizacija uchardas e Romane reprezentaciakoro, thai sar kado paruvipe si sivlardo ande Europaki integraciaki agenda, kana na odoborkha ķirla, o Rroma sas asimilirime sikade/reprezentime sar phirutne/nomade thai sar odoborkha sigh akana sikaven thai șhien Romengo dzividipe pe thana e manuškane thai minoritetengo ćacidisko pe minoritetengi integracija thai participation, manušikano barjairipe thai siguripe/sekuriteta? Ande save formake akana e themengi tehnika thai lenge thamia si kerde vaj keren kontribubia ande kadi nevi paruvdi forma e Romane reprezentaciakoro thai lenge /Romengi/ korkori-reprezentacija/sikavipe ande neve forme e aktivizmosko, ande historiako hramipe thai ande Romengi promocia? Sar kadala transformacie/paruvimata si phande ando ‘Europako’ gindo?

Te nakhelpe avri kadale pućimatendar, me dikhlem savi si praktika e Romane minoritetesski governanca, thai savi si lengi moderno Europaki historia, katar o analitikano dikhipe e governmentaliteteško. Po agor 1970 beršengo, e Francako filozofo Michelm Foucault avri prindžardas jekh phahe ķhibako neologizmo ‘governmentalizmo’ te kerelpe refleksia on governancaki praktika dur katar o konteksto e themengo, organizaciengi, thai instituciengi. O koncepto e governmentalizmosko saj te sikavelpe ando duj droma. Pe generalo drom kado alav siles indikacia thai phandado si e ‘governmentanke’ praktikasai thai verver dromenca save amen das godi palara sar phiravas o šerutno drom. Kado na phenel sar varesave ideše pala governanca sas angluni var kerde thai sas thodine ande praktika, numai kado anel thai sikavel sar governancake tehnikane thai rationalo dimenzi konstanto keren interakcia. Kado generalo haçeripe del akcento pala e inetrakcia e ‘governmentako’ aktnge e partikulario ‘mentalitetenza,’ kado si, sar ‘govern-mentalitetence.’ Ande Foucaulteski buti kado generalo haçeripe siles relacija bute buxle verver aktivimatenca, katar o idée pala praktika thai tehnika sar amer governirina korkore amende, avenen, foron/diza vaj e themen savenge sas vaj si te ovel’len governanca. Pe akordo te dikhelpe so si ćaço kado pheniben, sit te dzanas so o governentaliteto si jekh konsolidacion e aktivipasko katar o ‘governipe’ thai kavi si phandado e ‘governenta-liteto.’ Kado pheniben kerel o punkto pe jekh stabilo, institulizirimi forma e governipaski, sar kododelardar katar o governipe vaj korkoro-governipe ando nivelo e themenego vaj organizaciengi, ando sakodiveski dzividipaski praktika e sastipaski, edukaciaki, seksualitetesko, phangli maski, sikavimaski, aktivipaski, sar adikers o khe thai aver. O majćako pheniben e governentalitetesko si sar e konsolidinaras o drom e governipaso vaj korkoro-governipasko thai akava si soduj thana o kapaciteto te kerelepe o governiripe thai i zor te governirinelpe thai po agor so mangelape te ovel telal o governiripe.

O generalo, vaj but sano haçeripe e governamentalitetesko si phandade e: governamentalizaciake procesesa—kerinio partikularo objekte, subjekte, vaj governirime procese—save den kontribubia pe konsolidacione pe governiripaski praktuka thaj korkore-governiripaski, thai del jekh phravdi institucionalo forma. Dikhindoi kadalestar, avel
SUMMARY IN ROMANES

Šajipe, te phenas, te hačaras o them savo historikanes si institucionalizirimo, savo naj dži akana univerzalo, sar variabilo forma e governipaski, savo egzistinirel katar pesko kontinuirimo konstanto paruvipe e governmentizaciako. Jekh governmetalitetesko drom avel paše pe analiza e formaciaki thai vareasave grupengi reprezentacija sar so si e minoritetaki forma katar o general dikhip e governipasko thai sar kerelpe regulacija e grupenge and populacija e themeski. Kadi miri studia buxlarel o konceptualo rami e governmentalitetesko pe jekh analiza pala akanutni forma e minoritetengo governipe andre Europa, thai akate pe kado than ulavav e Romen. Me kerav e interpretacija Europake formengo pala minoritetengon governiripe pe kondicie e Europake governmentializaciakoro. Kerendoi akava, me dav jekh nevo dudi pe historia e formaciako e minoritetengo thai sar si reprezentime andre Europa thai pe korelacia e demarkacikariri e populacikakere grupengi save si akharde ‘o Europake’ (Europeanness). Me šužes dikhav e so e formacia, reprezentacija, thai e governance e Romene minoritetengo si paše phandi sar amen reprezentirina amari Europa. Thai sar e governance andre Europako niveło sas dikhli thai sar si thodini ande praksa.

Dikhen, e titula kadala pustikaki si—The European Roma (O Europake Rroma)—thai na kerel neutralo deskripca, objektivo kondicie katar o minoritetengo status. Buter, i pustikaki titula mangapre te drabarelpe pe jekh relacija, sar historikanes paruvelpe thai sar ovel o paruvipe e Romengo reprezentiripasko thai sar si lengo korkoro-reprezentiripe, thai sajekh pe kado perel vi o proceso e minoritizaciako thai minoriteteski korkori-artikulacija.

Kadi studia del kontribucia pe andrune procesengi pala minoritetngia formacija andre akanutni moderno Europaki historia. Thai sajekh del kontribucia pe akanutni debata so ovel pala governmetalitetesko studie save phanen I buti maškar politika thai themeski zor. Ande kadala teze, me mave hačaren o governmentaliteit sar depolitizirimo mehanizmo e protekciako/arakhipasko, savo but vaj hari si les efektivo suksespe pe kontrola ulavde populaciakere grupenge vaj procesengi.

Kadi pustik na vakerel numai pala governmentalitetsko sar jekh relative forma e zoraki, thai sajekh me akate dav than pala praktika save si akhardi te dikhelpe kaj si e zor. Mekerav čingar pe analitika pala governmentalipe savi anel jekh egzaminacija pala e themeske formengi konsolidacija te dikhelpe kaj si e zor thai kaj si o limito pe gasavi lengi buti. Gasavi analitika anel o pučipe e dinamikako maškar o procese thai o mehanozmo e depolitizaciako. Me sikavav miri interpretacija pe governenta-lipasko hačeripe sar voj perel pe Europaki modernizacija thai o drom sar amen dikhas pe akanutni situacija e Romene minoritetengo ande Europa. Kadi miri pustik anel duj dominanto, dži akana but ulavde droma pala rodipe te dikhelpe so si e situacija, historia thai reprezentacija e Romane minoritetengo, thai sa kado sar ando jekh than.

Ande jekh rig, akanutne studie pala Rroma astarde si buxle analiziripa thai diskusiosa sar si e historia e Romane minoritetengi reprezentaciakiri ande politika e governancako procesengi, thai e strukturengi ande politikani reprezentacija, pala socialo inkluzia, thai eksluziakne mehanizme. Katar jekh aver rig, partikularo katar o angluno periodo e 1990-une bersengo, kerdoo sas jekh gendo e rodipasko pala kultura, kulturikani-historiakani praksa thai pala koncepto e reprezentaciako thai korkore-reprezentipasko ande arto, džantripe, media, muzea, thai popular kultura. Me ande kadi studia studia dikhav te anav kadala duj studiengre kranga kethanes/andno jekh than. Me na anav e diskusia von te
Miri studia si ulavdi ande trin kotora. O jekhto kotor kerel prindžardipe/introdukcija teorēsā pala governmentaliteto thai sar amen šaj te buxlarasla ande jekh transnacionālo analīza, pe Euopeake forme e regulaciengo pe populacie. Kotor 1 sikavel e metodologikane thai konceptoske parametres kadala studiako. Jekha kritikasa vazindem kadava keripe pe Foucaultēski buti thai pe post-strukturalistenge analīze kadaja intelektualo mangin te sikavav sar o governmentaliteto pašrel te thai del dumo te marelpe/te ķudelpe avri varesave problem katar governancako drom. Me kade vakerav pala o koncepto e governmentalitetosko pe konteksto e Foucaultēsko dzāndipe thai sar te phandas kado pe avdisutni debata pala o them, suvereniteto, zor, agencia akana ando berša e globalizaciakie. Vazdiepe pe vareso akharelpe ‘topologikano’ drabariepe e zorako, me sikavav sar jekh analītika pala governmentalitetosko del vast te analizirina o buca pala e zor, agencia thai rezistensa but buxleder katar o funkcionalismo thai katar Euopeaki historikas periodizacia. Me dav te dzānelpe sar jekh analīza anel jekh dinamikakiri egzaminacija, jekh khelipe mašar governmentalitetia save si hačarde sar jekh stabili forma e zoraki, katar jekh vast, thai praktike katar e nakhli zor, pe dujto vast.

O 2 kotor dzāl dureder/buxleder anel e governmentalitetosko analīza ande Euopea thai vakerav sar intra-themeski thai inter-themeski governmentālītētosko forme iklon ande kombinacija jekh aversa ande Euopeaki historiakie. Vakerav pe Foucaultēsko dzāndipe de duj ulavde governmentalitetosko forme—akharde sar ‘policia’ thai liberalismo—te kerel egzaminacija pe transnacionālo forme e populaciaki regulacija thai procese ande Euopeaki minoritetengi formiaka. Saļekh dav te dzānelpe sar resle e liberalo forme e governmentalitetosko save nakhle kethanos e procesencar e ande majoritaki thai minoritetengi formiaka. Me dzāv dureder katar e Foucaultēski Eurocentrikani analīza e interthemesko governmentalitetosko te dav propozalo sar amen te kertas egzamenacija akasanu transnacionālo forme e populaciaki regulacija ande Euopea. Me vakerav pala postkolonialo regulacija ande Euopea. Me saļekh vakerav pala postkolonialo kritike sar barjol o režimo savo akharel vaš e analiza transnacionālo populaciakoro regulacija, sar kodola so si pala Rromani minoritēta, savi si dur tradiciatar vs. modernitēto, global hegemoniaki zor vs. lokalo resistentiaka darhina.

Pe tranzito e dujto kotoresko, me dav propozalo te lacharelpe e Euopeaki naracij pala modernitēto te ķudelpe o drom sar o Rromane grupe kerdile te oven minoritēte ande moderno Euopeaki historiaka. Dujto kotor vakerel sar o barjaripe e liberalo governmentalitēsko nakhlo kethanes sar ilkile ‘Gypsy studies’ thai Rromani minoritētaki formiaka. Me kerav rodipe kado neksuso sar ilkilo o liberalismo, Romani minoritezacija, thai ‘Gypsy studies,’ ando Hubsburgoski Imperia ando dešuoxtoto šēberšipe, thai kerav analīza kadale duj popularo akademikano dzāndipe ande kadi historia thai laki legacij.

O kotor 3 si debata pala Gypsy problematizacija pe vrjama/vaxti kana sas o thami e Habsburgosko thai sar o akademikane manuša kado dikhenas pe Rromani problematika.
Diskusia kerav savi si pozicija e historiakere dzene sar so si o Leo Lucassen thai Wim Willem thai o lingvisto Yaron Matras thai akharav o duj buxle hiriografie thai lengi buti si sikadi si sar ando dialogo. Me anav ando jekh than folizifikani thai homogenikani postkolonialo kritika, uniformno narativa e Siklimaski, thai general o moderniteto, thai te anava o pučipe sar kadala hiriografie sas sikade ande jekh relativio izolacija. Na jeh kalade duj hiriografikane ‘paradigmendar,’ me kerav ŝingar, ŝaj te aĉel ulavdi thai numai ande lengi kombinacija dikhelpe nevo dudi pe dujegodžengi Rromane minoritetongi formaci ane Europaki historia.

O 4 kotor phravel thai xor kerel debata pe Rromani minoritendgi formaci ane Europaki historia. Me ĉivav o pučipe pala 18 șeliberipasko modelongo so vakeren palo governmentiteto thai sikovala but șukar katar duj riga, Habsburgoski asiliaciaki Gyspy politika thai o džantripe pe ‘Gypsies’ ande Prusiaki akademia. Me kerav diskusia pe dujegodzako impako e džantripasko thai e administraciako tradikado savi si akhardi ‘Cameralism’ (Kameralistikani) thai ‘policiako džantripe’ (Polizeiwissenschaften) save sas ande praktika pala populaciaki regulacija ande Habsburgoski Imperia. Me sikavav sar te haçarelpe e politika Habsburgoski pala Roma thai sar resla o džandipe pala Roma te paruven governmentaliteteski dudi pe kadala pučimata. Me anav suţo dikhipe sar iklili komparativo forme e džantripaske— sostar iklile neve discipline ande lingvistika, biologia, thai ekonomia—save kethanes džan na numai sostar ule neve forme e Rromene populaciako regulaciengo, thai sajekh neve šajimatenca e Rromani minoritetaka korkori-artikulaci.

O trito kotor kerel jekh mobilizacija sar trine-ućipasko neksuso maškar e reprezentacija, them/governo thai e džandipaski formaci, savi me teoretikanes mothavav ande jekhto kotor thai historikanes kerav jekh artikulacija ando dujto kotor kote si mothovipe pe Romengi kadale divengi situacija ane Europ. Ando trito kotor, me kerav egzaminacija savi si maškar e Romangi reprezentacija sar Europako minoriteto, neo-liberalo forme e governmentalitetosko thai jekh heterogeno, hamimi formaci pe jekh transnacionalo Europako nivelvo.

O 5 kotor anel miri diskusia pe akanutni Europenizacia e Rromane identitetosko thai e minoritetosko status savo jekthane iklol e neo-liberalo formenca pala governmentalitet. Me sikavara sar te kera konsideracija e neo-liberalizmosko sar specifikani forma e governmentalitetoski thai sar kado si aver kodlestar dĵando sar konvencionalo džandipe pala o neo-liberalismo pe linia e politikakiri thai ideologiakiri. Me kerav kombinacija e neo-liberalizmosa sar jekh governmentalitetoski analizasa kote dikhas sar si ŝhidimo o arakhipo/sekuriteta, barjaripe, thai manušikan hakajengi Europaki agenda te sikavav sar resas pe keripe e Rromane reprezentaciaco sar Europaki minoriteta bi dikhle o fiksno institucienge granice. Saijek dav klarifikacija sar si kerde neve centrura pe ekspertiza pala Rroma ando nivelvo Internacionalo Governonge Organizaciengo thai pe Bi-Governonge Organizaciengo sar kadala duj nivelura adikeren neo-liberalo governengi tehnologia thai kultura pe pučimata pal-i politika thai administracija. Dži o 5-to kotor sikavel o neoliberalizmo pe jekh teoretikano nivelvo, o kotoro 6, 7, thai 8 astarel than te motohovel pala sar o neo-liberalizmo, Romengi Europenizacija, phagipe e kuminizmosko, thai iklovipe e nacionalizmosko sas influence/uštavipe pe Rromane minorotetngi situacija ane lokalo thana.
O šveto kotoe si kerdo te dikhen sar o neo-liberalo tehnologie save akana si kerde ande Disutni thai Maškarutni Europa kote si verver kerde institucie pe politikani thai socio-
ekonomikani kultura. Thai dureder sikavav sar kadala tehnologie si kerde kadale kulturenca, thar si o neo-liberalizimo si ando ando kado region savo na džanelpes so thai savo impako kerdas avrial. Sajekh, dikhen sar thovav miri jakh pe EU thai Sundaleski Banka save dende vazdinede neo-liberalo aktivizacija e programenca save si kerde ande Disutni Maškaratne Europake thema te arakhen bučake šanse vaš e Romenge. Me ando kado than sikavav sar kadala kedimata kadale programengi e ‘lokalų’ kulturenca thai politikas kerdas dujegodžengo impako pe Rromengi situacija, savi andas te ovel lengi evikcia/čhudipe dži pe praktika savi si prindžardi sar eksploatacja thai dehumanizacija. Dureder si diskusia savo sikavel e influence pe legacia e komunizmoski te thovav kadi depresivo informacija ande perspektiva akanutne transformaciako ando regiono. Me pale pučav pala komunistengi politikaki socio ekonimikani reforma, nakhle alternativio socio-kulturako thai ekonomikani drakhin, thai komustengi praktika pala rasizmo vis-à-vis o Rroma. Me sikavav akate sar and interrelacija e neo-liberalizmosa, lagacje kadale trin nakhle komunistenge praktike sar dramatikane kerde impako pe akanutne situaci e Rromane minoritetengo.

O 6-to kotor te drabarelpe kethanes e kotorencia 7 thai 8, kadala trin kotora si pala so akana ovel ande Europa. Kotor 6 kerel fokuso pe impako e de-politizaciako procesengo, thai ulavdo sar o politikane buča thai ulavdo sar on si paruvve ande kvazi-neutralo, napolitikani kondicja e ekspertizaki. O kotor 7 tahi 8 analizirenar sar o de-politizaciako procese aktualo astaren than e dromesa te ķivelpes o barjaripe thai o programe save den zor e Romenge pe umal e politikako thai von si e Romenge kerde sar te maren o ĵorrripe thai o na-jekhip e averenca. Dži o 6-to kotor vakerele pala de-politizaciakere konsekvence o kotare 7 thai 8 koncentririme si pe politikane thai social buča save akana si politizirime.

O 7-to kotor vakerele pala Rromengo social thai civilo miškuipe thai, sar peravdilo o komunizmo, transnacionalo Rromengo aktivizmo thai pro-Rroma promociakere drakhina resle ando učo niveło ande politikani scena. Me pale kerav ķingari pala so sas e Rromengo miškuipe pala 1989-to beršestar karakteriziro si e ‘perverzo konfluencasa’ participaciasa demokratikane thai neo-liberalo projektencia, kote o hačeripe e themutnipasko, participacija thai civilo societa khelel šerutni numai bangi rola. Me prindžarden tumen e alaverca save silen o hačeripe phirtuño aktivizmo (traveling activism) thai politika e themutnipaski sar participacija (politics of citizenship as participation) te dikhelpe o drom kote o buča pala e participacija, na-jekhipe, ĵorrripe si apsoluto politizirimo ande kanautno Rromano miškuipe. Me sikavav sar e Rromane aktivestienge drakhina strategikane mobilizirintende neo-liberalo instrumente thai aktistengo džandipe thai ekspertiza te keren artikulacija kadale politikake procesensi.

O kotor 8 sikavel sar vasno varesave Rromenge memorial prakse save si vazdiende ande post-1989-enjangi Europa. Kado kotor širdel katar jekh analiza ando 1992 kana e Katie Trumpener vakerda pala ‘o Europako memorialo problema.’ Thai kadale problemsa voj thodas po angušt sostar si čhudimo avri ande sasti moderno Europaki historia, dominantno kultura thai o intelektulo miškuipe, thai pe kado than resla Rromani memoria, thai o Roma reprezentiten ‘manuša save naj len historia.’ Me sikavav sar te dikhas pe akanutno pučipe pe Holokausto-savo si phandado e Rromane memorialo
kulturas ane Europa *vis-à-vis* so e Trumpener phenda. Me pale vazdav mo vakeribe Trumpener vakerdas pala o Europako memoriako problem savo na egzistirinel thai pala saveste voj phendas ke kado si Europako memoriako problema. Akanutni Romengi kulturaki thai memorialo praksa radikalo marel e politika e historikanizmoski savi mangel te chivel ‘e Romen’ thai lenge kulture ando than e anglo-moderne, ‘bi-historiake’ thema. Kadi praksa kritikasa marel e ekshluzia/hudipe e Rromane historiengi thai memoriengi katar nacinalo thai Europake thana, sajekh Rromengi kultura del kontribucia vaš jekh, nevo ververikano dikhipe/imažo thai gindo pala Europa thai dureder kadala neve naraciengne prakse sajekh si pala o kompleks relaciengo maškar ‘Europa’ thai o ‘Roma.’ Tumenge sikavav sar akanutni praksa ando konteksto e trendosko te governmentalizirmelpe o Holokausteski memoria ande EU, savi pe agor ande teoria kerel inkluzia e Rromane minorititongi ande Europaki memoriaki kultura. Sajekh, kadi governmentalizacija sila tendencia te irinel Holokausteski memoria ande pedagogia savi na kerel kozom mangelape refleksia pe politika sostar Europako governmentalizmo sila dujegodžengo thai jekh ekshluziaki praksa. Pe agor, akanutni Rromengi memoriaki praksa sar te akharel-amen te das amen godi pala akanutne structure thai pala politika e historikane integralo dikhipa vaš nakhli Thai akanutne forme Europake governmentalizmosko.

Miri studia agorinel jekhe palune pheniba, kerindoi jekh linko maškar neo-liberalo forme e governmentalizmosko, governiripe akana ande finansiaxiri thai politikake kriza, akana kana ovel instituciendar thai violence e dizutnendar mamuj o Roma thai o migrantia trujal sasti Europa. O rodipe so kerdilo kadale studiake me barjardem duj avutne rodimaske agende. Jekhto ka sikavel o andraluno e governmentalitizmoske studiengo rodipe, varesave lendar si sikade ande kadi pustik, sar so sas sikado o problema e ‘siguripasko,’ thai ‘publikake regulacie.’ Dujto agenda savi me mangav te anav si so vazdel i politika e dizutnengi thai lengi participacija thai dava sugestia te buxlarelpe etnografikane analize thai politikane praksengo save si phandade heterogeno Rromane miškuipa ande Europa.

*Translated by ORHAN GALJUŠ*
Samenvatting
Summary in Dutch

In dit proefschrift analyseer ik de huidige situatie van Roma minderheden in Europa vanuit het perspectief van veranderende vormen en instrumenten van Roma representatie en bestuur. In het bijzonder sinds de val van het communisme is er sprake van wat wel de Europeanisering van de Roma representatie kan worden genoemd. In politieke debatten en beleidsgelateerde discussies, in de media en wetenschap, evenals in verschillende vormen van activisme en belangenbehartiging worden de Roma in toenemende mate als een Europese minderheid voorgesteld. Deze trend is samengegaan met het ontwerpen en organiseren van grootschalige, Europa-brede projecten en programma’s, die gericht zijn op de ontwikkeling en verbetering van de situatie van de Roma, en op het creëren van kansen en fora om hen in staat te stellen daaraan zelf structureel bij te dragen. Geen andere bevolkingsgroep in Europa is recentelijk in zo veel inclusie-, empowerment- en ontwikkelingsprogramma’s betrokken geraakt als de Roma. Tegelijkertijd heeft de Europeanisering van de Roma een nieuwe fase in de geschiedenis van hun representatie en zelfrepresentatie ingeluid. Tijdens de Verlichting, de Romantiek, de negentiende- en vroeg twintigste-eeuwse processen van natiestaatformatie, alsook onder het nazisme en communisme, werden de Roma en hun culturen immers veelal gezien als niet-Europese en vreemd, en als barrières voor ‘vooruitgang’ en ‘beschaving’ in Europa.

In deze studie stel ik de volgende vraag centraal: hoe kunnen we deze verschuiving van de representatie van de Roma als een niet-Europese minderheid naar hun representatie als een Europese minderheid—alsmede de parallele ontwikkeling van transnationale vormen van minderheidbestuur—cultuurhistorisch, bestuurstheoretisch en politiek-filosofisch begrijpen? Ik onderzoek deze en andere recente verschuivingen in de Roma representatie en zelfrepresentatie, alsmede de consequenties daarvan, tegen de achtergrond van veranderende vormen, processen, instrumenten en concepten van bestuur (governance) en zelfbestuur in Europa. Bij de beantwoording van deze vraag gaat het mij niet uitsluitend om de wijze waarop minderhedenbestuur praktisch en concreet is of zou moeten worden georganiseerd. Op een meer fundamenteel niveau gaat het mij hierbij om de wijzen waarop uiteenlopende ideeën over en praktijken van sturing de relatie en interactie tussen ‘Europa’ en ‘de Roma’ historisch en tot op heden hebben beïnvloed en veranderd. Wat voor bestuurspraktijken en wat voor soorten kennis en expertise hebben het in Europa bijvoorbeeld mogelijk gemaakt om minderhedenbestuur en -zelfbestuur anders te constitueren en percipiëren dan voor het einde van de Koude Oorlog? Hoe
heeft de aanwezigheid van onderling verschillende Roma groepen in diverse Europese landen zich überhaupt kunnen ontwikkelen tot een vraag en een specifiek Europees ‘probleem’ waarop allerlei uiteenlopende programma’s, interventies en projecten een antwoord dienen te geven? Hoe hangen de gelijktijdige Europeanisering van de Roma representatie en de ontwikkeling van een Europese integratieagenda samen met de verschuiving van de Roma representatie in termen van assimilatie en nomadisme naar hun meer recente representatie in termen van mensenrechten, de integratie en participatie van minderheden, en human security en human development? Op welke wijze hebben recent ontwikkelde technieken en ideeën over sturing bijgedragen aan zulke nieuwe of veranderende Roma representaties en zelfrepresentaties, alsmede aan nieuwe vormen van activism, belangenbehartiging, geschiedschrijving en herinnering? Hoe zijn zulke transformaties verbonden met nieuwe ideeën en voorstellingen van ‘Europa’?

Om licht op deze vragen en thema’s te werpen, onderzoek ik praktijken van Roma minderhedenbestuur, alsook de geschiedenis daarvan in het moderne Europa, vanuit het perspectief van een analyse van gouvernementaliteit. Het nogal onbeholpen neologisme ‘gouvernementaliteit’ is aan het eind van de jaren zeventig van de vorige eeuw door de Franse filosoof Michel Foucault bedacht om op allerhande sturingspraktijken en hun verandering te kunnen reflecteren zonder daarbij uitsluitend overheden of organisaties en instituties in aanmerking te nemen. Het begrip ‘gouvernementaliteit’ kan op twee onderling samenhangende manieren worden gelezen. In algemene zin duidt het concept op de relatie van praktijken van ‘gouverneren,’ ofwel sturen of regeren, met uiteenlopende wijzen waarop we over sturing en zelfsturing denken. Het gaat hierbij niet om hoe bepaalde ideeën over sturing eerst worden uitgedacht en dan in praktijk gebracht, maar om de voortdurende en veranderende interactie tussen de technische en rationele dimensies van sturing. De algemene betekenis legt nadruk op de samenvoeging van en interactie tussen ‘gouverneren’ en ‘mentaliteit.’ In Foucaults werk is deze algemene betekenis verbonden met een breed scala aan activiteiten, dat reikt van ideeën over en praktijken en technieken van hoe wij onszelf of anderen ‘sturen’ tot hoe het bestuur van een stad of staat is of zou moeten worden ingericht. In enge zin duidt het begrip ‘gouvernementaliteit’ daarentegen in de eerste plaats op een verzelfstandiging van de activiteit van ‘gouverneren’ en dus op ‘gouvernementalité.’ In deze betekenis gaat het om min of meer stabiele en geïnstitutionaliseerde vormen van sturing, zoals die tot uitdrukking komen in bestuur en zelfbestuur op het niveau van overheden en organisaties, maar ook in alledaagse praktijken van gezondheidszorg, opvoeding, seksualiteit, internering, ten- toonstelling, activisme of de organisatie van huishoudens. Gouvernementaliteit in enge zin is verbonden met hoe de verzelfstandiging van een bepaalde manier van sturing of zelfsturing macht om te sturen en macht over dat wat gestuurd moet worden impliciet. De algemene en beperkte betekenis van ‘gouvernementalité’ hangen nauw samen: processen van ‘gouvernementalisering’—het (be)stuurbaar maken van bepaalde objecten, subjecten of processen—dragen bij aan de bestendiging van bepaalde praktijken van sturing en zelfsturing en geven er een meer expliciete institutionele vorm aan. Dit perspectief maakt het bijvoorbeeld mogelijk om de staat als historisch geïnstitutionaliseerde, maar niet universele of vastliggende bestuursvorm te begrijpen, die bestaat bij de gratie van haar voortdurende en ook steeds weer veranderende gouvernementalisering. Eveneens maakt deze invalshoek het mogelijk om de formatie en representatie van bepaalde
groepen als minderheid te analyseren vanuit het perspectief van de sturing en regulatie van bevolkingsgroepen.

In deze studie breid ik het conceptuele raamwerk van gouvernementaliteit uit naar een analyse van contemporaine vormen van minderhedenbestuur in Europa, en dat van de Roma in het bijzonder. Door Europese vormen van sturing en minderhedenbestuur te interpreteren vanuit het perspectief van Europa’s gouvernementaliseringsverschijnsel deze studie nieuw inzicht in de geschiedenis van minderhedenformatie en -representatie en in de daarmee samenhangende afbakening van bevolkingsgroepen in termen van het al dan niet toebehoren aan ‘Europa.’ Ik verduidelijk dat de formatie, representatie en regulatie van Roma minderheden intrinsiek samenhangen met onze voorstellingen van ‘Europa’ en met hoe (zelf)sturing op Europees niveau in de loop van de geschiedenis is opgevat en in praktijk gebracht. De titel van dit boek—De Europese Roma—beschrijft dan ook geen neutrale, objectieve conditie of minderhedenstatus, maar dient te worden gelezen in samenhang met historisch veranderde en veranderende Roma representaties en zelfrepresentaties, inclusief daarmee verbonden processen van minderhedenformatie en -zelfarticulatie.

Met dit proefschrift draag ik bij aan het inzicht in processen van minderhedenformatie in de moderne en recente geschiedenis van Europa. Tegelijk lever ik een belangrijke bijdrage aan het debat in gouvernementaliteitstudies over de relatie tussen politiek en gouvernementele macht. Ik neem stelling tegen die studies die gouvernementaliteit voornamelijk opvatten als gedepolitiseerde veiligheidsmechanismen die er op min of meer adequate wijze in slagen controle over bepaalde groepen of processen uit te oefenen. Deze dissertatie gaat niet uitsluitend over gouvernementaliteit als relatief stabiele machtsvorm, maar ook over praktijken die deze machtsuitoefening nadrukkelijk ter discussie stellen. Ik betoog dat een analyse van gouvernementaliteit zowel een onderzoek behelst naar de consolidering van gouvernementele machtsvormen als naar de grenzen van die machtsuitoefening. Een analyse van gouvernementaliteit stelt ons zo in staat de dynamiek tussen mechanismen van depolitisering en (re)politisering expliciet aan de orde te stellen. Ik laat zien dat mijn interpretatie van gouvernementaliteit zowel gevolgen heeft voor uniforme interpretaties van de Europese moderniteit als voor hoe we de huidige situatie van Roma minderheden in Europa beoordelen.

In dit boek breng ik twee tot op heden dominante, maar vaak gescheiden vormen van onderzoek naar de situatie, geschiedenis en representatie van Roma minderheden bij elkaar. Enerzijds wordt dit onderzoek tot nu toe gedoimeerd door analyses die Roma minderhedenrepresentatie en haar geschiedenis vooral thématiseren in termen van bestuurs- of beleidsmatige processen, structuren van politieke vertegenwoordiging, en sociaal-maatschappelijke in- en uitsluitingmechanismen. Anderzijds is er met name de afgelopen twee decennia steeds meer onderzoek naar Roma minderhedenrepresentatie en haar geschiedenis ondernomen dat zich toeligt op culturele en cultuurhistorische praktijken en noties van representatie en zelfrepresentatie in kunst, wetenschap, media, musea en populaire cultuur. In dit proefschrift breng ik deze tot op heden weinig met elkaar in verband gebrachte takken van onderzoek bij elkaar. Dat doe ik niet zozeer door deze twee takken naast elkaar te bespreken, maar door de intrinsieke samenhang duidelijk te maken tussen processen van sturing, representatie en kennisformatie. Ik expliciteer
op die manier de condities waaronder vormen van representatie en zelfrepresentatie veranderen zonder een van deze drie samenhangende processen te isoleren.

Samenvatting

 Dit boek bestaat uit drie delen. In deel 1 introduceer ik het theoretische kader van gouvernementaliteit en hoe we dit kunnen uitbreiden en vertalen naar een analyse van transnationale vormen van populatieregulatie in Europa. Hoofdstuk 1 introduceert de methodologische en conceptuele parameters van dit proefschrift. In een kritische dialoog met Foucaults werk en met poststructuralistische analyses van zijn intellectuele erfenis verklaar ik hoe een benadering vanuit het perspectief van gouvernementaliteit enkele van de nadelen van een governance-benadering verhelpt. Ik leg het gouvernementaliteitbegrip uit in de context van Foucaults werk en verduidelijk hoe dit concept en zijn geschiedenis zich verhouden tot lopende debatten over staatsvorming, soevereiniteit, machtsverhoudingen en agency in een tijdperk van mondialisering. Vertrekkende vanuit een zogeheten ‘topologische’ lezing van macht verduidelijk ik hoe een analyse vanuit het gezichtspunt van gouvernementaliteit het mogelijk maakt om thema’s zoals macht, agency en verzet onderzoeken voorbij functionalisme en de periodisering van de Europese geschiedenis. Ik verklaar hoe zo’n analyse een onderzoek behelst naar de dynamische interactie tussen relatief duurzame gouvernementele machtsvormen en alternatieve sturingspraktijken die deze machtsvormen tegelijk ook weer destabiliseren.

In hoofdstuk 2 breid ik mijn onderzoek naar gouvernementaliteit uit naar Europa en thematiseer ik hoe intrastatelijke en interstatelijke vormen van gouvernementele macht in de geschiedenis van Europa in voortdurende interactie met elkaar zijn opgekomen en ontwikkeld. Ik behandel Foucaults interpretatie van twee verschillende gouvernementele machtsvormen—zogeheten police en liberalisme—om de parallele opkomst van transnationale vormen van populatieregulatie en die van processen van minderhedenformatie in Europa aan de orde te stellen. Ik leg uit hoe de intrede van liberale vormen van gouvernementele macht is samengegaan met processen van meerderheden- en minderhedenformatie. Ik kritiseer Foucaults Eurocentristische analyse van interstatelijke gouvernementaliteit om te komen tot een alternatieve analyse van contemporaine vormen van transnationale populatieregulatie in Europa. Ik maak gebruik van inzichten uit postkoloniale studies, en met name van kritieken op de wijze waarop ontwikkelingssamenwerking mondiaal is georganiseerd, om een parallel met de huidige bejegening van Roma minderheden in Europa te trekken. Ik laat zien hoe zulke kritieken relevant kunnen worden gemaakt om huidige vormen van transnationale populatieregulatie van Roma minderheden te analyseren voorbij tegenstellingen tussen traditie en moderniteit of mondiale ‘hegemonische’ macht en lokale vormen van burgerverzet. In aansluiting op deze discussie en als voorbereiding op wat ik in het tweede deel van dit boek thematiseer, stel ik voor om de geschiedenis van de Europese moderniteit kritisch te herschrijven om zo een ander licht te werpen op de manier waarop Roma groepen in de moderne Europese geschiedenis als minderheid zijn geformeerd.

In het tweede deel van deze studie analyseer ik hoe de ontwikkeling van liberale vormen van gouvernementele macht historisch is samengegaan met zowel de opkomst van ‘zigevernerstudies’ als de formatie van de Roma als minderheid. Ik onderzoek de
nauwe samenhang tussen de gelijktijdige opkomst van liberalisme, wetenschappelijk onderzoek naar ‘zigeuners’ en de formatie van de Roma als ‘minderheid’ in het achttiende-eeuwse Habsburgse Rijk. Ik analyseer twee op dit moment dominerende interpretaties van deze geschiedenis en haar erfenis. In hoofdstuk 3 engageer ik me met een lopend debat over hoe de representatie en problematisering van ‘zigeuners’ ten tijde van de Habsburgse heerschappij tot nu toe in onderzoek naar de Roma is gerecipeerd en geïnterpreteerd. Ik bespreek achtereenvolgens de positie van de historici Leo Lucassen en Wim Willems en die van de lingüïst Yaron Matras. Ik pleit ervoor de twee grotendeels tegengestelde historiografieën die hun werken representeren in diaoloog met elkaar te brengen. Ik combineer inzichten uit de wijsbegeerte en postkoloniale studies, en met name kritieken op homogene, toenmalige en nieuwere ‘paradigma’s’ op zichzelf kan bestaan en dat hun expliciete combinatie nieuw licht werpt op de ambivalentie van Roma minderhedenformatie in de Europese geschiedenis.

Hoofdstuk 4 verrijkt en verdiept dit debat over Roma minderhedenformatie in de geschiedenis van Europa. Ik onderzoek het Habsburgse assimilatiebeleid ten aanzien van ‘zigeuners’ en de gelijktijdige opkomst van wetenschappelijk onderzoek naar hen in de toenmalige Pruisische academie aan de hand van een analyse van achtende-eeuwse gouvernementele machtsvormen. Ik analyseer de uitwerking van de toenmalige wetenschappelijke en bestuurlijke traditie van het zogenaamde ‘Kameralisme’ (Kameralistik) en de ‘politiwetenschappen’ (Polizeiwissenschaften) op de transformatie van praktijken van bevolkingsregulatie in het Habsburgse Rijk. Ik verduidelijk hoe we het veranderende Habsburgse ‘zigeunerbeleid’ en de gelijktijdige opkomst van Roma-gerelateerde kennisformatie vanuit het perspectief van gouvernementele macht kunnen begrijpen. Ik verklar hoe de opkomst van vergelijkende vormen van wetenschap—zoals die toen in de lingüïstiek, biologie en economie hun opgang maakten—niet alleen is samengegaan met hernieuwde vormen van Roma populatieregulatie waarin zij nu in termen van ontwikkeling, niet-Europese oorsprong, taal, ‘natie,’ en cultuur werden begrepen, maar ook met nieuwe mogelijkheden voor zelfarticulatie van Roma minderheden. Deel 3 mobiliseert de onderlinge samenhang tussen Roma representatie, sturing en kennisformatie die ik theoretisch heb uitgelegd in deel 1 en historisch gearticuleerd in deel 2 om de huidige situatie van Roma minderheden in Europa te belichten. In deel 3 onderzoek ik het verband tussen de Roma representatie in termen van een Europese minderheid, neoliberal vormen van gouvernementele macht, en heterogene, hybride vormen van kennisformatie op transnationaal, Europees niveau. Hoofdstuk 5 behandelt de huidige Europeanisering van de Roma minderhedenstatus en representatie in relatie tot de opkomst van neoliberal vormen van gouvernementele macht. Ik verduidelijk hoe we neoliberalisme als een specifieke vorm van gouvernementaliteit kunnen begrijpen en hoe deze interpretatie verschilt van meer conventionele lezingen van neoliberalisme langs de lijnen van beleid of ideologie. Ik combineer mijn lezing van neoliberalisme als gouvernementaliteit met een analyse van veranderende benaderingen van veiligheid, ontwikkeling en mensenrechten in Europa om te verklaren hoe we de huidige representatie van de Roma als een Europese minderheid kunnen onderzoeken voorbij min of meer vaststaande institutionele grenzen. Ik laat zien hoe we de opkomst van een groot
scala aan nieuwe centra van Roma-gerelateerde expertise op het niveau van internationale en niet-gouvernementele organisaties kunnen beschouwen in het kader van hoe neoliberale gouvernementele technologieën zijn en worden gearticuleerd met de beleidsmatige, politieke en bestuurlijke culturen van deze actoren. Hoofdstuk 5 introduceert het neoliberalisme vooral theoretisch. Daarna behandel ik in de hoofdstukken 6, 7 en 8 verschillende deelstudies van hoe het neoliberalisme, de Europeanisering van de Roma, de val van het communisme, en opnieuw oplevend nationalism in onderlinge samenhang de situatie van Roma minderheden in de alledaagse praktijk hebben beïnvloed.

Hoofdstuk 6 is gewijd aan hoe neoliberale gouvernementele technologieën recentelijk in Centraal Europa zijn geïntroduceerd en samengevlooid met uiteenlopende politieke en sociaal-economische culturen en institutionele contexten. Ik leg uit dat we de ambigue invloed van het neoliberalisme op de huidige situatie van de Roma niet zozeer moeten begrijpen in termen van hoe neoliberaal beleid of een neoliberale ideologie van buitenaf aan de regio zouden zijn opgelegd, maar in termen van een complexe kruisbestuiving van neoliberale sturingstechnologieën met diverse lokale politieke, sociaal-economische, culturele en institutionele contexten. Ik onderzoek hoe door de EU en de Wereldbank gesteunde neoliberale activeringsprogramma’s zijn geïntroduceerd in Centraal Europees sociaal beleid om de werkgelegenheidskansen van Roma te verbeteren. Ik laat zien hoe de kruisbestuiving van deze programma’s met ‘lokale’ culturele en politieke contexten op zeer ambivalente wijze op de situatie van de Roma heeft uitgewerkt en geleid tot huisuitzettingen, vormen van uitbuiting, en praktijken van dehumanisering. Ik bespreek drie invloedrijke erfenissen van het communisme om deze gevolgen in het bredere perspectief van de ingrijpende recente transformaties in de regio te plaatsen. Ik analyseer respectievelijk communistische sociaal-economische en politieke hervormingspraktijken, alternatieve sociaal-culturele en economische netwerken die ten tijde van het socialisme zijn ontwikkeld, en communistische racistische praktijken vis-à-vis de Roma. Ik laat zien hoe de erfenissen van deze drie voormalig communistische praktijken, in interactie en kruisbestuiving met neoliberale politiek, de huidige situatie van Roma minderheden radicaal hebben beïnvloed.

Hoofdstuk 6 dient naast de hoofdstukken 7 en 8 te worden gelezen, omdat deze drie hoofdstukken gaan over ontwikkelingen die tegelijkertijd en in interactie met elkaar in het huidige Europa plaatsvinden. Hoofdstuk 6 vestigt de aandacht op de invloedrijke effecten van depolitiseringprocessen, en met name op hoe in wezen politieke thema’s en problemen worden vertaald in de quasi-neutrale, non-politieke termen van beleid en expertise. De hoofdstukken 7 en 8 analyseren hoe die vertaalslagen plaatsvinden naast pogingen om vraagstukken van armoede en ongelijkheid die de Roma treffen politiek aanhankelijk en onderdeel van het publieke debat te maken. Met andere woorden, waar hoofdstuk 6 in het bijzonder de gevolgen van depolitisering thematisiert, gaan de hoofdstukken 7 en 8 vooral over de manier waarop vaak delicate sociaal-maatschappelijke thema’s worden gepolitiseerd die buiten het debat en beleidsanalyses dreigen te vallen.

In hoofdstuk 7 bespreek ik de heterogene Roma beweging (social and civil movement) en de manier waarop transnationale, Europese netwerken van Roma activisten en belangenvertegenwoordigers na 1989 een voornam function in de discussie over de situatie van de Europese Roma zijn gaan spelen. Ik betoog dat de huidige Roma beweging kan worden getypeerd door een ‘perverse samenvloeiing’ van enerzijds participatio-demo-
cratische en anderzijds neoliberale projecten, waarin concepten zoals burgerschap, participatie en civil society een cruciale, maar vaak tegengestelde rol spelen en betekenis hebben. Ik introduceer de begrippen ‘reizend activisme’ (traveling activism) en ‘politiek van burgerschap als participatie’ (politics of citizenship as participation) om te accentueren hoe vraagstukken rondom participatie, ongelijkheid en armoede in de huidige Roma beweging aan de orde worden gesteld. Ik laat zien hoe Roma activistische netwerken op strategische wijze neoliberale instrumenten en activistische vormen van kennis en expertise inzetten om aan zulke politiseringsprocessen invulling te geven.


Dit proefschrift eindigt met een slotbeschouwing waarin ik stilsta bij de relatie tussen neoliberale vormen van gouvernementaliteit, beleid en bestuur ten tijde van de huidige financiële en politieke crisis, en de recente opleving van institutioneel en burgergeweld tegen Roma minderheden en migranten in Europa. Op basis van de resultaten van mijn onderzoek, ontwikkelt twee nieuwe onderzoeksagenda’s. In de eerste agenda stel ik voor om de inzichten van onderzoek op het gebied van gouvernementaliteit, zoals bij- eengebracht in deze studie, te combineren met inzichten van critical security studies om zo
hedendaagse praktijken te analyseren waarin de Roma eenzijdig in termen van ‘veiligheid’ en ‘openbare orde’ worden geproblematiseerd. De tweede onderzoeksagenda die ik voorstel, borduurt voort op mijn notie van een politiek van burgerschap als participatie. Die agenda heeft als doel om etnografische analyses van politiseringpraktijken, die in de Roma beweging in Europa tot uitdrukking komen, te verbreden en verder te verdiepen.
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HUUB VAN BAAR is a researcher at the Amsterdam School for Cultural Analysis (ASCA), Faculty of Humanities at the University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands. He was trained as a mathematician and philosopher and worked for several years as a journalist for Dutch daily and weekly newspapers. This book is the outcome of his participation in the research project Globalization and the Transformation of Cultural Identities in East Central Europe, funded by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO). Van Baar's academic work on governmentality, memory, and the situation, history, and cultural representation of Romani minorities in Europe has appeared in various journals, such as Third Text: Critical Perspectives on Contemporary Art and Culture; the International Journal of Urban and Regional Research; City; the International Journal of Cultural Policy; Citizenship Studies; Environment and Planning D: Society and Space and the Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies. He is also the editor of the book Museutopia: A Photographic Research Project by Ilya Rabinovich (co-edited with Ingrid Commandeur, forthcoming with Alauda Publications).